Labour Migration From Mozambique to South Africa, With Special Reference to the Delagoa Bay Hinterland, c. 1862 to 1897. by Harries, Patrick
LABOUR MIGRATION FROM MOZAMBIQUE TO SOUTH AFRICA; 
with special reference to the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland, c. 1862 to 1897
Patrick Harries
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, School 
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
February, 1983
ProQuest Number: 11010583
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 11010583
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
2ABSTRACT
Numerous studies have portrayed migrant labour in South Africa 
as a mechanism of super-exploitation whereby capital, in alliance 
with the state, had only to pay the worker a bachelor wage because 
of his subsistence base in the rural areas. Migrant labour was 
thus synonymous with underdevelopment.
This thesis postulates that the origins of migrant labour 
cannot be sought in these terms. Because of the highly competitive 
nature of the labour market during the 19th century, employers 
were concerned only with securing an adequate supply of labour.
Much of this labour was drawn frcm geographically distant areas 
because the local population was able to market the product of its 
labour rather than the labour itself. Weak and impecunious colonial 
and republican states were hesitant to intervene directly in the 
labour market and did so only during times of economic expansion 
or when a non-interventionist policy threatened the stability of 
the state.
In the second part of the thesis, which deals with the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland of Mozambique, it is argued that a migrant form of 
labour arose out of the needs of the rural community rather than 
those of mining capital. Wages became the nutrient for survival 
in a harsh environment and compensated in seme measure for the 
dissolution of old forms of livelihood such as hunting and trading. 
Migrant labour and rural production were intimately linked and the 
ability of migrants to determine their wage level and the incidence 
of migrancy was dependent on the viability of the rural economy.
It was only cifter the colonial conquest of southern Mozambique in 
1895-97 that workers were partially alienated frcm their means of 
production - a move that brought dewn the cost of Mozambican mine 
labour and that furnished the Portuguese with a highly marketable 
ccnmodity.
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PART I
CAPITAL, THE STATE AND THE 
ORIGINS OF MIGRANT LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA
13
INTRCDUCTION
The study of the genesis of a black working-class in South 
Africa has been strongly influenced by Marx's experience of a British 
labour force created by primitive accumulation and the separation
i
of the worker frcm his means of production. This has resulted in
the belief that migrant labour emerged in South Africa as either an
exotic anomaly to the "norm" of proletarianization or as an organic
function of the super-exploitaticn that has characterized the
2
historical development of capital in the country. In this latter 
context it has been convincingly argued that following the 1913 Land 
Act a migrant labour system was purposefully implemented by the state 
in alliance with capital in order to secure a supply of cheap labour. 
This was achieved through the maintenance of labour reserves where 
rural production provided social security for workers and served as
3
a supplement to belcw-subsistence industrial wages. But a new 
orthodoxy has emerged as a number of researchers have sought the 
origins of migrant labour in capital's attempt to minimize labour 
costs. The central role of the state in this analysis has been
c
recently succintly summarized by two economists who claimed that
"South African capitalist development was predicated an 
a systen of migrant labour, in which male workers were 
forced out to work on the farms and the mines by the 
systematic destruction of the rural base through conquest 
and expropriation and by taxation. The existence of 
rural "labour reserves" enabled the farmers and the mines 
in the critical early stages of their development to reap
1. K. Marx, Capital, vol. I, chapters 26-32.
2. On the historiography of migrant labour cf. Francis Wilscn, Labour 
in the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969 (Cambridge, 1972) , 120- 
139; David R. Massey, "Labour migration and rural development in 
Botswana" (PhD., Boston University, 1981), 5-35.
3. H. Wolpe, "Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: frcm 
segregation bo apartheid", Economy and Society, 1, 4, 1972; M. 
Legassick, "South Africa: Capital accumulation and violence", 
Economy and Society, 3, 3, 1974.
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a sort of super-profit through the payment of labour at 
a level below its reproduction cost - the rest of the 
cost being borne by the peasant economy. "4
This interpretation of the origins of migrant labour has little 
historical basis and, largely dominated by sociologists and economists 
who have transformed contemporary function into historical cause, 
is challenged throughout this thesis. Part I disputes the view of 
the state as the historical handmaiden of capitalists conspiring 
to use its legislative and administrative powers, organized violence 
and revenues to increase and control the numbers of workers entering 
the market while concurrently effecting a reduction in their wages. 
Instead the picture is presented of a highly competitive form of 
capital, of employers who had no co-ordinated labour policy and of 
poorly developed colonial and republican states that were more 
concerned with paying for their own administration than in reducing 
capital's wage costs. Caught between Imperial, humanitarian, 
administrative and mercantile interests, a dynamic African peasantry 
and the labour needs of various sectors of the economy, these states 
were not the expression of any one dominant class interest. The 
result was a hesitant and highly ambiguous response to calls frcm 
capital for the state to intervene in the labour market.
4. Dudley Homer and Alide Kooy, "Conflict on South African mines, 
1972-1979", SALDKU Working Paper 29 (University of Cape Town,
1980). For a similar view, cf. Norman Levy, The Foundations of 
the South African Cheap Labour System (London, 1982) , 19-20,
22, 24-5, 29; E. Webster, "Background to the supply and control 
of labour in the gold mines", in E. Webster (ed.) Essays in 
South African Labour History (Johannesburg, 1978), 9-12; F. 
Molteno, "The historical significance of the Bantustan strategy", 
Social Dynamics, III, 2, 1977, 16-18; M. Morris, "The development 
of capitalism in South Africa", Journal of Development Studies, 
XII, 1976, 285, 288-9; N. Nbcasana, "The politics of migrant 
labour", S.A. Labour Bulletin, I, 8, 1978, 24. In Mozambique a 
.. similar analysis has been employed by Marvin Harris, "Labour 
emigration among the Mozambican Tonga: cultural and political 
factors", Africa, XXIX, 1, 1959 and A. Rita-Ferreira, 0 Movimento 
Migratorio de Trabalhadores entre Mozambique e a Africa do Sul 
(Lisbon, 1963) , 73. Probably the leading exponent of this view 
is Claude Meillassoux, "From production to reproduction: a Marxist 
approach to economic anthropology", Economy and Society, 1, 1972, 
103; "The social organization of the peasantry" in David Seddon 
(ed.) Relations of Production (London, 1978) , 168; Formes,
Greniers et Capitaux (Paris, 1975), 148, 165-6. See also Samir 
Amin, Modem Migrations in West Africa (Oxford, 1974) , 110.
Chapter 1
15
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA AND 
THE EMERGENCE OF A MIGRATORY LABOUR FORCE 
FROM MOZAMBIQUE: 1858 to 1875
In the three years following 1849, sane 5 000 British colonists 
settled in the district of Natal and transformed the basis of the
i
eccnany from hunting and trading to plantation production. By 
1857 the European population stood at 8 000 and a regular supply 
of labour, in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the 
coastal plantations, had bee one a vital factor in the development 
of an export econany and consequently, in the emergence of Natal 
as a settler colony. Natal planters blamed the failure of their 
experiment with cotton cultivation on the uncertain labour supply 
and they feared that a similar fate would befall the fledgling 
sugar industry.^
Sugar cultivation required the employment of a nucleus of 
experienced workers supplemented by less-skilled workers at parti­
cular times of the year. In preparing the soil, the ground had 
to be broken up and a good tilth achieved. Canes were then cut 
and ratoons were planted in the spring in order to take advantage 
of the sunrrver rains. During the spring and summer months, much 
labour had to be expended on hoeing and weeding fields in order 
to protect the young stalks. During this period farmers needed a 
permanent supply of labour as local workers returned hone to plant 
their maize crops. Before the cane was cut it had to be carefully 
stripped of its leaves, which had then to be removed frcm the foot 
of the plant, or gradually fired, in order to prevent the cane 
frcm being cut too high. If this happened the canes retained too 
much water relative to their more mature and sucrose-rich lower 
parts. An inexperienced worker could also damage the roots of the 
plant by cutting the cane too lew. During the dry winter months 
of July-September the work force had to be augmented by 25-35% as
1. A.F. Hattersley, The British Settlement of Natal, 315.
2. H.D. Dennys sen, "Labour Policy of Natal, 1852-1874" (MA, UCT, 
1926), 1.
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the canes had to be cut when the water absorbed during the sunuer
had sunk to the roots and the sucrose level was at its highest.
Late cut cane was of little use for planting as it gave few
ratoons. After cutting, the canes had to be transported within
two days to the mills in order to prevent fermentation from setting
in. Thus there was a concentration of labour demand in the winter
in order to harvest and crush the cane. If this was not efficiently
dene, the capital goods in which the planters had invested large
amounts of money, such as crushing mills, machinery, buildings
3
and waterworks, stood idle. This was forcefully brought home
when in 1855 Natal* s first steam mill had to close down due to an
4
insufficient supply of labour.
The root of the labour supply problem lay in the continued 
existence of the ties that bound Natal Africans to a means of 
subsistence independent of wage labour. One farmer compared Natal 
African labour to that of seasonal Irish labour employed during 
the harvesting period in England,
"They do not like to be long engaged for new 
(October 1850) they will rarely stop more than 
a month or two at one place at a time, but 
when their engagements are concluded they will 
return up the country to their Kraals and per­
haps remain there two or three months before 
they seek fresh engagement. "5
This iirpression was confirmed by a Government official who in 1855 
noted that
3. The problems of sugar farming were frequently referred to in 
letters and diaries. Cf. SNA 1/1/7 Shires o.a. memorialists 
to SNA, ID Dec., 1857;SNA 1/1/8 Jeffels to SNA, 20 May 1858; 
SNA 1/1/9 Middleton to SNA 3 Sept., 1859; Jeffels to SNA,
28 Sept., 1859; KCL. Letters of J. Ecroyd, Emigrant to Natal, 
1850-1853;KCL., E. Feildon diary, 1853-1856; KCL., Davidson 
diary 1867-1870.
4. B.J. Levertcn, "Government Finance and Political Development 
in Natal, 1843 to 1893", PhD. UNISA, 1968, 47.
5. KCL., Letters of J. Ecroyd, 53.
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"a considerable proportion of (the Natal African population) 
are by no means disinclined to labour, or unwilling to 
render it to the planters, but upon their own terms 
and at their own times.... They are ready to work for 
two or three months at a time, but they then insist 
upon returning to their locations, and the planter can 
never count upon seeing them again at any definite 
time. Such irregular and unskilled labour does not 
suit the planter and jeopardizes the success of all 
his undertakings."^
In order to force labour onto the market the pro-settler 
Native Affairs Caimission recommended in 1853 that the colonial 
government intervene in the labour supply by breaking up and
7
reducing the size of the locations.
African Dominance of the Cereals Market and the Genesis of the 
Natal Planters' Labour Problem
Settler calls for government intervention in the labour supply 
became more virulent when in 1856 Natal was finally separated frcm 
the Cape and was given a Legislative Council with a degree of 
representative government. But the control exercised by the 
settlers over African administration, and hence over the local 
labour marker, was restricted by the structure of the executive.
This determined that the administration of European affairs by 
the colonial secretary was strictly segregated, both politically 
and financially, from African affairs, which were the concern of 
the secretary for Native Affairs. Ultimate control over the 
administration of Europeans and Africans was vested in the local g
representative of the Imperial goverrment, the Lieutenant-governor. 
Thus the department of the secretary for Native Affairs constituted 
an imperium in imperio, and for various reasons, was able to thwart 
settler attempts to gain a "regular" labour force drawn from Natal's 
African population.
In the early 1850s, direct African taxation contributed 
between a third and, if seen in terms of benefits received, in excess
6. Rawson W. Rawson to Sec. of Goverrment of India, 17 Dec., 1855 
quoted in D. Welsh, The Roots of Segregation, 180.
7. Natal Native Affairs Caimission (NAC) , 1852-53, 27.
8. Leverton, "Government Finance", 86.
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9
of a half of all Natal's revenues. During the first three months
of 1850, when there was an acute shortage of cash in Natal, the
state was able to extort frcm the African population, for the
first time, £1,100 in hut tax.
By the end of the year, £5 241 in sterling had been collected
10together with a further £3 590 in kind. This totalled almost as
11much as the entire revenue of the colony in 1848 and is a 
reflection of both the wealth of African peasants and of the extent 
of their involvement in the market. In 1856 African direct taxation
l
provided the treasury with £10 403 and by 1864 hut tax returns 
12totalled £19 902. The importance of the contribution made by
Africans to the Natal revenue was underlined when an increased
import duty levied on beads and blankets supplied the government
13with the funds needed to inport Indian labour. African taxes
allowed an expansion of the civil service, frcm 20 in 1846 to 75
a decade later ard allowed the district to balance its budget
14and repay its loans to the Cape Colony. Thus, ironically, it
was largely revenue from the sale of the products of African labour
that provided the settlers with the prerequisites for limited
representative government in 1856. Because of the successful way
in which Africans produced and marketed crops, the Natal government
initially fostered the production of cash crops such as cotton and
15sugar by Africans in the locations. These experiments achieved
9. BPP 1859 XLV, "Correspondence between the Governor and Colonial 
Office relating to the £5,000 Reserved for Disposal of the
Crown and Correspondence regarding the Growth of Cotton by 
Natives, 1857-60", Lt.-governor Scott to Labouchere, 4 June 
1857? L. Young, "The Native Policy of Benjamin Pine in Natal 
1850-1855", SAAYB, 1951, II, 236? Leverton, "Government Finance", 
60.
10. Young, "Native Policy", 234? Leverton, "Government Finance", 58, 
96, 112.
11. Young, "Native Policy", 61, 64.
12. Ibid., 101.
13. L.M. Thompson, "Indian Immigration into Natal, 1860-1872",
SAAYB, 1952, II, 14.
14. Yeung, "Native Policy", 61, 64.
15. BPP. 1850, "Correspondence relating to the Establishment of the 
Settlement of Natal", 133-4? D. Welsh, Roots of Segregation,
21, 186-87.
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little success as Africans invested their energy in the production
of marketable foodstuffs and came to dominate, frcm an early
16period, the domestic and export markets for cereals.
Unlike the recently arrived English settlers, Africans were
particularly familiar with the production of maize and sorghum and
had access to the labour of their womenfolk, children and extended
kin. They were also able to farm extensive areas of free, albeit
infertile, land in the locations and were able to work white-owned
land by entering into cash or labour tenancy relationships with
absentee landlords and undercapitalized settlers. Large numbers
of African farmers occupied unsurveyed, so-called Crown land
while others settled on mission farms. Thus African farmers
occupied large areas of land both in and outside of the locations
and as early as 1849 exported "large quantities" of maize to the
17Cape and monopolized the Pietermaritzburg maize market. Officials 
of the Native Affairs department expressed their admiration for 
African agriculture and the secretary for native affairs stated in 
1862 that although Africans were willing to produce crops for the
18world market, they found the production of maize more profitable.
This is supported by official government statistics which shew that,
throughout the 19th century, the production of maize, millet and
sorghum by African farmers far out-stripped their European contem- 
19poraries. Conversely white farmers, through their access to 
capital and international markets were largely able to monopolize 
the export sector.^
16. For an alternative perspective, cf. ibid., 183, 187. See also 
E. Brookes and N. Hurwitz, The Native Reserves of Natal, 83; 
OHSA I, 387.
17. Campbell to Christopher, 16 May 1849 in J.S. Christopher Natal, 
Cape of Good Hope, 67; H. Slater, "The changing pattern of 
economic relationships in rural Natal, 1838-1914", in S. Marks
& A. Atmore, Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, 
156; NAC, Report, 27; T. Phipson, Letters of a ftjatal
Sheriff, ed. R.N. Currey, (Cape Town, 1968), 130-132.
18. H.F. Fynn in D. Moodie, The Natal Kafir Question, 80-81, 87; 
Welsh, Roots of Segregation, 186.
19. See figures 2 & 3on pp83, 84. These figures, taken from the 
"Agriculture" section of the Natal Blue Books, are probably 
highly inaccurate. They are however of impressionistic value.
20. Norman Etherington, "African economic experiments in Colonial 
Natal, 1845-1880", Africa Economic History, 6, 1978, 6; Peter 
Richardson, "The Natal sugar industry 1849-1905: an interpre­
tative essay", Journal of African History. 23, 4, 1982, 5±9,
521.
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The unwillingness of the Executive to break up the rural
locations was based partly on a shortage of administrative personnel
to replace chiefs in the reserves and partly on fears that the
alienation of land reserved for Africans would undermine Shepstone's
21power and involve Imperial troops in an expensive rebellion. Of
perhaps greater importance was the fear that, by tampering with the
locations, the government would disturb African production ahd
thus disrupt the major source of revenue for the Natal treasury.
Shepstone was adamant in his opinion that "reducing the size of the
locations would be a dangerous experiment" and that "so crowding the
Kaffirs as to canpel than to leave their locations and seek work
22(is) objectionable". It was also generally realized that the 
dismantling of the locations could not be achieved without a 
substantial increase in the British military presence and hence in 
the costs, to the Imperial government, of colonizing Natal. Discri­
minatory taxes passed by the Legislative Council in order to force 
Africans onto the market were often disallowed. Thus a Is tax an
all imported hoes was rejected by the Imperial government because
23it threatened to impede the development of African agriculture. 
Similar attempts to raise the hut tax and transfer the Native Reserve 
Fund to the Legislative Council were blocked by the Executive as
24it was feared that they would give rise to political disturbances. 
Although legislation was passed to prohibit "squatting" on Crown 
lands and to curb African rent tenancies, these measures were not 
enforced.
Absentee landlords and speculative land companies, who in the
1850s and 1860s leased to Africans five-sixths of all European-
owned land, were protective of African peasant enterprise and
supported the retention of Africans on the land as rent payments
25yielded the best return on their land investments. Many
21. Leverton, "Goverrment Finance", 121-122; Welsh, Roots of Segrega­
tion, 21-22, 27-28.
22. Moodie, Kafir Question, 86-87. See also similar conclusions in 
the evidence of magistrate Peppercorn, 88, 89, 128.
23. Leverton, "Government Finance", 100.
24. Ibid., 101, 112; Welsh, Roots of Segregation, 26.
25. H. Slater, "Land, labour and capital in Natal: the Natal Land 
and Colonization Company 1860-1948" in JAH, XVI, 2, 1975, 259-62, 
272-73.
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undercapitalized, up-country fanners, who had bought extensive 
tracts of land at lew prices, found that their best means of pro­
curing farm workers was to allow African tenants to occupy a part
26of the farm in exchange for a fixed amount of labour. The terms
of these labour tenancy relationships favoured African farmer-workers
as the up-country farmers had to compete for labour with the coastal
planters who were able to pay considerably higher wages. Missionary
interests encouraged African Christians to produce and market their 
27crops. Similarly, traders who dealt in African farm produce and
planters who needed maize and millet to feed their growing labour
force provided Africans with a market for their crops and in so
doing neutralized any moves aimed at their proletarianization. Thus
because of the viability of Natal's peasant economy and because of
the benefits that this brought to the colony, African petty
caumodity producers were protected from having to sell their labour
for extended periods. Forced labour for public works (islbalo)
and taxation that discriminated in favour of Africans employed on
28white farms, did little to ease the settlers' "labour problem".
In 1856-57, of the 30 000 African workers needed by the colony of
Natal, only 6 000 to 10 000 were drawn at any one time frcm the 
29local population.
Pressures on the Natal Colonial State to Abandon its Neutrality 
and Intervene Directly in the Labour Market
In order to resolve the "labour question", the Colonial govern­
ment in Natal agreed to facilitate the introduction of foreign 
labour as a temporary measure until such time as population pressures
26. SNA 1/3/8 Resident Magistrate, Weenen to Shepstone, 4 Oct., 1849; 
Natal Native Caimission, 1881-82, 10; Slater, "Land, labour and 
capital", 265, 272.
27. N. Etherington, Preachers, peasants and politics in South-east 
Africa, 1835-1880 (London, 1978).
28. Welsh, Roots of Segregation, 123-24; N. Etherington, "Labour 
supply and the genesis of South African confederation in the 
1870s", JAH, 20, 2, 1979.
29. SNA 1/8/6 SNA to Resident Magistrates, 6 Dec., 1856; Natal 
Mercury, 30 April 1857.
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in the reserves and new consumer desires would drive Natal Africans
onto the labour market. Public appeals for the introduction of
foreign labour were first made before the Native Affairs Camnission
30of 1852-53 and were followed by letters to the press. In order 
to aVoid the political complications arising from the uncontrolled 
entry and movement into the colony of landless Zulu "refugees", many 
of whom were merely returning to their areas of origin, they were 
subjected to three year indentures and the introduction of labour
31without the permission of the Lt.-governor was strictly prohibited.
Frcm 1854 to 1864, seme 7 194 Zulus sought refuge south of the
Tugela. These "refugees" included a number of "amatangas" who were
probably Maputos as the colonists claimed that they were escaping
Zulu oppression and that they often adopted the Zulu language and
habits in order to avoid the aprobrium attached to the name Tonga.
32As "Zulu refugees" they were then indentured for three years.
However, this scheme of refugee apprenticeship proved unfeasible.
Four thousand refugees entered Natal in 1856 when Cetewayo defeated
his brother to became the undisputed heir to the Zulu throne. But
of these, only 1 588 were indentured and of this number, more than
33two-thirds absconded when peace returned to Zululand. This caused
the planters to turn to the government to alleviate their labour
34problems by assisting in the importation of foreign workers. But
30. NAC., Proceedings, pt. 1, p. 54, evidence Spies; pt. 2, p. 47, 
Archbell; pt. 5, p. 77, Fcnn; pt. 6, p. 49 Cleghom; Natal 
Mercury, 7 March 1856.
31. Ordinance 4, 12 March 1855. "To prevent Natives being brought 
into this District", W.J. Dunbar Moodie, Ordinances, Proclamations, 
etc., relating to the colony of Natal 1836 to 1855, vol. 1, 450.
32. Sessional Docunents presented to the Legislative Council, no. 33, 
1865; SAAR, Natal no. 4, May 1853, 110; SNA 1/3/4 Res. magis. 
Tugela to SNA, 14 Nov., 1855; SNA 1/3/8 Verulam magistrate to 
SNA, 29 Nov., 1859; SNA 1/3/8 Res. magis. Inanda to SNA, 29 Nov., 
1859. See also Bleek, The Natal Diaries (ed.), Spohr, 28.
33. SNA 1/1/8 Draft letter entitled "Refugees", n.d.; SNA 1/3/8 
Res. magis. Inanda to SNA, 29 Nov., 1859.
34. SNA 1/1/7 Jeffels to SNA, 7 Dec., 1857; 1/1/8 memorial from Sugar 
Planters, Victoria County to SNA, 3 Feb., 1858; Shires to SNA,
25 May 1858.
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government-assisted labour immigration was to prove a source of
contention between the up-country fanners and the coastal planters.
In 1857 the up-country members of the Legislative Council
blocked the use of public money and stipulated that any importation
35of labour should be made at the expense of the coastal planters.
A simultaneous attempt to ease the restriction cn the importation of
workers by recognizing the validity of all labour contracts made
outside Natal was disallowed by the Imperial government as it
36offered no safeguards against the enslavement of labourers. In
response to planters' requests, the Lt.-governor then gave permission
for the private importation of "amatonga" labour and promised to
persuade Mpande and Cetewayo to allow this labour to pass unhindered 
37through Zululand. Thus in 1858 recruiters acting on behalf of
planters applied to the Lt.-governor for permission to import over
38300 amatonga families. By bearing the costs of importing 
families, the planters hoped to secure an experienced and constant 
labour force and recruiters, by contracting families for up to five 
years, intended to secure their labour at the same wage as Zulu 
apprentices and not at the open market rate, which rose by almost 
40% frcm 6s3d in 1858 to 10s in 1860.^ The inflow of this amatonga 
labour coincided with a change in a composition of the Legislative 
Council. In 1859 the coastal planters were able to overrule up- 
country objections to government assistance in the importation of 
labour by stipulating that the government's annual allocation of 
£5 000 towards the Importation of Indian labour should be drawn
35. N.P.P. Select Committee Report, no. 8 of 1857. An amended version 
of this bill was rejected in 1858 by the legislative council as 
unfavourable to employers.
36. L.M. Thompson, "Indian Immigration", 12.
37. SNA 1/1/17 Shires o.a. memorialists to SNA, 10 Dec., 1857. On 
the ethnographic origins and use of the term "amatonga" see 
appendix I.
38. SNA 1/1/7 Jeffels, 7 Nov., 1857; 1./1/8 Foxon, 6 April 1858; 
Shires, 10 May 1858; Res. magis. Durban, 13 May 1858; Robinson,
20 May 1858; Res. magis. Durban, 20 May 1858; Foxon, 19 June 
1858; Shires, 3 July 1858.
39. SNA 1/1/7 Jeffels, 7 Nov., 1857; Shires a.o. memorialists, 10 
Dec., 1857; 1/1/8 Jeffels, 20 June 1858; 1/1/9 Middleton, 3 
Sept., 1859; Jeffels, 28 Sept., 1859. The average annual wage 
plus provisions for African are in NBB, "Agriculture", 1858-60, 
see figure 1 , p. 78.
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frcm indirect taxation on articles consumed by Africans (blankets
40and beads) and coastal planters (machinery) . Law 14 which was 
passed together with Law 15 in order to regulate Indian immigration, 
set a precedent for the involvement of the colonial goverrment in 
the costs and organization of labour importation and a further law,
No 13 of 1859, made provision for government encouragement, protec­
tion and assistance in the importation of amatonga workers and 
their families, both overland and by sea. Recruiters had to apply 
to the Protector of Immigrants for licenses to import labourers 
and, in order to control their movements, all immigrant workers had 
to be registered with the Protector of Immigrants. In order to 
prevent accusations of slavery, heavy fines were enforceable for 
the maltreatment of immigrant workers and contracts were limited
to a maximum of three years. Employers were protected by the Masters 
41and Servants Act.
The increasing sugar production on the plantations was paralleled
by increasing pressure from the planters for the government to inter-
42
vene more directly in the recruitment of amatonga labour.
Recruiters were able to secure a capitation fee of 20s for each
contracted worker but the passage through Zululand was hazardous
and workers were loathe to enter into contracts which many regarded
43as akin to slavery. The Colonial government was disinclined to
take responsibility for the protection of labour passing through
Zululand as this might have led to an unwanted involvement in Zulu
politics. It was also fearful of the political repercussions that
would emerge from being dragged into any labour importation scheme
44that could be connotated with slavery. Nevertheless, a free flow
40. L.M. Thompson, "Indian Iirmigration", 14.
41. A.L. Hitchins and G.W. Sweeney, Statutes of Natal, 1845-99.
42. SNA 1/3/9 Res. magis. Durban, "Report of the state of the 
natives, 1859"; SNA 1/1/10 Philips, 29 Feb., 1860; Ayers, 27 
Feb., 1860; Ralph, 6 March 1860; Knox, 15 March 1860; Ryder,
13 April 1860; Foxon, 18 May 1860; Natal Witness, 23 Oct., 1863.
43. 1/1/12 Planters memorial to Lt.-governor, 30 Oct., 1862; Adams 
to Col. Sec., 17 Dec., 1862; Planters memorial, Umgeni, 28 Nov., 
1862; SNA 1/1/13 Acutt to SNA, 20 July 1863; Smith, 4 Aug., 1863; 
SNA 1/1/14 Cooley o.a. to SNA, 20 Jan., 1864; Campbell, 20 Jan., 
1864.
44. SNA 1/1/12 Greig to SNA, 19 Dec., 1862; SNA to Greig, 8 Dec., 1862; 
Thompson, "Indian immigration", 12.
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of labour was inpossible without sane form of protection being given
to the workforce while in transit through Zululand and thus in late
1862 the Lt.-governor agreed to approach the Zulu authorities. He
also attempted to ease the importation of labour by waiving the
licence requirement for all recruiters bringing less than forty
45amatonga families into Natal.
In August 1863 a Select Committee on the labour needs of the
colony recommended that amatonga immigration should be placed on
the same footing as government-sponsored Indian immigration. In
anticipation of this report John Dunn, who had earlier applied for
a government labour agency, was appointed in July 1863 to supervise
46the immigration of amatonga labourers. In this Dunn was unsuccess­
ful and in October 1863 the Government Gazette announced that "the 
hope of a regular supply of labour/^Stongaland must be abandoned".^ 
Dunn attributed the failure of the feeding scheme to his insufficient 
administrative personnel and the refusal of amatonga workers to 
emigrate in batches larger than 10 people. They also objected to
the stipulated three year contract periods and demanded that they
48be allocated to the employer of their choice. Of perhaps equal
importance in contributing to the failure of this early scheme was
Mpande's reluctance to protect amatonga labour in transit through
Zululand. Thus, although the Zulu king agreed to allow the labourers
to pass through Zululand, he complained that earlier emigration had
brought about a decline in the tribute extracted from the Maputo
by the Zulu royal house. Significantly for later immigration
schemes, it was reported that Cetewayo was of a more tractable 
49disposition. However, undoubtedly the most important reason for 
the failure of this first government attempt to import amatonga 
workers was the drop in demand for labour following a 35% decline
45. SNA 1/1/12 SNA to Greig and Umgeni memorialists, 30 Oct., 1862; 
SNA 1/1/12 Lt.-governor to all Res. magistrates and other 
officials, n.d. approximately Nov., 1862.
46. SNA 1/1/12 Dunn to SNA, 1 Nov., 1861; SNA 1/1/13 SNA to Dunn, 3 
July 1863.
47. Natal government gazette (NGG) notice 130, 6 Oct., 1863.
48. SNA 1/1/13 Dunn to SNA, 27 Sept., 1863; 1/1/14 Dunn to SNA, 10 
January 1864.
49. SNA 1/6/3 "Statement of the messengers sent by the government 
to Cetewayo and Panda", 23 March 1863; SNA 1/1/13 Dunn to SNA,
8 July 1863.
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in the sugar price from 1862 to 1863 and the onset of a general
depression in Natal. The sugar price continued to drop for the
next six years? frcm £34.10s in 1862 to £29.13s6d in 1865 to £18.19s
in 1867. The accompanying sluggish demand for labour during this
period is reflected in the fall in the average African wage from
10s to 9s0d to 7s6d.^ These price fluctuations, as represented
in figure 1 , made the Natal government even more cautious about
any involvement in the importation of labour for, not only had
the cost of importing Indian labour exceeded initial estimates but,
as a result of the depression, recruiting overheads incurred by the
gavernnent were lost and many farmers were unable to meet their
canmitments as regards the wages and importation costs of Indian
labour. Others were left with unwanted, but indentured Indian 
51workers. This caused the Natal government to end all Indian
immigration in 1866 and it was only eight years later, in 1874, that
indentured workers frcm India were re-introduced into the colony.
It is impossible to quantify amatonga ' immigration at this early
period. However, there is evidence to show that amatonga workers
were spread throughout Natal and that, according to one of James
Stuart's informants, under the Maputo chief Nozingile, who reigned
from 1854 to 1873, "large numbers" of men went to various parts of 
53South Africa. Emigration was large enough to affect the ability
of the Maputo to produce and market foodstuffs; like Mpande, the
Portuguese complained that the "great numbers" of Maputo going to
Natal each year had caused a decline in the amount of agricultural
54produce sold to the trading post at Lourengo Marques. In 1866
50. NBB 1862 to 1867, "Agriculture". On the depression, see Leverton, 
"Government Finance", 135-139.
51. SNA 1/1/19 Lt.-governor, annotation' on Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June, 
1869; Thompson, "Indian Immigration", 14; M. Palmer, The History 
of the Indians in Natal, 24, 26.; Leverton, "Government Finance", 
137. See also footnote 93.
52. SNA 1/3/8 Res. magis. Inanda, 29 Nov., 1859; Lt.-governor, anno­
tation an Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869; A. MacKenzie, Mission 
Life among Zulu-Kaffirs: Letters of Henrietta Robertson, 228, 289.
53. KCL., JSA, file 25, p. 261, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza,
8 Nov., 1897.
54. Governor of Lourengo Marques, 15 April 1865, report in B.O. no.
21, 27 May 1865.
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the circulation of currency in the town was stated by the governor
to be dependent on the sterling wages earned in Natal with which
55Maputo immigrants bought trade goods at the settlement. Thus the 
continued immigration of amatonga workers into Natal during the 
depression would seen to partly answer why, despite the absence of 
Indian immigration, sugar production rose by 51% over the period 
1867-1873.56
As Natal recovered fran the depression in the late 1860s and
as Indian indentures expired, calls were once again made for govern-
57ment intervention in the labour market. In order to gain more
control over local African labour, various attempts were made by
the settlers to place the department of Native Affairs under the
58Legislative Council. But when this was prevented by the Colonial
Office, the planters reiterated their demands for amatonga labour.
In a memorial placed before the Lt.-governor in 1869 coastal planters
asked for the reintroduction of indentured Indian labour and requested
that foreign African labour be imported on twelve-month contracts.
It was suggested that these immigrants pay the costs of their cwn
59recruitment, including a 10s tax to their chiefs. But the Natal
government was still unwilling to take on the responsibility of
importing labour, especially as the vicissitudes of employment
opportunities during the depression had persuaded numerous African
60workers to leave Natal and seek employment in the Cape colony.
The free flew of labour was further impaired by a shift in the 
balance of power in the Delagoa Bay hinterland when the Maputo moved
55. GEM to GGtf, 11 April 1866 in B.O. no. 41, 22 Sept., 1866.
56. Natal Blue Books, 1867-1871, "Agriculture".
57. SNA 1/1/18 Kinsman to SNA, 11 Aug., 1868; Kinsman to SNA, 21 
Aug., 1868; SNA 1/1/19 Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869; Goodliffe 
to Protector of Immigrants, 29 July 1869; Natal Mercury, 21 June
1870.
58. Charles Ballard, "The Transfrontiersman", 120; Leverton, "Govern­
ment finance", 204. A similar recommendation was made in 1871, 
Ibid., 193.
59. Special Document, Natal Legislative Council no. 20, 1869.
60. Natal Government Gazette (NGG) XXI, no. 1180, 22 June 1869, Lt.- 
govemor, 18 June 1869; NGG XXIII, no. 1267, 24 Jan., 1871. 
Keate-Granville, 30 Oct., 1869. See pp. 40 ff.
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north of the Tembe river in August 1870 and in so doing alienated
thenselves frcm the Zulu and further jeopardized the position of
their workers passing through Zululand. To forestall this worsening
situation the Natal government agreed to provide approved recruiters
with introductions to chiefs and in November 1870, Mpande and
Cetewayo were asked to prevent the harassment of amatonga migrants
61travelling through Zululand.
In the absence of a government labour importation scheme,
planters engaged private recruiters to secure their labour. These
men were generally hunter-traders who had a good knowledge of the
size of the chiefdcms lying outside Natal and were known to foreign
chiefs. They inevitably supplemented hunting and trading revenues
with those accruing frcm labour recruitment and used immigrant
62workers as porters on their expeditions. In the late 1860s one
of these men claimed to be able to recruit several hundred workers
in Maputo land on two year contracts at seven shillings per month for
63the first year and eight for the second. Another reported that
he could secure 450 amatonga and Swazi labourers in exchange for a
64capitation fee of £1 each. Others asserted that the Maputo 
chief was prepared to supply labourers for a £1 capitation fee 
and that these men would be supplemented with workers drawn from 
the lower Nkcmati.^
Following the settlement of the Zulu dispute with the Maputo, 
Mpande and Cetewayo gave permission in February 1871 for the movement 
of labour through Zululand to be resumed. This caused a large number 
of workers to enter Natal and prompted the Natal Mercury to state
61. SNA 1/6/2 no. 102, "Message frcmthe Lt.-governor of Natal to 
Pande King of the Zulus and Cetewayo his son", 22 Nov., 1870.
For the decline in relations between Zulu and Maputo at this 
time, see pp. 177ff.
62. SNA 1/1/8 Res. magis. Durban to SNA, 13 May 1858; SNA 1/1/12 
Planters memorial to Lt.-governor, 30 Oct., 1862; CH 1050 
Shires to SNA, 9 April 1875; GH 1050 Registrar Supreme Court to 
Lt.-governor, 14 May 1875.
63. SNA 1/1/18 Kinsman to SNA, 11 Aug., 1868, 21 Aug., 1868.
64. SNA 1/1/19 Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869.
65. CSO 381.714 Leslie to Col. Sec., 24 March 1871; SNA 1/1/19 Leslie 
to SNA, 28 July 1871; SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 8 July 1871.
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that "the unexpected influx of large number of Amatonga labourers
66by land, has quite changed the aspect of the labour market."
But when Natal attempts to negotiate a labour supply with Umzila 
67proved abortive, the planters renewed their calls for government
68intervention in the labour market.
Although the Imperial authorities refused to sanction any
participation by the Natal government in the importation of African 
69labour it did allcw the passage of law 15 in November 1871 which 
allowed them to control and regulate African inraigration into Natal. 
This law confirmed that only approved recruiters were given free 
licences and that illicit recruiting was punishable by a £50 fine 
or 4 months in prison. Immigrants unaccompanied by a recruiter 
had to report to the nearest resident magistrate on entering the 
colony. Applications for labour were then to be made to the magis­
trate who would attest contracts of up to three years for a 10s 
fee. The worker was then accredited with a bonus, the payment of
which was deferred and kept in trust by the magistrate until
70completion of the contract.
It is commonly believed that the sugar industry in Natal was
71developed on the basis of Indian labour. However, it would seem
66. Natal Mercury, 21 March 1871; CSO 379.535 Border Agent Zululand 
to Col. Sec., 28 Feb., 1871.
67. GH 1325 No. 26, Keate to GLM, 1 June 1871; SNA 1/1/96 no. 73, 
Col. Sec. to Lt.-governor, n.d. Oct., (?) 1873; BPP 1890-91 
C6200 Erskine correspondence, especially Erskine to SNA 3 July
1871.
68. SNA 1/1/21 Blainey to SNA 6 Oct., 1871; Couper to SNA, 7 Oct., 
1871; Natal Witness, 9 May 1891. On the Labour League and other 
planters' labour-recruiting organizations, see Sessional Papers, 
Natal Legislative Council, no. 5, 1872; "Petition frcm the 
Labour League", 7 Oct., 1872; Natal Mercury, 23 Sept., 1873;
C.J. Beyers, "Die Indier Vraagstuk in Natal, 1870-1910" SAAYB, 
1971, II, 64-65.
69. GH 54 no. 123 Kimberley to Keate, 23 Nov., 1871; GH 56 no. 245 
Kimberley to Keate, 9 Nov., 1872.
70. Hitchins and Sweeney, Statutes of Natal.
71. Thcmpson, "Indian Immigration", 68-69; Ballard, "The Trans­
frontiersman ", 180.
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that, at least during the early phase, until the reintroduction of
Indian labour in 1874, African imnigrant labour frcm outside Natal
played as important, if not a preponderant, role in establishing
sugar cultivation in the colony. In 1869 it was reported th&t
5 000 Indians were employed in the colony and the number of
local Africans entering the labour market had not increased over
72the previous thirteen years. In 1872 about 6 000 foreign
Africans were thought to be employed in the colony. They were
particularly valued because they worked for 18 to 24 months before
73returning heme for two to three years. The secretary for native 
affairs saw this labour as a vital asset to the development of 
the colony and felt that,
"if the influx of this class of (foreign Africans) goes on 
at the rate it premises to do, to satisfy the wants of 
planters, we shall soon have a body fluctuating as regards 
the individuals composing it, but permanent as regards ^  
its numbers, of from 15 000 to 20 000 men or even more."
75This foreign labour was drawn from Pondoland, frcm various north
76 77Sotho-speaking chief dams such as those of Matlala, Molepo,
78 79Modjadji and Sekhukhuni and from Venda-speaking chiefdcms such
80as that of Magato as well as Transvaal Ndebele chiefs like
72. SNA 1/8/6 SNA to Res. Magistrates, 6 Dec., 1856; Natal Mercury,
July summary 1869. Both reports estimated the supply of local 
labour to be approximately 10 000.
73. Legislative Council Sessional Paper, no 12, 1872. "Report of the 
Select Cormittee on the Introduction of Native Labourers frcm 
beyond the border of the Colony", p. 6; L.C. no 4, 1874, "Report .. 
... on the best means of introducing labourers frcm beyond the 
colony", 20 Aug., 1874.
74. SNA 1/7/8 memorial signed by SNA, 18 Dec., 1871.
75. KCL, Davidson Diary. This refers to scattered individuals. Few 
Pandos were employed in Natal during this early period.
76. W. Moschutz, "Tagebuch der Station Mankcpanspoort", BMB, 5, 1869, 83.
77. Natal Mercury, 13 May 1871.
78. SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 19 July 1871; PRO FO 63 /1047 Leslie 
statement in Keate to Kimberley, 15 Sept., 1871; Anon., Beimblatt 
zum Berliner Missions-freund, 12, 3/4, 1886, 35.
79. Letter of 1 March 1871 in Gold Fields Mercury, 7 July 1876;
WUL A55 R.T.N. James, "Diary".
80. Natal Mercury, 5 Sept., 1871; F. Elton, "Journal of Exploration 
of the Limpopo River", J. Royal Geogr. Soc., vol 42, 1872, 31-32.
31
81Mapela. Despite the failure of the Natal government mission to
Umzila in 1870-71, numbers of Gaza workers frcm the Bilene area on
the lower Limpopo made their way to Natal in the early 1870s.
Amatonga labourers followed three major routes linking Natal
with the area north of Zululand. The first route, used largely
by Maputos, stretched from the lower Tugela northwards along the
coast. Although this route had an abundance of water and good
grazing for stock, it was a particularly dangerous path during the
summer months when malaria and later sand fleas infested the area
and when rivers overflowed their banks. The second route passed
about 100 miles inland, through territory disputed by the Zulus
and the Transvaal,before entering the lower Newcastle division.
This mountain route was a good alternative to the coastal route in
summer. The third and most important route led from the Upper
Newcastle division, about 180 miles inland, to Lydenburg-Botsabelbo
in the Eastern Transvaal and then down the Olif ants river to the
north and the Sabi river to the east. Although many workers died
of exposure on this route, because it passed through high and
inhospitable country with little fuel or shelter, it gave access
82to Natal to people on hostile terms with the Swazi and Zulu.
Immigrant workers often travelled several hundred miles an foot
and arrived in a half-starved condition. Consequently death from
exposure or disease presented a constant threat on all the labour
routes as did banditry and the fraudulent promises of unscrupulous
83recruiters who waylaid groups of workers entering Natal. The 
dangers of travelling to and frcm Natal hindered the free flow of
81. Letter of 1 March 1871 in Gold Fields Mercury, 7 July 1876.
Other sources refer merely to "Bechuanas" and "Basuthos", BMB, 
1868, 334; SNA 1/1/21 Clarence to SNA, 24 April or "Swazies",
SNA 1/1/12, Couper, 7 Oct., 1871.
82. Legislative Council no 12, 1872, "Report of the Select Ccranittee 
on the introduction of Native labourers frcm beyond the border 
of the colony", SNA 1/1/27 mono by P.E. Ridley, n.d., 1872; SNA 
1/3/21 R.M. Omvoti, 6 Nov., 1871 reported the death frcm exposure 
of six amatongas out of a party of thirty-one. See also Natal 
Mercury, 16 Nov., 1871 and ZA 27 Saunders to Res. Catm., 8 June 
1895; BPP. 1890 Lll, Saunders to SNA, Nov., 1887; Zambili to 
SNA, 1 March 1889.
83. BMB, 1868, 334; SNA 1/7/8 memo by SNA, 18 Dec., 1871; BPP.
C 1137, "Report of the expedition to install Cetewayo", Aug., 
1873. Over the years 1875, 1881-82, a total of 67% of the workers 
entering or leaving Natal travelled in winter and 33% in 
summer. II. 1/1 Various correspondence; NBB 1881, p. F115;
1882, p. F48.
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labour, discouraged potential workers frcm emigrating and conse­
quently caused the planters to call on the government to build 
shelters and assist the entry of migrant labourers. Requests for 
the government to protect these workers were also received from 
amatonga chiefs who played a vital role in the stimulation of 
labour emigration.®^
African labour drawn frcm beyond the borders of Natal not 
only supplied the inmediate needs of the labour market, but also 
depressed the entire wage structure of plantation labour by
undercutting local African wage levels which in turn undercut the
85
wages paid to indentured and free Indian workers. The cost of
introducing indentured African workers was far lower than that of
indentured Indians, and, because employers felt that homestead
86production supplemented farm wages, foreign African labour was
87thought to be 25 to 50% cheaper than Indian labour. But the
Lt.-governor, conscious of the costs that had accrued to the
government frcm the first abortive Indian immigration project,
and ever fearful of the political risks involved in introducing
African proletarians, was opposed to the flooding of the market
with workers, merely in order to supply the planters with cheap 
88labour. He succintly summarized the carpeting interests involved 
in the debate over the labour question in a reply to a Colonial 
Office query which asked why more than 200 000 Natal Africans 
could not supply the labour needs of the 17 000 colonists,
84. II. R53/76 SNA to PI, 24 Jan., 1876. See also p. 320, note 61.
85. Kimberley to Keate, 13 Aug., 1870, Keate to Kimberley, 21 Oct., 
1870 in NGG XXIII no. 1269, 24 Jan., 1871.
86. KCL, Natal Land and Colonization Co. Trustees report on the 
state of insolvent estates of G.D. Koch and the Reunion sugar 
plantation; M. Palmer, Indians in Natal, 13.
87. The cost of introducing one Indian labourer was estimated at 
£17. Government involvement in the 1860-66 importation scheme 
amounted to well over two-fifths of importation costs, Thompson, 
"Indian Immigration", 13; Leverton, "Government Finance", 71, 
98-99. African wages in 1871 stood at 8s to 12s and Indian at 
15s to 19s. SNA 1/1/21 Clarence to SNA, 24 April 1871; Natal 
Mercury, 31 Aug., 1871, also July summary 1869 and 24 June 1875; 
MNE. caixa 697 , Portuguese vice-consul to MNE, 28 June 1872.
88. SNA 1/1/19 Annot. Lt.-governor on Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869.
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"The Natives of Natal inhabiting the locations on which 
they have been settled are in fact land-holders, though 
under a peculiar tenure. As such they are producers, 
in which they compete with the colonists. The habits of 
industry they are gradually contracting make this 
competition year by year more serious. But they are 
not, nor will they ever be producers to such an extent 
as to prevent their supplying from among them to the 
colonists a very large body of labourers for wages.
Of these labourers however, comparatively few are as 
yet absolutely dependent on wages for their livelihood 
for they have more or less share and interest in the 
location lands. The majority of them are apt in con­
sequence to offer their labour an terms and conditions 
more and more suitable to themselves than to the 
colonists who employ them. The colonists want to secure 
long terms of service at small wages, (the Africans) 
prefer short periods of service, terminable almost at 
their own discretion, though still remarkably small gg
as compared with the rate of wages in most other countries."
The Lt.-governor stressed that the colonists preferred 
foreign to local African labourers because they were separated 
geographically from their means of production and consequently 
provided a cheaper and more constant source of labour, thus:
"Natives coming from beyond the confines of the 
colony ... necessarily engage themselves to employers 
here for longer and more continuous terms of service 
than they would do if they had location lands or 
friends of their own race in the colony and they are 
obliged, in the absence of such alternative modes of 
supporting themselves, to accept such wages as may
be offered."90
Musgrave, who succeeded Keate as Lt.-governor in July 1872,
believed that the numbers of local Africans employed by European
farmers was underestimated as the latter wished to draw in foreign
Africans in order to flood the labour market and thereby reduce
91the wage level for unskilled workers. Shepstone agreed with the 
Lt-govemor in tracing the roots of the labour shortage to the 
independence of the Natal African peasantry,
89. Keate to Kimberley, 24 Oct., 1870 in NOG XXIII, no. 1269, 24 
Jan., 1871.
90. Ibid., SNA 1/1/22 "Memorandum on the importation and control of 
native labourers from inland tribes", Shepstone, 5 Nov., 1872.
91. Leverton, "Goverrnvent Finance", 227.
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"The natives in the colony do not and never will be able 
to supply ... the labour needs of the sugar and coffee 
planters of the coastal districts. They are themselves 
producers of much of the food which sustains the labourers
on the plantations."92
Shepstcne remained adamant that the political position and
economic productivity of Natal's African population should not be
undermined in order to provide the coastal planters with cheap 
93labour. In this respect he had an important ally in the up-
country Pietermaritzburg newspaper, the Natal Witness, which
advocated the maintenance of the reserves and frequently described
the progressive aspects and expanding production of African peasant 
94fanning in Natal. During the depression years of 1867 to 1871
the acreage of maize cultivated by European farmers had declined
by 10% while sorghum production remained minimal. African farmers,
on the other hand, had increased the acreaae of maize and sorghum
by 28% and 47% respectively. Thus African cereal farmers were in
a prime position to benefit from the general economic recovery,
following the diamond discoveries, when in 1872 the value of maize
95and sorghum almost trebled.
Despite the inducement to stay on the land and the consequent
shortage of local labour that this new prosperity engendered, the
Colonial office and the Lt-govemor remained unconvinced of the
need to involve the government in the importation of African labour.
They ronained fearful of the "serious political complications" that
could arise if workers, recruited at the expense of the government,
96were harmed while passing through Zululand. The Colonial office 
was under strong pressure frcm humanitarian organizations to prevent
92. SNA 1/7/8 memorial by SNA, 18 Dec., 1871.
93. Natal Witness, 26 Aug., 1870.
94. Natal Witness, 14 Dec., 1866; 1 April 1870; 26 Aug., 1870; 21 
March 1871; 30 April 1872.
(2001bs)
95. Maize rose from 6s7d per muid/and then averaged 15s for the next 
5 years. Sorghum rose from 7s9d to 19s7d and then settled at 13s2d
for the following 5 years. All statistics are drawn from NBB, 
1867-1877, "Agriculture". See figures 2 and 3, pp. 83-84.
96. Keate to Granville, 19 May 1870 in NGG XXIII, no. 1269, 24 Jan., 
1871; Natal Mercury, 21 Jan., 1871.
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any form of irrmigration that could be associated with the slave
trade. In July 1871 the Aborigines Protection Rights Society
expressed itself "filled with the utmost alarm and anxiety" over
proposals to Import labour from the Portuguese settlements to the 
97north of Natal. The Quakers were especially concerned with the
maritime importation of labour, over which they expressed "the
gravest apprehensions".^
Settler opinion was divided on the proposed resumption of
government-supported labour inmigration. Up-country settlers,
who farmed with cattle and sheep had suffered badly during the
depression and many had deserted their farms for the Diamond Fields
99and the Orange Free State. They felt that, for the area to recover,
government revenue should be spent on the construction of railways
that would connect up-country areas to coastal markets and to the
new markets developing in the interior and they remained opposed
to government expenditure on the importation of labour that would
benefit only the coastal planters.Even amongst the planters
the desire for workers was not uniform as seme coastal areas had a
101sufficient supply of labour. These settler interests were 
unwilling for government money to be spent on the importation of 
labour for the benefit of certain coastal plantations and in November 
1870 they were able to block moves in this direction in the 
Legislative Council.
Imperial and local administration fears that labour immigration 
would give birth to a politically volatile landless proletariat, 
or conversely to a population of indigents for which the government 
would be responsible, constantly hampered the planters' desire for
97. GH 1139 Aborigines Protection Society to Lt-govemor, 7 July 
1871.
98. GH 55 no. 55 Friends Institute to Col. Office, 23 April 1872.
99. Natal Mercury, 28 Nov., 1871, 21 Dec., 1871; Leverton, "Govern­
ment Finance", 178.
100. Natal Mercury, 11 July 1871; 21 Nov., 1871; Leverton, "Government 
Finance", 209.
101. Natal Mercury, Nov. summary 1870.
102. Ibid., Beyers, "Indier Vraagstuk", 66-67, 71. See also footnote 
51.
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103government assistance in the supply of labour. Shepstone saw 
the importation of foreign African workers as the answer to the 
labour problan on condition that their immigration should be placed 
on the same footing as Indian labour. In order to prevent the 
permanent settlement of "foreign" Africans the immigration of workers' 
families should be prohibited for,
"The colonial population are capable of being ruled by 
tribal arrangement and are so ruled,but upon these 
foreigners it is impossible to bring such responsibilities 
to bear - they exist amongst us not as caimunities but 
as individuals, therefore this difference must be recog­
nized in devising means for their control."104
Elsewhere he stated that
"The introduction of these African labourers, to the 
extent which appears necessary to carry on successfully 
the chief industries of the colony is in my opinion 
dangerous unless corresponding measures are taken to 
control them during their stay."
He stressed that they were drifters with no tribal control and, with
no immediate families to support, they were a potential "criminal 
105element." Government assistance in the labour supply remained 
minimal until the early 1870s and planters were obliged to fall 
back on private recruitment for their labour. But the question of 
a safe passage through Zululand remained central to any attempt to 
import amatonga labour. ^
103. GH. 54 no. 123 Kimberley to Keate, 23 Nov., 1871. See also 
footnote 87.
104. Sessional Papers of the Legislative Council, No. lw, 1872.
"Report of the Select Ccmmittee into the Introduction of Native 
Labourers frcm beyond the borders of the Colony" a memorandum
by SNA dated 5 Nov., 1872. See also Natal Witness, 26 Aug., 1870.
105. SNA 1/1/22 "Memorandum on the importation and control of native 
labourers frcm inland tribes, 5 Nov., 1872"; SNA 1/7/8 "Mono 
on the supervision and control of native labourers frcm inland 
tribes."
106. Frederick Elton in Natal Mercury, 5 Sept., 1871.
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Natal Government-assisted Labour Immigration Schemes as a Means 
of Alleviating the Planters' Labour Problem
In November 1872 a select carmittee appointed by the Legislative
Council recommended that the government aid the introduction of
labour by employing a labour agent who would construct food depots
and secure the safe passage of workers passing along the coastal
107route through Zululand. The secretary for Native Affairs gave
his guarded support to this scheme on condition that the movement
of foreign Africans was regulated and controlled by both a 25%
deferred wage payment and by the creation of a special rural 
108police. The shortage of plantation labour became critical
between 1871-73 for, despite a 23% rise in African wages and despite
a rise in the price of sugar from £23.10s to £24.10s a ton, the
109overall production of sugar declinedmrginally. The crisis
was only overcome when the executive allied itself with coastal
planter interests in order to overrule up-country objections
110to the re-introduction of Indian inmigration in 1874.
In September 1873 the Natal government was able to take
advantage of their official recognition of Cetewayo as sole heir to
the Zulu throne, to negotiate various topics, the foremost being
the establishment of a labour importation scheme through Zululand.
Thus at the coronation Cetewayo, who complained of the way in which
"large numbers of amaTdngas were constantly passing through Zululand
in all directions", agreed to the establishment of feeding stations
along the coastal route and suggested Dunn as protector of inmigrants 
111in Zululand. In February 1874, a month after Shepstone had been
forced to order several magistrates to use forced isibalo labour
112to bring in the sugar crop, Dunn was appointed labour agent in
107. Sessional Papers of the Legislative Council no 12, 1872 "Report 
of the Select Committee into the Introduction of Native labourers 
frcm beyond the borders of the Colony", 2.
108. Ibid., memorandum by SNA, 5 Nov., 1872.
109. Natal Blue Books, 1871-73, "Agriculture". Figure 1, p. 78.
110. Beyers, "Indier Vraagstuk", 75-76; Leverton, "Government 
Finance", 184, 226. In an appeal to up.country labour needs, it 
was stipulated that after completing their five year indentures, 
Indian workers would not be eligible for a free return passage 
for a futher five years.
111. BPP. 1875 C.1137 Shepstone "Report of the expedition sent by the 
Natal government to instaH Cetewayo", August 1873, 20-21.
112. SNA 1/8/10 Shepstone to Res. magistrates, Durban, Inanda, Tugela 
and Alexandra, 12 Jan., 1874.
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Zululand. His annual salary was fixed at £250 plus £30 for horses
and £20 for his six employees. He was to build five stations
between the Hluhluwe and Tugela rivers offering food and shelter
to migrants along the coastal route to Delagoa Bay and he was to
receive a grant of 6d for each meal provided. The Protector of
Inmigrants in Natal was to provide private recruiters with licences
clearly stating the wages that they offered. The recruiter was
then to have his licence endorsed by Dunn before contracting any
workers. It was hoped that once the feeding scheme had generated
its own momentum, the government would be able to dispense with 
113recruiters. In March 1874 an immigration agent was appointed
at an annual salary of £150 at the Lower Tugela ferry an the
southern end of the coastal route in order to register the names
and tribes of all immigrants on their arrival and send a receipt
to Dunn. He was to send the immigrants to the resident magistrate
in their employer's district. The costs of importing each worker
were then passed an to his enplqyer. The cost of returning hone
114was to be borne by the worker.
Dumg the first 23 months of the Dunn scheme sane 5 837
amatonga workers were introduced into Natal at a cost to the
115government of £1 394 or an average of 4sl0d per immigrant.
During the first 30 months an estimated 7 800 amatonga migrants
entered Natal while 5 758 left the colony by way of the Lcwer 
116Tugela ferry. Although the Dunn feeding scheme offered protection
113. SNA 1/1/23 Dunn to SNA, 16 Sept., 1873 and 24 Oct., 1873.
114. SNA 1/1/24 Protector of Immigrants to W.P. Jackson, 20 March
1874; NGG 3 March 1874, notice 63 signed by Protector of 
Immigrants, 24 Feb., 1874; CSO 665. 4069/78 SNA to Dunn, 29 
Oct., 1873 encl. in P.I. to Col. Sec., 27 Nov., 1874.
115. SNA 1/1/27 no. 15 P.I. memo, 18 Jan., 1876. The £1 394 was
broken down into Dunn's salary of £600, transit fees £589, 
Jackson's salary £160 and ferry cost £45.
116. These figures are drawn from II. 1/1; CSO 665.4069/78 PI to 
Col. Sec., 27 Nov., 1874; Sessional Papers, Legislative Council 
no 4, "Reports of the Select Committee on the best means of 
introducing labourers frcm beyond the colony", 20 Aug., 1874; 
CSO 556.2728 PI, 9 Oct., 1876. The figures given for Tongas 
leaving the colony are incomplete. The figure given here is
an expression of the available figures for outgoing inmigrants 
as a percentage against incoming inmigrants.
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to emigrant workers, it iirmediately ran into problems when 
employers lost money invested in the importation of workers, when 
the latter, having arrived safely in Natal, either deserted or were 
lured away by touts. Desertion not only incurred the loss of all 
recruiting overheads, it also ran counter to the Shepstonian syston 
by giving birth to a landless proletariat. As the Protector of 
Immigrants stated,
"although (through amatonga immigration) large additions 
are constantly being made to the male native population 
of the colony, no special supervision is exercised over 
a large and increasing body of strangers whose conduct 
is not checked by any of the local social or property 
considerations which so strongly influence the conduct 
of the resident native population ."117
To prevent desertions, a Legislative Council caimissian reccnmended 
that labourers be made to bear the costs of their own importation 
unless they completed a six month contract. This proved imprac­
ticable and instead, amatonga inmigrants were, in February 1876, 
strictly bound by six month contracts and an extension of the pass
laws, the contravention of which would result in their being
118indentured as refugees for three years.
As amatonga workers came from areas free of colonial control
they were under no compulsion from the Portuguese to emigrate,
nor did the latter have the manpower needed to guard the border in
119order to tax and regulate the emigration of labour. Only at
Lourengo Marques, where the Portuguese were cloistered within their
trading settlement, had they the strength and administrative
120capacity to tax labour passing through the port by sea. Here
the Portuguese were offered an important source of revenue when in
1874 coastal members of the Natal legislature pushed through a
resolution calling upon the government to defray expenses incurred
121in the importation of amatonga labourers by sea.
117. SNA 1/1/22 Protector of Immigrants, minute paper, 6 Dec., 1875.
118. Sessional Papers, Legislative Council no 4, 1874. "Report of 
the Select Committee on the best means of introducing labourers 
from beyond the colony", 20 Aug., 1874; Inmigraticn Notice no 1, 
1876, signed PI, 12 Feb., 1876.
119. AHU. Meg., CG. pasta 31, GLM to GGM, 20 Feb., 1878 in GGM to 
MSMU, 15 March 1878.
120. Natal Mercury, 19 Aug., 1873.
121. Natal Legislative Council, Votes and Proceedings, 18, 1874, 
124-5.
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Maritime Migration
It is difficult to quantify or establish when the maritime
migraticn of workers from Delagoa Bay began. This is because the
coastal schooners operated alcng the coast by Natal hunter-traders
avoided, often with the collusion of the Governor of Lourengo
Marques, Portuguese customs controls. Consequently this form of
migration was considered "illegal" and was not recorded. The
first official mention of maritime migration was made in 1868 when
workers were obliged, because of hostilities in the Delagoa Bay
122hinterland, to travel to Natal by sea. In June 1870 it was
reported in the press that numbers of amatonga workers were arriving
in Natal by schooner and by the end of the year the Natal government
recognized this form of migration as a possible means of solving
123the colony1 s labour shortage. But the following year the governor
of Lourengo Marques cracked down on the emigration of labour on
coastal schooners that refused to pass through the customs post;
the "Bibsy" was stopped with 52 immigrants an board, the "Poe"
carrying about 30 men was threatened with seizure and the "William
Shaw" which on a previous voyage had disembarked 50 workers on the
beach outside Lourengo Marques and had picked up workers on Sheffin
Island, was confiscated when it landed workers up the Maputo 
124river. The difficulties involved in importing labour into
Natal by sea gave rise to settler calls for the Imperial government
to annex Inyak Island, on the southern edge of Delagoa Bay as a
means of circumventing Portuguese and Zulu interference in the
125flew of labour to Natal. Frederic Elton, ostensibly sent to
122. MNE. caixa 697. J.B. Blandy to MNE, 21 Dec., 1868. See also 
BO 27, 9 July 1869. The Portuguese had ealier discouraged 
trade with Natal, see Natal Witness, 26 June 1846 and pp. 170-1.
123. Natal Mercury, 24 June 1870; PO 63/1047 Keate to Kimberley,
8 Dec., 1870.
124. SNA 1/1/19 Leslie to SNA, 25 July 1871; SNA 1/1/21 Elton to 
SNA, 20 Sept., 1871; GH 845 GEM to Elton, 23 Oct., 1871; FO 
63/1049 GLM to Elton in Keate to Kimberley, 7 Nov., 1871; AHU. 
Mog., CG. pasta 28, Ablett to GLM, 27 June 1872 in GLM to 
MSMU, 3 Dec., 1872. See also AHU, Mog., diversos, pasta 1.
125. PO 63/1047 Keate to Kimberley, 22 June 1871; BPP. 1890-91 LVII 
Erskine to SNA, 3 July 1871; SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 28 
July 1871; Elton to SNA, 20 Sept., 1871. See also Natal 
Mercury, surtmary 1870 and Sessional Paper, Legislative Council 
no 4, 1874.
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Lourenpo Marques to negotiate the release of the "William Shaw",
was also ordered to report on the suitability of Inyak Island as
an embarkation point for workers and to familiarize himself with
the density of the population living on the Limpopo and hence on
126its capacity to provide Natal with labour. But opposition frcm 
both the Zulu and the Portuguese prevented any British occupation 
of Inyak and, when in 1872 the question was submitted for inter­
national arbitration, negotiations over the regularization of 
labour migration were opened with the governor-general of Mozambique.
The Portuguese hoped to encourage maritime migration not only 
because of the rise in trade that an increase in coastal vessels 
would bring to their settlements but also because migrants were 
obliged to pay duty on the goods which they brought back frcm Natal
and because the governor was able to levy a 15s "passport fee" an 
127each emigrant. In this way government officials at Lourenpo
Marques, as distinct from traders, were able for the first time
to benefit financially from migrant labour. A 2s re-entry passport
for each migrant had also to be paid to the Portuguese vice-consul
at Port Natal by the owner of any coastal vessel carrying amatonga
workers back to Lourenpo Marques. As the governor of the settlement
influenced chiefs to send or withhold shipments of enigrants, it
is obvious that he too benefitted from, and consequently supported,
128maritime migration. Frcm May 1871 to May 1872, a total of 559 
migrants returned frcm Natal by sea and a similar number probably 
left, although generally frcm the areas outside of Portuguese
129jurisdiction or without the knowledge of the governor-general.
126. Frederic Elton, "Journal of an exploration of the Limpopo river", 
JPGS, vol. 42, 1872; N. Etheringtcn, "Frederick Elton and
the South African factor in the making of Britain's East African 
Bnpire", JICH, IX, 3, 1981.
127. AHU. M09., CG. pasta 29, GGM to Lt-gov., Natal, 7 March 1875 
encl. in GG to MSMU, 17 March 1875; MNE caixa 663 Duprat to MNE 
19 Jan., 1874; SNA 1/1/95 St. V. Erskine to SNA, 3 July 1871;
FO 63/1026 Elton to Beaumont, 1 Aug., 1874 encl. in Pine to 
Carnarvon, 13 Aug., 1874.
128. MNE caixa 697 W. Peace to GGM, 19 June 1872; 20 Jan., 1873; FO 
63/1049 Elton to SNA, 20 Sept., 1871 in Keate to Kimberley, 7 
Nov., 1871.
129. B.O. 16, 19 April 1873; B.O. 28, 11 July 1878. See also FO 
63/1047 Col. Sec. to Keate, 15 Sept., 1871 and note 133.
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Many of these workers were bound by their recruiters for two year
periods at wages of 13s4d per month, in exchange for capitation 
130fees of £3. The apparent success of this flow of labour by sea
gave rise to calls for the Natal government to participate in its
organization.131
In August 1872 the governor-general of Mozambique and the Lt-
govemor of Natal agreed to submit the question of organized
maritime migration to their respective Imperial governments and in
order to pressurize the British government, the governor-general
132of Mozambique suspended all maritime emigration. However, a
"large" maritime emigration continued "illegally" with the
connivance of the governor of Lourengo Marques who was the chief
recipient of the 15s "passport fee" and it was only after the
latter's dismissal in June 1873 that emigration by sea was
133effectively prohibited. The Portuguese vice-consul in Natal
considered this to be one of the prime causes for the scarcity of
134labour in Natal in 1873. But the Portuguese prohibition proved 
more formal than real when in August 1873 a "large number" of 
Delagoa Bay inmigrants were landed in Durban. The following month 
negotiations undertaken by a special envoy sent by the Natal planters 
resulted in the removal of all restrictions and on 23rd September 
the Natal Mercury reported that Delagoa Bay "natives are flowing 
in, in considerable numbers". But the following month labour 
migration was again prohibited and it became evident that without 
a formalized agreement, Natal labour would become dependent upon
130. Natal Mercury, 2 May 1871; 1 July 1871; 4 July 1871; 30 Dec., 
1871.
131. Natal Mercury, 2 May 1871; Sessional Papers, Legislative Council 
no 12, 1872 "Report of the Select Committee on the Introduction 
of Native Labourers from beyond the Borders of the Colony", 2.
132. AHU. Mog., CG. pasta 28. Lt-govemor Natal to GGM, 7 Aug., 1872.
133. AHU. Mog., CG. pasta 28. GGM to MSMU, 30 Oct., 1871; GGM to 
MSMU, 3 Dec., 1872; GGM to MSMU, 27 May 1873; GQ4 to MSMU, 7 June 
1873; GGM to Lt-govemor, Natal, 3 June 1873; GH. 845. GQ1 to 
Lt-govemor, Natal, 3 June 1873.
134. MNE. caixa 663. W. Peace to MNE, 29 Dec., 1873 in Duprat to 
MNE, 17 Feb., 1874.
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135the whims of the governor of Lourengo Marques.
Because of the critical shortage of labour, the Natal planters 
were prepared to accept any Portuguese conditions. But the Foreign 
Office was more cautious because of the constant pressure from 
humanitarians who felt that maritime labour schemes were synonymous 
with the slave trade. In order to counteract this impression and 
to coax the Portuguese, the British envisaged that migrants would 
be conveyed by steamship.
The Portuguese had first approached the Union Steam Ship Co. 
in 1864 to extend its services from Natal to the capital of Mozam­
bique Island but the terms offered had been rejected as too expen­
sive. But in 1873 the U.S.S. Co. extended its services to Zanzibar 
and offered to call at several Mozambican ports and at Madeira an 
the way frcm South Africa to Lisbcn. This premised to link 
Mozambique with international shipping routes and ensure trade 
openings and regular contacts with Lisbon. However, the entire 
plan was contingent upon the Portuguese allowing the U.S.S. Co.
to carry voluntary emigrants fron Lourengo Marques to Natal at a
137passage fee of 20s each. The British government enticed both
parties by agreeing to liberate slaves, taken in the Mozambican
channel, at Mozambique Island. A passage fee of £5 would be paid
to the U.S.S. Co. for the delivery of these liberated slaves to
Natal as well as a passport fee of 15s payable to the Portuguese
138authorities at Mozambique Island.
In March 1874 the Portuguese Foreign Office agreed to allow a 
free flow of labour by sea if the British would appoint a Protector 
of Inmigrants at Lourengo Marques to prevent the overloading of
135. Natal Mercury, 19 Aug., 1873; 23 Sept., 1873; 7 Oct., 1873.
136. MNE. caixa 663. Duprat to MNE, 11 Sept., 1873; Sessional Ppaer, 
Papers, Legislative Council no 4, 1874, Enfield to Colonial 
Office, 21 March 1873; GH 837 Elton to Brackenburg, 4 Aug., 
1875.
137. AHU. Mog., CG. pasta 24, Duprat to MSMU, 8 Sept., 1865; MNE
caixa 663. Duprat to MNE, 11 Sept., 1873; Duprat to MNE, 19
Jan., 1874; M. Murray, Union Castle Chronicle 1853-1953, 67;
see also John S. Galbraith, Mackinncn and East Africa, 1878- 
1895, 41.
138. MNE. codice 264 Sec. State to Br. Ambassador, Lisbon, 30 March 
1874.
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vessels and to ensure the fair recruiting and safe embarkation of 
anigrant labourers. In an appeal to the humanitarian interests 
which had pressurized the Foreign Office into handing over respon­
sibility for the maritime Inmigration scheme to the Natal government 
the committee stressed that the introduction of steamship canmuni- 
cations with the Portuguese would increase legitimate trade, that 
the steamers would participate in anti-slavery activities and that
labour migration to Natal presented Africans with an alternative
139source of incane to the slave trade.
In January 1875 Frederic Elton who had served the previous year
in a temporary capacity as Natal*s Protector of Immigrants, was sent
to Mozambique Island to negotiate with the governor-general the
i.
terms of the special committee1 s report, which had been endorsed
by the Legislative Council. Elton was an ardent imperialist and
it was largely through his endeavours that control over the labour
supply from Delagoa Bay came to parallel the Bay's strategic
140importance in Carnarvon's federation schemes. The governor-general
of Mozambique expressed his willingness to allcw the resumption of
maritime migration between Lourengo Marques and Port Natal but
stressed that final confirmation of any organised scheme would have
to come frcm Lisbon. Nevertheless in 1874 sane 1 542 migrants
141returned to Lourengo Marques by sea. In January 1875, U.S.S. Co.
vessels started to call at Lourengo Marques each month and in July
and August the governors of Natal and Mozambique issued decrees
regulating the maritime movement of labour between Lourengo Marques
and Natal. An 11s passport fee had to be paid to the Portuguese
for each emigrant worker, passage by sea was to cost 15s with an
extra ls6d for the cost of "guarding and superintending" and
preventing labour frcm "running away" while awaiting embarkation.
On arrival the inmigrants would be checked by the Natal Protector of
Immigrants and only after 48 hours, would be assigned to their
142employers at a cost of between £3.10s and £4. Contracts
139. Sessional Papers, Legislative Council no 4, 1874 "Report of the 
Select Committee on the best means of introducing labourers from 
beyond the colony", 20 Aug., 1874.
140. Norman Etherington, "Labour Supply", 249-50; Etherington, "Frederic 
Elton", 257-8, 260, 262-3. On the strategic importance of Delagoa 
Bay to Carnarvon's federation plans, see Axe Ison, Portugal & the 
Scramble for Africa (Johannesburg, 1967), 12-15.
141. Monthly figures are to be found in the Boletim Oficial de Mozambique.
142. Portaria no 152 of 2 Aug., 1875 in BO 32, 7 Aug., 1875; Inmigra- 
tion Notice no 4 of 1875, NGG, 6 July 1875.
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were to be for 2 to 3 years at monthly wages of 10s. Elton was
immediately critical of these lew wages and warned that inmigrants
would desert if they were not paid the current Natal rate of wages
143for Africans of 12s to 16s per month. Humanitarians in Britain
and France were critical of the scheme because of the encouragement
144that it would give to the slave trade. But the Foreign Office 
agreed to sanction the scheme if properly supervised.
The Natal labour agent operating frcm Lourengo Marques proposed 
drawing labour through the settlement frcm numerous chief dams an 
both sides of the Limpopo, fromSekhukhunein the south to the Banyai 
in the north and Tonga in the east. He wanted to make Modjadji's 
capital the centre of his recruiting catchment but was convinced 
that
"In no other part of South Africa is the country so densely 
populated by natives, as that portion lying between the 
Limpopo river and the amaSwazi tribe, and as they possess 
very few cattle, they are consequently more disposed to 
work."145
The total cost of imparting each worker was estimated to be £4.2s6d.
This compared favourably with the high cost of importing Indian labour,
which in 1875 stood at £16. The Natal authorities were afraid
however that whereas Indians were indentured for five years, foreign
African labour would desert if contracted for periods longer than
six months. Without a fixed and reliable core of workers, the
146farmers were unable to plan ahead. Nevertheless, in July 1875 the 
Protector of Immigrants called for applications and bonds from
143. GH 837 Elton to Brackenburg, 4 Aug., 1875; PO 63/1026 Elton 
to FO, 9 Aug., 1875.
144. Anti-Slavery Reporter, 1 April 1876; V. Schoelcher, Restauration 
de la Traite des Noirs d Natal (Paris, 1877). The French were 
particularly aggrieved as British complaints ended a similar 
French-run emigre scheme from northern Mozambique to Reunion and 
the Ccmores. For the latter, see P. Harries, "Slavery, social 
incorporation and surplus extraction: the nature of free and 
unfree labour in south-east Africa", JAH, 22, 1981, p. 317, note 33.
145. GH 1050. Shires to SNA, 7 April 1875. For a similar opinion, 
see MNE, caixa 664, R.T. Hall in Duprat to MNE, 28 Sept., 1877.
146. GH 1050. annotation on Shires to SNA, 13 April 1875. See also 
Natal Mercury, 22 Aug., 1871.
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prospective employers of irrmigrant workers brought by sea from 
147Lourengo Marques. But the untimely death of the labour
agent ended active recruiting schemes and the Natal government 
was obliged to make the terms of employment offered to migrants 
more attractive. Runners were sent to the chiefs in the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland announcing that immigrant workers would receive 
current Natal wages, that they could choose their own employers 
and that contracts were to be fixed at 2 to 3 years. The costs 
of introducing workers would be limited to between £2.10s and 
£3.2s.148
In November 1875 a Protector of Inmigrants was appointed at
Lourengo Marques by the Natal government at an annual salary of
£300 plus £30 for a messenger-cum-translator. The Protector
gained an extra inccme as local agent for the U.S.S. Co. and a fee
of ls6d for feeding, "guarding and superintending" and prohibiting
149the "running away" of migrants before embarkation. Workers
were sent to Natal on two to three year contracts at wages of 15s
per month. On receipt of the worker the employer paid the
Protector of Inmigrants in Natal £2.10s and, if the worker completed
his contract the employer was obliged to pay the worker's £1.4s 
150return fare. The return passage to Lourengo Marques was over­
crowded and far frcm comfortable. One traveller recounted
"the passage was very rough for nearly the whole of the 
journey and the stench from the natives was unbearable 
at times. Several of the natives died and were imme­
diately consigned to the fishes below and the vessel 
reached Delagoa Bay after sane miserable days and 
nights."151
147. Government Notice 208 of 1875; GH 846 GLM to Lt-govemor, 3 
July 1875.
148. FO 63/1026 Elton to emigration agent, 20 Oct., 1875; Elton to 
PI, 25 Oct., 1875.
149. Elton, 28 Jan., 1875 in NGG., 16 March 1875; GH 829 Elton to 
PI, 25 Oct., 1875.
150. AHU. Mog., OG. pasta 30, PI., B.P. Lloyd to emigration agent,
T. Thompson, 17 Dec., 1875 encl. in GG to MSMU, 17 Jan., 1876; 
Natal Immigration Notice no. 6 of 30 Nov., 1875; FO 63/1026 
Elton to PO, 30 March 1876.
151. Costello, 1874!, pp. 9-10. See also W. Joest, Urn Afrika, 204-5.
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Workers who generally formed "family parties" in which they
returned hone overland often sent their earnings with selected
friends or relatives by sea to Lourengo Marques. Traders and labour
recruiters, who travelled to Lourengo Marques by sea and returned
hone overland with their charges all took advantage of the maritime 
152labour scheme. Although a small number of emigrants paid their 
own passage and passport fees and consequently could choose their 
own employers, the vast majority of emigrant workers were discouraged 
frcm travelling to Natal by sea because of the difficulties involved 
in choosing a specific form of work and employer and by the long 
contracts that they were obliged to enter into. But numerous workers 
took advantage of the maritime scheme when, having saved sufficient 
money in Natal, they were able to afford to pay for the security of 
a return passage and the various duties on goods taken into Lourengo 
Marques. Thus in 1875-76 about 2 884 workers returned heme to 
Lourengo Marques by sea.^"^
Mozambican labour in the Western, Eastern and North-Western Cape
Natal's success in procuring labour through Delagoa Bay attracted
the attention of other areas desirous of obtaining cheap labour.
A large part of the western Cape's work force had long been drawn
frcm the area today known as Mozambique. South-east Africa had
provided the western Cape with a large number of slaves during the
15417th and 18th centuries. Bo Hewing the prohibition on the
152. Legislative Council Sessional Paper no 12, 1872 "Report of the 
Select Caimittee on the Introduction of Native labourers from 
beyond the Colony"; Ibid., no 4, 1874 "Report of the Select 
Ccmmittee to consider the best means of introducing labourers 
frcm beyond the colony, 20 Aug., 1874; 1.1. R211/75 Jackson to 
PI., 12 May 1875.
153. The B.O. recorded the number of "black passengers" or "free 
blacks" enbarking or disenbarking at Lourengo Marques, see esp. 
B.O. 1, 2 Jan., 1875. See also 1.1. 1/4.751/8 Bennet to Lt- 
govemor, 16 Feb., 1878.
154. F. Bradlow and M. Cairns estimate 26.65% of all slaves brought
to the Cape during the Dutch East India Company period, were
of African origin, The Early Cape Muslims, 102. N. Worden has
shewn that as the supply of slaves from the East declined
the percentage of Mozambican slaves living in the Stellenbosch 
district increased from 3.4% in 1722-39 to 16.2% in 1790-99, 
"Rural slavery in the western districts of the Cape Colony 
during the 18th century" (PhD., Cambridge, 1982),159.
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importation of slaves in 1808, wheat and wine farmers in the western
Cape became particularly dependent for their labour on slaves
liberated at Cape Town by the anti-slavery squadron. During the
Napoleonic wars a total of 2 032 "prize Negroes", captured frcm
British and French slavers, were landed at the Cape and indentured
155for period of up to 14 years. Over the next two decades a
further 200 slaves were released and indentured for 14 years when
the vessels in which they were carried ran aground at the Cape or
156were impounded for illegally importing slaves. Together with 
27 "free blacks", who were taken to the Cape when the British
abandoned Mcmbassa in 1826, these men were not considered to be
„ . „ 157"prize negroes".
In 1839 the British arrogated to thanselves the right to search
all Portuguese and stateless vessels and in 1844 a mixed British
and Portuguese anti-slavery canmissian was established at Cape 
158Town. Fran 1839 to 1846, sane 3 903 "prize negroes" were landed
at the Cape but, as the slave trade came to be dominated by dhows
operating between the African coast and the Indian Ocean islands and
as the anti-slavery squadron increasingly released slaves taken frcm
these vessels at Mauritius, the Seychelles, Zanzibar and elsewhere,
159this source of labour dried up. However, although only 60 slaves
155. CA/CO 414/6 p. 321. "Vice-admiralty court sentences under the 
slave trade abolition act"; for annual breakdown by vessel, see 
CO 48/64 Cape Fiscal to governor, 23 March 1824, pp. 79-85, 87- 
115, 118-134.
156. CA/GH.28/1 enclosure to despatch 45, court of ccmmissioners, 24 
April 1808; 00 48/64 Cape Fiscal to Governor, 23 March 1824.
One hundred and eleven slaves were released in 1808 and two other 
shipments, whose numbers were not declared, were landed in 1808 
and 1819.
157. Adm. l/70.Cmndr. Christian to Sir Lowry Cole, 23 Sept., 1826; 
Reginald Coupland, East Africa and its Invaders, 270; C.C. 
Saunders, "Prize Negroes at the Cape of Good Hope", typescript, 
UCT, 1979.
158. P. Harries, "Slavery, social incorporation and surplus extrac­
tion", 316-317.
159. FO 84/515. no 13. Mixed Carmission to Aberdeen, 7 March 1844;
FO 84/566 Mixed Carmission to Aberdeen, 1 Jan., 1845; FO 312/13 
Mixed Canmissian to Aberdeen, various correspondence; F0 312/14 
Mixed Carmission to Aberdeen, 9 April 1846; CA/LCA 15 no 5. 
Napier minute, 30 Jan., 1844.
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were freed at the Cape between 1846 and 1858, "prize negroes" remained
an important potential source of labour and in 1862 the Cape
parliament declared its willingness to contribute £5 000 in
160passage or bounty money towards their reintroduction. This was
refused by the Imperial government and, although one shipment of 181
was landed in 1864, prize negroes dried up as a source of labour
for the western Cape and the mixed coimissicn was dissolved in 
1611870. These prize negroes constituted, with the descendents of
the old Mozambican slaves, what became kncwn locally as the Mozbieker
community, several of whose members acted as guides and translators
for scientific, trading and colonizing expeditions sent frcm the
162Cape to "open up" the Mozambican hinterland.
Voluntary and uncontracted amatonga workers also made their
way overland to the Cape where they were readily absorbed into
the Mozbieker community. During the 1860s depression in Natal, a
number of amatongas sought new markets on which to sell their 
163labour. Soon after the establishment of the Dunn feeding scheme
in February 1874, the Natal Mercury complained that labour brought
into Natal at the cost of the Colonial government was lured away
by the high wages paid to construction workers on the Cape railways
164and to stevedores at Algoa Bay.
In 1875 the emigration agent stationed at the Lower Tugela
ferry reported that during one month, 7% of the 154 amatonga workers
165leaving Natal had worked in the Cape. Shires, the ill-fated
160. CA/HA. 53 "Report of the carmittee ... cn the subject of the 
introduction of Negro immigrants, 6 August 1862"; SA Advertizer 
and Mail, 6 Aug., 1862; FO 312/17 Mixed Canmissian to Russel,
18 Sept., 1862.
161. Reports of the Department of Native Affairs, 1863-71, vol. 1, 
Newcastle to Wodehouse, 10 Oct., 1862; FO 312/17 Mixed Canmissian 
to Russell, 20 Sept., 1864; PO 312/18 Mixed Canmissian to 
Clarendon, 30 June 1870.
162. G.S. Preller, Piet Retief, iewensgeskiedenis van die grote 
Voortrekker, 321; A. Delagorgue, Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe, 
463; W. Owen, Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of 
Africa, Arabia and Madagascar.
163. SNA 1/1/19 annot. Lt-govemor on Goodliffe to SNA, 7 June 1869.
164. Natal Mercury, 3 Oct., 1874; 8 Oct., 1874.
165. II. 1/16. 819 Thompson to PI, 4 Feb., 1877.
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labour recruiter for the Natal maritime immigration scheme com­
plained that recruiters fran the Diamond Fields and the Cape were 
able to offer as much as quadruple the wages stipulated by the Natal 
government and that chiefs like Modjadji were unwilling to allow 
their followers to work for less than the Cape rate. The Natal 
labour agent at Lourengo Marques complained in a similar way that 
his counterpart fran the Cape was able to offer monthly wages of 
30s, twice the existing Natal rate. It was generally recognized 
that competition for labour between the Cape, Natal and Diamond
Field employers brought about a significant rise in the wages offered
166in the supply areas. Other workers avoided recruiters and
contracts by selling their labour directly on the market, such as
a party of 70 amatanga workers which was reported in 1876 to have
167left Natal for the Cape along the coastal Pondoland route.
166. SNA 1/1/27 PI memo, 18 Jan., 1876; SNA 1/1/27 R. du Bois to 
SNA, 25 March 1876; 1.1. 1/3 R441 Natal emigration agent, 
Lourengo Marques to PI, 8 Oct., 1877.
167. SNA 1/1/27 no 47, Supt. Police to SNA, 2 March 1876. See also 
no. 60, du Bois to SNA, 3 April 1876.
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MOZAMBICAN MIGRANTS IN 
KIMBERLEY, THE CAPE AND NATAL
In the Cape, the economic upsurge of the 1870s that followed
the diamond discoveries brought with it a vastly increased demand
for labour. In August 1875 the Eastern District and Western
Railways needed 1 000 Black workers to whom they were prepared to
pay 2s per day if they agreed to sign a two year contract. Two
years later, between 8 400 and 9 300 Blacks were employed on rail-
2
way construction in the Cape. The high wages on the railways 
drew workers off the farms and led to renewed demands that the 
Cape government, because of this intervention in the labour market,
3
should import labour for private and government employment. The
need for foreign labour was compounded by the successful way in
which local African agriculturalists responded to new market
opportunities for produce and consequently refused to sell their
4
labour for extended periods.
The first attempt by the Cape Prime Minister to deal directly 
with the governor-general of Mozambique in order to secure workers 
for the railways was rerouted through the Imperial government by
5
Elton, who was by this stage British consul at Mozambique Island. 
The Portuguese, ever hopeful of benefitting from the labour lying 
behind their coastal settlements, were quick to seize on this
1. TA. A180. CPWD. Merriman to Levy, 26 Aug., 1875.
2. A.J. Purkiss, "The Politics, Capital and Labour of Railway 
Building in the Cape Colony, 1870-85" (D.Phil., Oxfor^’ 1978), 327-38 
389.
3. Annexures to House of Assembly, G. 5-76, "Report on Immigration 
and Labour Supply for 1875", Purkiss, "Railway Building", 330-31,
334.
4. Purkiss, "Railway Building", 371-77, 345, 346, 381-92; C. Bundy,
The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry, 65-107, 110.
5. PO 63/1026 Elton to PO, 29 Dec., 1875; PO 63/1039 PO to Elton,
30 March 1876; Elton to PO, 9 May 1875.
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potential source of revenue and in July 1876 the decree governing
g
emigration to Natal was extended to the Cape.
Between September and October 1876, eighty-three migrants
were introduced by private recruiters on U.S.S. Co. steamers.
The recruiters were paid a capitation fee of £7 per immigrant and
the wsrkers were guaranteed a monthly wage of 30s in return for a
7
one year contract. These costs to employers compared favourably 
with the generally accepted local capitation fee and daily wage 
for Black labourers of £12 and 2s6d respectively and were 
considerably lower than the high daily wages of 7s paid to exper­
ienced white navvies whose introduction into the colony involved
g
a further expenditure of £19.4s. But when the Cape established 
a government labour agency at Lourengo Marques the private 
importation of labourers was halted and, from November 1876 to 
February 1877, 327 workers were imported by the Cape government 
to work on the railways. These men were engaged on one year 
contracts at 30s per month but because they were recruited before 
the implementation of the decree of 18 July 1876, they were not
9
eligible for return passages. Frcm April to December 1877 a
further 392 labourers left Lourengo Marques to work on the Cape
railways but their contracts we re extended to two years and their
wages were effectively lowered to 25s per month as 3s was deferred
10towards their return passage and 2s was invested in a sick fund. 
These labourers were especially valued by employers because of 
their long-term contracts and because their wages were considerably
6. AHU. Mog ., CG. pasta 30, Barkley, governor of the Cape to GGM,
2 March 1876 in GGM to MSMCJ 17 April 1876; MNE., caixa 434,
Bonham to Corvo, 31 July 1876; MNE., ciaxa 679, MNE to Consul, 
Cape Tcwn, 22 April 1877.
7. Archives of the Portuguese Consulate, Cape Town (CPC), "Mappa 
mostrando o numero de emigrantes, 1 Dec., 1879"; TA. A180. CPWD. 
Merriman to Erskine, 6 April 1876.
8. Annexures to Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly,
A. 12-'90. "Report of the Select Coumittee on the Labour Question", 
appendix E, p.. v, Erskine to Ccmmissioner of Crown Lands (CCL)
20 June 1890.
9. Cgpe Times, 22 March 1877; CPC. Portuguese Consul to Cape Railway 
Engineer, 5 July 1878; "Mappa mostrando o numero de emigrantes'!,
1 Dec., 1879; Consul to Head of the Maritime Health Station. 
Madeira, 26 June 1882.
10. CPC. "Mappa mostrando..."; Consul to GLM, May 1878; Purkiss, 
"Railway building", 378-79.
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lover than the official open market rate of 2s6d per day. The
burden of the £7 capitation fee paid to the Cape labour agent in
Lourengo Marques was shared by the employers and the government
11in the same way as assisted imnigration from England. But 
following the death of the Cape government's labour agent in
12February 1878, immigration fran Lourengo Marques was suspended.
This move was taken because of the improved labour situation
following the importation of almost 4 000 Gaika and Galeka prisoners
taken during the Frontier war of 1878. These people were largely
employed on public works at extranely lew wages that graduated
fran 5s per month after the first six weeks to 10s per month in 
13the third year. The expenses involved in the Frontier war,
drought and the general commercial depression of 1876-78 all combined
to dissuade the Cape government from continuing with the importation
14of relatively costly Delagoa Bay labour. Furthermore, the
Portuguese were unwilling to continue with the labour scheme in
its existing form due to the reluctance of the Cape government
to repatriate the 801 workers already inported or to control their
15movements once their contracts had expired.
But by 1880 the upswing in the economy and the unwillingness
of the Eastern Frontier prisoners of war to remain on Western Cape
farms resulted in the appointment of a select committee to examine
16the Cape's labour problems. Farmers complained that wages 
offered to workers engaged in the construction of railways and
11. II. 1/16. 744 Monteiro - Col. Sec., 24 Feb., 1877 encl. in 
889/78 Hoffman to Macleod, 28 Feb., 1877; Annexures to Votes 
and Proceedings of the House of Assembly A26-'79. "Report of 
the Select Committee appointed to consider and report on the 
state of the labour market", evidence of Fuller, 60.
12. TA. 180. CEVJD. Elliot to Oswald Hoffman, 12 Feb., 1878; to 
Portuguese consul, 14 Feb., 1878; to Secretary, Chamber of 
Commerce, Port Elizabeth, 16 Feb., 1878.
13. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877, GLM district report for 1876-77; BO. 11,
18 March 1878; BO. 52, 30 Dec., 1878, GLM district report for 
1877-78; CA/IA2 - 19; Purkiss, "Railway building", 407-408.
14. TA. 180. CEWD. Elliot to Portuguese consul, 14 Feb., 1878.
15. CPC. Portuguese consul to Q3A, 18 Nov., 1879.
16. CA.HA 154 Stevens, contracting and pass officer to CCL, 5 April 
1880; G.39-'93, "Cape of Good Hope Labour Ccmmission", 1893, 
evidence of Stevens, p. 60.
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dockyards could reach 4s6d per day and consequently both sapped
the farms of their experienced workers and forced labour costs
17to spiral to 25-30% above English agricultural wage levels.
Faun wages were also not competitive with those paid on the Diamond
Fields and this drew both local and immigrant labour away fran the
Western Cape. The labour shortage was worsened by the attraction
of numerous workers to Zululand where the British army paid high 
18wages. Farmers wanted long-term immigrants who, because of
their contracts, would form a core labour force of experienced
workers who would be supplemented by piecemeal labourers during
the labour-intensive pruning, wine-making, ploughing and reaping 
19seasons. It was estimated that farming districts like Paarl
20could take 1 000 irrmigrants. Farmers reported favourably on 
Mozambican labour which, unlike labour drawn from the Eastern
21Frontier, did not return hone and which undercut local wage levels.
The importation of Mozambicans also had the advantage of keeping
the labouring classes black. English agricultural immigrants were
not well thought of as they were expensive to introduce and, through
contact with Black labourers "degenerated and practically turned 
22black.
17. A.26-'79 "Report of the Select Ccnmittee appointed to consider 
and report on the supply of the labour market", evidence Van der 
Byl, p. 18, Vermaak, p. 14, Eksteen, p. 23-24, Van Aarde, p. 28, 
Seul, p. 28, 34, Moodie, p. 41; CPWD. Elliot to Mackay, 24 Jan., 
1880.
18. A.26-'79 "Report of the Select Cortmittee", evidence of Seul, p.
34, Hockley, p. 44, Heathe, p. 50. -
19. A. 12-'90 "Report of the Select Committee on the labour question,
1890".
20. A.26-*79 "Report of the Select Catmittee," evidence of Piton, 
p. 41, Heathe, p. 51.
21. Ibid., evidence of Herzog, pp. 4-5, Bensusan, p. 10, Vermaak, 
pp. 14-15, Lochner, p. 23.
22. Ibid., evidence of Seul/ p. 34, Hockley, p. 45 , Heathe, p. 52.
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The select canmittee advised that "Mozambiques and Delagoa
23Bay natives" as well as "Mantatees" and "Berg Damaras" be imported.
In December 1879 the governor-general of Mozambique was asked to
authorize the renewal of voluntary emigration from Delagoa Bay
to Cape Town. The capitation fee of the Cape agent was lowered to
£6 for each worker landed on a two to three year contract. This
fee included passage money as well as passport and maintenance
costs. While the costs borne by the state were lowered those borne
by employers rose as they paid not only half the cost of introducing
an immigrant, but also a further £1 for his clothing and a blanket.
They were also obliged to provide the Delagoa Bay irmigrant with
24his £2.17s return passage on the completion of his contract.
This renewed immigration was aimed at alleviating the
farmers' labour problons. But farmers were unwilling to pay the
wage rates of 15s and 25s stipulated by the contracts of the first
batch of 103 inmigrants to arrive in November 1879. The immigration
agent was then ordered to procure labour at 15s per month but was
cnly able to obtain "youths" of under the age of twenty at this 
25wage. Young men were preferred by farmers as they were cheaper 
and could be more easily trained. They were also more likely to 
form social links in the work area and therefore renew expired 
contracts. Fran July 1880 "Delagoa Bay natives" were obliged to
23. "Mozambiques" was a synonym for Mosbiekers. "Mantatees" was a 
generic term applied to such diverse people as Venda- speaking 
followers of Magato and Pedi immigrants. Ibid., p. 59; Annexures 
to Votes and Proceedings, C2-192 "Report of the Select Committee 
on the labour question", evidence of Frost, p. 49. Berg Damaras 
were cattle Damaras who had been divested of their cattle and 
forced into the mountains for protection. Seme 400 Berg Damara 
were introduced between 1879-82 at a capitation fee of £12
per famly or £5 per man. A.26-'79 "Report of the Select Canmittee", 
pp. 63-5; TA.180. CPWD. Elliot - Ohlssan, 27 Sept., 1879; B.
Lau, "A Critique of the Historical Sources and Historiography 
relating to the "Damaras" in Pre-Colonial Namibia" (BA., Hons,
1979).
24. FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO, 2 Dec., 1879; CPC. Consul to MSMU,
7 May 1880; TA. A. 180. CPWD. McNaughton to Chairman, De Beers,
18 March 1881, to Thcmpscn, 5 July 1881.
25. IAC-21 "Lists of native labourers arrived from Lourengo Marques, 
November 1879 to May 1882". I have accepted the figures drawn 
from the original contracts rather than those in HA. 154, Con­
tracting and Pass Officer to Commissioner for Crown Lands (CCL),
5 April 1880; TA. A180 CPWD. Elliot to De Cdster, 15 Dec., 1879.
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26accept the 15s wage paid to "youths" and, importantly, their
27contracts were extended to three years. An examination of the
contracts entered into with these labourers indicates that,
although they were shipped from Lourengo Marques, most were drawn
frcm the Inhambane interior.
Whereas many early immigrants introduced into the Cape frcm
the Portuguese coastal settlement were described as locals or
"Pecuanas" (Bechuanas), after July 1880 the vast majority of
recruits were denoted as Tshanganes /Changanys /Gazas /Chobis or
Inhambanes. Thus the reduction in the wage paid to "Delagoa Bay
natives" can be attributed to the extension of the recruiting
frontier north of the Limpopo; an area portrayed in 1875 as free
28of canpetition between labour recruiters.
But not all immigrants were recruited. At least 14 paid their
own passage fares to Cape Town and thus, by avoiding any contractual
obligations, were able to sell their labour an the open market.
Similarly, numbers of amatanga purposefully travelled overland fran
Natal in order to avoid entering into contracts which would restrict
their access to the higher wages of over £4 paid to nan-contracted
29labour in areas such as railway construction. The great majority 
of immigrants were contracted to employers in wine-producing areas 
like Stellenbosch and Paarl and, as "general labourers", to 
employers in Cape Town. Large numbers were also sent to the wheat 
producing area of Malmesbury and were employed on the harbour 
works. Very few Delagoa Bay immigrants entered into contracts with 
Eastern Cape farmers although several hundred were employed on the 
Cape Midlands railway and on public works in Port Elizabeth and
26. Ibid., McNaughton to Chairman, De Beers, 18 March 1881; 1 AC-21 
"Lists of native labourers...."
27. Annexures to V&P, G56-'81 Contracting Officer to Ass. CCL, 17
■ Feb., 1881. The contracting officer's rates are marginally
higher than those on the contracts in IAC 21, "Lists of native
labourers..."
28. II. 1/1.R496 Shires to SNA, 26 Aug., 1875; Annexures to V&P, 
C2-'92 "Report of the Select Canmittee on the Labour Question, 
1892", evidence of Stevens, p. 12.
29. IAC. 10 to 12, various shipments; SNA 1/3127 RM Tugela to SNA,
| 17 April 1876; CSO 2555.c32 RM Durban to SNA, 27 July 1881;
j JSA file 74, p. 66, evidence of Majuba.
i
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East London. The Cape Copper Mining Company of Namaqualand employed
30almost 200 Delagoa Bay immigrants.
By February 1881 the demand for "Delagoa Bay" labour slackened
31due to the arrival of more than 2 000 workers after October 1879. 
Although the Cape was sliding into a depression and 11% of all 
Imported African labour was unemployed, in March the labour importa­
tion experiment was still considered to be "attended with good 
32success". In June the U.S.S. Co. gave notice of its intention 
to discontinue its Delagoa Bay run and it was feared that this
33would "considerably increase" the costs of labour immigration.
By July it was felt that
"the supply of Delagoa Bay labour is fitful and, what 
is more, extremely untrustworthy ... labourers frcm 
that part of Africa have little or no sense of the 
meaning of a contract, and give endless trouble by 
their habit of desertion ... It is more than doubtful 
whether they would continue to work at contract rate 
in the immediate vicinity of more highly priced
labour."34
In October the last U.S.S. Co. steamer returned fran Lourengo 
Marques with 150 workers and three weeks later the immigration 
scheme was suspended. The official reason was the high rate of 
desertion for, "very soon after their arrival (Delagoa Bay natives) 
discover that higher wages are to be earned than those for which
30. IAC 10 to 12 contains the contracts entered into by seme 2 400 Dela­
goa Bay immigrant workers. These show area of origin, employer, 
period of contract and wage and give the ages of some 500 
workers. See also Annexures to V&P, G64-'82 "Report of the 
Superintendent of Immigrants", 1882; TA. A. 180 CPWD. McNaughton
to Irvine, 17 Sept., 1881, to De Coster, 4 Oct., 1881, to King 
and Son, 21 Nov., 1881.
31. Annexures to V & P, G56-'81 Contracting officer to Ass. CCL, 17 
Feb., 1881.
32. TA. A. 180. CPWD. McNaughton to Chairman, De Beers, 18 March 1881.
33. Ibid., McNaughton to secretary, De Beers, 18 June 1881. When 
the Castle Packet Co. offered to carry immigrant workers from 
Delagoa Bay in 1884, the "normal" passage fee was given as 
£6.10s. The special fee for workers ranged from £4 to £4.10s.
This compared unfavourably with the original fare of £2.17s.
IAC 3 Messrs Anderson and Murrison to contracting officer, 10 
Sept., 1884.
34. TA. A. 180. CTWD. McNaughton to secretary, De Beers, 3 July 1881.
58
they have been engaged and many of them abscond in search of more
35remunerative employment."
According to one report, by April 1881, some 6% of all
36Delagoa Bay workers introduced by the Cape government had deserted.
The financial losses to farmers caused by these desertions and
the inability of the government to prevent them caused much
bitterness. Sane farmers attempted to discourage desertion by
paying workers on a sliding scale, increasing frcm 15s in the first
year to 25s in the third. For similar reasons, payment of a part
of the worker*s monthly wages was sometimes deferred until the
expiration of his contract. This seems to have been an informal
arrangement started in 1881 but was only included in contracts in
May 1882 when 5s of the monthly wage of 15s was withheld until the
37worker had completed his 3 year contract.
In January 1882 smallpox first broke out in Cape Town and
in June a major outbreak was transmitted by Delagoa Bay workers
employed on the dockyard. This gave rise to the fear that immigrant
workers were spreading the disease and, with Lourerxjio Marques
declared an infected port, all maritime immigration was halted and
38the Cape labour agent left Lourengo Marques for Natal. But the
smallpox epidemic of 1882 merely formalized the end of maritime
labour immigration for the last major shipment of workers left
Delagoa Bay in October 1881. The reasons for the decline in maritime
emigration to the Cape should be seen in terms of the fall in state
revenue and rise in unemployment that accompanied the drought and
39depression of the early 1880s and the loss of recruiting
35. Ibid., McNaughton to De Coster, 4 Oct., 1881; McNaughtcn to De 
Coster, 24 Oct., 1881.
36. CA.HA.167 Contracting officer, "Return of numbers of foreign 
labourers", 11 April 1881.
37. CPC. Consul to contracting officer, 7 Sept., 1882; CPC. Ccnsul to 
MSMCJ, 11 Sept., 1882; Annexures to V & P, C2-*92, "Report of
the Select Canmittee on the Labour Question", evidence of 
Stevens, p. 11; G64-*82 "Report of the Superintendent of 
Immigrants for 1881"; IAC. 12 shipment 33.
38. CSO 862.2451 Health officer, Durban to Col. Sec., 28 May 1882; 
Annexures to V & P, G58-*84 "Report of the superintendent of 
Immigrants, 1882".
39. V. B ickford-Smith, "Dangerous Cape Tcwn - middle class attitudes 
to poverty in Cape Tcwn in the late nineteenth century", Cape 
Town History Workshop, 1981, p. 19-20; Purkiss, "Railway 
Building", 412.
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overheads incurred by desertion. Simultaneously, new sources of
local labour became available for, as Purkiss has shown, in the
decade following 1875 the terms of employment "turned drastically"
against peasants who supplemented rural production with wage
labour. Thus two successive droughts, depressions and Frontier
wars, together with increased taxation, coercive pass and vagrancy
laws and the growing social stratification of the African peasantry
all combined to swell the numbers of migrants and permanently
proletarianized Black labourers in the Cape and increased the dependence
40of others on wage labour for their subsistence.
Maritime immigration fran Lourengo Marques to Cape Town 
ended in May 1883 with the landing of a final shipment of 27 
workers. A total of 3 202 men had been officially Imported since 
the initiation of the scheme. Of these, Very few took advantage 
of the return passage guaranteed by their contracts. In September
411882 only 9% of those eligible for repatriation had returned heme.
A year later this figure had increased to 10,5% and in 1885 it was
stated that only 7% of the total number of immigrants had returned 
42by sea. As virtually all the immigrant workers were young men
in their twenties, it may be assumed that many contracted local
marriages which encouraged them to remain as monthly servants and
day labourers or as farm workers held by the tied liquor and cottage
systems. Evidence placed by farmers before the Cape Canmittee on
the Labour Question in 1890 affirmed that Mozambican labour was
preferred by their fathers because of its permanency. Although
there were "only a few old ones left ... we are new working with
43the cross raised fran them." These men were easily absorbed 
into the community of Mozbiekers, Africans who spoke Low Dutch or 
Bantu languages that were unknown in the Cape. They recognized 
themselves and were classified by the Cape government as a distinct 
racial group.
40. Purkiss, "Railway Building", 409-411, 415-427, 430-431.
41. CPC Consul to MSMU, 11 Sept., 1882.
42. CPC Consul to MSMU, 11 Sept., 1883; Annexures to V & P, G21-’85
Immigration Agent to CCL.
43. Annexures to V & P, A12-'90 Report of the Select Canmittee on 
the Labour Question, evidence of Eksteen, van Reenen, Visser
and Stevens. See also CPP. A26. 1879 "Report of the Select
Committee ... on the supply of the labour market", evidence of 
Herzog, van der Byl, Heathe, Seul.
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Natal faced a renewed demand for labour with the building of
the railway system in the late 1870s. In September 1877, scxne 3 000
men were needed for railway construction but, because planters
complained that the railways were luring away their labour supply,
the Legislature stipulated that 2 000 of these men had to be
imported fran outside the colony by the Natal government railway 
44contractors. As Indian labour was adjudged too expensive these 
labourers were either recruited directly by Natal Government Railways 
labour contractors or subcontracted frcm the 
government. ^
The Natal experiment with maritime labour drawn from Delagoa
Bay proved as abortive as that of the Cape. The labour agent
employed by the Natal government at an annual salary of £300 plus
£30 costs was dismissed when, after 18 months of unsuccessful
canpetitian against Cape recruiters, he had sent only about 600 
46workers to Natal. He was replaced in August 1877 by an official 
employed on a capitation basis of £4 per immigrant landed in Natal. 
This sum included the 26s6d "passport fee" paid to the Portuguese, 
a passage fare of 20s, shipping and landing changes of 5s, 
miscellaneous feeding, "Delagoa Bay expenses" of 18s6d and a 
capitation fee of 10s. A further fee of 13s 3d accrued from immi­
gration depot charges in Durban and consequently, the total cost of
44. II. 1/16 R238 Pollinghome to Col. Sec., 16 April 1877; CSO 
606.3060 Col. Sec. to Lt. Gov., 15 Aug., 1877; Resident Engineer 
to Col. Sec., 13 Sept., 1877; Sessional Papers of the Legislative 
Council no. 38, 1877.
45. C80 656 3122 Inmigration Agent, Lower Tugela to PI, 15 Feb., 1877; 
II. 1/16 839 Railway Contractors to Col. Sec., 2 March 1877;
D.H. Heydenrych, "Natalse Spoorwegbeleid en -konstruksie tot 
1895" (PhD., Stellenbosch, 1981), 84-91.
46. Natal officials claimed that the agent had been unable to recruit 
any workers and this view is supported by official Portugal 
statistics. II. 1/16 819 Thompson to PI, 4 Feb., 1877; II. 1/16 
38 Bennet to PI, 28 Feb., 1877; II. 1/16 889 Col. Sec. annot.,
1 June 1877; BO. 1882, p. 336, "Relagab dos emigrantes que 
foram para o Cabo e Natal e dos que d'ali regressam", 30 Sept.,
1882. However a careful reading of the manifests of vessels 
leaving Lourenpo Marques shows that at least 563 "black 
passengers" or "free blacks" left the harbour between September 
1876 and July 1877. The manifests are contained in the 
Boletim Oficial.
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47importing one Delagoa Bay worker was estimated at £4.13s3d.
On 14 December 1877 it was made public that employers would be 
expected to bear two-thirds of this sum, or £3.2s2d. Because 
disputes over earnings gave rise to work stoppages or desertion, 
wages were contractually fixed at the locally competitive level 
of 20s per month, and, if the worker agreed to a two year contract, 
the employer was obliged to deposit a 24s personal bond with the
48Protector of Immigrants in order to guarantee his return passage.
The importation of labour by sea was disliked by the Immigra­
tion department because of its heavy expense. Between July 1877 and 
October 1878, costsofE218.18s. lid, which had not been budgeted for, 
accrued to the department. These included £103.14s.lid for board 
and lodging of immigrants in the depot as, due to the fluctuating 
demand for labour, they could not be placed immediately. Other 
charges included the £42 wages paid to an interpreter, doctor's 
fees of £50, advertizing costs of £1.4s and the loss of £12 when 
three immigrants deserted before they could be placed with 
employers. Labour costs were also driven up by the competition 
for workers between recruiters working for the Natal overland and
maritime schemes as well as between freelance recruiters and those
50working for the Cape and Natal governments.
The Natal government complained about the excessive fees
charged by the Portuguese which, cnce negotiations over the terms
of labour emigration were concluded, rose frcm 15s to 26s. This
sum was divided between the metropolitan government, which received
the official 11s. passport fee, and the Lourengo Marques authorities
51who received 15s for "clerical fees and stamp taxes." After
47. II. 1/16 243 annot. by Col. Sec., 5 June 1877? annot. by acting 
PI, 24 April 1878.
48. Government notice no. 3, 1878, Natal government gazette (NGG),
1 Jan., 1878; II. 1/4 515 Railways contractors to PI., 30 April, 
1878; C80 677.3811/78 Col. Engineer - Col. Sec., 12 Oct., 1878. 
See also SNA 1/3/27 R171/76 RM Durban - SNA, 9 March 1876.
49. II. 1/19 annot. acting PI., 9 April 1884.
50. SNA 1/1/27 Du Bois to SNA, 22 March 1876? II. 1/3 annot. PI to 
Col. Sec. n.d. on Bennet to PI., 28 Nov., 1877; AHU. Mog., CG. 
pasta 31, GLM to GGM, 24 Jan., 1878 in GGM to MSMU, 15 March 1878
51. GH 837 Elton to Lt. Gov., 23 April 1877? II. 1/16.38 Bennet to 
PI., 28 Feb., 1877; II. 1/16 Mcnteiro to Col. Sec., 16 May 1877;
II. 1/3 509 Bennet to PI., 28 Nov., 1877? AHU. Meg., CG. pasta 32 
British Ambassador, Lisbon to MNE, 10 July 1877 in MNE to MSMU
19 July 1877; MSMU to GGM, 4 Aug., 1877.
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lengthy negotiations/canprcmise was reached which enabled the 
Portuguese to retain the full labour tax in return for the promul­
gation of decree 251 of October 1877, which^ cjave Natal and the 
Cape monopoly access to Delagoa Bay labour.
A cheaper supply of labour was available at Inhambane 
where in August 1877 Reuben Benningfield was appointed labour agent. 
Benningfield had worked for several years as a hunter-trader in 
southern Mozambique, was thoroughly familiar with the area and 
had established good contacts with local chiefs and Portuguese 
officials. Over the next year he sent more than 500 workers to the 
iiimigration depot at Durban for a capitation fee of £3 which,
because the governor of Inhambane waived the 15s clerical and stamp
53tax, was £1 less than the Lourengo Marques capitation fee.
Benningfield also introduced an undisclosed number of workers into
the colony who, because he advanced them their passport fees and
passenger fares, were considered to be free rather than contracted 
54immigrants. Most of the contracted labourers were employed by
the Natal Government Railways which claimed that Inhambane labour
55was procurable at half the cost of that of Delagoa Bay. That
Inhambane labour was imported due to its cheapness was confirmed
by the Protector of Immigrants, who did not want to allcw Inhambane
labour through the immigration depot "as by so doing I am afraid
they will understand the cause of their being brought in, and it
56may tend to cause dissatisfaction among them."
A third source of Mozambican labour that found its way to 
Natal by sea was that of slaves liberated by the British navy. As 
distinct frcm "amaTonga" migrants these so-called "Makuas" were 
mostly drawn frcm northern Mozambique and were not voluntary immi­
grants. Adults were contracted for three to five years and children
52. BO. 41, 8 Oct., 1877; AHU. Mog., CG., pasta 31, GGM to MSMU,
13 Oct., 1877.
53. CSO 608.3282 PI to Col. Sec., 31 Aug., 1877; II. 1/16.889 note 
headed col. sec., (n.d.). For a breakdown of the numbers per 
vessel see II. 1/4, various correspondence.
54. CSO 632 Benningfield to PI, 5 Dec., 1877; II. 1/16 889 Note 
headed Col. Sec., n.d.
55. CSO 608.3283 Natal government Railways (NGR) contractors to 
Col. Sec., 30 Aug., 1877.
56. CSO 632 acting PI to NGR contractors, 2Jan., 1878.
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were indentured until they reached adulthood. They were paid 
graduated wages ranging fran Is per month for girls in their 
first year to 10s per month to adult males in their fifth year of 
service. Although their wages were extremely low the cost of their 
introduction was high as employers had to pay a £6 capitation fee.
The government bore a further cost of £3, as well as other fees 
such a monthly wage of £4.10s paid to a Makua interpreter.
Between 1873 and 1880 sane 587 slaves were taken frcm Zanzibar 
or Mozambique Island and liberated at Durban. While a few dozen 
others were taken to Cape Town where they joined the Mozbieker 
community, these people formed the basis of Natal's "Zanzibari" 
population.57
Voluntary migration by sea was seen by many government 
officials as morally repugnant as it was easy to press-gang into 
emigrating men who were classified as libertos, or slaves obliged 
to undergo a two-year period of indenture before obtaining their
58freedom, as these men had no say in the matter of their emigration.
Following allegations that the government agent at Lourengo Marques
had lured workers to Natal by giving false impressions as to the
terms of their contract the Colonial Secretary informed the
Protector of Immigrants that "Amatonga inmigration by sea appears
to me to be a very questionable mode of supplying the labour 
59market."
The advantage to anployers of labourers introduced by sea 
was that they were prepared to enter into long-term contracts in 
exchange for the security of a free voyage to Natal and a 
guaranteed return passage. Maritime labour immigration also
57. GH 67 PI to Elton, 16 July 1875; II. 1/2. 125 "Return of
Liberated Slaves in the Colony"; II. 1/4.880 Colonial Engineer
to PI, 13 July 1878; II. 1/19 PI to Col. Sec., 4 Nov., 1880;
Z. Seedat, "The Zanzibaris in Durban - a social anthropological 
study of the Muslim descendants of African freed slaves living 
in the Indian area of Chatsworth" (MA, University of Natal, 
Durbai, 1973).
58. Until the status of liberto was abandoned in November 1878, it
was possible to import libertos into Lourengo Marques from
other Portuguese ports. MNE caixa 433, Lytton to Corvo, 7 Oct.,
1875; MNE caixa 434, Morier to De Avila, 24 April 1877; BO. 26,
30 June 1877; AHU. Mog., CG. pasta 32, Curator-General to Corvo,. 
19 Aug., 1877; Report of the Curator-general, 27 Oct., 1880 in 
Curator-general to MSMU, 30 Oct., 1880. In 1862 Inhambane and 
Lourengo Marques still had slave populations of 3 116 and 276 
respectively, BO 23, 7 June 1862; BO 44, 5 Dec., 1862.
59. GH 845 Col. Sec. annot., 11 Sept., 1878; GGM to Lt. Gov., 27
Aug., 1878; II. 1/16.889 Col. Sec., note n.d., 1878.
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allowed Natal to tap new areas of labour and gave a safe passage
to people like various Chopi-speakers who otherwise would not have
been able to reach Natal due to Gaza and Zulu opposition to their south-
60ward passage through Zululand. The major disadvantage was that each
time one of these labourers deserted, the government lost its
immigration subsidy of £1.11s.Id and the employer lost the £3.2s.2d 
61capitation fee. Probably not more than 1 000 amatonga workers
entered Natal by sea between August 1877 and January 1879. Of far
greater importance was the return passage; over 6 000 amatongas
returned home by sea during the three years frcm 1877 to 1879.
Labourers who travelled overland via the Dunn feeding scheme
along the coastal route were mainly Maputos who were regarded as
Zulu subjects. They rarely engaged themselves for more than six
months and avoided the maritime emigration scheme because of its low
62wages and long contracts. Government officials complained that 
as amatonga workers cost the Natal government money to introduce, 
they should be obliged to spend a specific amount of time in Natal
63before moving on to the more lucrative labour markets in the Cape.
Financial losses caused the Natal government to intervene in
the labour market by using the pass laws to prevent desertion. In
November 1878 the government attempted to restrict desertion when
it decreed that all amatonga inmigrants had to purchase a 5s pass
if they wished to leave the colony without having completed a six
month contract. This proved only partially successful as it was
"fairly cannon practice" for lawyers and others to sell passes 
64for 3s. Because the pass law was never strictly implemented,
60. CSO 677.2882 Bennet to PI., 6 Aug., 1878; CSO 682.472 RM. Durban 
to Col. Sec., 27 Nov., 1878. See also II. 1/20 Meikleto PI.,
20 Sept., 1884 and footnote 125.
61. II. 1/3.558 annct.to Col. Sec., 22 Dec., 1877, annot. Col. Sec.,
21 Jan., 1878; CSO 787.3031 PI to Col. Sec., 26 Sept., 1878.
62. CSO 682.472 RM, Durban to Col. Sec., 27 Nov., 1878; PI to NGR 
contractors, Jan., 1879; CSO 820.3293 PI to Col. Sec., 14 Sept., 
1881.
63. SNA 1/1/27 no. 15 PI memorandum, 18 Jan., 1876; SNA 1/3125 R233/76 
RM Upper Tugela to SNA, 25 Feb., 1876 and 29 March 1876.
64. SNA 1/1/59.65 RM Lions River to Advocate, Pietermaritzburg, 19 
Feb., 1883 and enclosures; Circular, Col. Sec. to EMs 13 Nov., 
1878. See also SNA 1/1/59.77 SNA to RM Pietermaritzburg, 28 Feb., 
1888.
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when relations between Zululand and Natal declined in late 1878,
it proved inpossible to prevent large numbers of amatongas from
returning heme. Many deserted through fear of being called up by
the British to fight the Zulus; others returned to protect their
families while yet others returned heme to serve in Maputo regiments
65alongside the Zulu. In December 1878 the Governor of Lourengo 
Marques reported that:
"The large scale emigration from this district and frcm
the lands to the North has ceased completely. Enormous
caravans are to-day returning hone by land and sea, 
almost all were working (in Natal) and enjoying a com­
fortable living. In one month 1 300 have returned by 
sea and more than 5 000 by land."66
The return heme of large numbers of amatonga workers caused
heavy financial losses to employers who had invested capital in their
importation. Thus the Natal Government Railways complained that it
lost "a lot of money" when about 500 Delagoa Bay workers, imported
by the government, deserted due to rumours of war. As about two-
thirds of these men had been brought by sea, each desertion cost
67the Natal Government Railways £4.13s.6d. Desertions represented
large capital losses to other employers of labour, like planters
and to the government because of its subsidization of labour
immigration. Thus because of the heavy capital investment involved
in importing labour by sea, the maritime scheme was halted in late
68October 1878 after the importation of only 840 workers.
By February 1879 all overland immigration had ceased and the 
salaried posts held by Dunn and the immigration agent on the Lower 
Tugela were discontinued. In December the export of labour from 
Inhambane was prohibited as it was not covered by any law and 
because the Portuguese needed to withhold the emigration of their
65. ZGH 699.249 Shepstone minutes, 23 Aug., 1886; KCL. L. Von Wissel, 
"Reminiscences of trading days in northern Zululand, 1895-1919", 2.
66. AHU. Mog., CG., pasta 32. GLM to Conselheiro Director general 
do Ultramar, 25 Dec., 1878. In his district report for 1877-78 
the GLM wrote of the "numerous caravans" going overland to Natal 
and eastern Transvaal goldfields, BO. 52, 30 Dec., 1878.
67. C80 682.472 PI to NGR contractors, Jan., 1879.
68. II. 1/10.530 assistant PI to Col. Sec., 9 June 1882.
66
69dependants due to "unrest" in the area. Article two of the decree 
prohibiting the emigration of labour fran Inhambane significantly 
stipulated that Blacks were not free to emigrate fran the colony, 
for,
"Although Portuguese subjects are completely free to 
emigrate to any country whatever, provided they conform 
to the local regulations, the law does not extend this 
provision to those who are unfit, due to their low 
degree of civilization, to claim their rights and 
privileges as free citizens."70
Article five stated that emigration from Inhambane had not been
"spontaneous", that "secret agents" had operated in the area and that
emigrants had no guarantees as to the terms of their contracts.
In effect this confirmed the principle established in 1875 that all
emigration had to be controlled and taxed by Portugal. It also
underlined the growing awareness of the Portuguese that Black
labour, in its "voluntary" form, was as marketable a carmodity as
slave labour had once been.
Between 1876 and 1878-79 the price of sugar in Natal rose
by almost 30% but, over the same period of time and largely because
71of the Anglo-Zulu war, output dropped by 33%. Planters threatened 
disaster if they were left with insufficient labour for the planting 
season. At its meeting in October 1879, the Victoria Planters' 
Association declared that,
"planting and farming interests are suffering severely 
frcm the want of Kaffir labour principally attributable ^  
to the late war and the non-arrival of amatonga labourers."
They called upon the Lt.-governor to inform chiefs that the war had 
ended and to resume the government inmigration schemes.
Attempts to reduce the cost of labour immigration schemes 
proved difficult. The Lower Tugela labour agency, which had fallen
69. GH 837 Br. Cons, to Lt. Gov., 12 Jan., 1880; PO 84/1539 Br. Cons, 
to PO, 10 Dec., 1879; PO 84/1616 Azvedo to Nunes (n.d.) in Br. 
cons, to PO, 14 Feb., 1882.
70. BO. 50, 15 Dec., 1879. In 1877 there were no restrictions on the 
emigration of free Blacks, AHU. Mog., CG., pasta 32, GGM to 
MSMU, 13 Oct., 1877.
71. Natal Blue Books 1876-1879, "Agriculture". See p. 78 r figure 1.
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under the Protector of Immigrants, was not renewed and considerable
confusion arose over departmental responsibility when the agent's
duties were transferred to the Border Agent who was reponsible to
the Secretary for Native Affairs. In December 1879 Dunn was
reappointed to his position as Protector of Immigrants in Zululand but
at a capitation fee of 5s per worker rather than on a salaried basis
which amounted to an effective increase in his incane of 2d per 
73irrmigrant. Five stations ware used, two in Dunn's territory at
Manyeti and Ungoye, another at Inbabe under Mlandela and a further
station under Somkeli on the Umfolozi. The northernmost station
was built on the Hluhluwe river. Migrants were given a pint of
maize at each shelter, and two shelters were equipped with grinding
mills. They reported any harassment to the station heads who then
reported to Dunn or to Mlandela or Somkeli to whom Dunn paid a 
74stipend. Although Dunn was able to bring 2 539 men through Zulu­
land in 1880 his position as a supplier of labour was no longer 
75unchallenged. In 1880-81 seme 2 000 amatongas entered and about 
1 500 left Natal by sea. Dunn also faced continuing competition 
fran Cape agents operating in the Delagoa Bay hinterland but with 
the defeat of the Zulu royal house an alternative source of labour 
emerged when Zulu workers began to enter Natal.
Labour from Areas under Zulu Control and the End of the 
Dunn Feeding Scheme
As early as 1873 labourers whom the colonists referred to
interchangeably as Zulu or amatonga, were drawn into Natal frcm
chiefdcms situated north of the Hluhluwe which konza-ed to the Zulu
76chiefs Scmkeli and Zibhebhu. The Natal public was informed that 
these immigrant labourers were forced to work in Natal by Cetewayo 
and that three to four hundred men had been "sold" in this fashion
73. CSO 2554.C137 Campbell to PM Stanger, 11 July 1880; CSO 726. 
4993 Dunn to PI., 1 Nov., 1879; CSO 820.3293 Cronje to Col. 
Sec., 29 Aug., 1881.
74. In 1878 Dunn supplied 2 557 men x 2s6d = 6 395s6d + 6 000s 
salary = 4sl0d. SNA 1/1/68.936 PI to Col. Sec., 9 Jan. and 15 
Jan., 1884.
75. CSO 2555.C32 Dunn to acting SNA, 8 Sept., encl. in PM Lower 
Tugela to Col. Sec., 13 July 1881.
76. CSO 817,809 PI to Col. Sec., 17 March 1883. To konza is to pay 
honage or serve.
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for six month periods at the low wage of 8s per month. These
workers proved not only cheap but extremely reliable for, as
almost their entire wage was handed over to Cetewayo, they dared
77not desert their employers. The mechanisms of this labour system
emerged in 1878, when in a civil law suit it was alleged that the
Natal Government Railways contractors had received from Cetewayo
800 workers from a "tribe which is subject to the Zulu king and
is situated between the Zulus proper and the amatonga". It was
claimed that these men were forced to work in Natal and that their
entire wages were paid via John Dunn to Cetewayo. In evidence before
the court, the Natal Government Railways claimed that Cetewayo
received a capitation fee of 20s for each worker as well as a total
of 6s4d frcm the workers' monthly wage of £1. The men had no
recourse to desertion as a means of resistance for they feared that
they would be killed if they returned home without Cetewayo's 
78permission. Following the adverse publicity of the trial, the
Natal Government Railways dispensed with this forced labour and
turned to Benningfield, from whcm they were able to procure Inhambane
labourers at a capitation fee of £3. Shield-bearing Zulu men were
prevented by Cetewayo frcm selling their labour in Natal. This was
because, as bachelors without families to support, almost all the
product of their labour was funnelled through the ibutho system into
79the royal lineage. As Shepstone stated before the Anglo-Zulu
war, the Zulus were "too strongly attached to their military
organisation for the planters of Natal to hope for a direct supply
80of labour frcm the unemployed population of Zululand."
77. D. Leslie, Natal Colonist, 4 March 1873 in Leslie, Among the 
Zulus and Amatongas, 2817 The men were drawn frcm chief dans 
under Manaba, Umangaliso, Endongene and Umhlamala. See map 
no. 2, p. 72 for the Maputo-Zulu frontier in c. 1885.
78. BPP. South Africa Correspondence 1878-79, C.2220 no. 66. In 
this document it was "believed" that the sending chiefdcm was 
that of the "Bonambi". This is highly unlikely as the Bonambi 
was an ibutho of the Zulu army living on the Upper Pongola 
near its junction with the Bivane, see F. Fynney, The Zulu Army 
and Zulu Headmen (Pietermaritzburg, 1879). See also CSO 656 
NGR to PI, 5 March 1877; II. 1/5 NGR contractors to PI, 1 Aug., 
1878.
79. J.J. Guy, "Production and exchange in the Zulu Kingdom", Mohlomi, 
II, 1978; J. Guy, The Destruction of the Zulu Kingdom, 10-12, 
21-30.
80. Cited in Ibid., 3, 17-18.
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In order to gain access to Zulu labour the British included
a clause in the Deed of Submission, signed by the defeated chiefs
at the end of the Anglo-Zulu war, guaranteeing the freedom of Zulus
to work in Natal. In the months following the end of the war, the
office of the Secretary for Native Affairs was inundated with
81applications from planters wishing to import Zulu labour. In 
November 1880 Melmoth Osborne, the British Resident in Zululand, 
stated that although before the Anglo-Zulu war "no shield-bearing 
Zulu had been permitted to leave the country, now these young men
82hastened to places where they could earn money to acquire herds."
The Deed of Submission abolished the Zulu military system, which 
obliged the chiefs to seek alternative forms of surplus appropriation. 
Foremost amongst these was the sale of Zulu male labour formerly 
appropriated by the King. But immediately following the defeat of 
1879 Zulu males had little concept of their freedom as individuals 
to sell their labour power. As Osborne expressed it,
"The Zulu chiefs have been so long accustomed to look 
for and abide by the direction of their chiefs in all 
matters of a public nature, that they are not as yet 
enough advanced in appreciation of the personal freedom 
they new have of going to labour of their own discretion, 
as to take advantage of their liberty. Going to work - 
especially in large numbers - outside the chief's 
territory is looked upon as a public act."
Osborne then made the crucial point that unless the chiefs benefitted
financially from the loss of labour power that was entailed by the
emigration of their dependants and followers, they would actively
83dissuade their people from seeking work in Natal. Thus, despite
the fear of Imperial reprobation, local British officials encouraged
84the chiefs to force labour cnto the market. This system of
81. See numerous despatches in SNA 1/1/37; 1/1/38; 1/1/41; 1/1/42; 
1/1/46; 1/1/48; 1/1/49; 1/1/51; 1/1/52; 1/1/54; 1/1/55 to 59; 
1/1/65.
82. NA. Despatch book of Melmoth Osborne, Osborne to Colley, 10 Nov., 
1880 cited in C.S. Shields, "The Life of John Dunn", (MA, UNISA, 
1939), 60.
83. CSO 787.3373 British Resident to High Commissioner, 10 Nov., 1880; 
Jeff Guy, "The destruction & reconstruction of Zulu society" in 
Industrial and Social Change in South Africa, eds. Shula Marks & 
Richard Rathbone (London, 1982).
84. CSO 787 acting SNA to Lt. Gov., 21 Sept., 1880; SNA 1/413 Report 
of acting SNA in Border Agent Lower Tugela to SNA 31 March 1880. 
See also GH. 857 and SNA 14 Feb., 1880 report on Dunn to Lt Gov., 
2 Feb., 1880.
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compulsory labour had the added advantage of undercutting the wage
level of more traditional sources of labour for, in contrast to the
2 Os-2 5s monthly wage earned by araatongas, inexperienced Zulu
85labourers earned 10s-15s per month. In 1881 more than 3 500
86Zulus entered Natal in search of work.
It is difficult to state with any certainty fran which areas
of Zululand these men originated. it is however certain that large
numbers of "Zulus" entering Natal came from groups like the important
87Ngwayo clan, that had close relations with the Zulu state but
whose members were excluded frcm serving in the Zulu army. Various
aspects of the material culture of these chiefdoms, all of which
were situated north of the Hluhluwe, differentiated than fran the
88Zulu; they tekeza-ed and several practised circumcision and
89amputated the last joint of the little finger. Within the Zulu
economy they performed a specialized occupation; that of carriers,
either in the Zulu trade with Delagoa Bay or of tribute from 
90Maputo land.
Under Cetewayo, Zibhebhu had partially colonized and subjugated
91this area and had forced numerous people to move north of the Mkuzi. 
But under the 1879 settlement, Zibhebhu and Somkeli were excluded
85. See extensive correspondence in SNA 1/1/41; 1/1/46; 1/1/48;
1/1/52; 1/1/53; 1/1/54.
86. SNA 1/1/25.54 "Return of Natives entering and leaving the colony",
1881.
87. Guy, Destruction, 22, 31, 85, 200; A.T. Bryant, Olden Times in 
Zululand and Natal, 335-346.
88. To speak Zulu with an accent like that of the Swazi or coastal 
NatalNguni .groups like the Baca or Lala, C.M. Doke and B.W. 
Vilikazi, Zulu-English Dictionary. See also Bleek, The Natal 
Diaries, ed. Spohr, 76.
89. Ingwavuma magistrate. District Record Book, sections 7 to 19. 
History of Crown Land, Ingwavuma District, 8 June 1959. When 
this report was written the Ngwayo and Mtshelekwana had already 
abandoned these customs and were indistinguishable from the Zulu.
90. BPP. South Africa. Correspondence 1878-79. C.2220 no. 66. Bulwer 
to Hicks-Beach, 28 Aug., 1878.
91. ZGH 786. Report of the Zululand Boundary Conmission of 1879.
June 1880.
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from the area north of the Hluhluwe, which was to be "given back to 
92the Tongas." The change in Zulu politics following Cetewayo's 
exile and the installation of the thirteen chiefs, gave new expre­
ssion to old antagonisms in the trans-Hluhluwe area as chiefs
aligned themselves behind either the Usutu royal house or Zibhebhu's 
93Mandlakazi. As Zibhebhu's district lay to the west of the trans-
Hluhluwe, the British assigned him, as an appointed chief, the task
of retrieving cattle and arms which the Zulu royal house had
deposited for safe keeping with the "amatonga" chief dams to the
north of Zululand. Under this pretext, Zibhebhu was able to make
constant depradations into the area where he demanded cattle frcm
94the pro-Usutu chiefdoms. He also forced them to provide his
European agent, Johan Colenbrander, with labourers for Natal. These
men were then contracted to planters for six months in exchange for
a £2 capitation fee. Half of the capitation fee and half of the
95workers' wages accrued to Zibhebhu. After the restoration of
Cetewayo in January 1883, the settlement of 1879 was scrapped and
Zibhebhu was given the area between the Mkuzi and Pongola rivers
as compensation for territory lost elsewhere. But his attempt to
occupy this area triggered the Zulu civil war. Following the crushing
of the Usuto in mid-1883 at least cne recruiter was able to acquire
500 pro-Usuto Ngwayo through Zibhebhu and as late as the beginning
96of 1884 Colenbrander was given a licence to import 2 000 "Zulus".
92. BPP 1892 C-6684 Correspondence respecting boundary questions in 
Zululand. See especially "Sketch map of the Ndwandwe district 
of Zululand showing boundaries variously assigned to Usebebu 
between 1879 and 1880;”Guy, Destruction, 72.
93. SNA 1/4/3 Border Agent, Lcwer Tugela to SNA, 31 March 1880; ZA 
26.636 Saunders to Osborn, 26 Aug., 1887; Saunders to Osborn,
10 Sept., 1884; KCL. von Wissel, ”Reminiscences", 2-3.
94. Zibhebhu also attempted, unsuccessfully, to raid the pro-Usutu 
Maputo chiefdom. Von Wissel, "Reminiscences", 3; FO 84/1564
British consul to PO, 1 Jan., 1880.
95. SNA 1/4/3 Border Agent, Lower Tugela to SNA, 26 March 1880. See 
also SNA 1/1/25, J. Colenbrander to SNA, 27 March 1880.
96. II. 1/17.534 Annot. Gol. Sec., 9 Feb., 1884 on Mcrris and Co. 
to PI., 5 Feb., 1884; SNA 1/1/72.245 Veer to SNA 17 April 1884 
and annotations.
72
Map No. 2 
The Maputo-Zulu Frontier ca. 1885
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Dunn canplained that this alternative source of labour for Natal
97interfered with his amatonga agency. But a greater threat to
Dunn's monopoly arose fran planters and officials who complained
that, following the British conquest of Zululand, amatonga workers
no longer needed protection on their way south, that immigrants did
not receive sufficient food from Dunn, that the scheme was too
98expensive and that it merely extended Dunn's political power.
97. GH.857 Dunn to Lt. Gov., 7 Feb., 1880. Dunn had himself tried 
unsuccessfully to levy tribute frcm the Maputo. FO 84/1564 
O'neill to FO, 1 Jan., 1880.
98. CSO 2554.C137 Campbell to RM Stanger, 11 July 1881; CSO 2555,C32 
Minute RM Lower tugela to Col. Sec., 13 July 1881; Administrator
of Native Land and Border Agent, Lower Tugela to SNA, 10 Aug., 1881.
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The Border Agent also claimed that Dunn had issued passes to numerous
amatongas who did not report to the Immigration agent or Resident
Magistrate of the Dower Tugela. These illegal imnigrants, who sold
their labour on the open market, traded or practised as diviners,
99were an added source of revenue for Dunn. In November 1881 at 
the beginning of the planting season when the demand for labour was 
highest and when it was dangerous for immigrants to enter Natal 
because of the unhealthy state of the coasted, route, Dunn declared 
his willingness to drop his rates to 4s on condition that the two 
northern stations were abandoned. The Natal government was 
obliged to accede to these demands as the feeding scheme not only 
assisted the importation of labour, it also cheapened the general 
price of wage labour in Natal. The former Natal government 
inmigration agent at Lourengo Marques wrote, following the Anglo- 
Zulu war, that
"For the last two years there has been and continues to 
be a great demand for labourers and that demand is far in 
excess of the supply, caused by the large numbers (of 
amatongas) who have completed their terms of service 
returning hone, the consequence is that wages have risen 
very considerably throughout the colony, which must 
continue unless labour is imported."^
Over the period 1881-82, seme 4 341 amatongas entered while
1027 063 left Natal by way of Dunn's agency. But in February 1883, 
a month after Cetewayo's return to Zululand, Dunn ended his parti­
cipation in the feeding scheme "owing to the present changes in
99. SNA 1/1/68 Border Agent to Col. Sec., 11 Jan., 1884.
100. SNA 1/1/25 Dunn to Col. Sec., 19 Nov. and 17 Dec., 1881; 
Border Agent to PI., 30 Nov., 1881.
101. CSO 840.289 Bennet to Gov., 23 Dec., 1881.
102. CSO 897.809 PI to Col. Sec., 17 March 1883; SNA 1/1/68.936 PI 
to Col. Sec., 9 Jan., 1884.
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103Zululand." This move was no doubt as much due to his opposition
to Cetewayo's restoration as it was to the difficulties that would
emerge when amatonga migrants attempted to pass through the territory
104of Scmkeli, a staunch Usutho supporter. With the ending of the
flow of amatonga labour to Natal, competition for labour between
planters and the railways became more acute. In August 1883 the
Victoria Planters' Association complained that 4 000 Indians had
been requisitioned for the building of the railway, that a further
2 000 to 3 000 were to be requisitioned over the next two months
and that there was little solution to the problem as the railway
1 oswould not be finished before 1885. By December 1883 labour was
so scarce on the plantations that contractors were able to make as
106much as 3s a day fran hiring out Indian labourers.
In January 1884, during a temporary halt in the Zulu civil war,
Dunn was asked to rejuvenate the feeding scheme. This he agreed to
do but, no doubt because of the dangers involved, he dananded a
107capitation fee of 25s. This the Natal authorities found
unacceptable and on 21 January 1884 the Secretary for Native Affairs
informed the Lt.-governor that the feeding scheme had ended due to
the Zulu civil war and the inability of the authorities to control
108amatonga labour once in Natal. Private recruiters were also
103. CSO 897.809 Dunn to Col. Sec., 18 Feb., 1883.
104. Guy, Destruction, 200, 251.
105. CSO 921.3289 Victoria Planters Assoc, to Col. Sec., 27 Aug.,
1883.
106. SNA 1/1/68.922 Wilkinson to SNA, 20 Dec., 1883.
107. II. 1/17.17 CSO to PI., 4 Jan., 1884; SNA 1/1/68.936 Col. Sec.,
9 Jan, 1884. The Usuthu, who had been crushed in July 1883 
were to combine forces with a group of Boers to defeat the 
Mandlakazi in June 1884. During the lull in the civil war, workers 
had to pass through the anti-Usuthu district of Sokwetshata who 
had succeeded Mlandela, and then had to enter the pro-Usuthu area 
of Somkeli before reaching Zibhebhu's territory.
II. 1/17.17 CSO to PI., 4 Jan., 1884.
108. SNA 1/1/68.936 SNA to Bulwer, 21 Jan., 1884. The defeat of
Zibhebhu in June 1884 was a severe blow to Dunn. He did however
re-emerge in the late 1880s as a private recruiter of Zulu 
labour, drawn from the area under his control. SNA 1/1/112.3 
Dunn to SNA, 31 Dec., 1888; SNA 1/1/24 Ritchie, 26 April 1890.
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restricted frcm introducing labour because of the unrest that 
plagued the area north of the Hlatuze river which, according to the 
post restoration partition of Zululand, marked the northern border 
of the reserve.
The shortage of African labour brought about by the Zulu civil
war led the Natal government to respond to appeals for labour frcm
110the Natal Government Railways and the Harbour Board by briefly
resuscitating the maritime labour importation scheme. Following
the Portuguese prohibition of maritime emigration frcm Inhambane
in 1879, Reuben Benningfield was able to initiate a scheme whereby
labour was taken "illegally" by sea frcm Inhambane to Durban and
111then overland to Kimberley. Officially-recognized labour iirmigra-
tion frcm Inhambane was cnly resumed in December 1883, an the same
basis as the old scheme, with the former Cape agent acting for the 
112Natal government. But with Natal in the depths of an economic
depression employers were unwilling to pay the £3.2s.2d capitation
fee for this labour and consequently in the first two months
following the publicization of the scheme they only applied for 
113110 workers. The pre-war Natal wages offered at Delagoa Bay
could not ccmpete with those of the diamond and eastern Transvaal
gold fields and in the first eight months only 136 workers were
imported, most of whan came frcm the Shangane and Chopi chiefdcms
114well to the north of Lourengo Marques. During the Zulu civil
109. SNA 1/1/70.27 Bennett to Col. Sec., 12 Jan., 1884 and 22 Jan., 
1884; 1/1/70.77 annot. Zululand Resident, 7 March 1884 on 
Farrel to SNA, 4 Feb., 1884.
110. CSO 918.2921 NGR Contractors to Col. Sec., 26 July 1883.
111. This scheme is discussed on page 91, notes 165-168.
112. CSO 862.2494 PI to Col. Sec., 4 July 1882; II. 1/16.1139 Natal 
Harbour Board, "Meeting with Just de CosterJ1 8 Dec., 1883. The 
Portuguese also attempted unsuccessfully to initiate and control 
the export of Gaza labour from Chiloane, see J.C. Paiva de 
Andrade, Relatoria de uma viagem as Terras dos Landins, 24.
113. II. 1/17.89 Col. Sec. to PI., 8 Feb., 1884; II. 1/17.136 
Newspaper cutting marked Jan., 1884.
114. II. 1/19.382 De Coster to PI., 10 April 1884; minute PI, 5 
April 1884; CSO 978.3561 RM Durban to Col. Sec., 11 Sept., 1884; 
II. 1/19.477 PI to Col. Sec., 7 April 1884; II. 1/19.506 De 
Coster to PI, 14 April 1884; II. 1/19.1087 De Coster to PI,
3 Aug., 1884.
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war private recruiters also offered to take labour overland frcm
the untroubled Inhambane interior and in September 1883, three
months after the ending of the first phase of the civil war, about
200 men entered Natal after a two month journey overland frcm the
Inhambane area. This route soon became the most important means
of securing labour immigrants frcm Inhambane and, during the
following year large numbers of migrants, accompanied by recruiters,
115made their way overland to Natal.
In March 1884 the governor^ -general of Mozambique expressed his
dissatisfaction that the "great flow of emigrant workers who go
from the district of Inhambane to the English colony of Natal"
were not allowed to go by sea and hence, because they were not
contracted, they provided no source of revenue to the Inhambane
treasury. For the first time, he significantly referred to this
116uncontracted labour as "clandestine". The governor of Inhambane
reported that it was prejudicial to the interests of the town that
several thousand Africans had been recruited in the area and taken
to the Diamond and Gold Fields and to Natal without passing through
117any Inhambane controls. In an attempt to control and tax this 
labour emigration the Portuguese dropped the prohibition on the 
export of labour from Inhambane in January 1885 and placed emigra­
tion frcm the port an the same footing as that from Ibo to Mayotte
-»• 118and Nossi Be and frcm Lourengo Marques to Durban. But when the
Castle Packet Co. offered to take migrants from Inhambane to Durban 
for a 30s passage fee, the Natal government was unwilling to
115. II. 1/21.1139 Col. Sec. to PI, 4 Sept., 1884? II. 1/22,1398 De 
Coster to PI, 8 Oct., 1884; PM Durban to PI, 27 Oct., 1884. See 
also II. 1/17.534 Morris and Co. to PI, 5 Feb., 1884.
116. AHU. Mag., 2a Rep., pasta 1, GGM to MSMCJ, 28 March 1884 also 
enclosed unsigned memo 17 Nov., 1884, In 1886 Gungunyana claimed 
that he should be the recipient of the 30s emigration fee taken 
frcm his subjects at Lourengo Marques and Inhambane. But this 
was impossible to enforce as these ports were controlled by the 
Portuguese; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 3, GGM to MSMU 22 March 
1886; GGM to MNE 27 Dec., 1886.
117. AHU. Mag., 2a Rep., pasta 1, G Inhambane to GGM 13 June 1884 in 
GGM to MSMU 28 June 1884.
118. BO. 2, 10 Jan., 1885; BO. 18, 17 Jan., 1885; FO 84/1709 Br. 
consul to FO, 12 Jan., 1885. Following French criticisms of their 
exclusion frcm the 1876 Lourengo Marques emigration scheme, they 
were given permission in June 1881 to contract Inhambane labourfor 
the plantations of the Indian Ocean Islands, AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., 
pasta 1, memo, 20 Aug., 1884; FO 84/1616 for consul to FO, 5
July 1882; FO 84/1640 Br. Consul to FO, 15 Feb., 1883.
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initiate another project involving capitation overheads that could 
be lost through desertion.
Economic Depression and the End of Natal's Dependence on 
Amatanga Labour
The Protector of Immigrants was of the opinion that amatonga
immigrants did not desert "because of a wish to return to their
hemes but in the hope of obtaining better wages as free men, which
119labourers frcm Inhambane might equally do" Desertion was only
one of a number of strategies used by amatcngas to improve their
120conditions of service. Because of the planters' need for a core
of skilled workers, amatongas were encouraged to renew contracts
and to return to their old employers after a period of "home leave".
This could only be achieved if the workers considered the conditions
on a plantation to be good. Amatonga workers also influenced the
flew and direction of workers by propagating in their heme areas
the trustworthiness of various recruiters and the conditions
121existing on various plantations. Thus according to one planter, 
"Seme of these (amatonga) people like ourselves have strong
122preferences for certain kinds of work as well as certain employers."
The capitation losses that desertion caused employers consti­
tuted a major reason for the cessation of the amatonga labour
123immigration scheme. As figure 1 shows, wages on the plantations
119. II. 1/24.163 D.C. Andrews to PI, 8 Jan., 1885 and annotation 
PI to Col. Sec., 9 Jan., 1885.
120. Desertion was not always used as a strategy to improve conditions. 
It was equally used by employers as a means of reducing over­
heads when wage arrears were abandoned. Cf. SNA 1/3/9 Res. Mag., 
Durban, "Report of the State of the Natives", 1859.
121. SNA 1/7/8 Memorandum by SNA, 5 Nov., 1872; Ibid., 18 Dec., 1871; 
L.C. no. 12, 1872, "Report ... an the introduction of native 
labourers frcm bey end the border of the colony," SNA 1/1/24 PI 
to Jackson, 20 March 1874; GH 837 Elton to Brackenberg, 4 Aug., 
1875..
122. II. 1/1 R815/76 C. Parson to Col. Sec., 18 March 1876.
123. II. 1/21.1139 Reynolds of Umzinto Estates to PI, 26 Aug., 1884;
II. 11/22.1536 Reynolds to PI, 12 Nov., 1884. In a ld:ter to the
Transvaal State Secretary the Natal Colonial Secretary saw the 
state's inability to control desertion as the only reason for 
the ending of amatcnga immigration. TA SSa 330 Ra 4047 in Ra607 
Col. Sec. to SS, 27 July 1897.
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were closely tied to both output and the market price for sugar.
Thus the depression of the sugar industry in 1881-86 was accompanied 
by a fall in wages which further encouraged desertion and acted as 
a strong disincentive for labourers to seek work in Natal.
Figure 1
Fluctuations in the Production and Price of Sugar 
and in African Wages in Natal, 1863-1897
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Another important reason was the smallpox epidemic of 1882-83 which 
gave the up-country farmers an important weapon with which to attack 
the labour importation schemes of the coastal planters. In September 
1884 the Colonial Secretary, the Protector of Immigrants and the 
Quarantine Board agreed that amatonga immigration should be halted 
due to the fear that smallpox would be imported and due to "the
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generally unsatisfactory nature of the hold we have on these men
124as regards contract of service and their tendency to desert."
A final batch of 60 men, consisting largely of "Chopis", whom the
labour agent at Lourengo Marques feared would be killed if they
125returned home, arrived at Durban in October 1884.
The colonists' fear that smallpox would be introduced by
amatongas acted as a catalyst in the promulgation in 1884 of new
regulations aimed at controlling labour irrmigration. All iirmigrant
workers were then obliged to report to a government official on
entering Natal and permission to enter the colony would only be
126granted after a 21 day quarantine period. Although magistrates
could refuse Africans passes to leave the colony for the Diamond
Fields or Cape, law 48 of 1884 aimed "To provide for the better
regulation of the passing and re-passing of Natives between Natal
and the neighbouring States and Territories." This law obliged
amatongas to take out passes on entering Natal and threatened any
person employing an immigrant without the requisite pass with a
£10 fine or a three month jail sentence. Three years later a
127charge of Is was introduced for each pass.
The earlier establishment of a minimum wage for contracted
workers introduced by sea proved difficult to maintain and in 1884
the government merely advised that "It is not expected that migrants
can be induced to ccme to Natal for less than 20s or 25s, per month."
Instead of a fixed minimum wage of 20s, applicants were merely to
128state the highest wage that they were prepared to pay. Because 
of a lack of manpower, these laws proved difficult to enforce and
124. II. 1/20 Minute Col. Sec. to PI, 28 Aug., 1884; Col. Sec. to 
Gov., 2 Sept., 1884; PI to De Coster,. 10 Sept., 1884.
125. II. 1/20 De Coster to Col. Sec., 2 Oct., 1884; II. 1/22.1398 
De Coster to PI, 8 Oct., 1884. Although maritime immigration 
officially ended in October 1884, at least 350 Inhambane workers 
were landed at Durban where they were employed by the Harbour 
Board in 1886. See CSO 1082.2223 Port Capt. to Sec., Harbour 
Board, 18 March 1886.
126. SNA 1/1/78.812 SNA to Attorney Gen., 21 Nov., 1884; Att. gen. 
enclosure 21 Nov., 1884; Government notice 323, 1884; SNA 
1/1/78.832 Tatham and Edmonstone to SNA, 19 Nov., 1884.
127. CSO 2555 c 32. PM Durban to ANA, 27 July 1881; SNA 1/1/53.1144 
Fynney to SNA, 31 March 1882; Law 52 of November 1886. William 
Broane, The Laws of Natal, vol. Ill, 1879-1889, pp. 1592-94, 
1867-68.
128. Government notice 14, 1884 in NGG., 8 Jan., 1884.
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when, with the sugar industry in dire straits and contributing little
to the colony's economy, up-country fanners renewed their demands
for the withdrawal of all labour immigration subsidies, the Natal
government was obliged to withdraw its amatonga subsidy which in
sane years amounted to as much as £3 000; almost one-third that of
129Indian irrmigration.
When Natal emerged frcm the depression of the early-mid 1880s,
the government no longer felt obliged to subsidize the introduction
of amatonga labour. Large numbers of applications were made to the
Secretary for Native Affairs to import Zulu, amatonga and Fondo
labour. Government notice 255 of 1888 reminded employers that they
had to bear the cost and burden of introducing foreign labour and
that workers could caily be introduced with the permission of the
Secretary for Native Affairs. Labour was being drawn frcm the
plantations by the railways, labour tenancy and especially by the
130Gold and Diamond fields. The planters received little sympathy
frcm the Secretary for Native Affairs who considered that the drawing
of labour away frcm the plantations was only natural as the latter
paid monthly wages of 15s while the Diamond Fields paid 30s per
week. It was "a question of wages, the labourer will always go
where his labour will be best paid." Consequently it was "not
practicable" for the government to embroil itself in expensive
131labour importation schemes. Others saw the solution to the 
"labour problem" as a tightening of government control over foreign 
labourers once they had arrived in Natal by restricting the movement 
of labour frcm Natal to the Transvaal and Cape.
This was forcefully put by one memorialist who stated, at the 
beginning of the 1888 planting season, that
129. SNA 1/1/86.653 Border Agent, Lower Tugela to SNA, 20 Oct., 1885 
and 23 Dec., 1885; SNA 1/1/88.834 RM Durban to SNA, 2 Dec.,
1885; Debates, Natal Legislative Council, vol. VII, 1884, 278- 
283, 322-333. For African immigration subsidies, see II. 1/1R600 
annotation on PI to Col. Sec., 24 Sept., 1875; Bo. 3, 20 Jan., 
1878, GUI district report for 1877-78; II. 1/16.1211 Annot.,
PI., 22 March 1884.
130. SNA 1/1/106.335 Asby a.o. to SNA, 25 April 1888; SNA 1/1/108.607 
Wood and 48 others to SNA July(?) 1888; Various correspondence 
in SNA 1/1/108 to SNA 1/1/110.
131. SNA 1/1/106.416 SNA to Governor, 21 June 1888.
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"the present extraordinary demand (for labour) by foreign 
states ... requires dealing with otherwise our labour 
supply is curtailed, colonial industry crippled and the 
cost of production greatly increased."132
But the planters, many of whan had interests in the Gold Fields,
opposed any governmental restrictions being placed on the emigration
of African labour frcm Natal. In the event, the only new restriction
placed on the mobility of African labour was that of a special
permit, introduced in 1889, that had to be granted by the
Secretary for Native Affairs in order to take labour through Natal
to the Gold Fields.
Planters' fears that amatonga labourers would no longer be
drawn to Natal due to uncompetitive plantation wages were compounded
by misgivings over recruiting overheads lost when labour immigrants
deserted. They believed that the solution to their labour problem
lay in the increased proletarianization of local labour together
with a tighter control of the labour force which, however, was
134only fully possible with Indian indentures. The transition to 
employing local rather than immigrant labour was also determined 
by a structural transformation of the Natal economy which pushed 
local labour onto the market and consequently decreased the colony's 
dependence on foreign labour.
By the 1880s, the locations were becoming increasingly over­
crowded. They had been centred around rugged, broken and infertile
135country where people had retreated for security during the Mfecane.
Yet although the population of the locations had trebled by the
1880s, the extent of the rural locations had been reduced and very
136little capital had been spent on their development. The early 
1880s were marked by a sharp downward turn in the terms of trade 
for many African peasants.
132. SNA 1/1/108.661 Hawksworth to SNA, 30 Aug., 1888.
133. SNA 1/1/114.438 Levy to SNA, 11 May 1889; 1/1/118 J.G. Colen-
brander to SNA, 11 Sept., 1889.
134. S.F. Benningfield in Natal Coast Industrial Planters conference 
(Durban 1888), 9; SNA 1/1/108.661 Hawksworth to SNA 8 Aug., 1888.
135. NAC Proceedings I, 69, evidence of Shepstone; Young, "Native
Policy", 225-6, Welsh, Boots, 177.
136. Welsh, Boots, 179, 220; E.H. Brooks and N. Hurwitz, The Native 
Reserves of Natal, 11. The £5 000 annual Reserve Fund for Natives 
had hardly been touched, Leverton , "Government Finance", 392-3.
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The contribution of Africans to the Colonial revenue rose from
£33 000 in 1872 to £63 000 in 1880. This included direct hut
taxation and indirect duties on all goods thought to be used by
137Africans, including a tax of 6d on each hoe and pick. The
Anglo-Zulu war had provided an enormous market for maize and
sorghum, the price per muid of which rose frcm an average of 15s and
13s2d respectively in 1873-77 to 28s4d and 25s2d in 1880. While
many white farmers were unable to take advantage of these high
prices due to their involvement in the war, the African response to
this sudden demand for foodstuffs was to increase the production
of maize and sorghum frcm one season to the next by 87% and 105%
respectively, and profits were invested in ploughs, harrows and
wagons. But in 1881 the market price for maize and sorghum fell
to 16s5d and 17slld. Two years later, as recession trailed into
depression, prices dropped to 8s4d and lls2d and by the end of the
138depression in 1886 prices had ' slumped to 7s and 9sl0d. Due
to the increasing involvement of free Indians in the cereals .
139market and the general overproduction of maize and sorghum,
140prices remained constantly low into the 1890s. As African
peasants were largely dependent for their cash inccme on the
141marketing of maize and sorghum, the depression in prices
137. "Mr Greenstock's notes of travel", Mission Field, 1 Jan., 1876, 
137; C. Axe Ison, "A history of taxation in Natal prior to 
Union", (M.A., University of Natal) , 106.
138. Natal Blue Books, 1880-81, "Agriculture". The production of 
maize by Europeans fell by 31% frcm 1880 to 1881 when Africans 
produced 80% of Natal's maize. See figure 2 . The number of 
ploughs used by Africans rose frcm 4 810 in 1878 to 8 591 in 
1883 and 13 898 in 1888. The number of harrows rose frcm 195 
to 275 to 876; wagons frcm 375 to 955 to 1 165, Natal Blue 
Books, "Agriculture".
139. Natal Blue Books, Native Affairs, 1887, KM Inanda, 20; RM Alex­
andria; Ibid., 1888 KM Lower Tugela, 78; Ibid., 1889 RM Inanda; 
Norman Etherington, "African Economic Experiments in Natal, 1845- 
1880", Afr. Econ. Hist., 6, 1978, 8. It was claimed in 1884 that 
free Indians grew 100 000 muids of maize annually, Binns in 
Debates of Natal Legislative Council, VII, 1884, 322. This seems 
highly unlikely as in 1897 the Blue Books recorded the harvest­
ing by Indians of 69 086 muids of maize.
140. Natal Blue Book Native Affairs, 1886, RM Lower Tugela; Ibid., 
1887 RM Inanda, 20.
141. Ibid., 1881, 140, 151, 156, 161, 176, 185; Ibid., 1882, 117, 
120, 124.
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Figure 2
African and European maize production in Natal 1867-1897
18901867 1875 1880 18851870 1895 1897
Production: 
1000 muids
800
700
_ African production
-I--T N L
600
500
Price400
300
200
Settler production
100
illustrated in figures 2 and 3, obliged them to seek cash incomes by 
selling their labour for longer periods on the market. Many moved 
away from cereals production altogether such that in a bad harvest 
year, like 1889 in Onsinga district, the magistrate reported that, 
"many of the native s... are now dependent on their earnings and 
wages of beys out at service and there are few men to be found at 
their hones."
142. NBB., NA 1889 RM Umsinga, 52; NEB., NA 1886 RMIrianda, 34; 
NEB., NA 188 RM Ixopo, 22.
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Figure 3
African and Settler Millet and Sorghum 
Production in Natal, 1867-1897
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During the boom years of 1876-1880 a great deal of capital
was invested in land and, as the price of land rose, rents were 
143increased. This pushed many Africans off the land or obliged
them to seek less-advantageous tenancies; in seme cases children
of tenants then found it more profitable to move permanently onto
the labour market or to work for extended periods on the railways 
144or gold fields. In same areas rents were demanded in money
rather than labour because of the scarcity of cash and low prices
paid for farm produce.
In 1880 the Crown Lands were first offered for sale, four
years later an annual rent of £1 was charged of all "squatters"
living on these lands and by the end of the decade most of the
formerly unsurveyed land in the colony had been sold. This meant
that Africans living on unsurveyed land either lost their farms
146or had to find the capital to buy them frcm the state.
143. Welsh, Roots, 196; Leverton, "Government Finance", 301. See 
also Mission Field, 1 Jan., 1876, 21.
144. Natal Blue Book Native Affiars, 1886, 83; 1887 RM Umsinga, 33,
68; Ibid., 1888, 17, 31, 67; 1889, 74, 78.
145. Ibid., 1887 PM Umsinga, 33; Ibid., 1888 PM Umsinga, 31.
146. Natal Legislative Council, SP 1884 no. 12, "The collection of rent 
for squatters on Crown Lands"; NBB., NA 1886 PM Newcastle, 49; 
NBB., NA 1887 RM Ixopo, 24, 28; RM Klip River, 75; RM Wfeenen,
67; Law 41, 1884.
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It is impossible here to examine in any depth the various
other factors which drove Natal Africans onto the labour market.
These include the growing use of labour-saving implements; the
need for cash in order to procure goods which, although once
luxuries, had became necessities and the ability to circumvent the
power of the elders that was given to young men through access to 
147wage labour.
By the late 1880s, Natal drew the majority of its labour force
frcm within the colony. Many workers were also drawn frcm Zululand
where recruiters worked through magistrates and chiefs who received
capitation fees of 5s to 20s in exchange for forcing their followers
to accept work on the Natal government railways for wages of 20s 
148per mcnth. The use of Zulu labour was supported by the government 
which, in a notice issued in May 1888 on the laws governing the 
introduction of labour declared "that every facility will be given 
consistent with the requirements of the laws of Natal and Zululand 
to persons desirous of introducing labour frcm Zululand." The 
question of amatonga labour was significantly excluded and their
149importation was discouraged by the Secretary for Native Affairs.
In 1889 recruiters applied for licences to introduce overland 
more than 2 250 Zulu workers, 1 000 unidentified "native labourers" 
and 800 amatongas, most of wham were drawn frcm the Gaza state in 
the Inhambane interior. The following year the number of Zulus 
applied for rose to 4 700, "native labourers" remained constant, 
amatongas dropped to 200 and several hundred workers frcm "the Cape" 
and Basutoland were applied for, mostly on six month contracts at 
25s per month.
By the late 1880s, despite the ending of the smallpox scare 
and the emergence of the colony frcm the depression of 1882-86,
147. H. Slater, "The Changing Pattern", 161; Welsh, Roots, 222-24.
148. ZGH 725 Res. Carrm., to Gov., 28 Oct., 1889; Times of Natal, 23 
Oct., 1889.
149. Government notice 255, 1888, NGG., 22 May 1888; SNA 1/1/129.909 
Crompton to SNA, 30 Oct., 1890. Guy dates large-scale labour 
migration from Zululand to 1888 following the crushing of the 
last of the royalists. "Destruction and reconstruction", 176ff.
150. Figures drawn frcm various correspondence in SNA 1/1/112 to SNA 
1/1/135.
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Natal was no longer reliant on amatonga labour. The drawing of 
workers frcm within the colony and frcm a Zululand severely dis­
located by the civil wars of 1883-86, entailed no government 
expense. It also provided Natal with a source of labour over which 
it had some control at a time when employers were faced with growing 
competition for foreign labour from the Diamond Fields and especially 
from the newly-discovered Witwatersrand goldfields.
151Mozambican Labour and the Kimberley Diamcnd Fields
In much the same way as Natal and the Cape, Africans living
around the Kimberley and Dutoitspan diggings were able to respond
to the new market opportunities offered by diamond mining, by
selling the produce of their labour rather than their labour power 
152itself. Following the Natal and Cape patterns, a geographical
division of labour emerged in which the southern Tswana chief dams
supplied the diggings with food and fuel while labour was drawn
from outside of the area. Although it is impossible to calculate
the nuntoers of amatongas, or "Shangaans", as they became known at
Kimberley, employed an the Diamond Fields, the manner in which "new 
153hands" were registered shews that during the early 1870s they 
were of relatively little inportance. In 1873 Shangaans entered 
into 2 285 new labour contracts or 11.8% of the 19 338 registered 
on the Kimberley and De Beers mines. Three years later, Shangaans 
signed sane 1 098 new labour contracts out of a total of 12 274.
Of far greater inportance to the diamcnd diggings was the number of
151. Labour on the Diamond Fields has been thoroughly examined in 
several recent works: R.F. Sieborger, "The Recruitment and 
Organisation of African Labour for the Kimberley Diamond Mines, 
1871-1888" (MA., Rhodes University, 1976); R.V. Turrell,
"Capital, Class and Monopoly: The Kimberley Diamond Fields 1871- 
1889" (PhD., University of London, 1982); K. Shillingtan, "Land 
Loss, Labour and Dependency, The Inpact of Colonialism on the 
Southern Tswana, 1870-1900" (PhD., Univ. of London, 1981).
152. K. Shillingtan, "The Inpact of the diamond discoveries on the 
Kimberley hinterland" in S. Marks & R. Rathbone, eds., Indus­
trialization and Social Change; Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond 
Fields", 45-47.
153. A "new hand" could in theory annually enter into six two month 
contract with different employers. An "old hand" re-registered 
with the same employer. Many workers rested between contracts in 
the location around Kimberley. The origins of the term "Shangaan" 
meaning "followers of Shoshangane (Manukosi)" are dealt with
in appendix 1 . The following statistics are drawn from 
Turrell, " Kimberley Diamond Fields," 397-399.
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154iten drawn from the Pedi and South Sotho polities. But in 1876
the first Sekukuni war co-incided with an attempt by employers to
reduce their workers' wages following a fall in the price of
diamonds. This caused large numbers of South Ebthos to move to the
Eastern Cape which both obviated the harassment suffered in crossing
the Orange Free State and providing them with remunerative labour
on the railways. This exodus of labour was accompanied by the
return home of thousands of Pedi workers to defend their families.
Thus between May and July 1876, seme 6 000 African workers left
the Diamond Fields.1^
Influenced by the Natal immigration feeding scheme, the
Griqualand West Labour Commission of 1876 recommended that the
government construct rest stations along the labour routes in order
to protect immigrants and supply them with food. It further advised
the construction of a central depot from where immigrant labourers
would be contracted for a minimum of three months. If unable to
find labour within five days, the immigrant should be assigned to
an employer. But the government was not prepared to bear the costs
involved in implementing policies that would merely cheapen the cost
of labour and concurred with the Labour Commission's finding that
"the surest means of encouraging the introduction of labour is the
payment of high wages." Thus despite the recommendations of the
Labour Commission, government intervention in the labour market
was limited to a half-hearted and abortive attempt to procure
"Shangaan" labour through Albas ini and to the construction of a
156central depot at Kimberley. Consequently amatonga migrants, 
passing from tropical areas to the cold winter highveld suffered 
terribly from exposure,banditry and the labour exactions of
154. "Pedi" here refers largely to Sekukuni's people but also 
includes numbers of Transvaal Ndebele under chiefs Mapoch, 
Zebedelia, Matiega and Makapan and Venda speakers frcm Magato's 
chiefdcm. South Sotho refers largely to the Basotho followers
of Moshesh. De Vaal, "Joao Albasini", 141? Sieborger, "Recruitment 
and Organisation", 66-67, 71-72.
155. Purkiss, "Railway Building", 390-393; Turrell, "Kimberley 
Diamond Fields", 166-168.
156. BPP 1879. C2220, Labour Commission of Griqualand West, 165; 
Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 165-166.
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157Transvaal farmers and state officials.
In February and March 1876 the Resident Magistrate of Natal's 
Upper Tugela district, which bordered on the Orange Free State, 
remarked on the "unusual number of amatongas passing this way to 
the Diamcnd Fields". He described a migration by stages in which 
"many of (the migrants) were lately from their homes, had passed 
through Zululand, remained a short time at Durban or its neighbour­
hood until they could earn sufficient to purchase food and clothing 
and then started for the 'Fields'". The magistrate then outlined 
sore of the routes taken by workers returning from the Diamond 
Fields. Because Africans were not allowed to carry guns through 
Natal and the trekker republics, they would send "the half of 
their nunber heme with the arms by a circuitous route north of the 
Transvaal republic ... other natives return via Natal and proceed 
to Delagoa Bay frcm Durban by sea." In depositions enclosed in the 
magistrate's report, "Jonas" declared that he had left the Delagoa 
Bay area two months previously with nine other immigrants, had 
entered Natal via the government feeding scheme and had worked for 
six months in Verulam and Durban before saving sufficient money 
and clothing to complete the journey to the Diamond Fields.
"Maroonga" stated that he intended to return home by sea to Delagoa 
Bay frcm where he and five others had set out about three years 
previously. Having taken advantage of the feeding scheme, he had 
worked for six months in Durban before acquiring the capital 
needed to travel to Kimberley. There his companions had purchased
guns which they sent heme with carriers who, passing north of the
158Transvaal, took more than two months to arrive at Delagoa Bay.
As early as January 1876 the Natal Protector of Immigrants complained 
that the movement of amatonga labour to the Diamond Fields was a
157. TA.SN 5 Merensky to Osborne, 25 July 1877; TA.SN 1 Acting 
Native Commissioner(NC) Waterberg to SNA, 8 May 1879; SN 2.
H. Shepstone, minute no. N309/1879 of 13 Dec., 1879; Ibid., NC 
Zoutpansberg to M. Barlow, 21 Oct., 1879; Ibid., Barlow to SNA,
3 Sept., 1879; SN. 4A NC Spelonken to SNA 2 July 1881; SS 490 
Lddst. Lydenburg to Col. Sec., 25 Nov., 1880; SN 173 R179/83 
NC Spelonken to NC Zoutpansberg, 9 Oct., 1883. See also p 100, 
note 28.
158. SNA 1/3/26 R233/76 RM Upper Tugela to SNA, 25 Feb., 1876 and 29 
March 1876 and enclosed depositions of "Jonas", 2 Jan., 1876 and 
"Maronga", 23 Feb., 1876. See also Junod, The Life of a South 
African Tribe, II, 401 for Kimberley as a source of guns. Breach 
loaders costing £25 were more than four times the price of tower 
muskets at Kimberley. Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 100.
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drain on Natal's finances as many of the migrants entered the colony
159via the government's feeding scheme. These men either sold their
labour to the highest bidder on the Kimberley market or were taken
up by labour touts who protected and fed them and who were then
paid as much as a £1 capitation fee for each worker willing to
160contract himself for a three month period.
As increasing numbers of amatonga labourers entered Natal
through government-assisted immigration schemes and as the numbers
of Pedi and South Sotho labourers on the Diamond Fields dropped,
amatonga/Shangaan workers were increasingly recruited in Natal for
the Diamond diggings. They were offered wages which, at £2 per
month, were lower than the Kimberley average but which were almost
quadruple those offered in Natal. The six month contracts thought
'normal' in Natal were especially valued by Kimberley employers as
they were considerably longer than the two to three months average
161contract on the Diamond Fields. The annexation of the Transvaal
by the British removed a major obstacle to the movenent of Shangaan
162workers across the Highveld. By 1878 Shangaan labour constituted 
26% of all new contracts registered on the Kimberley and De Beers 
mines and 29% of those entered into on the poorer Dutoitspan and 
Bultfontein mines. This marked a rise from 1 594 contracts signed 
by Shangaan "new hands" in 1877 to 9 369 in 1878. After dropping 
to 7 588 new contracts in 1879 when the Anglo-Zulu war restricted 
transit through Zululand, sane 8 776 new contracts were signed in 
1880. This period was marked by the movement of Shangaan workers 
onto the Bultfontein and Dutoitspan diggings where, although wages 
were slightly lcwer than on the Kimberley and De Beers mines, new 
opportunities existed for wage-eamers. Thus the number of new
159. SNA 1/1/27 no. 15, PI, Memorandum, 18 Jan., 1876.
160. Sieborger, "Recruitment and Organization", 58-60.
161. Helps to Gov. sec. Griqualand West, 25 Aug., 1877 in Smalburger. 
collection, University of Cape Town, BC 635. B12.6.
162. AHU. Mog., pasta 32, R.B. Morier, British Ambassador to MNE,
10 July 1877. Morier stated that the Transvaal which had formerly 
"rendered itself disagreeable to its neighbours ... (by) ... 
preventing the free emigration of the tribes from the North 
desirous of obtaining employment in the Cape colonies" would 
therefore canpete with the Portuguese areas as a supplier of 
labour.
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contracts entered into by Shangaans employed on the Bultfontein and 
Dutoitspan mines increased frcm 637 in 1877 to 6 198 in 1879; an 
increase frcm 7% to 47% of the work force employed on those mines. 
These statistics underline the flaws inherent in attributing, in an 
over-generalized way, the origins of migrant labour to the "pull" 
of the Griqualand West market for quns; for the sharp rise in the 
number of Shangaans employed at Kimberley was preceded by the 
prohibition of the gun trade in 1877.
When the Cape government annexed Griqualand West in October
1880, it attempted to assist the labour needs of employers on the
Diamond Fields by extending the terms of the Cape-Delagoa Bay
maritime immigration scheme to Kimberley. In March 1881 the Cape
official in charge of labour inmigration wrote an encouraging letter
to the chairman of De Beers stating that the Cape government was
willing to subsidize half the cost of £6 involved in taking Delagoa
Bay workers to the Diamcnd Fields via Cape Town. Although they
would have to pay more to mine labourers than the 15s per month
paid to Delagoa Bay workers employed on Cape farms, he felt they
could still be employed at relatively "moderate wages" and possibly
163on two year contracts. But the importation of Delagoa Bay labour 
became too expensive for the Cape when the U.S.S. Co. ended its run 
to Lourengo Marques and, due to the large number of desertions and 
the onset of the depression, De Beers was unwilling to pay an 
increased capitaticn fee of £4, especially as the government could 
not prevent labourers frcm deserting, and hence the loss of this 
money. The Cape immigration official stated frankly that importation 
overheads were unlikely to be covered by low wages and long contracts 
as it was "more than doubtful whether (Delagoa Bay labourers) would 
continue to work at contract-rate in the immediate vicinity of more 
highly priced labour.
163. TA. A 180. CPWD. McNaughton to Chairman De Beers, 18 March 1881.
164. TA. A 180. CPWD. McNaughton to secretary De Beers, 18 June 
1881; BO 13 July 1881
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A more successful scheme was that entered into by J. Benning­
field, a director of the Kimberley Central Diamond Mining Company 
with his brother Reuben, who had worked as the Natal government 
labour agent in Inhambane until the Portuguese prohibited labour 
emigration from that port in November 1879. Despite the. terms of 
the Portuguese prohibition, Reuben Benningfield was able to bring 
his first shipment of labour for Kimberley into Durban bay in October 
1881 and, over the next five months, at least 500 workers were 
introduced in this way.^^
Benningfield paid the passport and passage costs of these men
who consequently entered Natal as free labourers, able to choose
166their own employers, and not as contracted workers. As a means
of importing labour, this irtmigraticn scheme manifested many of
the trappings of slavery. The British consul at Mozambique Island
was informed that Benningf ield's agent in Inhambane, Jose Teixeira,
the man who in 1888 became the Natal government labour agent, sent
envoys into the interior to get labour by "all sorts of pretences".
Once inlrihambane, the labourers were chained and in chains or stocks
were embarked for Natal. For his services Teixeira received a 20s
capitation fee from Benningfield who also paid an undisclosed amount
to the governor of Inhambane who, in order to circumvent the decree
prohibiting the export of labour form the town, made out exile
167passports with false names for 5s (1 $200 reis). The superinten­
dent of police in Durban complained about the conditions under 
which the labourers were Imported; as many as 200 men were packed 
into the Benningf ield's coastal schooner on each trip, they were
not examined by a medical officer on landing at Durban and had no
168latrines attached to their sleeping quarters. The workers were 
taken in groups under guard to Kimberley where they were employed 
on one year contracts at 40s per month for the first six months 
and 60s for the following six months. For supplying the Kimberley 
Central with labour that was, by Kimberley standards, inordinately
165. CSO 841 Benningfield to Fort Captain, 20 Jan., 1882; Fort Captain 
to PI, 20 Jan., 1882; Henderson and Grice to PI, 6 March 1882;
I 1.1/10. 79 Supt.. Police to Mayor and Council, Durban, 6 
Jan., 1882.
166. CSO 841.341 Henderson and Grice to PI, 24 Feb., 1882 and 
Benningfield to PI, 1 Feb., 1882.
167. FO 84/1616 Br. consul, O'Neill to FO, 14 Feb., 1882.
168. II. 1/10.79 Supt. Police to Mayor and Council, Durban, 6 Jan.,
1882.
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cheap and bound by long contracts, Reuben Benningfield was paid a
capitation fee of £6. The scheme seems to have contributed to the
mine-owners' attempted wage reductions of late 1881 but ended when
the Benningf ields1 schooner was wrecked on the coast of Madagascar 
169in 1883. Benningfield re-emerged as a recruiter of labour for
Kimberley when, in the late 1880s, he brough several hundred
immigrants frcm Inhambane into Natal from where they were taken
170to Kimberley and employed by De Beers.
During the early 1880s non-contract amatonga labour immigrants
continued to make their way across Natal to the Diamond Fields.
Natal officials complained that amatongas merely "made a convenience"
of the government immigration scheme in order to enter Natal
legally and then, after earning the 5s pass which was required
by legislation of November 1878 for all immigrants who had not
worked in the colony for six months, they continued to the Diamond 
171Fields. Many were recruited in Natal on six to twelve month
contracts for wages which, estimated to be £4 to £5 in 1884, were
172over six times greater than those offered in Natal. On their way
hone amatongas would often work on plantations and railway works
in order to earn sufficient money to pay their passage fee to
Lourenco Marques or to cover the costs incurred in returning 
* 173overland. Large numbers of labourers walked in small parties
overland from Inhambane, an extremely dangerous journey of up to
five months, while others fran the same area sought the protection
of recruiters who contracted them to employers on arrival at the 
174Diamond Fields. Other Shangaans reached Kimberley via the route 
to Natal which ran along the Olifants and Sabi rivers to Lydenburg 
and Botsabelho, but then branched off to Middleburg, Pretoria,
169. CSO 841 RM Durban to PI, 2 Feb., 1882.
170. The Portuguese consul in Cape Town mentioned a figure of 600 in
1890. CPC Packet "various documents", 1890.
171. SNA 1/1/25 PI to Border Agent, 24 Nov., 1881; PI to Col. Sec.,
14 Dec., 1881; CSO 2555 C32. RM Durban to SNA, 27 July 1881;
SNA 1/1/53.144 Fynney to SNA, 31 March 1882.
172. SNA 1/1/78.840 SNA to gov., 29 Nov., 1884; Bulwer to SNA, 8
Dec., 1884; SNA to gov., 12 Dec., 1884; Maxwell to SNA, 9 Dec.,
1884.
173. SNA 1/1/66.755 RM Umsinga to Col. Sec., 14 Sept., 1883.
174. ABM: ABC 15.4 vol. 12, Richards to Mean, 24 Aug., 1884; AHU.
Mog., 2^ Rep., pasta 1, Governor of Inhambane to GGM, 13 June 
1884 in GGM to MSMU, 28 Jme 1884; E. Creux, "Une Tournee 
Missionaire", BMSAS, 40, 3881, 231, 234.
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175Potchefstream, Bloemhof and Christiana. The number of contracts
registered by Shangaan "new hands" declined sharply frcm 10 311 in
1882 to 1 680 in 1883 and 997 in 1884. This was caused partly by
the Zulu civil war which disrupted the labour route through Zululand
and partly by the war against Mapoch, through whose territory Shangane
workers had to pass on their way frcm Lydenburg to Middelburg in 
176the Transvaal. But the decline was largely due to the effects
of the depression at Kimberley. This co-incided with a high
mortality rate caused by smallpox in 1883-84 and the closing of
the Natal borders to all labour immigrants going to or returning
frcm the Diamond Fields, in order to prevent the spread of the 
177disease.
The last ethnic breakdown of workers employed on the Diamond 
Fields was taken in 1884 when 2 144 Shangaan "new hands" were 
registered. But by 1885 workers who re-registered as "old hands", 
for whom we have no ethnic breakdown, constituted by far the majo­
rity of the work force. Thus whereas 50% of the contracts entered 
into in 1878 were signed by old hands, by 1885 this percentage 
had risen to 83%. The compound system was established between 1885
and 1888 in order to "maintain and discipline a migrant labour 
178force." Compounds reduced desertions, pressured workers to
re-register and, in conjunction with convict labour and financial
amalgamations, effectively drove down the wage level for African
workers from an average monthly wage of £5.14s8d in 1885 to £2.8s
in 1894. During the 1890s, mechanization on the mines, the partial
stabilization of the labour force and competition with the Witwaters-
rand for migrant workers reduced the numbers of Shangaans to about
700 domiciled at the Fields and a probably similar annual number
179of immigrant labourers.
175. Sieborger, "Recruitment and Organization", 39. A graphic des­
cription of the problems faced by migrants on this route to the 
labour markets is C. Richter, "Wanderende Basuto", BMB, 1882,
46-59.
176. Cape Blue Books. G3.-'84 Division of Kimberley. Native Regis­
trar to Civil Ccnmissioner, 18 June 1884, 28.
177. C80 927.3812/83 annot., Col. Sec., 27 Sept., 1883; C80 936.
5730 Manorial of Farmers in the county of Weenen; (sic 1884?)
RM Ladismith to Col. Sec., 18 Aug., 1884; CSO 974.3915 Col.
Sec. to Qndt. Natal Mounted Police, 27 Sept., 1883.
178. Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 172, 275-6, 289-298.
179. CA G7-'92 Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1892, p. 16; C6-*92 Cape 
of Good Hope Census, 1891. pp. 90-91; see also G19-*05 Cape
of Good Hope Census, p. 93.
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Chapter 3
THE EFFECT OF THE WITWATERSRAND MINES ON 
THE PATTERN OF MIGRANT LABOUR FROM MOZAMBIQUE
The Decline in the Number of Mozambicans working on 
Natal Plantations
During the late 1880s and 1890s a constant demand existed in 
Natal for experienced labour, held by long-term contracts, to work 
as stevedores, in railway construction and on the plantations.
Indian labour was expensive, and local Zulu labourers were not 
sufficiently divorced from their means of production to work long
i
contracts at low wages. Delagoa Bay labour was drawn by the
high wages paid on the Transvaal goldfields and by local railway
construction. Thus recruiters for the Natal plantations were
2
obliged to look further north for their labour. Consequently, 
when Reuben Benningfield, by this time a director of the Natal 
Government Railways, offered in August 1888 to introduce 500 
labourers frcm Inhambane at a capitation fee of 30s, the government
3
agreed to re-establish maritime labour immigration. In September 
1888 Jose de Sousa Teixeira was appointed the Natal government labour
4
agent at Inhambane and Paulino Fomazini at Lourengo Marques.
Teixeira had worked for Benningfield in the early 1880s when he was 
responsible for shipping labour, illegally and under dubious 
circumstances, to Kimberley via Durban. Fomazini was to play an 
important role in the recruitment of labour for the Witwatersrand 
in the 1890s.
In order to prevent what the Portuguese referred to as the 
"great clandestine emigration" from the Inhambane interior, maritime 
labour migration was resumed in December 1888 but on the basis of
1. CSO 1202.504 Chairman, Harbour Board to Col. Sec., 13 Nov., 1888.
2. FO 84/1901 Br. cons., Lourengo Marques to FO, 23 Sept., 1888.
3. CSO 1194.3552 Benningfield to Col. Sec., 10 Aug., 1888; CSO 1203.
5201 Benningfield to Col. Sec., 24 Nov., 1888; CSO 2566.C42 
Engineering Chief, NGR to Col. Sec., 17 July 1890.
4. BO. 49, 8 Dec., 1888.
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5the emigration scheme to Reunion. From November 1888 until April 
1890, well over 1 200 workers were introduced into Natal by Castle
g
Packet steamer frcm Inhambane and many more returned heme by sea.
In contrast to earlier labour immigration schemes and in line with
the goverment's desire that colonists should employ Zulus rather
than amatongas, it was declared in January 1889 that the government
.the
was to lift its subsidy and that/ £4.13s3d cost of introducing a 
worker by sea from Lourengo Marques had to be borne by the employer 
alone. In order to discourage desertion, the government advised 
the payment of a minimum wage of 17s for agricultural labour and
7
20s for railway labour. Contracts were for one or two years,
at the discretion of the immigrant worker. But this ruling did not
apply to Benningfield's railway labourers who were not brought in
as immigrants but as passengers who paid their own fare to and frcm
8Natal in monthly instalments to Benningfield. However, with the 
re-emergence of a smallpox threat on the East coast in 1890 the 
Natal government discouraged the introduction of Inhambane labour. 
But the general manager of the Natal Government Railways opposed 
any attempts to halt this source of labour and in response to the 
requests of the Colonial Secretary, reported that,
"I am sorry to say it is desireable to continue the immigration 
frcm the East coast. Indeed for some years past, and at 
present, it has been the only reliable source of labour 
from which (the Natal Government Railways) draws bodies 
of men.
5. Ibid., decree 596. Reunion emigration was controlled by decree 327 
of 1888 (BO. 24, 16 June 1888). Within six months of the promulga­
tion of this decree, same 1 215 labourers left Inhambane for 
Reunion, almost 600 carried on the Castle Packet Co's SS. "Florence". 
A further 300 were employed on the Tanganyika coast in German 
military operations. In 1889, another 800 men were sent to Reunion 
where they earned wages of 10s per month. CSO 1198.3482 Br. cons.
to Gov., Natal, 22 July 1888; BPP 1890. Br. Cons, report no. 742 
for 1889; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 7, GGM to MSMU, 9 Aug., 1890.
6. See various correspondence in II. 1/46; 1/50; 1/51; 1/54.
7. Government notice 25, 1889, NOG, 8 Jan., 1889; SNA 1/1/106.335 
Ashby a.o. to SNA, 25 April 1888; Government notice 25, 5 Jan.,
1889; SSa 264 Ra 3309 Col. Sec., Natal to State Secretary (SS),
ZAR, 10 Dec., 1893.
8. I.I. 1/54.272 PI-Col. Sec., 28 April 1890. See also I.I. 1/51.1175 
Benningfield - PI., 13 Dec., 1884.
9. 1.1. 1/57.816 Gen. manager, NGR - Col. Sec., 13 Aug., 1890 enclosed 
in PI - Col. Sec., 19 Aug., 1890.
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The Portuguese made further attempts to restrict "clandestine"
emigration frcm Inhambane and Lourengo Marques when in April 1889
unauthorized recruiters were threatened with prison sentences of
10two years or heavy fines. But although "illegal" Natal recruiters
were arrested in Portuguese territory, "clandestine" migration was
very difficult to prevent as the Natal government refused to recognize 
11its illegality. In order to discourage overland migration, the
legal number of migrants shipped to Durban frcm Lourengo Marques and
Inhambane was doubled frcm two to four per five tans in January
1891 and the provision that shipments of over 50 men be accompanied
12by a doctor was lifted.
Apart from the 1 200 workers shipped by Benningfield frcm
Inhambane to Durban between November 1888 and April 1890, he was
able to land a further 1 217 in the 23 months between May 1890 and
April 1892. These men were contracted for a year to either
Benningfield, who presumably represented the Natal Government Railways,
or the Harbour Board at a irmthly wage of 20s. Many amatongas were
14also employed as "togt" labourers in Durban. From 1893 to 1897 
a further 430 men were introduced, largely as colliery labourers 
and, no doubt because of the nature of this work and the 
ccmpetition for labour at Inhambane, at an increased salary of 25s 
per month.^
During the 1890s, more legislation was passed in Natal in order 
to both ease the introduction of immigrant labourers in to the colony 
and to discourage their desertion and movement to more profitable 
labour markets outside Natal. Thus it was stated in 1894 that an
10. Decree 209 in B.O. 15., 13 April 1889. Fines extended frcm 100$000 
to 400$000 and as much as 1 000$000 if violence had been used to 
procure labour.
11. FO 84/1969 Br. Cans. Lourengo Marques to FO, 3 Oct., 1889;
MNE caixa 698 Portug. Cons., Durban to MNE, 12 July 1892 and 
enclosures; CSO 1330.2276 PI - RM UMlazi, 6 April 1892 and 
enclosures.
12. Decree 8, BO 1, 3 Jan., 1891; Government notice 61 in NGG XLII,
27 Jan., 1891.
13. See various correspondence in I.I. 1/55 - 1/64. It is highly 
unlikely that these figures are complete.
14. SNA 1/4/3 J.J. Milne to SNA, 16 July 1889.
15. Various correspondence 1.1. 1/68; 1/74-76; 1/80; SNA 1/1/294 .2349 
Curator, Durban to PI, 10 Oct., 1901.
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immigrant worker would only receive a pass to leave Natal after 
showing proof that he had completed his contract and a contracted 
immigrant worker was thenceforth only required to purchase and carry 
a pass if he wished to seek work outside the colony. Four years 
later the duration of recruiting licences was restricted to two 
months and they were only issued if the labourers were to be employed
■ XT 4- t 1 6in Natal.
Following the defeat of Gungunyana, the Portuguese in Mozambique 
were in a better position to benefit financially frcm labour emigra­
tion and a decree issued in May 1896 first increased enormously the 
cost of recruiting labour and then in November 1897, following a 
profitable agreement with the Transvaal excluded Natal, Mozambique's
"most energetic and persistent rival" for the trade of the Witwaters-
17rand, frcm access to Mozambican labour. A symbolic change in 
Natal's labour supply occurred in the same year when Indian immigra­
tion was prohibited and when Zululand, together with the southern 
part of the Maputo chief dan, was formally brought under the control 
of the newly "responsible" settler government in Natal. Drought, 
locusts and a rinderpest epidemic in the mid and late 1890s helped 
separate African producers frcm their means of production and by the
end of the century the Natal labour market was dependent on African
18labour drawn almost entirely frcm within the colony.
The Emergence of a "Labour Problem" in the Transvaal
The nature of the early Trekker economy in the Transvaal, based 
largely on hunting and pastoralism, precluded the need for large 
amounts of labour. Seasonal labour was obtainable with the co­
operation of local chiefs, whose followers were obliged by Transvaal 
law to work for fourteen days, as long as they fell under the 
"protection" of a Boer ccmnunity. A more important and experienced
16. Government notice 489 of 1894, NQG, 25 Dec., 1894; Government
notice 174 of 1897, NQG, 30 March 1897.
17. MNE caixa 698, Cons., Durban to MNE, 19 July 1897; GH 830 GLM -
Br. Ccns., Lourengo Marques, 9 Aug., 1898 in Br. Ccns., Lourengo
Marques to Gov., Natal, 6 June 1898. The November 1897 labour 
agreement is examined an pages 134 ff.
18. Welsh, Boots, 193-94; Slater, "Land, labour and capital", 274-76; 
Guy, Destruction, 239; Charles Ballard, "Pestilence and the 
Peasantry: The Holocaust in Natal and Zululand 1895-1907", 
Economic History Conference, University of Natal, Durban, July 
1982.
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form of labour was supplied by inboekselings. These were indentured
workers who were often purchased or demanded as tribute from peoples
like the Swazi and Gaza or who were captured in raids cn frontier 
19chief dans. But inboekselings were expensive. In 1863 Manuel da
Gama, an Indo-Portuguese trader, sold 17 slaves in the Zoutpansberg;
male children fetched £10 to £30 and adolescent males as much as 
20£60. Furthermore once the inboekseling had completed his period 
of service he was under little obligation to stay with his master. 
The supply of slaves that fed the inboekseling system had largely 
dried up by the late 1860s and was prohibited by the London Conven­
tion of 1884. Thus although individual slaves were still obtainable 
in the 1880s and 1890s, the trekkers were obliged to look to the 
state for their labour. Legislation passed in 1870 introduced a 
graduated form of taxation that favoured Africans employed on 
white farms. It also made Africans liable to statutory labour as 
vagrants if convicted of travelling outside their heme areas without 
passes. By introducing and charging high fees for passports and 
internal passes the Transvaal government attempted to restrict the 
entry of "rootless", foreign Africans into the country and to limit 
the ability of local workers to sell their labour to the highest 
bidder.^
The Transvaal state was, unlike the Cape and Natal, fully
representative of settler opinion and, until the British annexation
of 1877, intervened actively in the labour market by passing
legislation on taxation and vagrancy that was aimed at forcing
22Africans to seek employment on farms.
19. R. Wagner, "Zoutpansberg; the dynamics of a hunting frontier,
1848-67", in S. Marks and A. Atmore, eds., Economy and Society in 
Pre-Industrial South Africa, 332-35; Harries, "Free and unfree
labour", 316, 326; P. Delius and S. Trapido, "Inboekselings
and Oorlams: The Creation and Transformation of a Servile Class", 
JSAS, 8, 2, 1982; J. Agar-Hamilton, The Native Policy of the 
Voortrekkers; W. Kirstner, "The Anti-Slavery agitation against 
the Transvaal Republic, 1852-1868", SAAYB (1952), II.
20. Account book of Manuel da Gama (private manuscript).
21. Law 9 of 1870 in Locale Wetten der Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek,
1849-1885 (ed) F. Jeppe and J.G. Kotze.
22. For laws related to taxation, vagrancy and passes, cf. Law 3 of 
1872, Law 4 of 1873, Law 3 of 1876 in Ibid. A good overview of 
the relationship between land, labour and legislation in the 
early Transvaal is P. Delius, "The Pedi polity under Sekwate 
and Sekhukhune" (PhD., London, 1980), 171-216.
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Thus the elements of a labour supply problem already existed
when in 1873 the New Caledonian alluvial goldfields were discovered
in the eastern Transvaal. Two years later it was estimated that at
23least 1 000 men were employed on these goldfields. The majority
of the Africans were "Shangaans" who arrived in gangs varying in
numbers frcm 4 to 5 or frcm 40 to 50. Many also crossed the border
24and settled as tenants on ccmpany farms surrounding the goldfields.
They earned salaries which, at 20 to 25s per month, compared
favourably with Natal and, probably because the goldfields lay
just across the Lebambo mountains, workers seldom spent more than
25three months on the mines. In 1883, the first year of their
operation, the southern De Kaap Goldfields drew about 2 000 workers
alone and the Sheba reef at Barberton employed sane 1 500 men in
1886. Shangaans were drawn to the eastern Transvaal fields frcm as
far north as Inhambane and the high wages lured away much of Natal*s
26"amatonga" labour force. Most of the labour force at Barberton,
as well as the small mining camps in northern Swaziland consisted 
27of Shangaans.
The growth of mining settlements exacerbated the labour supply 
problem for with the expansion of the urban consumer market, 
increasing numbers of workers were needed for both agriculture and 
mining. This accounts for the Transvaal's unwillingness to allow 
Africans to seek work outside the Republic at Kimberley or on the 
Cape railways and explains why African workers travelling across 
the Transvaal without the protection of white recruiters, were so
23. MNE caixa 663, Forsman - MNE, 22 March 1875 in Duprat to MNE,
4 May 1875; Fernando da Costa Leal, Uma Viagem na Africa 
Austral, 74.
24. T. Baines, Goldfields of South Africa, 134, 137; TA. W 179
H.T. Glynn, "Game ard Gold"; D.M. D(unbar), The Transvaal in 1876,
10. For a description of these Shangaan workers, see Percy 
Fitzpatrick, Jock of the Bushveld, 212, 216.
25. Dunbar, The Transvaal in 1876, 10, 14; Costello, 18741 57; MNE
caixa 663, Duprat to MNE, 19 Jan., 1874, Forsman to MNE, 22
March 1875 in Duprat to MNE, 4 May 1875.
26. AHU. Mog., 2^  Rep., pasta 1, GInhambane to GGM 13 June 1884 in
GGM to MSMU, 28 June 183 4; NA/II. 1/47.91, Jose Teixeira to 
PI, 12 Jan., 1889; D.M. Wilson, Behind the Scenes in the Trans- 
vaal, 29. See also R.G. Herring, The Pilgrim Diggers of the 70s, 
31.
27. W.H.C. Longden, Red Buffalo, 45; Goldfield Times, 31 Aug., 1888; 
SPG., L. Marvis, "The Usuto Mission Station in Swaziland".
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28often forced to undertake statutory labour for Boer fanners.
This problem was appreciated by Owen Lanyon who in 1877, as the
newly-appointed administrator of the Transvaal, wrote to his
successor in Griqualand West that, although the Transvaal had
benefitted fran the Diamond Fields, "...at the same time the fact
that it has suffered considerably from the consequent loss of its
labour cannot be ignored. The amount of land under cultivation has
certainly become less from this cause for the native prefers to go
29to Kimberley for work..."
During the 1880s the state intervened in the labour market in 
various ways. The defeated followers of chiefs such as Njabel of 
the Mapoch and his ally, the Pedi dissident chief Mampoer, were 
indentured to farmers for five years in 1883. Two years later a 
similar fate befell the followers of a small Koranna chief in 
the south-western Transvaal, David Massouw.^ Although the repub­
lican government was obliged by the London Convention of 1884 to 
implement a policy of rural locations for Africans, which had first 
been mooted in 1853 and then legislated for in 1876, it was envisaged 
that the locations would not be large enough to provide the African
population with a means of production entirely independent of wage 
31labour. Closely tied to the surveying of reserves was the squatter
law of 1887, which sought to prevent the concentration of Africans
on company land and unsurveyed, "government" land by limiting the
number of tenants to five families per farm. It also sought to
prevent a rise in farmers' overheads by restricting competition for
labour through the equitable division of workers, living outside the
32locations, amongst the Boer fanning canmunity.
28. TA. A180 CPWD Elliot to Teiw and Co., 6 Nov., 1875; McNaughton to 
Few and Co., 30 March 1876; TA. SS 185. R54 Colonial Secretary,
Cape Town to SS, 27 Feb., 1875 R529; SS 186. R652; SS 188. R1103;
SS 192. R1810; SS 1193. R1822; NA. SNA 1/1/27 F.B. Fynney to SNA,
19 Jan., 1876; Sieborger, "Recruitment and Organization", 47-51, 
66-67.
29. Cited in Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields," 167.
30. War Office, The Native Tribes of the Transvaal, 87, 111; J.A. 
Mouton, "Generaal Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis", 
SAAYB, (1857), I, 74, 146.
31. B.J. Kruger, Die Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Republiek, 1885-1889, 9-10; W.A. Stals, "Die Kwessie van Naturelle- 
eiendansreg op grond in Transvaal, 1838-1884" SAAYB, (1972), II,
67, footnote 122.
32. Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 12-15.1.
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During the first British occupation of the Transvaal, the pass
laws were relaxed partly in order to facilitate the entry and transit
of foreign African labour. But although differential African
taxation, favouring men in European employ, was scrapped in favour
of one overall tax, local Africans could only obtain passes once
their hut taxes were paid. An 1885 amendment to the pass laws
proclaimed that an African could not be hired without a pass, that
a pass less African was eligible to a fine of 15s and the costs of
his capture and transportation. The frequent levying of this fine
in statutory labour and the bounties offered for pass less Africans
left migrant workers at the mercy of the Boer population and thus,
although the pass law provided and tied workers to the farmers, it
33restricted the flow of labour into and through the Transvaal.
The state lacked the unity of purpose, administrative capacity 
and military strength needed to enforce comprehensively its inter­
vention in the labour market. The landdrost at Christiana on the 
labour route to Kimberley warned that if any attempts were made to 
extract a Is pass fee from migrant workers the prison would soon 
be full. The squatter law was similarly unenforceable and African
resistance to proletarianization extended the size of the rural 
34locations. But the pressures on the state to supply labour to 
farmers and miners were multiplied after the Witwatersrand gold 
discoveries of 1886.
Labour on the Wi twaters rand Gcldfields
The demand for labour on the mines attracted both workers and
recruiters away fran the established labour markets. As early as
1888 an experienced Natal recruiter like J.W. Colenbrander applied
to the Transvaal superintendent of Natives for at least 3 500
35passes to introduce workers from Amatongaland. Other workers 
migrated in stages, by, for example, working on the Nkomati railway 
for 12s per week before moving to the New Caledonian and De Kaap 
goldfields because wages there were 18s per week. Workers commonly
33. Law 6 of 1880, Law 22 of 1885 in Jeppe and Kotze, Locale Wetten 
der ZAR.
34. SN.2 acting landdrost Christiana to SNA, 22 April 1880. See also 
p. 116 ff.
35. SS 1603 R3370 Kleijn to Supt. Natives, 13 April 1888 encl. in 
R3501 Kaptyn to SS, 23 April 1888.
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used the eastern Transvaal gcldfields as a halfway house where 
money could be earned to complete the journey to the Rand. In many 
cases, mines were reliant on freelance labour recruiters who often 
engaged men cn the goldfields and then contracted them out to 
employers for as much as 13s per week. The mines had little control 
over the terms of employment offered by these labour touts; in 
many cases these were falsely inflated and, when they were not met,
V
induced the worker to desert his employer. In seme cases it was 
felt that freelance recruiters encouraged this desertion as they
36were then able to re-sell the worker for a further capitation fee.
By 1890 about 58% of all African labour employed on the Rand mines
was of Shangaan origin and the following year it was estimated that
there were more than 7 000 Shangaans on the mines attached to the 
37Chamber of Mines.
By world standards mining on the Witwatersrand was particularly
expensive. The lew-grade ore. deposits required extensive mining of
the reef outcrops and the use of expensive machinery and skilled
labour. Fluctuating and inconsistent levels of investment, a fixed
gold price that took no account of rising costs and the sheer extent
of the gold fields all placed heavy cost constraints on mining 
38operations. Consequently the mining industry was prone to seek the
assistance of the state, especially in times of depression,in an
attempt to lower working costs. Mining costs were dominated by wage
payments which, largely because of the winter seasonal shortage of
workers, were highly competitive. At an early stage labour overheads
in combination with the speculative gold share crisis of 1889-1890,
39threatened several mines with closure. By September 1890, the
36. SMA 1760 Grand jean diary, 12 March 1890; Chamber of Mines Annual 
Reports (CMAR) , 1893, 182; HE 146 L. Philips to Wemher, Beit and 
Co., June 1890; HE 146 L. Philips to Eckstein and Co., 20 Feb., 1891.
37. HE 149. L. Philips to Wemher, Beit and Co., 13 Sept., 1890; CMAR 
1891, 49, 50, 76.
38. Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African 
State", History Workshop, 8, 1979, 60; P. Richardson & J.J. van 
Helten, "Labour in the South African Gold Mining Industry, 1886- 
1914" in Marks and Rathbone, op. cit., 79-82; N. Levy, The 
Foundations of the South African Cheap labour System, 8-19, 44.
See also notes 79 and 112.
39. SN 17. SR 378 C. Jordan a.o. mine managers to Minister of Mines,
12 May 1888; CMAR 1899, 10; G. Schumann, Structural Changes and 
Business Cycles in South Africa, 1806-1936, 87-90; J.A. Henry,
The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank, 96-99.
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average African monthly wage on the Rand stood at £3.3s4d, with
40larger and more competitive companies paying up to £3.19s. To
the many employers who believed implicitly in a backward-sloping
labour supply curve and the economic irrationality of African
labour, these wages were untenable. This was clearly put by Lionel
Philips when he stated that: “Kaffirs work for a given sum and not
a given time. The less we pay the longer they will stay each time
41and the more efficient they will become." But an attempt by 66
companies in October 1890 to institute a maximum average wage of
£2.Is per month failed when workers responded to the wage-cut by
42deserting and returning hone.
The mines then put greater pressure on the state to intervene
in the supply of labour. Initial fears that the existing pass
system might dissuade Africans from travelling to the Rand were
overruled by mine-managers who called for a tighter implementation
of the existing travel pass system. They also recormended the
introduction of a special pass system on the goldfields in order to
monitor and control the movement of workers and consequently cut
43wages by restricting competition between the mines for labour. In
1889 only about half of the 10 000 Africans employed on the mines
had passes while in 1892 only about one-third of the 25 800 strong
44workforce possessed passes. The Chamber of Mines felt that the 
existing pass law of 1885 was applicable only to fanning interests 
as the statutory labour which it provided to the farmers simulta­
neously discouraged the movement of African labour to the mines.
It was suggested that travel passes be exchanged on the Rand for
40. SS 2273 R5596 Sec. Ch. Mines to Supt. Natives, 22 Sept., 1890
encl. in R3213; HE 149 L. Philips to Wemher, Beit and Co., 27
Sept., 1890; CMAR, 1890, 65.
41.. HE 149 L. Philips to Wemher, Beit and Co., 9 Aug., 1890. See 
also Ibid., 1 Aug., 1890; CMAR, 1889, 9-10; CMAR, 1893, 44; 
Industrial Cairaission of Enquiry (ICE) , 1897, evidence of Ed.
Way, 43, H. Jennings, 219.
42. CMAR, 1890, 69-70; S. van der Horst, Native Labour in South Africa,
92-3, 165-6; F. Wilson, Labour in the South African Goldmines, 5
106-7.
43. CMAR, 1889, 9-10; SS 2273 R1078 Sec. Chamber of Mines to SS, 25 
Jan., 1890 encl. in R3213/90; SS 2273 RMD1452 Mining Coitm., 
Klerksdorp to Minister of Mines, 4 March 1890.
44. D. Etheredge, "The Early History of the Chamber of Mines, 1887- 
1897" (University of the Witwatersrand, MA, 1949) , 72; CMAR, 1892,
45, 106. See also CMAR, 1890, 52, 73, 189.
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work passes and that a strictly controlled special pass system for
the goldfields would "effectually prevent or reduce to a minimum the
malpractices of touts and the wholesale desertion of natives, which
45so frequently and seriously erbarrasses employers at present."
As in Natal and Griqualand West, employers on the Rand wished
to extend workers' contracts for as long as possible. The constant
turnover of workers caused by the migrant labour system involved
recurrent recruiting costs and made it difficult to train new 
46employees. The Native Labour Caimissioner of the Chamber of Mines
warned that any official attempt at "the fixing of service at six
months will very much decrease the value of Kafir labour, because
47experienced workers are more valuable than raw Kafirs." The
Secretary and the Chairman of the Chamber of Mines at various times
called for the building of urban locations to house a stabilized
African work force, but were told by the Superintendent of Natives
that this was unacceptable to the government as it would drain
48labour fran the farms and would encourage detribalization. The
government supported "in principle" the Chamber of Mines' measures
to introduce foreign labour, but stipulated that all costs should
be borne by the industry and that all workers should return bane
49on completion of their contracts.
The government was also asked to construct stations that would 
offer food and shelter to migrants on their way to the mines. 
Migrant workers needed protection from fanners who captured them 
and made them pay fines or undertake statutory labour for crossing 
their lands. The police were accused of arresting migrants and of 
forcing them to work on the Rand-Delagoa railway. Workers were 
defrauded by bogus policemen , were liable to attack and robbery 
and were the prey of unscrupulous labour touts who offered them 
false terms of employment and then sold them for a capitation fee. 
Wild animals, banditry and harsh environmental conditions on the
45. SS 3924 Ballot to Grant in Ballot to Supt. Natives, 2 Nov., 1893.
46. CMAR, 1893, 44: TLC., evidence of Perry, 40, 49.
47. SS 3924 R16105 W. Grant to SS, 19 Dec., 1893.
48. SN 23 R2470 sec. Ch. Mines to Supt. Natives, Dec., 1893; CMAR, 
1897, 24. See also J.A. Hobson, The War in South Africa: Its 
Changes and Effects, 237.
49. LA 455 Leyds to ZAR Cons., Lourengo Marques, 3 Nov., 1893.
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Highveld in winter caused workers to arrive on the goldfields and
diamond fields in a poor physical condition and resulted in winter
50labour shortfalls. Furthermore, by spreading stories of mis­
adventure in the labour supply areas, returning migrants dissuaded 
their peers frcm emigrating. Thus a guaranteed safe passage to and 
frcm the mines for Shangaans, who constituted over half the labour 
force, was vital if a cheap and plentiful supply of labour was to 
be achieved.^
Several mine-cwners saw an answer to their labour problems in
a raising of the hut tax, and its payment in specie, while others
called for the institution of a government Carmission to determine
how best to push Africans living within the Republic onto the labour 
52market. A further solution to the labour problem on the mines 
was sought in the contracting of Mozambican labour, along Natal 
lines, cxi long contracts of up to two years and at lew wages of 
20-25s per month. This early scheme proved abortive as the Transvaal 
government was only prepared to supply the Chamber of Mines' Labour 
Caimissioner with letters of introduction while the Portuguese were 
not prepared to assist any labour emigration schemes without the 
establishment of a Portuguese curator of natives in Johannesburg 
who would tax and monitor the arrival of "Portuguese " Africans 
on the Wi twaters rand. The Portuguese also demanded the appointment 
of a Transvaal government labour agent in Mozambique who would be
50. LA 462 Portuguese consul to SS, 7 May 1888; TA. W 179 Glynn,
"Game and Gold", 205; R. Berthoud-Junod, Du Transvaal A Lourengo 
Marques, 81, 92-99; E. Smithers, March Hare, 55; MNE 697 Portuguese 
Consul to MNE, 28 Sept., 1891; P. Bonner, "The Rise, Consolida­
tion and Disintegration of Dlamini power in Swaziland", (PhD, 
London, 1977), 477. The official and semi-official harassment
of immigrants in the rural areas remained a constant grievance 
for those attempting to supply the mines with labour.
51. HE 149 L. Philips to Wemher, Beit and Co., 8 Nov., 1890; CMAR, 
1890, 76-77; 1891, 41, 49, 50; 1892, 44, 52-53; SS 2651 R119 
telegram, Ch. Mines to SS, 5 Jan., 1891; Ibid., 6 Jan., 1891; 
enclosures.
52. SS 2273 R3213, "De Kaffer Arbeids Kwestie"; SS 3924 R6151 sec. 
Barberton Mining and Canmercial Chamber to SS, 18 May 1893; 
Etheredge, "The Early History", 75.
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53responsible for all recruiting in the colony.
The Chamber of Mines, having failed to get the government to
intervene in the labour market an its behalf, then attempted to
involve the government in the establishment of a labour recruiting
organization. An employers' combination aimed at regulating wages
had been mooted when the Chamber of Mines was formed in 1889 and
companies had combined in 1890 to replace weekly with monthly wage
payments and to introduce the wage-cut of October. But after the
setbacks of that year, plans for a recruiting organization were not
rejuvenated until 1892 when the Chamber of Mines suggested the
establishment of a labour recruiting combination that would cost
£2 000 annually. Capital would be drawn from a payment of 3d for
each African worker employed and the object of the organization
would be to over-supply the market with labour in order to cut 
54wages. In 1893 it was estimated, probably exaggeratedly, that
recruiting agents earned £132 000, or 10s each month for every
migrant brought to the mines and that if this amount, plus a wage
reduction of 24s per worker, could be saved it would cut working
costs by £500 000 annually. But this required the establishment of
an expensive, centralized recruiting structure; a carmissicner and
his personnel should get £5 500 annually and a further £3 000 should
55be spent on the construction of compounds. In February 1893 the
State Secretary was asked by the Chamber of Mines to appoint a native
labour carmissianer who would head the proposed recruiting organiza-
56ticn. When this was rejected, it was explained to the Superinten­
dent of Natives that the lack of labour on the mines resulted in a 
restricted output and raised the price of labour. There was a need 
for a government official to liaise with the mine companies, to find 
and procure labour and to keep in touch with the chiefs; to make out 
passes and approve contracts, to arrange the lodging and protection
53. HE 190 Taylor to Edward Cohen, 10 June 1891; SS 3045 R12419 SS 
to Portuguese Consul, 7 Oct., 1891; Ibid., Portuguese Consul to 
SS, 8 Oct., 1891; AHU. Mbg., 2a Rep., pasta 9, SS to Governor of 
Inharabane, n.d. Oct.,? 1891 encl. in GGM to MSMU, 11 Nov., 1891; 
LA 462 Cans., Lourengo Marques to SS, 18 Oct., 1891.
54. CMAR, 1892, 40-41.
55. SS 3924 R6443 Artwell to Supt. Natives, 1 Feb., in Ballot to Supt. 
Natives, 2 Nov., 1893.
56. SS 3654 R2870 Lippert to SS, 8 Feb., 1893.
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of African migrants and to hear their complaints. It was hoped
that this official would also organize the importation of African
labour. The mining companies would supply the capital needed to
establish and run a Native Labour Department. The Superintendent
of Natives was asked to use his position to get native ccumissioners,
veldkomets, landdrosts and chiefs to send labour to the mines.
It was argued that cheaper mine labour would bring dcwn the cost 
57of farm labour. The government hesitated for five months before
finally deciding not to embroil itself in labour recruiting but
gave its support to the creation by the Chamber of Mines of a Native
58Labour Department headed by a caimissioner. The Native Labour 
Department was established in August 1893 and, according to the 
report of the Chamber for that year marked
"the first determined step on the part of the local 
mining industry to tackle the native labour problem, 
and to endeavour, while lowering the rate of native 
wages, to secure an ample supply of labour."59
It was envisaged, perhaps more realistically, that the NED would
60save the mines seme £150 000 annually in recruiting costs.
In October 1893 the government agreed to support the Native 
Labour Department's plans to negotiate with the Portuguese over the 
supply of labour from Mozambique and the following month the State 
Secretary asked the Governor General of Mozambique to accept the 
Native Labour Department's proposals for the regulation of labour 
migration.61
In Mozambique, a considerable debate was generated by the issue
of migrant labour in the early 1890s. A traditional fear was that
migrant labour anglicized Mozambique Africans and consequently
undermined Portuguese authority and encouraged British imperial
62designs an Delagoa Bay. The emigration of labour to the Transvaal
57. SS 3924 secCh. Mines to Supt. Natives, 28 March 1893; Ibid., 16 
May 1893.
58. SS 3924 R6440 sec. Ch. Mines to SS, 13 July 1893 encl. in R6443 
Ballot to Supt. Natives, 2 Nov., 1893.
59. CMAR 1893, 43. This sentiment was repeated in CMAR 1899, 57.
60. CMAR 1893, 36.
61. SSa263 Ra3309/95 Supt. Nativ^to SS, 26 Oct., 1893; SSa264 SS to 
GGM, 3 Nov., 1893.
62. AHU. Mog., pasta 31, Curadoria geral to GCM 8 Feb., 1878 in GGM
to MSMCJ, 15 March 1878; CPC. Portuguese Consul to MSMU, 30 Nov.,
1880; PO 84/1846 O'Neill to FO, 26 Feb., 1887; MNE 697 Portuguese
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and Natal was bad for conmerce as it reduced the number of consumers 
in Mozambique, it stripped the southern part of the colony of its 
labour and consequently increased wages at Lourengo Marques, which 
was itself employing increasing amounts of labour. This situation 
was worsened as Africans were not allowed to move between districts 
within Mozambique without passes which made it difficult to bring 
labour frcm the north to Lourengo Marques. But more importantly, 
most of the revenues frcm migrant labour, amounting to 6$000 or 
27s6d per migrant, went to the governor of Lourengo Marques and his 
secretaries who then sent these emoluments to Portugal rather than
go
spending the money locally in Mozambique. In January 1891 a 
proclamation was passed calling on all returning migrants to present 
themselves to the goverrment secretary who had issued their pass­
ports. Failure to comply with this ruling would result in a criminal
64prosecution and a fine of 12$000. In an attempt to bolster colo­
nial administration by spreading the profits of labour migration, 
it was decreed in October 1891 that state incane frcm this
source would be deposited in the Mozambican treasury and divided
65amongst the district governors and their secretaries. Despite
the plethora of legislation regulating migrant labour, the Portuguese
were largely unable to pressurize or tax labour leaving Mozambique
and the large numbers of recruiters who invaded southern Mozambique
66each winter generally operated free of Portuguese control.
In order to gain sctne return fran the egress of this labour, 
and, more immediately, to try to tax labour passing by sea to 
Natal and then overland to the Transvaal, the Portuguese government
Consul Natal to MNE, 13 Aug., 1889; SMA 484 Paul Berthoud to 
Leresche, 29 June 1892; L. Fuller, Light on the Lebambos, 9.
63. AHU. Mog., 2* Rep., pasta 7, GGM to MSMU, 24 Aug., 1890; GLM to 
Director Geral to Ultramar, 18 June 1891 in Catmisao Organizadora, 
Mouzinho, Govemador de Lourengo Marques, 193-4. See also Joest, 
"Reise in Afrika im Jahre 1883", Zeitschr. fur Ethnologie, 17, 
1885, 204-5, 211.
64. Portaria 7 B.O. 1, 3 Jan., 1891; Eduardo de Noronho, O Distrlcto 
de Lourengo Marques eaAfrica do Sul, 81.
65. Portaria 500, B.O. 41, 10 Oct., 1891; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 
7, GGM to MSMU, 24 Aug., 1890.
66. SMA 483 Grand j ean to Leresche, 7 Oct., 1891; SMA 513/A Grand jean 
to Leresche, 21 Aug., 1893; SMA 81/1 Grandj ean "Report an
Antioka", 1893.
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in December 1893 agreed to regulate the emigration of labourers
to the Transvaal on the basis of the decree which governed labour
67migration to Natal. Once the Transvaal government was assured
by the Natal Colonial Secretary that it would be placed under no
financial obligation, it complied with Portuguese wishes and
68established labour agents at Lourengo Marques and Inhambane.
These men acted as co-witnesses, with Portuguese officials, to the
signing of contracts by emigrant labourers who then had to be
vaccinated. The Chamber of Mines guaranteed to pay a 15s fee to
the Portuguese for passports and emoluments as well as all costs
involved in transporting workers to and frcm the mines. It also
undertook to transport all migrants on the Portuguese-built railway
69frcm Lourengo Marques to Ressano Garcia. The Portuguese stressed 
that these conditions were provisional and that they would be 
reconsidered after six months; permanency could only ensue frcm 
direct negotiations between the Transvaal and metropolitan Portu­
guese governments.^ Despite the lack of Portuguese control over 
the flow of labour from Mozambique, the ad hoc agreement of 1893 
laid the basis for co-operation in the field of labour recruitment 
between the Chamber of Mines and the Portuguese and initiated the 
prospect of monopsonistic recruiting.
Several schemes for the recruitment of labour in Mozambique 
were considered by the Native labour Department. Reuben Benningfield 
offered to introduce "East Coast Natives upon a large scale" on 
annual contracts and at monthly wages of £2.12s6d for adults and 
£2 for adolescents, costs which he later reduced to £ 1.15s and £1.5s 
respectively. The total cost to the Chamber for importing each 
labourer under Benningfield*s scheme was estimated at £ 5.10s, broken 
down into passport and contracting fees of £2, travel costs of 15s 
frcm Inhambane to Durban, embarkation costs, food and depot expenses 
of 7s, Transvaal consular fees of 5s for confirming contracts, 
railway costs to Waterval of 12s plus depot expenses at Lourengo 
Marques, the cost of food to Waterval and vaccination fees which
67. MNE 698 Portuguese Consul, ZAR to MNE 10 Nov., 1893.
68. SSa 264 Ra330 Natal Col. Sec. to SS, 10 Dec., 1893; SS 3924.15520
ZAR Cons, Lourengo Marques to SS, 15 Nov., 1893.
69. LA 455 sec.Ch. Mines to SS, 18 Oct., 1893; LA 463 Cons. Lourengo 
Marques to GGM, 14 Nov., 1893; SS 3924.15520 telegram ZAR cons.,
LM to SS, 6 Dec., 1893.
70. LA 455 GGM to ZAR Cons.lM, 22 Dec., 1893; SS 3924 R2002/94 GOtf to SS,
10 Feb., 1894 and encl.,R3233 16 Dec., 1893; SSa263 Ra3309 Supt.
Natives to SS, 12 April 1894.
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71totalled 8s. The remaining 23s constituted Benningfield's profit.
Other recruiters offered Mozambican labour on similar terms. But in
contrast to Benningfield, who stressed that his workers would emigrate
with the full knowledge of the Portuguese, others offered to
introduce labourers, for amounts varying from less than £1 to £4
each, as long as they came "frcm tribes not acknowledging Portuguese 
72authority." It is clear that in 1893 the vast majority of 
Mozambican workers were drawn from areas outside Portuguese juris­
diction. By 1894, some 20 000 men, two-thirds to three-quarters
73of the Rand African labour force, were drawn frcm the East Coast.
They were particularly valued because they spent up to three years 
on the mines, which was considerably longer than the 3 to 6 months 
African average, and often returned to enter into new contracts.
They were highly sought after, not only because of their long 
experience cn the mines but as underground workers; an occupation 
shunned wherever possible by other African workers but which, 
during the 1890s became almost an ethnic specialization for 
Shangaans.74
Shangaans travelled to and from the mines in groups ranging 
frcm two to three members to over two hundred. They carried 
blankets, clothing, pots, knobkieries, a sleeping mat and rolls of 
tobacco for exchange purposes. Food consisted of a pouch of 
cassava or maize flour, a calabash of water and xigugo, a nutritious 
mixture of roasted groundnuts, maize and salt which needed no 
preparation and did not ferment. Shangaan workers tended to gather 
and work together, out of choice and because of the manner of
71. CMAR, 1893, 37; CMAR, 1894, 26, 29.
72. CMAR, 1893, 29, 31, 34-36; SS 3925 R10295 R. Wilhelm to Supt.
Natives, 26 Jan., 1894.
73. SSal55 Ra 1358 ZAR Cons., Lourengo Marques, Report for 1894.
74. CMAR, 1893, 38; CMAR, 1894, 34; CMAR, 1895, 33, 37, 43, 44, 55.
See also SSa329 R1959 see Robinson group to SS, 7 Feb., 1896 encl.
in Ra607; Annual Report of Assoc. Mines 1896, 18, 61; ICE evi­
dence of J.H. Johns, 261; CMAR, 1898, 459; Ibid., 1899, 39;
TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 99, 100; Ibid., Ferraz,
246; Ibid., Perry, 47; Ibid., Report, 37; J. Bovill, Natives ' 
under the Transvaal Flag, 66. See also A. Longle, "De Inhambane 
a Lourengo Marques", BSGL, 6, 1, 1886, 33-34; A.M. Cardoso, 
"Expedigao as Terras do Muzilla", BSGL, 7, 3, 1887.
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their recruitment, on specific mines to which they gave special
names. In the early days they attached themselves to hunter-traders,
travellers and recruiters for protection but as the migrant system
developed many recruiters constructed compounds at strategic
points such as canteens, drifts and alongside chiefs' villages.
African sub-recruiters gathered scores of workers, who sometimes
received a £1 advance, in these compounds before they were taken
to the goldfields by the white recruiter. Clandestine workers were
"run" across the border and sold to the highest bidder for up to
15s or were taken to compounds at Kcroati Poort and Hectorspruit
by African sub-recruiters who, apart from their basic wages,
earned capitation fees of 5s to 7s6d. A more profitable but also
more precarious alternative was for workers to emigrate and enter
75the labour market as nan-contracted individuals.
Two major obstacles prevented the mines from investing large 
amounts of capital in the Native Labour Department and hence 
restricted the organized importation of foreign labour. The first 
was the competition in the supply areas between recruiters accre­
dited to the Native Labour Department, individual mines, free­
lancers, sub-contractors and runners. This competition resulted in 
the luring away of contracted labourers en route to the mines and 
high wages and often fraudulent terms being offered to the pros­
pective worker. This saddled the mines with high labour overheads
76and induced workers to desert if their expectations were not met. 
Wealthy companies paid thousands of pounds annually to freelance 
recruiters or "touts" who received 10s to 20s for each worker, and 
it was generally recognized that the cheapest recruiting was to be
75. SMA 438/A Liengme to Leresche, 18 Feb., 1895; Richardson, The 
Crowded Hours, 137-46, 160, 317; Bovill, Natives under the 
Transvaal Flag, 47-48, 67; Junod, Les Chants et les Contes 
Baronga, 37; South African Mining Journal, 14 Sept., 1895; CMAR 
1895, 37, 40; Ibid., 1898, 4; TEC., evidence of Perry, 43, 48-49; 
Wirth, 111, 115; Breyner, 100, 102; Dyer, 281, 283-284; Cabral, 
535-36; Coelho, 538; E. Krige and W. Felgate, "An ecological 
survey of the Temba-Tonga", 99. The most popular Shangaan mines 
were the Simmer and Jack and New Primrose . For a breakdown of 
the Shangaan mine population, see SPG, Report of the Bishop of 
Lebcmbo on the State of the East Coast Labourers at the Joha­
nnesburg Goldfields, Jan., 1899.
76. SS 3925 R10295 Grant - P.J. Joubert, 6 Dec., 1893; SS 3924
SR 1383 R. Wilhelm to SS, 23 Aug., 1895; CMAR, 1894, 35; TLC., 
Perry, 49.
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77done on the Rand itself. Because of the high labour costs arising 
out of untraroelled competition, when a representative of the Associa­
tion of Mine Managers and of the Chamber of Mines visited southern 
Mozambique in September 1894 he reported that, "nothing can be done 
to procure Kaffir labour without the aid of the Portuguese govern­
ment and its agents..." But Duncaribe envisaged the cost of impor­
ting each labourer from Inhambane as £4.12s6d, which was 5s6d 
higher than Benningfield's estimate. Thus the major restriction 
on the organized importation of Mozambican labour was the high 
capital cost of introducing labour and the fear that this money
would be lost if the worker were lured away by touts or if he 
78deserted. The labour situation worsened considerably in 1895.
In January of that year it was estimated that 40 000 Africans were 
employed on the Rand. But within the next six months, a number 
of deep level mines, first started two years previously, entered 
the development stage and at least one mine reached the operating 
stage. This resulted in a vastly increased demand for labour and, 
accompanied by a general increase in stamping power, it was esti­
mated that by the end of 1895
"in consequence of the very general increase of stamping 
power and the working of deep level mines, not many less 
than 60 000 . men will be required to fully satisfy
demand."79
The Luso-Gaza war of 1894-5 aggravated the labour shortage. Accor­
ding to the report of the Chamber of Mines for 1895 the war had a
"disastrous effect on the mines by cutting off supplies of the most
80acceptable and best class of natives for underground work." By 
mid April 1895 the approaching annual winter egress of labour was 
foreshadowed by Mozambicans returning home on foot and via Durban 
to fight in the Gaza alliance and protect their families. When the
77. CMAR, 1894, 19.
78. CMAR, 1894, 19, 42-44; CMAR, 1895, 28; Etheredge, "Early History", 76.
79. L. DeLaunay, Les Mines d'or du Transvaal, 532; CMAR, 1895, 36,
37; TLC Minority Report, 47. See also Richard Mendelsohn, "Blainey 
and the Jameson Raid: The Debate Renewed", JSAS, 6, 2, 1980 and 
notes 38 and 112.
80. CMAR, 1895, 37.
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war intensified, it was estimated that more than 150 Shangaans left
81
the Rand each day. Although in August missionaries in Khosen
reported that "masses of young people are leaving in a great hurry
for the mines so as not to be called to fight", in September the
Native Labour Department declared that "the eastern border of the
Transvaal was guarded by armed bodies of natives belonging to
Gungunyana, who were instructed to prevent all natives frcm leaving
the country, and thus entirely preventing any men caning forward 
82for service." By September the supply of Mozambican labour had
dried up entirely and the mines were suffering frcm an acute
shortage of experienced underground workers. The deteriorating
political situation, which culminated in the Jameson raid of December
1895 led to a further flight of labour and the ballasting of the
Delagoa Bay railway , completing of the Barberton line and the
expansion of the Eastern Transvaal and Klerksdorp goldfields
83exacerbated the labour shortage on the Rand. The shortage of cheap
labour was partly responsible for the collapse of the share market
in late September 1895, which followed the over-speculation of the
boom years 1894-5. The ensuing drying-up of capital placed an added
pressure on the mining industry, especially on the undercapitalized
84companies, to cut back on overheads such as wage costs.
The perceived high cost and shortage of labour caused many
85mines to either cut back on output or face closure. As Mendelsohn 
has pointed out, even where mining companies successfully weathered 
the drying-up of foreign capital in late 1895, these were generally
81. Ibid., 41-42. The Luso-Gaza war is dealt with on pp. 206 ff.
82. SMA 514 Grand jean to Leresche, 13 Aug., 1895; CMAR, 1895, 54.
83. CGP (Portuguese Consular archive, Pretoria) 2nd Register of 
Correspondence,no 54, Portuguese consul to GEM, 2 Sept., 1894; 
CMAR, 1895, 36, 37, 55.
84. ICE. evidence of C.S. Goldman, 130; Schumann, Business Cycles, 
91; Henry, Standard Bank , 101-102.
85. Staatscourant, 27 Jan., 1896; CMAR, 1896, 140, 151.
114
Or
deep level companies in need of large amounts of cheap labour.
Competing Labour Markets: Agriculture in the Transvaal
The Transvaal government, which was representative of faming 
rather than industrial interests, did little to alleviate the labour 
problems of the mines. This was largely because the soaring consumer 
demand for agricultural produce, which accompanied the expansion 
of the raining industry, called for a commensurate rise in the supply 
of labour for the farms. Transvaal burghers made repeated applica­
tions for the government to assist in the supply of rural labour 
and warnings from the mining industry, that gold production was 
closely tied to the supply of cheap labour, were paralleled by
warnings from farmers that food production was similarly dependent 
87on cheap labour. The rural labour problem was exacerbated by
the accumulation of land into the hands of speculative companies
and Boer notables and by the emergence of a class of landless
burghers. Speculation in the shares of land and prospecting companies
was as intense as speculation in gold mining shares. In 1889 the
market value of nine land companies with a nominal capital of
£5 283 ,000 had reached over £30.000 000; a similar rise in land
values was noticeable before the stock market crash of September 
881895. By the mid 1890s, large tracts of the Transvaal had been
purchased by these companies and, in order to get an immediate
return on their long-term speculations, they rented out land to 
89Africans. Large numbers of Africans were also able to lead an 
existence independent of the labour market an unsurveyed or "govern­
ment" land, mission farms, freehold "trust" land and in rural 
locations.
The differences between rich and poor burghers were exacerbated 
as the price of land rose with the speculative investments of the 
land companies and as bank credit became available to those burghers
86. Richard Mendelsohn, "Blainey and the Jameson Raid: the Debate 
Renewed," JSAS, 6, 2, 1980.
87. B.J. Kruger, Die Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Republiek, 1885-1899, 45.
88. Schumann, Business Cycles, 88, 91.
89. S. Trapido, "Reflections on land, office and wealth in the South 
African Republic, 1850-1900" in Marks and Atmore (eds) Economy & 
Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa, 354-5; Trapido, "Landlords 
& Tenants in a Colonial Economy: the Transvaal, 1880-1910", JSAS, 
V, 1, 1978. One group of companies claimed to own more than 8 
million acres, J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic (Oxford, 
1961), 5.
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90able to mortgage their freehold farms. With this money the
wealthier fanners purchased the capital goods needed to develop,
and the fencing with which to protect, their lands. This placed
them in a pre-eminent position from which to respond to the soaring
urban market for agricultural produce. In 1894 maize, sorghun,
and millet worth £107 000 was inported; by 1896 some 800 000 bags
of maize was consumed on the Rand and grain valued at over
£1 000 000 was imported into the Republic. The government's strategy
of encouraging fanners to grow maize by placing high tariffs on
imported maize was opposed by the mining industry as, together with
drought and locusts, it pushed the cost of maize, the major nutrient
of the industrial workforce, up from 10s per bag in 1893 to 14s -15s
91and as high as 22s in 1897-98. But many Boer fanners, especially
those without freehold rights, were unable to take advantage of these
high maize prices. They tended to be conservative, partly because
the government failed to modernize fanning through the creation of
a ministry of agriculture, partly because the farmers failed to
create an organization representative of their interests and partly
because the majority of them were hunters or cattle keepers with
little capital and little experience of crop cultivation for the 
92market. These factors, when combined with labour losses through
90. P. Naude, "Boerdery' In die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, 1858-1899" 
(PhD., UNISA, 1954), 142-3. 279, 281-86, 290, 301. This was 
especially true in 1896 when following the Jameson Raid, the 
cessation of speculative activity left banks like the Standard 
with idle capital, £500 000 of which was then extended to those 
farmers able to use mortgage bonds as collateral, see Henry,
The First Hundred Years of the Standard Bank (London, 1963) , 132; 
J.J. Fourie notes that rural poverty rose out of "the structural 
change in the economic framework after 1886", Afrikaaners in die 
Goudstad, 1886-1924 (Cape Town, 1978), 30, 33.
91. W. Bleloch, The New South Africa (London, 1902), 394-5; ICE., 
evidence of L. Hamilton, 74; TLC., 218, evidence of Menne and 
Nicholson; Naude, "Boerdery", 146, 273; D. Denoon A Grand Illusion 
(London, 1973), 71-72; SS 349. R14179 Sec., Chamber of Mines to 
SS, 2 Dec., 1892 and various other despatches in R8309/92.
J.F.W. Grosskopf, Rural Impoverishment and Rural Exodus (Carnegie 
Commission on the Poor White Problem in South Africa, vol. I), 54.
92. TLC., Report, 15, 17, 31, 63; Naude, "Boerdery", 104, 229, 235, 
346-7, 499, 501; Trapido, "Landlords and Tenants", 48-9, 51.
The first congress of the Transvaal Agricultural Union, the 
farmers* equivalent of the Chamber and Association of Mines, was 
only held in November 1897 and was accompanied by calls for the 
establishment of a department of agriculture, De Pers, 24 Nov., 
1897.
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compulsory coirmando duty, determined the slow response of many Boer 
farmers to the booming market for agricultural produce.
African farmers were thoroughly familiar with the production 
of maize and sorghum and were able to cultivate land far more inten­
sively than bywoners or Occupation farmers. This was partly because 
of their widespread social and political networks, which gave them
access to large amounts of labour, and partly because of their
93willingness to use the labour of women and children. Because 
of what they perceived as a scarcity of labour in the rural areas, 
farmers vied with one another to attract tenants who, because 
they owned their own cattle and often draught animals, ploughs 
and harrows as well, were not tied to one employer. Thus as long 
as labour remained a scarce factor of production relative to land, 
tenants were able to use the threat of desertion to ensure that 
the terms of their tenancies remained in their favour. Consequently 
in the late 19th century, not all the members of the tenant's family 
needed to work for the farmer and tenants had access to generous 
amounts of land for cultivation and grazing. Conditions varied frcm 
farm to farm, but it was possible, despite the anti-squatter law, 
to find 40 tenant families and their 400 cattle squatting on a Boer 
farm in exchange for the full-time labour of three adolescents 
aided by 20 adults who worked for the farmer for two consecutive 
months each year, and were free to work their lands or go to the 
mines for the remaining 10 months; on another farm more than 100
94squatters provided the owner of their land with only seven workers. 
This meant that, at a time when fanners needed increasing amounts of 
labour, there were severe restrictions on the extent to which they 
could exploit their workers; in economic terms, "squatting" was a 
highly wasteful and inefficient form of labour utilization.
The widespread establishment of rural locations in the 1890s 
was also seen by fanners as a major cause of the rural labour 
problem. After 1886 several attanpts had been made to settle 
landless burghers on the small occupation farms that acted as 
buffers against the independent chief dams of the northern Transvaal. 
Because the "government land" on which these burghers settled was
93. Trapido, S., "Landlords and tenants", 36-38.
94. Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 10-12. See also Naude, 
k "Boerdery", 221-2.
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in effect unsurveyed land occupied by Africans, they were often
95harassed and forced to flee their farms. The state only intervened
actively on the side of the Occupation fanners when the struggle
between landless burghers and Boer notables found expression in treks
96out of the Republic and when gold revenues provided the state with
the capital needed to mount costly military campaigns.
In 1894 chiefs Malaboch and Magoeba were defeated and thousands
of their followers were distributed amongst the farmers of the
victorious commando. But demands by oomuandos that other defeated
chiefdoms be broken up, or their people indentured in the traditional
manner as prisoners-of-war for five years, were refused by the
government as the state did not possess the administrative or
military capacity to control a large rural proletariat and needed
97to win the co-operaticn of chiefs in order to entrench its rule.
Thus the establishment of rural locations in the 1890s was partly
pragmatic in that it preserved, in a circumscribed form, the
material basis of chiefly power.
Boer fanners were constantly opposed to the establishment of
these locations because they engendered and protected a source
of agricultural production against which they had to compete and
especially because the locations deprived them of their "natural”
98source of labour. When location dwellers did sell their labour, 
it was on a seasonal basis and generally to the mines as they paid 
far higher wages than farms. Consequently farmers continually 
called for the break-up of the rural locations or for their
95. H.W. Grimsehl, "Qnluste in Madjadjiland, 1890-1894", SAAYB, 1955, 
II, 207-^ 9, 211, 221-27. 231-2; Mouton, "Genl. Piet Joubert in 
die Geskiedenis van Transvaal", SAAYB, 1957, I, 149; Naude, 
"Boerdery", 78.
96. J. Hattingh sees the shortage of rural labour as one of the 
reasons for the impoverishment of many burghers, the consequence 
of which was social disharmony and treks out of the Republic,
"Die trekke uit die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek en die Oranje- 
Vrystaat, 1875-1895" (PhD., Pretoria University, 1975), 467-8.
By the end of the century many burghers were without land and 
it was largely these disaffected men who collaborated with the 
invading British forces during the Anglo-Boer war, see A.M. 
Grundlingh, Die Hendsoppers en Joiners (Cape Town, 1979) , 232ff.
97. War Office, Native Tribes (London, 1905), 112-3; Grimsehl, "Qnluste 
in Modjadjiland", 236, 246-7; Mouton, "Genl. Piet Joubert", 153; 
J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, 184. According to
G.G. Munnik, many of Modjadji's people were indentured after 
the 1894 war, Memoirs (Cape Town, 1933) , 143.
98 . Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 9, 22, 29, 33.
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occupants to be forcibly obliged to work on white farms.
The government had always been sympathetic to these demands
and had initially pegged the size of locations to between 4 and 6
acres per household. But when it came to surveying the locations,
the maximum was officially raised to 12 acres and, due to the
unwillingness of the chiefs to retreat into areas which were only a
fraction the size of their old domains, locations often exceeded
99the stipulated 12 acres per family. Popular pressure frcm Boer 
farming interests attenpted to limit the establishment of reserves 
and eventually culminated in the passing of law 21 in September 
1895, the plakkerswet, which transferred the right to delineate 
new reserves frcm the government-appointed Location Ccnmission to 
the Volksraad and stipulated that locations would not be of such 
a size as to provide their inhabitants with a means of production 
entirely independent of wage labour. The same law modified the 
1887 Squatters law by prohibiting Africans frcm squatting without 
the permission of the farmer while at the same time apportioning 
a white farmer with five African families for each adult family member, 
bywoner or part cwner of his farm. Although a farmer was legally 
permitted a maximum of 25 families, the size of the family was 
never stipulated. The plakkerswet also sought to tie workers 
more strictly to the farms by stipulating that an employer was only 
obliged to supply a labourer or tenant with a trekpass three 
months after receiving notice of his intention to quit.
This aspect of the plakkerswet was tightened in October 1895 
by a new pass law which threatened with long terms of forced labour 
any African caught moving without "good reason" or in a direction 
not stipulated in the pass. In the same month new legislation 
introduced a personal tax of £2 to be levied on all African males
99. Ibid., 28, 35; W.H. Stals, "Die Kwessie van Naturelle-eiendansreg 
op Grond in Transvaal, 1838-1884", SAAYB, II, 1972, 67; Grimsehl,
"Qnluste in Modjadjiland", 228. The surface area of a location 
was not always a good indication of its ability to support a 
large population. Thus the "Knobnose location", surveyed in 
1892, was unhealthy and lacked sufficient water and because 
of this, most people preferred to squat as tenants on surrounding 
farms, see Transvaal Native Affairs Department, Report for 1905, 
60; War Office, Native Tribes, 67, 98; E.H. Brookes, The History 
of Native Policy in South Africa (Cape Town, 1924) , 342.
100. Resolutions of the first Volksraad, 6 Sept., 1893; 3 Sept.,
1894 in BPP., Laws of the Transvaal up to 1899; Kruger,
Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 35-38.
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not employed by Europeans. This law was aimed at forcing Africans
living on mission stations, rural locations, government land or
101paying rents in cash or kind, onto the labour market.
But the attempt by the government to influence the supply of
labour in the rural areas, through the passing of legislation, proved
abortive. Much of the pressure on the state to intervene in the
labour supply came from bywoners and under-capitalized individuals,
working occupation plots and loan farms, who could not afford to
compete for labour with the larger Boer farmers and notables. The
latter, who generally comprised the landdrosts and veldkomets whose
duty was to enforce the plakkerswet, saw little advantage in forcing
labourers from their farms, or in undertaking dangerous and costly
expeditions against the large numbers of Africans on Company lands,
merely in order to supply their poorer compatriots with cheap 
102labour. Where attanpts were made to enforce the plakkerswet
and the other "labour laws" of 1895, largely in the outlying
districts where the power of the central government was weak, the
rural labour problem was compounded rather than solved as squatters
tended to flee, with or without their trek passes, frcm white
occupied land. They then settled on government, company and mission
lands as well as rural locations or fled the Republic, while others
responded to the threat posed by the plakkerswet by moving to the
103mines or by purchasing freehold land under the trust system.
Three years after the passing of the 1895 plakkerswet, the Volksraad 
concluded that it was unenforceable and refused to consider the 
numerous calls for its modification. Nevertheless, it was conceded 
that faming interests were unable to compete with the wages paid 
by the mining industry and, towards the end of the decade, moves
101. According to article 7 of Law 22 of 1895, an African caught 
without a pass had to pay a fine of up to 15s, a fee of Is for 
his travel pass and any costs involved in his transportation.
He was allowed to earn this money by hiring himself out to an 
employer, Locale Wetten, 228-231; Kruger Landelike Arbeids­
vraagstuk, 37-38, 42; Naude, "Boerdery", 211, 218.
102. Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 30; Trapido, "Landlords 
and tenants",41.
103. BMSAS no 124, 1895, 423; TLC., evidence of B.H. Dicke, 326-7;
S.A. Native Affairs Commission, 1903-05, evidence of Hbgge, 457-8, 
and Munnik, 488; Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 43-45.
Bundy states that by 1899 Africans owned just under 250 000 
acres in the Transvaal, South African Peasantry, 205.
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were made to force young men living in the Reserves to spend two 
years in the employ of fanners before working in the mines.
Labour and the Transvaal State
The Transvaal state served as the mediator between the carpeting
needs for labour of fanning and mining interests, while attempting
at the same time to regulate the canpetition for labour within those
two sectors of the econany. The ambiguity of the state's position
becomes more real when it is realized than in 1895, a year in which
60 000 Africans were employed on the Rand, the African male
population of the Transvaal was estimated at about 131 500. Two
years later the African population was thought to total 400 000 to
500 000. Yet 100 000 labourers were needed for agriculture and
105120 000 for mining. Although fanning interests were represented 
in the Volksraad by enfranchised burghers, the vast majority of 
Transvaal export revalues came frcm gold sales. In order to overcome 
this contradiction between farming and mining interests, the 
government sought to control and cheapen labour on the mines by 
legislating a separate pass law for the De Kaap and Rand goldfields. 
The object of this law, which was drafted by the mining industry 
and was passed together with the "labour legislation" of September 
and October 1895, was
"to prevent the hitherto indiscriminate desertion of natives 
which has involved so many companies in heavy money losses, 
and to give legal security to any canpany prepared to incur 
the necessary expense of importing natives from a distance."
Law number 23 of 1895 helped depress African wages by severely 
restricting the freedom with which African workers moved frcm mine 
to mine in search of higher wages. This law decreed that when a 
migrant entered the proclaimed Goldfields of the Rand or De Kaap he 
had to procure a pass and metal badge which were specially coloured
104. This legislation, tabled in February 1899, was bitterly opposed 
by the mines and was never put into effect due to the outbreak 
of war that year. Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 52? Naude, 
"Boerdery", 223.
105. Ibid.,'44; CMAR, 1895, 181; Star, 4 Nov., 1897.
106. CMAR, 1895, 39.
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and initialled for each district. This pass entitled him to spend
three days looking for work within the specified district and was
renewable for 3 days at a fee of 2s. An employer was prohibited
frcm engaging a worker without a district pass. After finding work
the migrant's district pass was exchanged for an employer's pass and
only on completion of his contract would the district pass be
returned to him. In order to leave the proclaimed Goldfield the
district pass and badge had to be destroyed and a travel pass issued
for a Is fee. The punishment for failing to produce a district or
travel pass was respectively, 10s or one week's imprisonment and
107£3 or 1 month's imprisonment.
Because of the rural labour shortage in the Transvaal, calls 
by mining companies for native carmissioners to help supply the 
mines with labour went largely unheeded. Government tardiness 
over the construction of shelters along the labour routes within 
the Transvaal may also be attributed to the fear of criticism frcm 
burghers over the costs to the public treasury of such shelters 
and the facility they would afford rural labour to move to the mines. 
But the refusal of the government to build shelters or bear any of 
the costs of introducing labour drained the financial resources of 
the Chamber of Mines' Native Labour Department. By the middle of 
1895 the Native Labour Department had established stations at 
Kcmati Poort and three other points intersecting the paths leading 
frcm Gazaland to the Rand. The costs involved in the construction 
and maintenance of these shelters and the evident inability of the 
Native Labour Department to end high wages and competition for 
labour through the importation of large numbers of workers or the 
establishment of a fixed scale of wages on the Rand undermined the 
effectiveness of the recruiting organization. By the end of 1895 
the Native Labour Department was faced with collapse and in 
desperation it attempted to supplement its inadequate funding by 
doubling the 3d per African employee charged of its member companies.
107. Ibid., 51-59; SS 264 Ra 3309 "Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines, 
Regulations in terms of Act 88, Gold Law, n.d."
108. When in 1897 the State Secretary advised the Volksraad to allow 
the construction of labour depots on the Rand, he was quick to 
point out that "the waiting houses were not intended to be on a 
magnificent scale, but only to prevent the natives deserting." 
Star, 6 Nov., 1897.
108
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109. CMAR, 1895, 31-2, 53.
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The year 1896 marks a watershed in the government's approach
to the mining industry's labour supply. In that year, gold consti-
110tuted 97% of the Transvaal's export revenue yet the development
of the mines was held back by a governmental system of monopolies,
111concessions and general bureaucratic inefficiency. Foremost
amongst the fetters which the mining capitalists condemned as
responsible for holding back the expansion of the mining industry
was the inadequate supply of cheap labour; in 1896 wages paid to
African labourers constituted about 25% of total working costs on
the Rand. The following year the state mining engineer estimated
the price of African labour as sane £2 million, or 18.6% of total 
112work costs.
The Jameson Raid in December 1895 attempted to removed these 
impediments by establishing a government supportive of the needs 
of mining capital. Although a failure in its political objectives, 
the Raid did succeed in pushing the Transvaal government to inter­
vene more actively in the procuring of labour for the mines.
The Jameson Raid and State Intervention in the Labour Market
The ad hoc labour agreement of December 1893, which theoretically
regulated labour recruiting in Mozambique, lasted until the defeat
of Gungunyana in September 1895. The defeat of the Gaza allowed the
Portuguese to extend their control over the vast majority of the
population of Southern Mozambique and this gave them the pcwer, for
the first time, to control labour emigration and to make effective
113demands of the Transvaal. In September 1895 it was reported
110. C.W. de Kiewiet, History of South Africa: Social & Economic 
(Oxford, 1941), 119.
111. Marais, Kruger Republic, 23-46; C.T. Gordon, The Growth of Boer 
Opposition to Kruger (Cape Town, 1970), 28-111.
112. The total wage cost, including white wages, came to over 50% as 
against an average wage cost on English mines of 31.7%. I.C.E., 
evidence of Seymour, 149; Albu, 14; Way, 38; H. Jennings, 200; 
Shanks, 366; Annual Report of the Assoc. Mines, 1896, 19; TLC., 
evidence of Jennings, 44.
113. The ad hoc agreement of December 1893 had officially lapsed
on 6 June 1894 but as no action had been taken by the Portuguese, 
the Transvaal regarded the regulations governing the recruitment 
of labour as "uncertain". SS 241 Ra 2716/95, p. 30, "Arbeid in 
de goud-mynen deur kleurlingen kamende van Mozambique", 23 Sept.,
1895.
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that Paulino Pomazini had been granted a concession to authorize
and control the emigration of African labourers frcm Mozambique
114and that all recruiting had been halted. In February 1896 a
Barberton newspaper stated that recruiters were "frantic" because
of the comprehensive enforcement by the Portuguese of an 18s 6d 
115emigration tax. Labour agents operating in Mozambique were
either arrested or left the country and this led to high capitation
116fees of 27s6d being paid for labourers at Kcmati Foort. The
scarcity of Mozambican workers brought about a severe shortage of
underground labour, restricted stamping power, and threatened
several mines, when combined with the withdrawal of capital caused
117by the Jameson raid, with closure in early 1896.
The political and economic crisis brought about by the Jameson 
Paid drove the Transvaal government to intervene directly in the 
labour market on the side of the mining industry. On 27 January 
1896, just over three weeks after Jameson's surrender outside 
Klerksdorp, a proclamation was issued in the government gazette 
which declared the government,
"beady to provide all the help and assistance within its 
ability to facilitate the supply of native labour on 
the public diggings of this Republic."^®
A week later, on 4 February, a circular was sent to native ccmni-
ssioners, calling an them to assist in supplying the mines with 
119labour. Because the government recognised the inability of the
114. S.A. Mining Journal, 14 Sept., 1895, 1064-65; PO 63/1316 Cons, 
to FO, 6 March 1896; CMAR, 1895, 35. On Fomazini, a leading 
Lourengo Marques entrepreneur, see Std. Bank 1/1/102, LM 1895- 
1900, Lourengo Marques Branch Inspector, 26 July 1897.
115. Gold Fields News, 20 Feb., 1896. This figure seems exaggerated 
as the official emigration fee remained 15s until May 1896, LA 
464 Cons., Lourengo Marques to SS, 27 Aug., 1895.
116. CMAR, 1896, 141, 169-70.
117. HE. 171 Eckstein and Co. to Beit and Co., 17 Feb., 1896; Ibid., 
22 Feb., 1896; SSa 329 R 1728 Secretary, Robinson Gold Mining 
Co. to SS, 17 Feb., 1896; Ibid., 13 Feb., 1896; Ibid., R1377 
manager, East Rand Prop, to SS, 2 Feb., 1896.
118. Staatscourant, 27 Jan., 1896; SSA 330 "Resume", p. 120.
119. SS 329 BB. 139/66. SS to Supt. Natives, 30 Jan., 1896 and 
circular of 4 Feb., 1896 encl. in R607. See also CMAR, 1896, 
141, 143-44; Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk, 187.
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Transvaal's African population to satisfy its cwn labour needs as
well as those of both farmers and mine companies, it was obliged
120to turn to foreign sources of supply. The reversal of government 
labour policy was underscored when on 2 February, negotiations were 
opened with the Portuguese on the basis of the 1893 ad hoc labour 
agreement. ^ 1
The Transvaal government was pressured by the mining industry 
to seek a formal arrangement with the Mozambique authorities. The 
secretary of the Robinson group wrote that
"as far as our needs are from outside, preference is 
given by us to East Coast boys on account of the 
distance they are away frcm home, and therefore they 
would stay longer, and also they are willing to work 
underground...."
He distinguished between "Maputasland" (sic) and "Gazaland", which 
had adult male populations estimated at 12 000 to 15 000 and 100 000 
respectively. Gaza labourers were preferable because they could 
evade "vexatious and expensive" Portuguese taxation by being brought 
to Komati Poort for 10s each. "Maputa" labour cost 3s6d to take to 
the railway at Lourengo Marques and Inhambane labourers were 
expensive because of Fomazini's local concession and the 27s6d 
shipping fee. The railway fee of 28s6d from Lourengo Marques and 
19s6d frcm Kcmati Poort was thought to be "enormous considering 
that the niggers are conveyed in open trucks and packed like
122herrings." Only government intervention could reduce these costs.
The inability of the Chamber of Mines' Native labour Department
to procure labour resulted in a falling off of subscription rates
123and threats of secession in early 1896. The organization sought
its salvation in an agreement with the Portuguese and with this end
in view the Native Labour Department manager sought Transvaal
124government support for his negotiations in Lourengo Marques.
The Portuguese consul was first approached unofficially by the 
Transvaal government in January 1896 when he was told that it would 
be "materially advantageous" for him if he were able to influence
120. SSa 330 Resune, 8 June 1897, p. 120. See also Fourie, 
Afrikaners in die Goudstad, 20; Trapido, "Land, Office and 
Wealth", 362.
121. SS 329. R243 SS to Lourengo Marques cons., 8 Feb., 1896; LA 464 
Cons. Lourengo Marques to GGM, 10 Feb., 1896; SSa 330 "Resume", 
pp. 120-23.
122. SSa 329 R1959 Sec. Robinson Group to Assistant SS, 7 Feb., 1896.
123. HE. 171 Rouliot to Beit, 6 April 1896; Ibid., 26 April 1896;
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the governor-general in Mozambique to lift the restriction on labour
emigration. In late February the consul met with President Kruger
who informed him that the need for a labour agreement with the
Portuguese arose fran his desire to rectify one of the major causes
125of the dissent that had culminated in the Jameson Paid. The
Portuguese negotiators were well aware that because of the Transvaal
government's need for labour in order to settle its political
problems, "we may later be able to turn this unsettled situation to
our advantage" and that the labour supply question should be made
126"a weapon that could be very useful for us." In March the 
Transvaal government agreed to abide by existing Portuguese legisla­
tion, which controlled emigration of labour fran Mozambique to Reunion 
and Natal and in particular agreed to appoint an official in 
Johannesburg who would fulfil the role played by the Protector of 
Immigrants in Natal. On 21 April the various clauses of the 
agreement were verbally agreed to and, although no reference to
costs was made, decree 129-A of 27 April was published in the
127Mozambican government gazette. The strength of the Portuguese
position became evident when on 13 May, decree 158 was published
which fixed the price of labourer engagements at 5$000 (22s6d).
This marked an increase of 7s2d over the 1893 price, but was 3s6d less
than the 26s charge initiated in 1877 when the Portuguese began to
tax maritime emigration to Natal. On top of this increased cost,
each recruiter had to purchase a 500$000 (£111.2s) licence, valid
128for one year only, from the Portuguese.
CMAR, 1896, 154.
124. SSa 329 Ra852/96 Grant to Sheppard, 20 Feb., 1896 in Ra607.
125. MNE 709 Cons to MNE, 23 Feb., 1896. This desire
on several occasions, see MNE 709 Cons, to MNE, 16 May 1896; 
Cons, to GEM, 2 Dec., 1896 encl. in Cons, to MSMU, .9 Jan., 1897;
Portuguese Consulate Pretoria (CGP) cons, to MNE, 23 Feb., 1896;
Mcuzinho de Albuquerque, Mogairbigue 1896-98, 148.
126. MNE 709 Cons, to MNE, 23 Feb., 1896; Cons, to MNE, 16 May 1896.
127. SSa 330 "ResumS", 123-8; SS 329.975/96 SS to Min. Mines, 7 May 
1896 in Fa607.
128. BO. 20, 16 May 1896. For Natal costs see go.61-62.
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This legislation caused much consternation in mining circles
and, on the same day that decree 158 was pranulgated,the Association
of Mine Managers put forward its own recommendations. These included
a contract period of 24 months and minimum wages of 40s to qualified
workers and 20s to "youths". They further agreed that the mine
companies should reimburse the government all costs incurred in
supplying the goldfields with Mozambican labour. Following these
objections to the Portuguese plan, the Transvaal government expressed
its unwillingness to accept responsibility for the fulfilment of
workers' contracts. Probably because of the financial costs that
would have been incurred and because it would have dragged the
British government into the "native labour question" on the Rand,
the Transvaal revised its earlier negotiating position and insisted
129that responsibility for contracts was a matter for the courts.
The responsibility clause was vital for the Portuguese as through
it they sought to limit clandestine migration by monitoring
Mozambican labour at the receiving, employment end. Only in this
way could they effectively end clandestine emigration and control
130and tax "Portuguese" labour. Clandestine emigration also involved
a loss of Portuguese railway revenue amounting annually to about
£2 000 as, after the Luso-Gaza war, recruiters looked increasingly
131to the Gazaland area north of Ressano Garcia. Although negotia­
tions broke down over the issue of responsibility in late August 
1896, the Transvaal government was nevertheless given permission 
by the Portuguese to issue recruiting licences to labour recruiters 
recommended by the Superintendent of Natives.
By mid 1896 the Native Labour Department of the Chamber of Mines 
which had been unable to cane to an agreement with the Portuguese, 
was in the process of dissolution and a new labour agency had been 
proposed which would consist of members of both the Chamber and 
Association of Mines. In dissolving the Native Labour Department the 
Chamber was abandoning its attempt to form a monopscni s tic labour
129. SSa 330 "Resums", 130-35; SS 329 Ra2389 Sec. Mine Managers Assoc
to Min. Mines, 13 May 1896 and R1873 SS to Portuguese cons.,
29 Aug., 1896 in Ra607/96.
130. MNE 709 Cons, to MNE, 16 May 1896; CGP cons, to MNE, 14 May 1896
131. MNE 709 Cons, to MNE, 2 Sept., 1896.
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recruiting organization that would exclude its competitors. Foremost 
amongst these was the Association of Mines which canmsnted auspi­
ciously that
"The proposed Association for the Native labour supply 
originated from the generally acknowledged necessity 
of having one uniform and united organization for the 
introduction of Native labour at the least possible 
expense to the companies, and above all to do away 
with the competition which has arisen through indivi- 
r " of companies providing their own native
A leading member of the Chamber of Mines carmented that the value of 
a new labour association was that
"it would constitute practically a monopoly for the 
introduction of labour and we sincerely hope to obtain 
gradually a reduction of wages. Our code is to centra­
lize the introduction of Natives (and to) get a uniform 
system of pay and management of the compounds so as to 
get a better control over the native population ."133
The Chamber of Mines and the Drive towards Monopsanistic 
Recruiting in Mozambique
Following the breakdown in negotiations with the Transvaal
government in August 1896, the Portuguese entered into direct
134consultations with the Chamber of Mines. In September an
agreement was entered into with the Native Labour Department which
gave the organization the right to erect shelters and recruit labour
anywhere in Mozambique. More importantly it prohibited any recruiter
fran operating without the permission of the Chamber of Mines or the
135Governor of Lourengo Marques. This effective monopsony invested 
the Native Labour Department of the Chamber with renewed political
T32. Assoc. Mines, Annual Report, 1896, 19, 55.
133. HE. 171 Rouliot to Beit, 6 June 1896.
134. The Portuguese consul in Pretoria feared that the government was 
blocking a labour agreement and that the Chamber was the only 
serious party, MNE 709, Cons., to GEM, 2 Dec., 1896; Cons, to 
MNE, 9 Jan., 1897.
135. CMAR, 1896, 164. See also Ibid., 157-61; HE 172 Rouliot to 
Beit, 12 Sept., 1896.
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strength for, as the Portuguese started to arrest labour recruiters
not tied to the Chamber of Mines, the labour monopsony threatened
136mining companies not attached to the Chamber. The secretary of 
the Robinson group which belonged to the Association of Mines, in 
asking for government assistance to secure a similar labour 
concession, complained that
"For sane time past our labour supply has come entirely 
from (Mozambique) and now through this concession our 
supply has been cut off and we are helpless to acquire 
natives fran that direction."!37
The acquisition of a Mozambican recruiting monopsony by the
Native Labour Department turned negotiations over a new labour
association in favour of the Chamber of Mines as it was agreed that
the proposed recruiting "organization should be established ...
embracing and utilizing the privileges conceded by the Portuguese 
138government." Adequate funding was assured by a 3s contribution
and a further liability of 3s per worker onployed by each member
company. This capital would allow the Labour Association to construct
a labour depot and five recruiting stations between Ressano Garcia
and the Limpopo. It was hoped that these shelters would attract
1392 500 to 3 000 workers each month.
The manager of the Wemher-Beit group, which was attached to the 
Chamber, saw the formation of such a labour association, which would
136. HE 171 Rouliot to Beit, 26 April 1896; Ibid., 10 Oct., 1896;
PO 63/1317 Cons, to FO, 2 Sept., 1896; Ibid., 5 Sept., 1896.
See also CMAR, 1896, 169-170.
137. SS 329 Ra5025 see Robinson group to SS, 16 Oct., 1896 encl. in
Ra 607; SS 329 Ra5026 Bortug. cons, to SS, 21 Oct., 1896.
138. Assoc. Mines, Annual Report, 1896, 56-57.
139. An earlier attempt in June-July 1895 to build shelters in 
Mozambique had been abandoned. SMA 514 Grand jean to Leresche,
7 July 1895; Idem., 7 Sept., 1895.
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be heavily dominated by the Chamber of Mines, as "a step towards
140the fusion of the two chambers." The secretary of the Robinson 
group was more explicit in his outline of the Chamber's political 
motivation in acquiring the Mozambican labour concession.
"It is well known that the Chamber of Mines has an object 
in view in securing the concession - it is namely to 
prevent the companies belonging to the Association of Mines 
from getting any labour whatsoever and so force them to 
break up the Association and join the Chamber on their 
terms."!41
Because of these political motives, the Association withdrew its
support for the new Rand Native Labour Department in October but
allowed its individual mothers to join the organization.
Despite the inability of mining capitalists to form one
umbrella recruiting organization, they were sufficiently sanguine
over the expected flow of labour that would emerge from the labour
concession in Mozambique, as to cut the wages of African mine-
142workers in October 1896. But the Chamber of Mines had been
obliged to pay a high cost for its labour monopsony.
A recruiting licence cost 1,014$000 (£225,6s7d) which consisted
of a guarantee fee of 800$000 (£177.15s6d), a stamp fee of 200$000
143and a registration fee of 14$000. The Portuguese charged the 
Rand Native Labour Department 7$650 (27s6d) for every emigrant; 
this was broken down into a basic passport fee and various 
contracting and registering charges. Apart from these revenues 
claimed by the Portuguese, a further cost of 11$815 (42s6d) was 
incurred in recruiting, feeding and transporting the workers to the 
Rand. Thus the high cost of £3.10s involved in recruiting and 
transporting Mozambican labour to the Rand limited any successful 
wage reduction as mine managers feared that wage reductions would
140. HE 172 Rouliot to Beit, 7 Nov., 1896.
141. SS 329 Ra5025 see Robinson group to SS, 16 Oct., 1896 encl. 
in Ra607/96.
142. HE 172 Rouliot to Beit, 5 Sept., 1896; Ibid., 10 Oct., 17 Oct.,
1896.
143. LA 465 ZAR cons., Lourengo Marques to SS, 17 Nov., 1896. These 
figures are computed at the official exchange rate of $225=ls.
See also SS 329 Ra5537 and Assoc. Mines, Annual Report, 1896, 61.
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lead to an increased rate of desertion and the consequent loss of
recruiting overheads. The desertion of labour caused by wage
reductions was worsened by drought, locusts and rinderpest which
in many cases drew men back to their families and prevented them
144fran seeking service on the mines.
By the end of December 1896 the wage-reductions of October had
"utterly and hopelessly collapsed" and, due to the shortage of labour,
145several mines were once again faced with closure. The inability
of the mining industry to hold down the rate of wages was largely
attributable to the failure of the mines to form a solid labour
association. However mining capitalists saw their immediate labour
problems in terms of the government's lax implonentation of the
pass laws and the "extravagant and unjust" taxes extorted by the
146Portuguese on all workers leaving Mozambique. These taxes
substantially increased recruiting overheads and necessitated a more
efficient pass system to prevent desertion. Thus the importation of
foreign labourers, whose introduction was necessary in order to
oversupply the labour market and reduce wages, was dependent upon
the successful implenentation of the pass laws. A month before the
wage reductions of October 1896, Wemher-Beit had stated that "if
the new 'pass law' is being properly administered it should be
possible to enforce the fulfilment of contracts, and in that case
it will pay to import labour from long distances at considerable
147cost and at lower wages." But the mining capitalists complained
that the existing pass law on the goldfields was "a grievance
148instead of the relief it was designed to be."
A major inducement for Mozambicans to desert was that they had 
to repay the cost of their transport to the Witwatersrand. As this
144. Ibid., 18, 64-5; HE 140 Fitzpatrick to Beit, 26 Dec., 1896.
145. HE 140 Fitzpatrick to Beit, 26 Dec., 1896; HE 162 Phillips to 
Eckstein, 23 Jan., 1897; to Bouliot, 9 Jan., 1897.
146. SS 329 R1756 Sec. Assoc. Mines to SP, 11 Dec., 1896. The 27s6d 
fee was more than that levied on labour going to Natal in 
1877, see SSa 330 "Kaffirarbeiders aan die Witwatersrandsche 
gDudvelden", 170.
147. HE 62 Wemher-Beit to Eckstein, 12 Sept., 1896, p. 198.
148. HE 140 Eouliot to Beit, 26 Dec., 1896.
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was variously estimated at 45s to 60s, many workers deserted once
149on the Rand and willingly paid pass fines of 10s. Even when, in
December 1895, under pressure from the mining canpanies the pass
fine was raised to 60s, Africans could still desert and reappear
in another pass district, like Boksburg, where officials asked no
151
questions and where the pass fine was only 20s. Labour touting
was closely linked to desertion as touts often encouraged workers
to desert and then shared their capitation fee with the worker.
Large profits were made by touts, who operated on the Rand, and by
freelance recruiters who brought labour fran Mozambique. With
private enterprise in the recruiting sphere largely untrammelled,
competition for workers drove monthly wages up to £3.10s and resulted
151in the payment of high capitation fees of up to 60s and 70s.
One recruiter claimed that he was paid £5 per recruit by Consolidated
Goldfields and a further 5s for each month, over and above six
152months, that the recruit spent on one mine. These capitation
fees hampered the work of the Rand Native Labour Department as they
encouraged company recruiters to sell their workers to freelancers.
But more importantly, high capitation fees, when combined with
desertion, involved the mines in losses of up to 75% of the capital
153invested in recruiting. Despite the promulgation of the "Pass 
Laws" (no. 23 of 1895 and 31 of 1896), the amount of money lost by 
individual canpanies through desertion increased annually. The 
execution of the pass law was described as a "farce" and "merely 
an extra tax-collecting agency" and it was averred that Mozambican 
labour could not be imported on a large scale until contracts of
149. Assoc. Mines, Annual Report, 1896, 19, 75-79.
150. HE 171 Rouliot to Beit, 8 March 1896, 15 March 1896: CMAR, 1897, 
130-37; ICE. evidence of C.S. Goldman, 104; Ibid., J.H. Johns, 
261; UR. 12 "Pasambtenaar Johannesburg, Rapport 1897".
151. SS 329 R1959 sec Robinson group to SS, 7 Feb., 1896 in Ra607;
HE 171 Rouliot to Beit, 29 March 1896; ICE., evidence of T.H. 
Leggett, J.H. Johns; D.M. Wilscn, Behind the Scenes in Transvaal, 
(London, 1901), 196-7.
152. Richardson, Crowded Hours, 317.
153. ICE., evidence of C.S. Goldman, 104, 109-110; Ibid., evidence of 
J.B. Robinson, 268; T.H. Leggett, 256.
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at least two years could be guaranteed by a strictly enforced pass
i 154 law.
Calls frcm the mining industry for the government to tighten
the pass laws were accompanied by cries for the government to allow
155the introduction of foreign labour drawn fran various sources
and to ccsrpel the Netherlands South African Pailway (NZASM) to
lower the costs of transporting Shangaans or Improve the conditions
of their journey. Although rail transport reduced the molestation
of immigrant workers, allowed their transport in winter months and
landed them on the Rand in a better physical condition, workers
were discouraged fran travelling by train as they were often herded
into overcrowded and insanitary sheep trucks and luggage vans and
were brutally treated. It was claimed that NZASM charges for
transporting Shangaans were twelve times the rates charged by the 
156Cape railways. The mining industry also called on the government
to persuade the Portuguese to lower the tax on emigrant labourers.
Fran September 1895, which marked the end of the Luso-Gaza war,
to March 1897 the cost incurred by the Rand Native Labour Department
in recruiting and transporting labour from Mozambique to the Rand
doubled to 70s. The Association of Mines felt it could afford to
pay the Portuguese no more than 5s, and that only if recruits were
157prevented fran deserting by an enforced pass law.
By 1897 the problem faced by the mines with respect to 
Mozambican labour was less one of supply than one of cost, although 
the two were still intricately linked. Thus an oversupply of African 
labour in April allowed the mines to reduce African wages by 30%
154. SSa 329 R1959 sec. Robinson Group to SS, 7 Feb., 1896; SSa 330 
R5792 sec. Assoc. Mines to SP., 14 Paril 1897; SSa 330 R661/97 
Trew and de Savingy to ZAR govt., 15 June 1897; D.M. Wilson, 
Behind the Scenes, 185-86.
155. Proposals that labour be drawn fran Abyssinia, Italy, Syria, 
Madagascar, China, Zanzibar and Nyasaland were all quashed 
by the Transvaal government, SSa 330 "Kaffirarbeid a an de _ 
Witwatersrandsche Goudvelden", p. 114.
156. CGP 2° no 76. Cons, to GEM, 4 Oct., 1893; South African Mining 
Journal, 14 Sept., 1895, 1063-64; Star, 11 Dec., 1897.
157. SSa 330 R5792 sed. Assoc. Mines to SP., 14 April 1897 in Ra607/96 
CMAR, 1896, 119-120.
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158fran 1 June 1897. This wage-cut, when combined with the
seasonal egress and the second Luso-Gaza war of 1897, resulted in
a "considerable exodus" of African workers fran the mines. For the
wage reduction to be maintained the labour market had to be over-
supplied and this necessitated the importation of large numbers of
Mozambicans. But for Mozambican labour to be imported, its price
had to be lowered andihis re-emphasized the need for government
159intercession with the Portuguese in Mozambique.
The high tax levied by the Portuguese on emigrant labour was
strongly supported by colonial interests in Mozambique opposed to
the loss of labour and high wages induced by labour migration to 
160the Rard. But the heavy tax on labour emigration merely 
encouraged clandestine migration, which resulted in a loss of
161government revenue estimated at 450, 000$000 (£10 000) in 1896. 
According to the governor of Lourengo Marques it was this clandestine 
emigration that forced the Portuguese into an agreement with the 
Transvaal; it was never the government's intention to deplete the 
colony's work force by encouraging labour migration, for,
"In view of the extent of the frontier between the 
Portuguese territory and the South African Republic 
it was found impossible to prevent the illegal emigration 
of Portuguese natives without having a bureau at the 
place where these natives were accustomed to go to 
and this was the reason for the publication of the 
regulation (governing the movement of labour from 
Mozambique to the Transvaal), and never to encourage 
emigration to the Transvaal which, by causing a 
scarcity of labour, is continually hamful to the 
interests of trade and to the development of this
province."162
But although labour migration was harmful to the development 
of Mozambique, it provided metropolitan Portugal and the local
158. HE 62 Beit to Eckstein, 10 April 1897, 30 April 1897; HE 172 
Eckstein to Beit, 30 April 1897; CMAR, 1897, 107.
159. Ibid., 114, 116, 118-19; SSa 330 "Kafferarbeid aan de Witwater- 
randsche Goudvelden", 117; R. Monster, "Die Industriele Kcmmissie
van Ondersoek in 1897 en sy Politieke Betekenis" (MA., Potchef- 
stroan University, 1966) , 77, 109.
160. Mouzinbo de Albuquerque, Mozambique, 146; MNE 709 Cons, to SS,
23 April 1896 encl. in Cons, to MNE, 16 May 1896; CMAR 1898, 461.
161. MNE 709 Cons, to MNE 14 May 1896.
162. NA. GH 830 GEM to Br. Cons. LM, 9 Aug., 1898 in Cons, to Governor 
of Natal 6 June 1898. See also Mouzinbo, Mozambique, 149. For 
colonial opposition to migrant labour, see pp. 251-254.
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administration with an important source of revenue. As early as 
1884 it was estimated that migrants brought more than 36 000$000 
(£8 000) into the Delagoa Bay area each year. By the mid-1890s 
the Royal Cdmiissioner, Mouzinho de Albuquerque, estimated that 
most of the approximately 25 000 migrants, who annually returned 
from the mines, repatriated savings, after two years of work, 
of about £20-30 or a total for the colony of £500 000 to £750 000. 
This money was used to purchase goods on which import duties had 
to be paid and it provided the colonial authorties with valuable 
foreign exchange as the hut tax was levied in gold specie. Perhaps 
most importantly Mozambican labour, by contributing to the develop­
ment of the Rand, brought about the development of the Lourengo 
Marques harbour and railway system. Mouzinho was of the opinion
163that, apart fran its labour, Mozambique had little else to export 
and a later governor of Lourengo Marques believed that the town's 
future was based on its role as a service port for the Witwatersrand. 
This he stated clearly,
"It is only by aiding and enabling the Johannesburg mines 
to work and by developing the Transvaal trade in general 
that Lourengo Marques itself can be developed and it was 
partly with this end in view that the regulation legalizing 
emigration to the Transvaal was entered i n t o . "  164
This subordination of both indigenous and colonial Mozambican
interests to those of the metropole dominated negotiations with
1the Transvaal and were entrenched in legislation. On 1 Nov. 1897 
the Portugese agreed in principle to control and regulate the 
emigration of labour to the Transvaal. This was made legal by the 
pronulgation on 25 November of decree 109 and on 11 December the 
regulations governing the recruitment of Mozambican workers were
163. Adolpho de Castro Neto de Vasconcellos, "Dos Mappas Estatistioos 
com Relagao ao Movimento Commercial no Districto de Lourengo 
Marques, Durante o Anno de 1884", Bol. de Soc. de Geog. Commercial 
do Porto, 1886; Mouzinho, Mozambique, 146-48, 150.
164. NA. GH 830 GLM to Br. Cons., Lourengo Marques, 9 Aug., 1898 in 
Cons, to Gov., Natal, 6 June 1898. For a similar view cf.
GUM report for 1881 in BO. 1882, p. 142.
165. See extensive correspondence in SSa 594, especially Ra 5540 
"Kaffirarbeiders uit Portugeesch gebied" and in Ra 6501/95.
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published. These regulations were simultaneously published in the 
166Staatscourant.
Decree 109 attempted to minimize competitive recruiting by
cutting out freelance recruiting and by demanding that only recruiters
representing "firms or bodies which are bona fide employers of
natives" would be given a certificate of reccrrmendation, costing
10s, by the Transvaal's Superintendent of Natives. The cost of
an annual recruiting licence was increased from 214$000 (£47.10s)
to 450$000 (£100) but the guarantee fee was reduced from 800$000
(£177.15s6d) to 450$000 (£100). A fee of 4$500 (£1) was charged
for witnessing labour contracts, which could include 100 workers on
one contract. Once the contracts were drawn up the worker was
taken to Ressano Garcia where he was issued with a passport costing
7s6d, a reduction of £1 on the old fee. In order for the passport
to be valid for travel in the Transvaal, it had to contain a Is
Transvaal revenue stamp. The recruiter was made responsible for all
desertions between the signing of the worker's contract and the
purchase of his passport at Ressano Garcia. A fine of £2 was deducted
from the recruiter's guarantee for each emigrant worker not presented
167at Ressano Garcia. The deserting recruit or "runaway" was made 
liable to a fine of 60 to 90 days labour.
The recruit had to report, with his Portuguese passport, to the
166. J. Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Providencias publicados pelo
Gommissario Regio na Provincia de Mogambique desde 1 Dezembro 
1896 ate 18 Novembro 1897, 694-703; BO 50, 11 Dec., 1897, 
"Regulamento para engajamento dos indigenas da Provincia de 
Mogambique para o trabalho n.a Republica Sul Africana"; SSa 
594 "Regulations drawn up by the government of the South African 
Republic in connection with the supply of natives fran the 
Portuguese Province of Mogambique", pp. 8-11, 177-81; Staats­
courant, 8 Dec., 1897; Ibid., no. 957, 30 March 1898, government 
notice 149. For a further decree governing recruiting in the 
territory of the Mogambique Company, see Boletim da Canpanhia 
de Mogambique, no. 100, 16 Oct., 1897.
167. This clause was removed in 1899, CMAR, 1899, 67.
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"Curator of Natives" on the Rand who was an official nominated by 
the Mozambican authorities. The Curator of
Natives performed much the same function as Natal's Protector of
Immigrants in that he ensured the fulfilment of contracts, received
complaints fran Mozambican workers and, in theory, sent hone workers'
168savings through the district governors. His major task was to
register and keep track of "Portuguese" labour on the Witwatersrand.
The funding for the Curator's office came from a registration fee
of 2s6d levied on each African worker passing through his office.
After leaving the Curator, the recruit was taken to the pass officer
with whan he deposited his passport and from Whan he received
a district pass. In order to prevent a worker fran discarding his
Mozambican identity the district pass had imprinted upon it in red
ink, the number of the worker's Portuguese passport and the name
of his employer. Africans paid Is per day for board and lodging
in the canpound attached to the pass office building in which the
curator's roans were situated.
On the expiration of his contract, the worker exchanged his
district pass for his passport, which was validated for travel with
a Is Transvaal revenue stamp, and then reported to the Curator. The
latter then endorsed, for a 10s fee, that the worker's contract
had expired. In this way an attempt was made to curb clandestine
migration and , if a worker returned hone without an endorsed passport
he was liable to 60 to 90 days forced labour. But in many cases the
levying of the 10s endorsement fee was counter-productive as it
169caused Mozambicans to return hone early and illegally. If the 
worker wished to re-engage he had to pay 10s for the endorsenent of 
his old passport and 10s for a new passport. On his return hone, 
the migrant had to present his endorsed pass to officials in the 
district where he had been engaged. This measure ensured the payment
4= U *  4- 170of hut taxes.
Although the 10s re-engagement costs were often borne by the 
recruiter, the migrant was made liable for the costs incurred in 
his transport to the Rand as well as for all pass and registration
168. In practice, this was seldom done. NA/SNA 1/46 confid. papers
C22/1899, Marwick to SNA, 28 June 1899.
169. TLC., evidence of I. Ferraz, 248.
170. TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 99.
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fees. In this way a major part of the cost of labour recruitment
was legally transferred frcm the mining canpanies to the workers.
Mozambican workers, by paying passport, registrations, endorsement
and pass fees, also bore the costs of reproducing the system of
control, which prevented their "clandestine" migration and desertion
and which thus restricted than fran selling their labour to the
highest bidder. Similarly the reduction in the cost of a Portuguese
passport fran 27s6d to 7s6d was only acceptable to the Portuguese
because the worker was obliged to pay a registration fee of 2s6d
and an endorsement fee of 10s to the Curator on the Rand. In 1898,
the first year in which fees were hesitantly gathered, the income
171of the Curator's office totalled £30 000.
Because of its benefit to the mining industry, the 1897 labour
legislation was celebrated by newspapers like the Natal Witness as,
172"the only reform so far granted the mining industry". The
Association of Mines and the anti-capitalist press on the Rand also
173greeted the legislation as a major government reform. But the 
Chamber lost its prospective monopoly through this legislation and 
an editorial in the Star, which was supportive of the Chamber, decried 
the labour agreement as a "sprat" in comparison with "whales", 
such as the railway and dynamite monopolies. The legislation was a
"cleverly arranged scheme (according to which) the Republic 
is not called upon to sacrifice a solitary halfpenny ... the 
whole or nearly the whole penniary (sic) burden of the hew labour 
scheme falls upon the hapless native himself."
The editorial expressed the fear that the taxation and bureaucracy
in the new legislation would discourage imnigrant labour and encourage
desertion and ccmnented, "We have settled with the respective govem-
174ments. We have now to settle with the natives."
Despite the complaints of the Chamber of Mines, the 1897 labour 
legislation marked a decisive intervention by the state in the labour
171. NA/SNA 1/46 confid. papers, C22/1899 Marwick to SNA, 28 June 1899.
172. Natal Witness, 8 Nov., 1897.
173. Standard and Diggers News, 22 Nov., 1897; De Pers, 10 Nov., 1897.
174. Star, 24 Nov., 1897. See also Star, 22 Nov., 1897 and 23 Nov.,
1897.
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market on the side of the mining industry. Many burghers who were
already angered by the use of native caimissioners to secure labour 
175for the mines, were opposed to the potential expenditure of state
revenue on the importation of mine labour and felt that labour
immigration would merely compound and not solve, the Transvaal's 
176"native problem". But in reality the 1897 labour legislation
was achieved by sacrificing the interests of the African worker, and
hence the grass-root development of the Mozambican economy, to those
of mining capitalism and metropolitan Portugal. The 1897 labour 
the
agreement allowed/RNLA to oversupply the mines with workers and
reduce wages. Thus while the number of workers cn the mines attached
to the Chamber increased by 21% fran 1897 to 1898, the wage reduction
of 29% effected in 1897 was successfully held into the following 
177year. This meant that, in exchange for supplying the Rand with 
cheap labour, the colonial government in Mozambique was assured of 
a steady source of foreign exchange. By the end of the century the 
first Portuguese curator of natives was able to state that
"the native revenue (fran migrant labour) is very large, 
the province lives upon the n a t i v e s . "  ^ 8
The Chamber of Mines in its report for 1897 remarked that although
the labour supply had "fluctuated considerably ... the supply must
on the whole be regarded as very satisfactory. More especially as
concurrently with the greater labour requirements of the industry
a large reduction in the scale of native wages has been successfully 
179carried through." This sentiment was repeated in the following
175. ICE., evidence of Albu, 14; Kruger, Landelike Arbeidsvraagstuk , 
54.
176. The attorney-general had initially opposed the creation of a sepa­
rate pass law for the goldfields as he feared it would encourage 
the growth of the mining industry as a state within a state, SS 
3925. R10295/93 att. gen. to SS, 25 April 1895 encl. in R3116/94; 
others opposed the exportation of Transvaal capital by foreign 
workers, which the pass officer in Johannesburg estimated at £3 
million in 1897, U.R. 12, "Pasamptenaar, Johannesburg, Rapport 
1897", p. 27; see also Volkstem, 6 Jan., 1894; Star, 6 Nov., 1897. 
Others feared the political implications of importing African 
labour, HE 171 Rouliot to Beit, 8 March 1896.
177. CMAR, 1897, 129.
178. TLC., evidence of Ivens Ferraz, 248.
179. CMAR, 1897, 129.
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year, when the Chamber reported that,
"The rapid growth of the industry has only been made 
possible by a corresponding increase in the supply 
of native labour."
It then noted that the rise in the number of workers employed on the
goldfields, from 14 000 in 1890 to almost 90 000 in 1898 "has been
obtained without any appreciable rise in the rate of wages ... (and
that) ... good work has been done, both in meeting as far as possible
180labour demands and especially in keeping down the scale of wages." 
Wages fell fran an average of 63s4d in September 1890 to 49s9d in 
1898.181
From March 1897 to the beginning of the Anglo-Boer War in
October 1899, sane 42 000 Mozambican workers were brought to the 
182Rand by the RNIA. At least another 6 400 were brought by
freelancers and an undisclosed number of "clandestine" immigrants,
who often passed themselves off as residents of the Republic, found 
183work on the Rand. In 1898, 53 223 Mozambicans, earning an
average of £2.9s9d constituted 60% of the labour force on those mines
184attached to the Chamber of Mines. The following year the number
of Mozambican workers was estimated at over 70 000 or seme 67% of
185the total labour force on the Rand. It was thought that 10 000
of these men came from Lourengo Marques district and 30 000 fran
186each of the Gaza and Inhambane districts. Large numbers of
180. CMAR, 1897, 129.
181. CMAR, 1890, 12, 62-5; CMAR, 1898, 407, 458.
182. TDC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 28, 101. See also CMAR,
1898, 445.
183. W. Holterhoff felt the figure 6 400 to be "ridiculously low", 
TLC, 160. See also F. Wirth, 111.
184. CMAR, 1898, 458.
185. TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 27; Oxford History of
South Africa, II, 15 gives a figure of 119 000. The CMAR (1899,
p. 68) gives a figure of 94 550 workers employed on mines 
associated with the chamber in 1899. In June 1899 "a careful 
investigation conducted along the entire main reef by Rev. C. 
Baumgarten "revealed that Mozambicans constituted 56 830 of the 
total workforce of 92 168" i.e. 64%, Hobson, The War in South 
Africa, 232.
186. TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 101.
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Mozambicans, up to 26 000 according to one source, were also
employed outside the mining industry in such occupations as domestic
187service and railway work.
The Chamber of Mines sang the praises of Mozambican labour
"The East Coast native pays us better in every respect 
than any native of South Africa, or, indeed, any class 
of coloured labourers we can get as far as we are now 
aware. He certainly cones farther and takes more 
trouble to collect but when we get him he stays longer, 
and after he has once learnt his business, he almost 
invariably comes back again after he has gone to his 
kraal. The greatest advantage of anploying the East 
Coast native is that you have no difficulty with him 
underground, as compared with natives from other 
sources."18o
This was a frequently expressed sentiment, put plainly by Percy
Fitzpatrick when he declared in 1904 that the "Portuguese East
189Coast has been the salvation of the Rand."
Although freelance recruiting, touting and desertion remained
190a problem for the mining capitalists, the Transvaa 1-Mozambique
agreement of 1897 was accompanied by a tightening of the pass law.
The Natal native labour agent on the Rand wrote in 1898 that,
"... the treatment of natives found without passes is nothing less
than barbarous ... thousands of innocent natives are at the present
time fined, Imprisoned and lashed under the provisions of the Pass 
191Law." Decree 109 ended free enterprise recruiting and gave the
workers less room for manoeuvre in determining the conditions of
their employment. This caused a rise in clandestine emigration,
192which was encouraged by non-KNLA recruiters, and consequently
187. TLC., Report, 30; Ibid., evidence of Wirth, 112, Baldwin.
188. CMAR, 1898, 459.
189. TLC., evidence of Fitzpatrick, 119.
190. CMAR, 1898, 66, 76, 83-86, 460; CMAR, 1899, 68.
191. NA/SNA 1/46 Confid. papers. C22/1899 Marwick to SNA, 28 June 
1899; CMAR, 1898, 463.
192. TLC., evidence of Holterhoff, 160-161.
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caused the Portuguese to pass decree 466 in September 1899 on the
eve of the Anglo-Boer war which gave to the Chamber of Mines an
193unrestricted labour recruiting monopsony.
193. BO 39, 30 Sept., 1899. Tiie implementation of the monopsony was 
prevented by the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war in 1899.
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CONCLUSION
Employers benefitted fran a migratory form of labour in numerous 
ways. Men who were geographically divided from their means of 
production were more dependent on wage labour for their subsistence 
and consequently worked longer periods and performed tasks avoided 
by local workers. By seeking workers fran areas v^ here production 
patterns were unaffected by the new centres of consumer demand in 
southern Africa and by constantly pushing the labour frontier north­
wards, employers succeeded in flooding the labour market with 
migrants who tended to undercut their more experienced peers by 
accepting longer contracts and lover wages. Perhaps most importantly 
migrant labourers, who were employed extensively during times of 
econonic expansion, could be expelled with equal vigour during 
periods of economic depression.
A system of migrant labour also entailed a number of disadvan­
tages for employers. Workers were often discouraged from seeking 
employment by the long and dangerous journey to the labour market 
and many arrived in an exhausted condition which precluded their 
immediate employment. Temporary workers did not acquire high levels 
of skill and, by returning to areas outside British or Transvaal 
jurisdiction, were able to sell diamonds or gold amalgam stolen on
i
the mines. The greatest obstacle to the introduction of a migrant 
labour system was the cost of recurrent recruitment, capitation fees 
and travel expenses. This resulted in untrammelled competition 
between employers for workers, the loss of labour overheads through 
desertion and a consequent inflation of the wage level.
Before the installation of colonial rule throughout the region 
and the creation of an effective recruiting monopsony, numerous 
contemporary observers remarked that, even by the standards of 
industrialized western Europe, the wages paid to workers on the mines
1. ICE., evidence of C.S. Goldman, 115; Johns, 263. According to 
oral tradition collected by Martha Binford the theft of 
diamonds and gold amalgam was an important "pull" factor drawing 
workers to the mines, "Stalemate: a study in cultural dynamics" 
(PhD., Michigan State University, 1971), 86-87.
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2
were high. Basic African wages at Kimberley and on the Rand
compared favourably with the wages paid to workers in Britain and
Germany and were far higher than those paid to workers in countries
like Ireland and Poland which were on the periphery of industrial 
3
Europe. Mozambican workers were able to accumulate relatively 
large amounts of money before returning home. For a migrant 
employed in Kimberley in the 1880s these generally amounted to about
4
£8 to £10 although larger cash savings were also reported, such as
5
£27 after three years of enployment in the Western Cape. Wages
repatriated fran the Witwatersrand in the 1890s varied fran £10 
6to over £20. The Mozambican migrant's cash wage was augmented by 
theft and informal activities such as brewing, male prostitution and 
the investment of wages in goods which were then sold for a profit
2. W. Nelson, Masbro Advertizer 19 May 1877 in Africana Notes and 
News. XX, 5, 1973, p. 179; Milner to Chamberlain, 6 Dec., 1901 
in the Milner Papers, ed., C. Head lam, II, 313. This point was 
forcefully made by the S.A. Mining Journal (24 Oct., 1891? 28 
Jan., 1893) which complained that because of the black migrant
'> workers productive base in the rural areas he, unlike his 
proletarianized European peer, only required a bachelor wage.
3. Pamela Horn, Labouring Life in the Victorian Countryside (London, 
1976), 30, 119-23, 126; see especially Appendix G; John Clapham,
An Econanic History of Modem Britain 1887-1914 (Cambridge, 1963) 
97-99; Ronald Blythe, Akenfleld (London, 1969), 40-41? L.M.
Cullen, An Economic History of Ireland (London, 1972) , 137, 151-2,
160. Irish wages were as low as Is to ls6d per day in 1870 and
. wages of 10s for a working week of over 72 hours were not 
uncanmon in areas like Oxfordshire and Suffolk in the 1890s. 
According to K. Hvidt, Flight to America (New York, 1975) , 126, 
Danish farmhands in 1870 earned wages of approximately £1 per 
month. Compare this with peak wages of over £4 at Kimberley and 
£3.10s an the Rand. See also note 9 , p. 145.
4. SS 490 Lddrst. Lydenburg to Col. Sec., 25 Nov., 1880; SN 173 
R179/83 native cornnissioner Spelonken to n.c. Zoutpansberg, 9 
Oct., 1883. See also a report on the robbery of £102 fran two 
Mozambicans after working in the Transvaal, Fernandes das Neves 
to GLM, 13 June 1882 in Mogambique 69, 1952, p. 90. These figures, 
as well as those in notes 5 and 6, refer to amounts stolen in 
robberies and, as the complainants may have carried money for 
friends, they can only be treated as very rough estimates.
5. CA: IAC - 1 Swellendam magistrate to contracting officer, 15 Feb., 
1884.
6. CMAR, 1895, 69-70; Daniel da Cruz, Bn terras de Gaza (Oporto, 
1910), 308 ; Mouzinho, Mozambique, 147.
144
in his hone area. By the 1890s wages paid in gold in the Transvaal 
were worth up to 30% more in Mozambique when exchanged against the 
inflated real. By international standards, migrant labour from 
areas independent of European control proved expensive to anplqyers 
in various other ways. The existence of a migrant male labour force 
drew large numbers of men away from the mines and into domestic and 
other non-con tract ed forms of service and precluded the direct 
exploitation of the worker's family in ways similar to the 19th
7
century west European model.
The co-operation of the state was frequently sought by capital 
in its attempt to increase the numbers of African workers on the 
market without increasing the wage level. But the state only 
intervened in the labour market and then in a half-hearted and 
ephemeral way, during times of economic expansion, as in the Cape 
and Natal, or following the Jameson raid when capitalist grievances 
threatened the very structure of the Transvaal state. Pass laws 
aimed at restricting the movement of labour were poorly implemented 
and schemes involving state expenditure an the introduction of labour 
were either rejected or short-lived. On the Witwatersrand the 
Republican state did little, apart fran its pass laws, to restrict
g
the fratricidal tendencies of competitive capital. At no stage 
in the 19th century did capital or the state, let alone in combina­
tion, attempt to control the African wage level through the implemen­
tation of a migratory form of labour movement.
Although workers were "pulled" to the market by competitive 
wages and "pushed" hone by harsh industrial conditions and the iron 
discipline of the labour market, it was the viability of production 
in the rural areas that determined the degree to which men worked on 
their lands, engaged in petty commodity production, or accepted wage 
labour. As a result of the restriction on the labour supply caused 
by rural production, men who sought work in southern Africa offered 
their services on a "seller's market", which allowed them to canmand
7. Charles van Onselen notes that competitive wages paid to domestic 
servants inflated not only African mine wages but also the wage 
demands of white workers who employed domestics. Hence the attempts 
after the Anglo-Boer war to introduce European women who would 
release the large number of African domestic servants for mine 
labour, Studies in the Social and Economic History of the Witwaters­
rand, 1886-1914, 2: New Nineveh, 6-22.
8. Marks and Trapido, "Lord Milner and the South African State", 64.
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correspondingly high wages and shape the timing and condition of 
9
their labour. In order to understand why rural producers sought 
wage labour in southern Africa and why their movement onto the 
labour market took a migratory form, it is necessary to examine the 
changing structure of the social formation in the labour-sending 
areas. The second part of this thesis deals with the political, 
econanic and social causes of labour migration fran the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland which was the earliest and most consistent supplier 
of Mozambican labour to South Africa.
9. For a comparative example of the high wages paid to migrant 
labourers because of their access to a viable rural means of 
production, see Jerome Blum, Lord and Peasant in Russia: fran 
the ninth to the nineteenth century (Princeton, 1961), 322, 401.
PART II
THE DELAGQA BAY HINTERLAND
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MAP NO. 3. THE DELAGQA BAY HINTERLAND
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SECTION ONE
Political Disruptions and Population Movements
INTRODUCTION
The Delagoa Bay hinterland, for the purposes of this thesis, 
covers approximately the former Portuguese administrative 
district of Lourengo Marques. It comprises an area of about 
16 000 square kilometres which in the nineteenth century supported 
a population of roughly 80 000 to 120 000^. It is bordered in 
the west by the Lebombo mountains, which reach a plateau summit 
of about 1 500 feet and the Upper Pongola river, in the south by
2
the Nkuzi river and St Lucia Bay and in the north by the Limpopo
and its tributary, the Olifants river. Together with the more 
3
southerly Nkomati and its tributaries the Vanetzi and Massintonto,
the Limpopo and Olifants rivers rise in the inland Highveld
plateau, cut through the Lebombo mountains and meander through the
wide alluvial valleys, reaching the sea to the north of Delagoa
Bay. The central and southern area is drained by the lesser
4
rivers, the Matolla, Umbeluzi and Tembe and by the more important 
Maputo-Pongola.
During the nineteenth century the Delagoa Bay hinterland was
occupied by a number of chiefdoms of varying size^. Each
chiefdom was dominated by one specific clan whose members believed 
themselves to be consanguinially related. Various symbols reified 
the clan. Foremost of these was the institution of chieftaincy, 
for the chief as the direct descendant of the founding ancestors 
and as the senior member of the kin group, was the embodiment of
1. Anon. "Caminho de Ferro..." BSGL., 2, 1, 1880, p. 82; H.-A.
Junod, Grammaire Ronga, 5; TA. SNA 168 NA 200/02 G.GM to Br. Cons- 
gen., 20 Aug. 1903.
2. Also known as the Crocidile, Bembe, Ouro, Uri, Meri and Inhampura 
river.
3. Umkomokazi, St Georges,Meti and Manice river.
4. The Matolla was also known as the Lourengo Marques river, the 
Um.beluzi as the Dundas river and the Tembe as the Espirito Santo 
or English river.
5. See appendix 2 for a list of the major chiefdoms and their 
military strength in 1894.
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clan unity and the centre of its corporate identity. As one 
missionary expressed it, "take away the chief, break the tribeg
and the individual becomes more conscious of himself". The 
chief administered justice, protected the army with his war 
medicines, interceded with the clan ancestors and generally 
regulated production strategies. He gave to his followers a sense 
of belonging by organizing various rites that were limited to clan 
members such as first fruit ceremonies and entry to the age regi­
ments. Membership of the clan was expressed through the use of a 
common clan patronymic or shibongo by which an individual 
identified himself as a member of his chief's house. The cohesion
of the clan was reinforced by marriage patterns which stressed
7
clan endogomy and by milk taboos which excluded non-kin. The 
differences between clans were accentuated by myths which accredited 
to each clan a separate area of origin and migration.
In a society with few labour-saving tools and marked by 
seasonal peaks in labour demand-and in the absence of an ideology 
that regarded labour as a marketable commodity, land and capital 
goods were generally less important as factors of production than 
labour. Consequently a chief's productive capacity was largely 
dependent on his ability to attract followers who would cultivate 
his soil, look after his cattle, increase his military strength
g
and make certain payments to him in labour and in kind. By
attracting manpower from outside his clan the chief was able to
increase the amount of food produced under his supervision. But
because of limited storage facilities, food had to be consumed
quickly and it was the chief's capacity to distribute food and
thereby to act as a hedge against the vagaries of nature, that
discouraged seqmentation and attracted further dependants. The
power of a chief was measured not in terms of his accumulation of
material goods but rather by his redistributive powers and his
9
consequent ability to attract followers. Thus the social formation
6. SMA513/b. A. Grandjean to Leresche, 5 Sept., 1894.
7. Junod, Life of a South African Tribe I, 253.
8. Ibid., II, 7.
9. Ibid., II, 6-7.
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of the Delagoa Bay hinterland was marked by a high degree of
geographical mobility. Because of extensive in-migration and
out-migration no clan was of "pure" descent or occupied one
contiguous territory and its material culture was constantly chang-
10ing through cultural adaptation, borrowing and innovation.
The most institutionalized form of dependence was for an in-
migrating outsider to khondza or subjugate himself to a chief,
through the payment of taxes, in return for access to a means of
production.^ However, while military and production strategies
demanded that the political unit consist of more than the members
of one clan, the clan remained the central focus of the chiefdom
and,- while it discriminated against outsiders, it provided for
their gradual social incorporation through the ideology of agnatic 
12descent. Thus in the pre-colonial period the "nation" or tiko 
included all those people who professed fealty to the chief 
irrespective of their divergent kin backgrounds. The tiko or 
chiefdom was the "true national unit"^ in which political identity 
was rooted and clan members who shared a common patronymic were 
often scattered amongst several chiefdoms. This "national" 
consciousness could be strong for, as one missionary lamented,
"The sense of national spirit is much developed amongst 
the maKhossa (on the Inkomati river bend) and no-one 
conceives of the possibility of detaching himself from 
the rest of the people and thus abandoning all the 
national customs in order to become a Christian." ^
People identified themselves as being from "the land of" the 
clan dominating a specific chiefdom. Thus a person from the area 
dominated by the Maputo clan might refer to himself in Tsonga and
10. Ibid, I, 358-59.
11. Ibid., I, 405, 433; II, 388.
12. Ibid., I, 356-440, see also 358-9? SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 
1891,
13. Grandjean, La Mission Suisse a laBaie de Delagao, 434; Idem, 
La Race Thonga, 34; Junod, Life I, 356? Junod, Cinquante ans 
apres, 14-15.
14. SMA1256/A Grandjean, "Rapport sur 1'oeuvre missionaire".
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Zulu as va ka Tembe and aba kwa Tembe - of the land of Tembe, the 
founding ancestor of the Maputo clan. These terms of identification 
were also sometimes used by a particular corporate group whose 
members defined their political allegiance within the clan in terms 
of their real or putative descent from a junior branch of the line 
started by the founding ancestor. These "lineages" provided the 
political ideology for large-scale group segmentation from the clan 
and chiefdom. Thus a Maputo could also refer to himself as va ka 
Maputo (aba kwa Mabudu in Zulu), of the land of Maputo (Mabudu), 
the chief (1764-1782) who broke away from the senior house of the 
Tembe clan or as va ka Makasana (aba kwa Makasana), the grandson 
of Maputo, who ruled as chief of the clan from 1800 to 1854. In a 
similar way, people living in the lower Nkomati area occupied by the 
Mazwaya clan might refer to themselves in Tsonga as wa ka Makaneta 
or wa ka Maketshe, who was the grandfather of Makaneta.^ The 
existence of these modes of identification explains why the 
Portuguese used terms such as "Catembe" or "Gamfumo" to refer to 
specific geographical areas.
Neither the chiefdom, clan, lineage, homestead or household
was organically unified by ties of kinship; they were highly fluid
and processual institutions which provided for the incorporation
of many refugees, immigrants and other peoples displaced by warfare,
famine, soil exhaustion and contamination with death, disease and 
16witchcraft. "In-migration" was a rational means of exploiting 
the environment by moving from areas of low productivity and high 
mortality to more productive and safer areas. The number of root­
less in-migrants, disadvantaged by their status as dependents, 
increased markedly during the second quarter of the nineteenth 
century as the effects of the . mfecane broke onto the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland.
15. These terms were also used as polite forms of address by 
foreigners. JSA file 25, 260; file 74, 6 6 ; A. Delagorgue, 
Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe (Paris 1847), 462-3; KCL., 
Erskine Papers (4) misc. notes, n.d. approx. 1870-75; Junod, 
Life, II, 360-61. Doke and Vilakazi, Zulu dictionary ("kwa"); 
Sa Nogueira, Dicionario Ronga, ("ka").
16. SMA 497/D Paul Berthoud to Leresche 4 Feb., 1888; Idem., 497/E 
11 Oct., 1888; Junod, Life I, 319; Idem., BaRonga, 121; 
Grandjean, Mission Romande, 34.
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The severe dislocation of the Delagoa Bay hinterland caused by
the Nguni incursions of the 1820s has been stressed as probably
17the single most important cause of early labour migration. Yet 
a careful historical examination reveals that the Nguni disruption 
of the Delagoa Bay hinterland and the Gaza civil war of 1858-62 
left Maputoland, the earliest and largest supplier of labour to 
Natal, almost unscathed. This indicates that political upheavals 
were less important in mobilizing workers than factors such as 
proximity to labour markets. However any study of the origins of 
migrant labour from the Delagoa Bay hinterland must start with the 
m.fecane for this left the area sandwiched between the Zulu, Swazi 
and Gaza and resulted in an endemic instability which changed the 
demographic structure of much of the Delagoa Bay hinterland and 
loosened the ties of kinship and fealty that had restricted 
people's freedom of action; it also expanded people's horizons and 
swelled the number of rootless in-migrants and out-migrants. But 
most importantly for this study the forced migrations of the period 
were a prelude to labour migration.
17. Eduardo Noronho, Lourengo Marques e a Africa do Sul (Lisbon,
1895), 80; Antonio Rita-Ferreira, O Movimento Migratorio de 
Trabalhadores entre Mozambique e a Africa do Sul (Lisbon, 1963),
13, 16, 38-42; D. Webster, "Migrant Labour, Social Formations 
and the Proletarianization of the Chopi of southern Mozambique", 
African Perspectives 1978/1, pl61-163; S. Young, "Fertility 
and Famine: Women's Agriculture History in Southern Mozambique" 
in R. Palmer and N.Parsons (eds), The Roots of Rural Poverty, 
p72.
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Chapter 4
IMMIGRANTS AND EMIGRANTS:
The Delagoa Bay Hinterland to c. 1875
The Nguni Incursions to 1838
According to oral tradition, the first wave of displaced Nguni,
the Maseko, under Ngwane passed peacefully through the Delagoa Bay
hinterland in 1818 and then travelled to the Zoutpansberg along
watercourses linking the Highveld with the coast.* Portuguese
sources however, recall the destruction of a whaling station outside
2
Lourengo Marques and the killing of its manager in that year. In
1821-22 Manukosi and Zwangendaba invaded the southern and central
chiefdoms of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, extracted tribute from
Lourengo Marques and took many cattle and women before pushing
northwards to defeat Manyisa and settle in the fertile Bilene area
3
on the lower Limpopo. During this troubled period an attempt by
the Portuguese and their Mafumo allies to prevent local chiefdoms
from dealing directly with foreign ships resulted in the killing by
Matolla of the governor, 45 of his soldiers, and the ravaging of
4
Mafumo in February 1823. The Portuguese at that time paid an
annual sagwati to Matollo, the chiefdom straddling the northern and
western trade routes out of Lourengo Marques, and to the Tembe who
5
controlled the .southern outlet for goods. The Tembe established 
their supremacy in the area when they attacked and defeated a 
weakened Matolla and then killed the newly-installed governor of 
Lourengo Marques, subsequently replacing him with an administrator
1. A. Grandjean "L'Invasion des Zoulou dan le sud-est Africain", BSNG.,
XI, 1899, 71. But cf. G. Leisegang who believes Ngwana was the son 
of Ngoqwen and did not pass through the Delagoa Bay hinterland, 
"Beitrage zur Geschichte des Reiches der Gaza Nguni im Sudlichen 
Mozambique 1820-1895" (Ph.D., Cologne, 1967), 48, 52.
2. G. Theal (ed) RSEA, IX, 112-113; Gomes da Costa, Gaza 1897-1898
(Lisbon, 1899), 63; F. Toscano and J. Quintinha, A Derrocada do 
Imperio Vatua, p57. But cf. Naval Officer (W. Owen?) "Remarks on 
Delagoa Bay" South African Quarterly Journal, Noll, 1830, 136 
where it seems more likely to be Tembe.
3. Francisco Ferrao, Circumscripgoes de Lourengo Marques: Repostas
aos quesitos feitos pelo secretario dos negocios indigenas 
(Lourengo Marques, 1909), 52-3; Grandjean "L1Invasion". These two 
compilations of oral tradition do not tally. See also ADM 1/2269 
Owen "Report on the Portuguese Settlements" 15 April 1823; Ibid.;
Osborne "Description of the Peoples of Delagoa Bay, 28 September
1822". See also note 7, p. 154.
4. CO 48/62 no 76 W.H. Lijs to P. Brink 12 April 1824 encl. in Somer­
set to Bathurst, 22 April, 1824; ADM 1/69 Threlfall to Nourse 29
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more amenable to Tembe wishes. But in order to prevent a Tembe
monopoly the Maputo chief gave refuge to his brother-in-law, the
6Matolla chief, while mobilizing his army.
The political instability of the period was worsened by the 
arrival of another Nguni group under Nxaba which was forced north­
wards by Manukosi. In 1825 Zwangendaba also moved northwards and 
Manukosi crossed the Nkomati to settle in the Ntimane areas for 
about a year. He then defeated the allied forces of Khosen and 
Rikotsho and settled next to the Masimichope River. These migrations
caused a great upheaval throughout the Delagoa Bay hinterland,
7apart from Maputoland.
Zulu expansion into the Delagoa Bay hinterland has been 
explained by Alan Smith and David Hedges in terms of the collapse 
of the Ndwandwe in 1819 and the subsequent success of the Zulu in
Q
capturing the trade route to Lourengo Marques. By June 1824
British naval officers reported that all the chiefs on the northern
side of the bay and southward to Zululand had recognized Shaka's
overlordship; by September of 1825 Zulu rule stretched as far as 
9the Limpopo. Yet the extent and nature of Zulu suzerainty
April 1824; ADM 1/2269 Owen to Adm., 19 June 1824.
5. ADM 1/69 Nourse to Adm. 5 Jan., 1823. FO 97/303 no 36. encl.
Owen to Adm., 11 Oct., 1823.
6 . ADM 1/2269 Owen to Adm., 19 June 1824. H. Fynn, Diary 46, 47. 
Fynn's account of warfare is probably exaggerated. This section 
of his "diary" was written in the 1860s.
7. Threlfall Cape Monitor 9 July and 2 Aug., 1853; T. Boteler, 
Narrative of a voyage of discovery, I, 78-9, 8 6 , 100, 104, 128. 
Vol II, 301-2; FO 97/303 Owen to GGM 10 May 1825, E. Noronho, O 
Distrito de Lourencg Marques 53. For oral tradition, see Ferrao,
Circumscripgoes 52-3, 85, 109; SMA 1760 Grandjean 16 Aug., 1890; 
Grandjean, La Mission 54-59; D. Fernandes das Neves, "Exploracao 
de Rio Bembe", BSGL 3, 6 , 1882; H.A. Junod, Life I, 449, Gomes de 
Costa Gaza 1897-1898, 62. It has been impossible to verify these 
oral traditions. Their value lies in their impression of great 
geographical mobility and corresponding political upheaval.
8. A.K. Smith, "The Struggle for Control of southern Mozambique, 
1720-1835" (Ph.D. UCLA., 1970). D.W. Hedges, "Trade and Politics 
in southern Mozambique and Zululand in the Eighteenth and Early 
Nineteenth Centuries" (Ph. D., London, 1978).
9. ADM 1/2269 Owen to Adm., 19 June 1824; FO 97/303 Report of Lt. 
Badgly 2 Sept., 1825; FO 97/303 Owen to Adm., 11 Oct., 1826.
during this period remains perplexing. This is partly because of
the confused orthography and nomenclature used by coastal observers
to describe the complicated movements of Zulu and refugee Ndwandwe
10
groups in the interior. What is still more confusing is the lack
of any reference to a Zulu army of occupation before 1828 or to 
any extensive Zulu trading. Sagwati presentations made during this 
period entailed a good deal of reciprocity and did not necessarily 
imply a tributary relationship. Lourenco Marques for example, in
A
exchange for tribute given to the Zulu, received both cattle to
11feed visiting whalers and ivory for trade purposes. To view
Zulu involvement in the Delagoa Bay hinterland in the early 1820s
in terms of purposeful territorial expansion begs the question as
to why the Ndwandwe did not move northwards and why the Zulu took
five years to decide to move into the Delagoa Bay hinterland (1819-
1824) at a time when new mercantile outlets were being developed on
the Natal coast. Furthermore, if the Zulu moved northwards in order
to guard Maputoland from the devastation of wandering refugee Nguni
groups, why was the same policy not applied to Tembe, the northern-
12most point of the trade route to Lourenco Marques? While the
10. Little distinction was made between the various Nguni speakers 
who were termed "Vatuas", a Portuguese term derived from the 
word ba-tua or ba-tsua, used by coastal peoples to refer to the 
San and Nguni whose languages contained clicks, Bryant Olden 
Times, 286; Junod, Life I, 18; C. Montez, "As Ragas indigenas 
de Mogambique", Mogambique, 23, 1940, 65. Other generic terms 
were "Mapsitis", "MuNgoni" and "Olotrtontes". The word "Nyamboses" 
seems to have been synonymous with the term "Gazas", Webb and 
Wright, Stuart Archieve, II, 69.
11. ADM 1/2269 W. Owen "Report on the Portuguese Settlements", 15 
April 1823; Antonio Jose Nobre, "A Guerra das Reis Vatuas" in 
F. Santana (ed.) Documentagao avulsa Mogambicana do Arquivo 
Historico Ultramarino, I, 225 (henceforth Documentagao); Fynn,
"History" in Bird, Annals, I, 63. Hedges' comment that Maputo- 
land was "the great supplying country for Zululand" is an 
extrapolation of evidence presented by James Stuart's informant 
Bikwayo, which should only refer to Mpanda's reign, i.e. 1840- 
1860s. Evidence of "Ronga tribute bearers" in Zululand in 1824 
and 1826 is similarly misleading as Isaac's reference could as 
easily be interpreted to mean ivory hunters or traders. Hedges, 
"Trade and Politics", 226, 233; N. Isaacs Travels and adventures 
in Eastern Africa, 59. For problems with the "Trade hypothesis" 
see pp 259-60, note 7.
12. But cf. evidence that Maputoland was stripped of cattle in the 
early 1820s, Fynn, Diary, 46; NA/ZGH. 708 Z288/87, Saunders,
"Supplementary Report", 17 Nov., 1887.
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trade hypothesis remains the most convincing reason for Zulu
expansion into the Delagoa Bay area, it fails to explain why they
moved north of the Bay.
It seems possible that Zwangendaba and Manukosi, like Mzilikazi,
were sent northwards by Shaka, but subsequently decided to sever
their ties with the Zulu king. This would account for the so-called
"Zulu" presence in the northern Delagoa Bay hinterland during the 
13
early 1820s. South of the Bay, the Maputo area was ecologically
unsuited to Zulu colonization as it was disease and fever-stricken.
Poor soils, a lack of ground water and extensive tsetse infestation
moreover, prohibited the keeping of cattle on a large scale, and
14cattle were essential to the Zulu diet and bride-wealth system.
Secondly, contemporary political intrigues played an important
role in drawing the Zulu unwillingly into Maputoland. What initiated
the direct intervention of the Zulu in Maputo affairs was the
toppling of the Tembe chief Mayette, by the Maputo chief Makasana
in late 1823 or early 1824. This would have placed the entire
southern trade route between Zululand and Lourengo Marques in the
hands of the Maputo and was no doubt an important reason for the
Zulu King's decision to attack Makasana and reinstate Mayette as 
15ruler of Tembe. The first major Zulu invasion of the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland took place in 1828 due to Zulu opposition to the 
establishment of a Nguni state near enough to attract Zulu
13. G. Leisegang is of the opinion that Zulu power in the early 
1820s was restricted to Mabudu and Tembe, "Dingane's Attack on 
Lourenco Marques in 1883" JAH 10, 4, 1969, 569-70. This could 
be the case if, when the visiting British naval officers 
referred to "Zulus", they included Zwangendaba and Manukosi, who 
lived north of Delagoa Bay. For evidence suggesting that when 
the two Ndwandwe leaders entered the Delagoa Bay hinterland they 
were in the service of the Zulu, cf. FO 97/303 Owen to Adm., 26 
Oct., 1826; Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 71; Nunes to GGM, 4 Oct., 
1830 in Documentagao, II, 221, 222. Cabral, Ragas, Usos e 
Costumes dos Indigenos do Districto de Inhambane (Lourengo 
Marques, 1910), 23. Yet elsewhere {Narrative I, 255) Owen was 
well aware as early as 1823 of the distinction between followers 
of Shaka and Zwangendaba.
14. A.T. Bryant, Olden Times, 336. NA. SGO III 1/2 Cowie to Moodie 
26 July 1848, see also chapter 6 .
.15. Webb and Wright, James Stuart Archive, 143, 152 evidence of 
Mahungane and Nkonuza; Fynn, Diary, 46-7; Threlfall, Cape 
Monitor, 20 Aug., 1853.
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secessionist groups. In order to entrench and perpetuate their
political power and means of surplus extraction by expanding their
Nguni following, the Gaza pursued a policy of enticing northwards
Zulu, Swazi and Natal Nguni male and female immigrants by means of
economic and political incentives; Zulu immigrants were given
military commands and were presented with enough ivory or cattle to
16procure up to four wives. Shortly after the Zulu defeat of the
Ndwandwe in 1819, one of Shaka's generals, Ndengezi-mashumi, emigrated/%
northwards to join Manukosi. The Zulu invasion was probably caused
by the segmentation of another Shakan military chief in 1828,
17Hlangabeza ka Mabedhla, with his ama-Ntshali clan. Before the
Ntshali were able to reach Manukosi's headquarters, they were cut
down by a pursuing Zulu army, whose mission included the subjugation
18of the area south of the Limpopo. The results of the Zulu
19expedition were inconclusive but on its return through the
unhealthy Maputo lowlands the impi was decimated by the effects of
malaria and famine before reaching Zululand in about September 
201828. Together with the coup d'etat that placed Dingane on the 
Zulu throne, this setback precluded further Zulu invasions of the 
area and limited Zulu power to the southern side of the Tembe River
16. D. Kruger and H. Pretorius (eds) Voortrekker Argiefstukke 
(Pretoria, 1937), 329; Gomes da Costa Gaza 1897-1898 p. 26;
Webb and Wright, James Stuart Archive II, 251; Harries, "Free 
and unfree labour", 319, n40; Montanha estimated that only 200 
Nguni speakers accompanied Manukosi, "Viagem de ida, estada
e volta dos Hollandezes da Republica Hollandeza Africana", ACU 
1857, 331.
17. Webb and Wright, James Stuart Archive I, 445, evidence of 
Bikwayo. p. 95 evidence of Dinya ka Zokozwayo. See also Ibid., 
Ill evidence of Mbovu, 45.
18. W. Bleek, The Natal Diaries ed. O.H. Spohr, 76; J. Gibson, The 
Story of the Zulus, 38. See also Webb and Wright, James Stuart 
Archive, II, 61, 67n82, 163n24, 249-50_
19. Ferrao, (Circumscripgoes, 85)gives victory to the Zulus. Toscana 
and Quintinha A Derrocada give victory to the Gaza. Grandjean, 
La Mission, 54, merely mentions that the Khosa paid tribute
to the Shakan army.
20. Webb and Wright, James Stuart, I, 187, evidence of Jantshi.
Gibson, The Story, 38. Fynn, Diary, 161; Grandjean "L*Invasion 
des Zoulou", 78.
158
for the next five years. The removal of the Zulu threat allowed 
Manukosi to settle in Bilene on the lower Limpopo and was followed 
by an expansion of Gaza power in alliance with local Portuguese 
mercantile interests.
In 1825 a Commercial Company was established at Lourenco 
Marques largely in order to thwart British imperial designs on the 
Bay. In return for bearing the costs of a Portuguese civilian pre­
sence, in effect that of a penal colony, the Company was given
21monopoly rights to the purchase of ivory and slaves. This,
however, removed the rights of the badly and irregularly paid
garrison to its only source of steady income and led to a rapid
deterioration in relations between state officials and Company 
22traders. Competition between the two interest groups following
the appointment of governor Dinisio Ribeiro in September 1829 came
to a head. Ribeiro used his position as the representative of the
Portuguese colonial state to expand the territories held by
Portugal around the Bay. In effect this amounted to the use of state
violence, at Ribeiro's disposal, to extort slaves and ivory from
23the people with whom the Commercial Company traded. In this
Ribeiro's greatest advantage was his alliance with Manukosi, which
was cemented by his access to government powder, troops and visiting 
24ships.
21. The monopoly of slave exports was constantly disputed. On the 
Commercial Company, see Lobato, Quatro Estudos para a histdria
de Lourengo Marques, 123-8. On degredados, see Documentaqcto, III, 
317. Carvalho to GGM, 27 April 1830 20-1. "Relagao dos presos..." 
29 April 1830, 104-5. Carvalho to GLM, 30 April, 1830, 313. 
Cadaval to Paulo Miguel de Brito 20 Oct., 1830; Lobato,
"Lourenco Marques em 1830”, Studia, 1966, 27ff.
22. Documentagao, III "Nove documentos relativos a irregularidades
que seram cometidas em Lourengo Marques em Detrimento da 
Companhia Commercial, 1831". Doc., I. GLM-GGM 24 July 1832,
p. 180. Boteler noted that in 1823 Lourengo Marques trade was 
entirely in the hands of the garrison, soldiers receiving 8 
yards of cloth and 80 lbs of rice per month as wages, Narrative 
of a Voyage, 31.
23. A. Lobato, Quatro Estudos, 121, 123, 126.
24. Ibid., 122, 138.
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In 1829 the governor of Lourengo Marques paid tribute to the
25Maputo and Manukosi and, more or less continuously, to the Zulu.
Bawever, in that year an alliance of Portuguese, Mafumo and Gaza
forces defeated Matolla and Mabota and initiated a trade blockade
against Maputo. In the following year tribute was extorted from the
Mazwaya, Xerinda and Matolla, payments made to the Zulu were cut
drastically and in April 1833 tribute was extracted from the Nwamba.
It was probably this growth of Gaza power, in alliance with the
garrison, and its threat to the Commercial Company and to Zulu
trade with Lourengo Marques, that unleashed the Zulu invasion of
1833, by which time Dingane had consolidated his position at home
and was able to continue Shaka's expansion northwards.
After an initial foray in July 1833, a Zulu-led army of about
6 000 soldiers appeared before Lourengo Marques, in October of 
27that year. Seven days after the sacking of the town and execu­
tion of the governor a Gaza attack on the Matolla allies of the 
Zulu was repulsed and it was probably due to this defeat, when 
combined with the crushing of the Portuguese garrison and their
25. witworth to Nourse 29 April 1824 in RSEA, IX; Lt. E. Rogier 
"Notes on Owen Expedition" ms. in RGS; Documentagao, 932, 
GLM-GGM., 1 April 1829; Fynn, Diary, 198.
26. Documentagao, ±, Nobre "A Guerra" pp. 223-4. Documentagao, II, 
p. 439 Ribeiro to GGM., 30 Oct., 1830, p. 938. GGM to Duque de 
Cadaval, 1 June 1831; Documentagao, III, p. 275. GLM to GGM,
5 May 1831, p. 276, GLM to GGM (May?) 1831; p. 218 GLM to GGM,
15 May 1831; p. 443 GLM to GGM, 29 July 1831; Ferrao, 
Circumscripgoes 53. Anon, to Cmdr., HMS Pelican 16 Jan., 1836,
East Sussex Record Office, Lewes, see also UNISA/JC. H.A. Junod, 
"Les Causes de la Rebellion..." JSA. file 25 p. 259, evidence 
of Mahungane and Nkonuza. Documentagao, I, 212, "Termo dos 
interragatorios...." April 1833. G. Liesegang, ("Dingane's 
Attack", pp. 571-72) interprets the above reference to a "King 
of the Vatuas" who aided Ribeiro against Moamba as Dingane. I 
interpret this as a reference to the continuing support of 
Ribeiro of Manukosi.
27. The army was composed of men from Maputo, Tembe, Matolla,
Magaia, Shirinja and Moamba. AHU. Mogambique. Diversos caixa 2. 
Jose Maria dos Santos to GLM, 9 Dec., 1834. The Matolla
later claimed to have killed Ribeiro. FO 63/1050 Delagoa Bay 
Statements of David Leslie enc. in Dean to Hammond 14 July 
1873.
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28
Mafumo allies that persuaded Manukosi to move north. In May 1834
he straddled the route between Inhambane and Lourengo Marques and,
after sacking Inhambane in October 1834, crossed the Save river
29
to settle in Mosapa. The removal of Ribeiro and Manukosi 
allowed the company to dominate trade at Lourengo Marques and 
ensured Zulu hegemony over the Bay. More than a decade of in­
security and turmoil dislodged many people from the Delagoa Bay
thehinterland and initiated/emigration of coastal peoples into the 
interior. The Voortrekker leader, Louis Trigardt, met his first 
"Knobnose chief" near the upper reaches of the Groot Letaba in 
July 1836. A contemporary trekker report referred to these 
"knobnoses" as "defenceless and unwarlike people, always flying
before their assailants... (and of whom) ...many perish from
*  .,30 want.
The years 1834/5 mark the apogee of Zulu power in the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland when Lourengo Marques and most of the chiefdoms 
south of the Nkomati paid tribute to Dingane. The following years 
saw the growing menace of the Trekker invasion culminate in the 
crushing defeat of Dingane at Bloodriver in 1838. This caused a 
sudden contraction of Zulu power with a resultant political vacuum
28. Nobre "A Guerra" p. 224; Lobato, Quatro Estudos p. 136 gives 
this date incorrectly as 20 November 1833.
29. AHU. Mogambique. Diversos caixa 2. GGM to MSMU, 18 Febr., 1835; 
AHU. Mog., Mago 1286. GLM to MSMU 30 Jan., 1840; Nobre "A 
Guerra" 225; Liesegang ("Beitrage" p54) gives the date of 
Manukosi's departure from the Delagoa Bay hinterland as 1834.
In "Nguni immigrations between Delagoa Bay and the Zambezi 
1821-1839" Afr. Hist. Studs. 3, 3, 1970, 324, he gives the 
date as 1836. The former date is more probably due to the 
attack on Inhambane in Oct., 1834.
30. The term "Knobnose" derives from the prominent nasal cicatri­
sation practiced by many people living in the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland in the early 19th century. T.H. le Roux (ed),
Die Dagboek van Louis Trigardt (Pretoria, 1964), 1, 189;
J.G.S. Bronkhorst, in The Chase Papers, (ed), J.C. Chase, 72;
B.H. Dicke, "The first Voortrekkers to the northern Transvaal", 
SAJS XXIII, 1926, 1012-1020. See also Jose Antonio Texeira, 
"Descripcao dos Rios da Bahia de Lourenco Marques" (Sept.,
1838) in ACU, II, 1918, 64; Nobre, "A Guerra, 226. See also 
Webb and Wright, Stuart II. pl43 Mahungane and Nkonuza.
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31in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. The way was open for Manukosi
to return to the fertile Bilene area and, propelled by a smallpox
epidemic in Mosapa and the need to punish dissidents, he did so in
late 1838 or early 1839, with a following much reinforced by people
speaking the Tsonga dialects from north of the Limpopo, as well as
32Shona speakers from Mosapa.
Large Scale Emigration from the Central and Northern Delagoa Bay 
Hinterland
The return of Manukosi to the Limpopo-Shengane area, and his
later move to Bilene, is remembered as a time of great devastation
marked by much fighting and the flight of individuals and chief-
doms. Refugees tended to flee along existing trade routes flanking
the two major eastward-flowing rivers in this area, the Olifants
and the Limpopo-Levubu. As the land between these rivers was dry
and inhospitable, coastal migrants entered the Transvaal in two
major streams. The Nkuna, Mavundja and Tsungu chiefdoms were
pushed southwards from the Limpopo-Shengane area, parts of the
Nkuna following the Olifants river to settle under the Kaha who
33were at that time tributary to the Pedi. The Mavundja with part 
of the Tsungu initially settled under the Swazi before moving to 
the Spelonken via the Buluberi area, between the Groot and Klein
31. To the south of Zululand, the decline in Zulu power after 
Blood river allowed the Pondo under Faku to move east of the 
Mzimvubu. Beinart, "Production and the material basis of 
chieftainship”, in Marks and Atmore, op. cit., 131.
32. Grandjean, La Mission, 55-56; Ferrao, Circumscripgoes, 53;
A. Merensky, Erinnerungen aus dem Missionsleben, 82. The 
Massuits (Mapsitis) whom Liesegang mentions ("Ngoni Migration" 
p 322) threatening Inhambane in 1836 are probably the group 
mentioned by M. Reio (Indigenas de Mogambique, 22) as that of 
Mucisse who rebelled against Manukosi in Bilene while the latter 
was in Mosapa.
33. H.-A. Junod, "The Ba-Thonga of the Transvaal" SAAS 3, 1905, 
229-231, 237; Junod, Life I 17, 28. II 169, 584-586; Grandjean, 
La Mission, 59, 77; J. Stevenson-Hamilton, The Low-veld 
(London, 1929), 1170. J.D. Krige, "Traditional origins and
tribal relationships of the Sotho of the northern Transvaal", 
Bantu Studies, XI, 1937, 347.
162
MAP NO. 4. AREAS WEST OF THE LEBCMBO MOUNTAINS. SETTLED BY 
EAST COAST IMMIGRANTS
TSHIVASE
ZOUTPANS &
• Schoemonsdol
PODILE-
>nts R
m
SEKWATI
'Origstad
Co
( Pilgrims Rest)
co
Lydenberg
Lourenco Marques
Swaziland
163
34Letaba rivers which was under Modjadji. Many people who lived
in eastern Khosen-Bilene were displaced by an immigrant Mosapa
group and fled to the area between the Sabie and Masinthonto rivers
35before moving to the Olifants-Limpopo region. The Khosas were
pushed into infertile areas in the west and later came to act as a
buffer between the Gaza and the Swazi by their occupation of part
of the chiefdom of Mabila. In the north, the Maluleke living on
the Shengane-Soungoutane rivers, with some of the Boloyi chiefdoms,
settled on the Nuanetsi-Nkomati river. Northern Hlengwe clans such
as the Tshauke and Sono also migrated up the Limpopo. The Maluleke
36and some Hlengwe refugees settled on the Middle and Lower Levubu.
While some Baloyi returned to the northern Olifants-Limpopo area,
others continued further south to settle under Modjadji in the
Buluberi area and under Podile's Letswalo Narene in the Haernerts-
berg area, while still others filtered through to the Spelonken
37where they later settled under Albasini. In the south, people
from the Hlanganou area were pushed westwards over the Lebombos
to settle on the northern fringe of the Drakensberg under various
north-Sotho chiefs as well as other immigrant African and Boer 
38communities.
To Junod, the return of Manukosi to Bilene initiated a
"general exodus" of the people who had lived between the Nkomati
39and Limpopo rivers. To another missionary historian it unleashed
34. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 230-231.
35. Grandjean, "L*Invasion", 77-8; Ferrao, Circumscripgogs, 82.
36. Ferrao, Circumscripgoes, 110. TA. A.18. B.H. Dicke, "The 
Development of the Northern Transvaal"; Idem., "The Northern 
Transvaal Voortrekkers", SAAYB 1, 1941, 138-141. Cuenod ms. 
Henri Berthoud, "Voyage chez Gungunyane, 1891".
37. Grandjean, La Mission Romande, 60; J.D. Krige, "The Sotho of 
the northern Transvaal", 355.
38. UNISA. A. Nachtigal, "Beitrage zur Geschichter der Knopneuse" 
in Tagebuch, band 2, vol. I, 281; H. Raddatz, "Das Kaffernland
des Untern Olifant", Petrm. Geogr. Mitteilungen, 1886, 53.
39. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", pp 229-231, 237. Grandjean, La Mission 
Romande, 59.
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a "massive emigration" along the trade routes to the west. These
people joined earlier emigrant groups pushed out by the Dlaminis
and Khumalos or settled in malarial and tsetse infested valleys
under chiefs like Ramapulane, Pafuri, Tshivase, Modjadji, Maale,
40Podile and Sekwati. Although they often shifted their political
allegiances, the coastal refugees were welcomed by these chiefs
as dependants who paid them tribute in labour and in goods.
Coming from a different ecological area, East Coast immigrants
brought with them new sources of food such as fowls, crops like
cassava, certain kinds of ground-nuts, various grain and potato
41
strains and especially maize. Immigrants were attached to home­
steads as individuals or, as small groups under their own headmen, 
were scattered throughout the veld, colonizing those areas where
human and animal diseases, poor soils and lack of water had
42previously restricted settlement.
Manukosi's return south brought little peace to Lourengo
43
Marques and in 1841 the Portuguese settlement came under attack.
It seems likely that this was part of Manukosi's strategy aimed at
extracting tribute from a wider area, for the following year he
raided for cattle as far west as the 29th degree, expelled the
Nkuna from their shelter with the Pedi and threatened to attack 
44Sekwati. Manukosi went on to raid cattle from Boer settlers
in the Lydenburg Republic but was obliged to negotiate an un-
45
favourable peace with them in 1848. As the victors of Dingane
40. UNISA. A. Nachtigal, "Beitrage zur Geschichter der Knopneuse", 
in Tagebuch, band 2, vol. I, 277-284, 237? Anon. "Altes und 
Neues..." BMB, 1863, 7? J.D. Krige, "The Sotho of the Northern 
Transvaal", 342-344, 47, 55-56; War Office, Native Tribes, 6 6 .
41. E. Krige, The Realm of a Rainqueen, (Oxford, 1943 ), 45; Evidence 
of Edmund Mabyalane (Kurulen, 30 March 1979). See also p 282.
42. N.J. van Warmelo, A Preliminary Survey of the Bantu Tribes of 
South Africa (Pretoria, 1935), 90; J. Krige, "Sotho of the 
northern Transvaal", 355; Paul Berthoud, Les Negr.es, 20; 
Nachtigal, "Geschichter der Knopneuse", 282.
43. Quintinha and Toscano A Derrocada, 57; E. Noronho, Augusto 
de Castilho, 61.
44. SAAR, Transvaal I, pp 45, 88 to 91; Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 237; 
Junod, Life, II, 585.
45. H. Ward, The Cape and the Kaffirs, 177; Kruger and Pretorius 
(eds), Voortrekker Argiefstukke, 329.
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and Mzilikatze and the friends of Mpande and Mswati, the Trekkers 
were a powerful new force in the Delagoa Bay area.
The attempt by various governors of Lourenco Marques to 
attract Boer settlers was frustrated at every turn by a protec­
tionist Metropolitan government fearful that the Voortrekkers
were the unwitting vanguard of British economic and political 
46imperialism. without settlers, Louren9o Marques remained "little
more than a fortified trading post” sandwiched between the Gaza,
47
Swazi and Zulu empires. The town, visited by five or six ships
every year, lay at the mercy, as the Governor General mournfully
stated, "of the blacks, who are already acquainted with our weak-
48nesses and have hemmed us within the confines of the fort".
Portuguese power was dependent on the Lourengo Marques traders and
their ability to attract allies from among the chiefs of the
interior. Traders like JoSo Albasini and Boda Cassimo in fact
supplied the slave hunters and boats needed for the Portuguese to 
the 49
defeat/Mazwaya in 1843. However, the threat of the firepower
at the disposal of the traders was no surety against attack, for
when Makasana intervened in a Tembe succession dispute in order to
ensure the installation of his grandson, he laid siege to Lourengo
Marques in June 1844, as did Manukosi four years later.^
46. TA. A344. GGM to GLM, 2 Nov., 1838? 18 May 1839, 16 June 1843,
20 Sept., 1843, 30 Oct., 1843, 16 April, 1844, 30 May 1844;
SAAR, Transvaal no 3, p 350 GLM to Governo da Republica 
Africana, 1 May 1855, p 271? Ibid., 24 July 1854, pp 98-101,
C. Potgieter to GLM, 6 Nov., 1854. B. van Tonder, "Die Verhouding 
tussen die Boere in die Transvaal en die Portuguese van 
Mosambiek tussen 1836-1839" (M.A. Pretoria, 1952); Ida Belo 
Carmona, "RelagoS’s entre os Portugueses de Mogambique e os 
Boers", Mogambique, no. 85, 1950, p. 54, no 8 6 , pp. 53-57, 61.
47. Roberto Theodorico da Costa e Silva, March 1857, cited in 
Noronho, Lourengo Marques, 71;. Liesegang, "Dingane's attack", 567.
48. TA/A. 334. GLM to GGM, 20 Sept., 1843; GGM to MSMU 16 April 
1844.
49. E. Noronho, Lourengo Marques, p 55.
50. Ferrao, Circumscripgoes, 147; Noronho, Augusto de Castilho, 58,
61; J.B. de Vaal, "Die Rol van Joao Albasini in die Geskiedenis 
van die Transvaal". SAAYB, I, 1953, 11; B. van Tonder,
"Die Verhouding", 49. Gomes da Costa, Gaza 1897-1898, 63.
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The Swazi raided the Delagoa Bay hinterland in 1852, 1855 and
1858, mainly for children whom they exchanged with the Boers for
cattle and horses and for their help in sheltering Swazi cattle
51
from a Zulu attack in 1854. A further reason for the Swazi 
incursions was the wish to take advantage of civil unrest in Zulu­
land to assert their control over the Lebombos, neutralize Matolla 
as a refuge for Mswati's enemies and consequently secure Swazi 
trade links with Lourenco Marques. The Swazi invasion of 1855 
had succeeded in upsetting the balance of power in the Delagoa Bay
hinterland for, following the incorporation of two Matolla sub-
52chiefdoms into Swaziland, the Zulu, who claimed the Matolla as 
tribute-paying subjects, were drawn into the area. The area south 
of Delagoa Bay was relatively free of Zulu control during 
Makasana's lifetime when the Maputo were able to extract tribute
53as far south as the Mkuzi river, the northern border of Zululand.
However, following Makasana's death in 1853 or 1854, Zulu control
over Maputoland was entrenched when his grandson Nozingili was
54
presented with a wife and placed on the throne by Mpande.
Following the Zulu civil war of 1856, groups paying tribute to 
Cetewayo settled north of the Pongola and the Tsonga-speaking
51. FO 312/14 encl. 3 in mixed commission to Clarendon, 3 Dec.,
1858; "The hunting journal of Robert B ._Struthers,.
3" Feb., 1856"; A. Merensky, BMB, 1860, 267-68; Idem., "Tage- 
buch der Reise", BMB, 1861, 172; Webb and Wright, James Stuart 
I, 150, evidence of Giba; III, evidence of Mnkonkoni; Bryant, 
Olden Times, 329-330; P. Bonner, "The Rise, Consolidation and 
Disintegration of Dlamini power in Swaziland between 1820 and 
1889" (PhD., London, 1978), 88-90.
52. P. Bonner, "Dlamini power", 90-92.
53. P. Kirby (ed) Andrew Smith and Natal, 76; BPP. 1890. C. 6200 
Zambili to Natal SNA 1 March 1889. Natal SNA to Zambili 1 
March 1889. See also Bryant Olden Times, 284; A. Delegorgue, 
Voyage dans l'Afrique Australe, 462; E. Krige and W. Felgate,
"An ecological survey of the TembeThonga", p 10; Junod, "Tembe", 
BSNG. 1895, 123; JSA file 25 p 255 Mahungane and Nkonuza.
Ferrao, Circumscripgoes, 149-150.
54. NA.SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA 28 July 1871; JSA file 25, p 255, 
evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza, 8 Nov., 1897; Ferrao, 
Circumscripgoes, 148. Nozingili was a son of Makasana's 
deceased son Hluma, by a junior wife. His adversary, Makasanyana, 
was the son of Hluma's great wife by a leviratical marriage.
167
chiefdoms south of Lake Kosi became increasingly independent of the 
55Maputo. A further extension of Zulu power into the Delagoa Bay
hinterland occurred in 1854 when Mpande sent an emissary to Lourenco
Marques to secure the succession to the Matolla chieftaincy of his
favourite. When the Portuguese, who also claimed tribute from the
Matolla, attempted to intervene in this dispute, Mpande threatened
both to aid an attack on Lourengo Marques and to invade Matollaland.
These plans were only defused by the intervention of Sir George
Grey on behalf of the Portuguese and by the eventual installation
56of the Zulu favourite.
Despite this direct involvement by the Zulu in the politics 
of the Matolla, sovereignty over the chiefdom remained disputed. 
James Stuart's informants, when referring to the 1850s and 1860s, 
remembered Matolla as a Portuguese dependency, while others
57
remembered the northern chiefdoms as tributary to Manukosi.
Thus it would seem that Zulu influence in the 1840s and 1850s was
largely restricted to the Maputo and Tembe chiefdoms which occupied
58
the trade route from Zululand to Lourengo Marques.
To the north of the Bay, the Shimoy war of 1855 was initiated
by Manukosi's attack on the Rikotsho, Khosen and Baloyi chiefdoms
which had allied themselves with the Boers. Ohrigstad had been
established when A.H. Potgieter was given permission by the
Governor of Lourengo Marques in 1845 to found a settlement five days 
59from Delagoa Bay. The Boers had then extended eastwards looking
55. NA.CSO 682.472/79 R. Magis. Durban to Col. Sec. 27 Nov., 1878
JSA file 25 p. 255. Manhungane and Nkonuza. On the relationship 
between the Mkuzi River-Kosi Bay people and the Maputo, see BPP 
1890 C.-6200 Saunders to Osborn 21 Sept., 1889; Leslie, Amongst 
the Amatongas, 257; Bryant, Olden Times, 286; NA/ZGH 736.3233/91 
Minute 13 March 1891. Res. Comm. Zululand; Delegorgue Voyage,
440; Krige and Felgate, "Ecological Survey", 11-12, 16, 25.
56. CA.GH 28 no. 29 Co to Lt. Gov. 6 March 1856 and enclosures; 
"Hunting journal of Robert Struthers", 6 July 1855; FO 63/1049 
Keate to Barkly, 17 Dec., 1871; Noronha Lourengo Marques, 46.
57. JSA file 25 p. 259. Mahungane and Nkonuza; Ferrao Circumscripgoes, 
83, 85.
58. AHU. Sa da Bandeira papers, maco 2 "Mappa Nominal dos Nagoes 
vizinhas do districto de Lourengo Marques" quoted in Liesegang, 
"Beitrage", 6 6 ; Thomas Baines, The Gold Regions, 10; "Hunting 
journal of Robert Struthers", 11 July 1855; Delagorque, Voyage, 
462-3; JSA file 25 p 255, file 72 p 137, Mahungane and Nkonuza.
59. TA. ABB. Albasini to GLM, 24 July 1859; Luis Martins, "Joao 
Albasini e a CoIonia de St Luis", in Pelo Imperio, no 126,
1957, 64.
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for game and raiding for tribute and slaves. Maswati had recognized
the threat posed by the Boers and had proposed an alliance with
Manukosi in 1849.^ This had been rejected and by the late 1850s,
largely due to metropolitan Portugal's unwillingness to delimit its
claims to the interior, the Boers were able to kidnap children as
slaves and extcrt payments from the Nwamba who lived 25 miles from 
61Lourenco Marques. In order to prevent this encroachment Manukosi 
attacked a number of chiefdoms which had allied themselves with 
the Boers and, fearing that Lourenco Marques had also allied itself 
with the Boers, the Gaza king pillaged the town's merchants'
62
supplies of ivory and trade goods and attacked the fort in 1856.
The war ended in 1857 when Manukosi signed a peace treaty with the
Governor of Lourenco Marques and agreed to pay a heavy reparation
to the Trekkers who had routed his forces in a battle near the
confluence of the Singwedzi and Limpopo rivers. But the Boer
menace continued and Manukosi threatened to invade the Transvaal in
1858 in order to recover stolen cattle and to free Nwamba from the 
63Boers.
When the Gaza king died in 1858, Louren<j:o Marques and its 
allies expanded their area of tribute collection. This process had 
first started in 1850 when chief Assane of Mafumo refused to attack 
the Nwamba and instead killed his pro-Portuguese leading general. 
The Portuguese had then succeeded in deporting Assane to Mozambique
60. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 232; SAAR Transvaal I 103, 110.
61. MNE. Direcc^ao dos Consulados. macjo 23 GGM to MNE 4 May 1860 ; 
TA/ABB. Albasini to GGM 24 July 1859 ; Webb and Wright, Stuart 
Archive. I, p 150. A treaty entered into in 1848 by the GLM 
marking the border between the Portuguese and Boer settlements 
was repudiated by the metropolitan government, TA. A.334. GGM 
to GLM, 16 Oct., 1848.
62. Noronho, Augusto de Castilho, 61-62; "Hunting journal of Robert 
Struthers", 30 June 1855; Liesegang, "Beitrage", 65; Gomes
da Costa, Gaza 1897-1898, 63; Augusto Cabral, Ragas, Usos, 27.
63. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 232; Noronho, Lourengo Marques, 62; St. V. 
Erskine, "Route map of the Gaza country" published by Conseil
de la Mission Romande (n.d.). TA/SS.21 R2230/50 Du Toit to State 
Pres. 9 Aug., 1858; De Vaal, "Joao Albasini", 48.
169
Island, and had installed Machaquene, the chief of a minor house,
64
as the Mafumo regent. In 1859 Machaquene led a combined
Portuguese, Mafumo and Shirindja force against the Mazwaya, many of
whom sought refuge in the north and whose chief, Kobete, was deposed
65in favour of his brother Mapunga. But Machaquene was to achieve
66his major distinction during the Gaza civil war.
Following Manukosi's death in 1858 Mawewe, the eldest son of 
his principal wife, was installed as king and several of his 
brothers were obliged to flee north of the Zambezi with their 
followers. Umzila, an elder son by a minor wife, fled westwards 
and settled alongside a trading depot on one of the major routes
6
to Delagoa Bay, where he fell under the protection of Joao Albasini. 
The latter was a hunter-trader who in 1857 had moved out of 
Schoemansdal in order to consolidate his hold over both those 
followers who had accompanied him from the Delagoa Bay hinterland 
and an increasing number of refugees, all of whom lived on his 
farm on the upper Levubu river. Although many of those who sought 
Albasini's protection were Venda-speaking refugees from the chief­
doms living in the mountains north of the Levubu river, the great
majority were Tsonga-speakers displaced from their home areas east 
68of the Lebombos. Umzila was thus one of several chiefs who were 
to seek refuge with Albasini and whose followers swelled his power 
and prestige.
Mawewe was prepared to pay handsomely for Umzila's repatriation, 
but this was precluded by the weak and divided nature of the Boer 
society in the Zoutpansberg. Instead of securing the surrender of
64. Junod, "BaRonga", 10, 135; UNISA/JC., H.A. Junod, "Les causes 
de la rebellion dans le district de Lourengo Marques", 21 Oct., 
1896. Junod's oral evidence confuses Assane with his son Amule 
who was a minor at the time of his father's expatriation.
65. Noronho, Augusto de Castilho, 55; E. Torre de Valle, Diccionario 
Shironga-Portuguez, (Lourengo Marques, 1906), 46; UNISA/JC H.A. 
Junod, "Les Causes...."
66. The political history of the Gaza civil war has been examined
in some detail by G. Liesegang, "Beitrage", 74-84; De Vaal, "Joao 
Albasini", 57-63; P. Bonner, "Dlamini power", 195-204.
67. Dicke, "First Voortrekkers", 1016.
6 8 . OT. , Edmund Mabyalane,Kurulen, 17 Feb., 1881
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Umzila, through his dealings with various Boer and Portuguese
groups claiming to represent the Transvaal government, Mawewe was
69
subjected to numerous fraudulent extortions. This caused him to 
close Gazaland to Transvaal hunters in January 1861, a move that 
made Umzila's position in the Zoutpansberg untenable. Threatened 
by hostile factions in the Transvaal and with growing signs of 
support for his cause in Gazaland, he recrossed the Lebombos in 
October 1861.
In Gazaland, Mawewe's marriage to a Swazi princess in 1861 led
him to raid several tributary chiefdoms for brideprice cattle, and
due to a severe famine and cattle epizootic he was obliged to
extort ever-increasing amounts of food from people in the Delagoa 
70
Bay hinterland. Mawewe's exactions increased the precariousness
of a life already made difficult by ecological upsets. His
marauding sullied his popularity and caused many refugees to flee
across the Lebombos, including a large part of the Khosa population
which moved westwards into Mabila and displaced part of the local
population which sought refuge in the pro-Mawewe chieftaincy of 
71NWamba. For these reasons the Khosa were quick to support
Umzila, as were the Louren9o Marques residents and their Mafumo
allies under Machaquene who were severely hindered by the restric-
72tions that Mawewe had placed on hunting and trading. The
Portuguese were influenced in their support for Umzila by Albasini's
plans for a common front with the Zoutpansberg Boers against 
73Mawewe and perhaps even more so by the commercial overtures that
74Mawewe had made to the British in Natal. These overtures had
69. NA.SNA. 1.6.2 "Statement of Unkunhlana..." 5 Oct., 1859; NA. SNA. 
1/1/10 "Statement of Mabulawa, 12 January 1860".
70. Fernandes das Neves, A hunting expedition to the Transvaal, 
(London, 1879), 116, 122, 254.
71. Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 83.
72. AHU. Moc.,CG., pasta 18, Joao Tavares Almeida to MSMU, 2 
Sept., 1861.
73. TA.SS.R4322/61 Albasini to State President 29 March 1861;
R4325/61 Albasini to State President 30 March 1861; TA.ABB 
Albasini to GLM 23 May 1861. Albasini to Paiva de Raposo 
21 March 1862; Albasini to GLM 7 April 1862.
74. NA.SNA 1/6/2 "Statement of Umkunhlana", 5 Oct., 1859; SNA 
1/1/10 Statement of Mabulawa, 12 Jan., 1860; 1/1/12 Sanderson 
to SNA 8 Sept., 1862; 1/6/2 Statement of Ukundhleni and Uhayi,
21 Oct., 1862. See also p. 178.
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brought a number of schooners up the coast which threatened the
monopolistic position of the Lourenco Marques traders and caused
the British to annex Inyak and Elephant Islands, on the southern
75side of Delagoa Bay in November 1861. Umzila's other ally was
Matolla which, because of its geographical position, had close
trading links with Lourengo Marques and whose sovereignty was
threatened by the marriage alliance between Mswati and Mawewe.
On 27 November 1861 an army sent by Mawewe to prevent Umzila
from reaching Lourengo Marques was beaten at Bolouanine in
Matolla. On reaching the settlement, Umzila was provided with
more than 2 000 guns and 50 000 cartridges by the Lourengo Marques
traders and the support of their hunters and several thousand
auxiliaries drawn from the Mazwaya, Mabota, Matolla and Tembe
76chiefdoms under the Mafumo army chief Machaquene. In return
Umzila agreed to make tributary to Lourengo Marques, various
chiefdoms situated between the settlement and the Nkomati river and
to remove all restrictions on Lourengo Marques hunters and 
77traders. With this support Umzila was able to defeat Mawewe
for a second time on 16 December at a battle in which the latter's
allies, Nwamba and Mabila, were decimated. But after being
reinforced by a Swazi army, Mawewe returned in February 1862 to
defeat and dislodge Umzila from Bilene, scatter the Khosa
throughout the dry Baloyi area to the north and raid the Delagoa 
78Bay hinterland. Umzila fled northwards, harried by Mawewe and 
hunger, to the Chiguaraguara area, north-east of the Limpopo bend, 
where he regrouped his shattered forces before pushing on to Mosapa. 
Here Mawewe's pursuing army, much depleted by the effects of famine
75. KCL. Alexander Anderson Papers "Gun Running at Port Natal"; FO 
63/1046 Portuguese legation, London to FO, 22 May 1863. See 
also TA. ABB Albasini to GGM, 9 Dec., 1861.
76. Onofre Lourengo de Andrade, O Presidio de Lourengo Marques no
periodo....1859 a 1865 (Lisbon, 1867), 19, 26-28; TA.SS
45 9/62 Albasini to Schoeman, 8 Jan., 1862.
77. BO. 12. 22 March 1862; BO. 23. 21 June 1872. "Condigoes impostas
pelo governador do districts de Lourengo Marques...as regulo 
Muzilla, 2 Dec., 1861", a translation of this treaty is in FO 
84/2142 Marques de Soveral to FO, 4 Jan., 1891, encl. no 1;
TA.ABB Albasini to GLM, 22 Dec., 1862.
78. Neves, A Hunting Expedition, 243; Bonner, "Dlamini Power",
200-201.
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and smallpox, was routed in mid-1862 and, fleeing south, was
finally crushed in Nwambaland in August 1862. With Umzila hunting
down his defeated enemies, people fled from Nwambaland to Swaziland 
79and the Transvaal while another of Manukosi1s sons, Sihono,
80fled north to the Shire with his followers.
The civil war, when combined with the famine, cattle epizootic
and the smallpox epidemic raging through the area, shattered the
economy of the northern and central Delagoa Bay hinterland.
Hunting and trading were suspended, enormous numbers of cattle
died or were lost to the Swazi and crops either failed to materia-
81lize, were burnt or left unharvested. However the war did not
end with Mawewe's flight to Swaziland, for in 1863, and almost
each following winter, armies swept out of northern Swaziland to
82devastate the central and northern Delagoa Bay hinterland.
Umzila, threatened by the Swazi and divided from his southern 
marshes by the Mbethe famine, vacated Khosen and the chiefdoms to 
the south of the Nkomati and moved the administrative centre of 
his kingdom north of the Save river to Mosapa. Bogota who had been 
chief of the Gaza provinces south of the Limpopo before Umzila's 
accession to power was reduced to a small sub-chief living about 
260 miles north-west of Inhambane while Manjobo was entrusted 
with the populous Bilene area on the lower Limpopo which became
the southern border of the Gaza empire and the buffer against the
■ 83 Swazr.
The retreat of the Gaza to the area north of the Limpopo and 
Olifants rivers left the central and northern Delagoa Bay hinterland 
open to the Swazi who were able both to secure their access to
79. AHU Mog. CG past 19. GLM to GG., 13 Aug., 1862 in GG to MSMU 
14 Oct., 1862; ABB. Albasini to GLM 2 April 1862? H. Merensky 
Erinnerungen aus dem Missionsleben, 90.
80. Cuenod papers. Henri Berthoud, notebook 4.
81. See pp 223-224.
82. Junod, "The Ba-Thonga", 234-235; Idem., Life I, 472;
Stevenson-Hamilton, The Low-veld, 170; Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 
1899.
83. ABM:ABC.15 4 col. 12 Richards to Mann, 4 Jan., 1882.
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Lourenco Marques through Matolla and to extort tribute from the 
84settlement. The Swazi raids, and the civil war that had
preceded them, caused large numbers of people to flee westwards
8 5into the Transvaal. The Hlanganou moved into the mountains of
the Lydenburg district while those remaining were forced to lead
86a hunter-gatherer existence. Many Khosa sought refuge with
Albasini, while others moved into the thinly-populated northern
87plains where they were still to be found in 1881.
Albasini competed with the surrounding chiefs in his attempt 
to attract displaced people, many of whom were refugees from the 
civil war and other political disturbances to the east of the 
Zoutpansberg. This he did by offering them access to both land 
and, in contrast to many other chiefs who incorporated refugees, 
by allowing them to retain their clan-names, material culture and 
chiefs and by offering them the possibility of rapid advancement
88in his service as hunters, traders and tax-collecting "soldiers". 
Like several Venda-speaking petty chiefs, his followers were mainly 
Tsonga-speaking; but they were a conglomeration of various clans, 
had no links with other coastal refugees and did not refrain from 
attacking immigrant Nkuna and Maluleke chiefdoms as well as chiefs
84. Fernandes das Neves, "Exploragao do Rio Bembe", BSGL., 3, 6 , 
1882, 343. In 1863 a Swazi army laid seige to Louren90 Marques 
and five years later another army camped "within pistol shot" 
of the settlement. BO. 47, 1870, 196; BO. 12, 1871, 52;
Bonner, "Dlamini power", 251.
85. ACU. 1866, Report of governor of Inhambane for 1864; BO. 21, 27 
May 1865; Noronho, Lourengo Marques, 63; BO. 41, 14 Oct., 1866; 
AHU Mog., CG., pasta 25, GLM to CG, 9 Feb., 1867; Idem., 22 Feb. 
and 25 Feb., 1867; Bonner, "Dlamini power", 251; War office, 
Native Tribes, 65-66;Nachtigal, Tagebuch, 280. Grandjean
thought the Swazi raids of 1861-78 responsible for "the dis­
persion of the Tonga clans", SMA 514/A Grandjean to Leresche,
27 May 1895; OT., Edmund Mabyalane, Kurulen, 30 March, 1979.
8 6 . Van Warmelo, Preliminary Survey, 91; Nachtigal, Tagebuch; 
Stevenson-Hamilton, 172.
87. SMA 467 Grandjean; Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 80-86.
8 8 . Grandjean, La Mission, 60; Stayt, The BaVenda, 136; OT.,
Chief Chevane (14 April 1979, Ribola); Nqcapu and Lucas 
Siweya (16 April 1979); Headman Maswanganyi (8 April 1979).
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like Magato and Modjadji, who had given asylum to many Tsonga- 
89speakers. Albasini presided over a shifting population, the
size of which depended upon his fluctuating fortunes. Thus at
the height of his power, when after the fall of Schoemansdal he
came to represent the Boer presence in the Zoutpansberg, he drew
Tsonga-speaking followers both from the coast and from refugees
settled under local chiefs. As his power declined in the 1870s,
90many of these people deserted him for wealthier masters.
Albasini was merely one of many chiefs living in the north and
eastern Transvaal who was willing and able to offer a home to
91large numbers of Tsonga-speaking followers.
Within the wide and constantly shifting diaspora of coastal
immigrants and their descendants, four semi-independent clusterings,
generally under their own chiefs, had begun to crystallize by the
1860s. Those on the middle and lower Levubu, mainly of the
92Maluleke clan, frequently paid tribute to Umzila. Those 
living in the Spelonken and on the left bank of the upper Levubu 
accepted the overlordship of Albasini and his chiefs who were 
responsible for the maintenance of the north-eastern frontier.
The other major Tsonga-speaking groups, largely composed of
89. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 235, 238; B.H. Dicke, The Bush Speaks,
24-26; Evidence of Edmund Mabyalane (Kurulen, 17 Feb., 1981);
De Vaal, "Joao Albasini", 71, 83-84, 98; H.W. Grimsel, "Onluste 
in Modjadjiland 1890-94", SAAYB, 1955, II; Van Warmelo, 
Preliminary Survey, 91; War Office, Native Tribes, 6 6 .
90. Junod, "Ba-Thonga", 235; TA. SN.l.A Oscar Dahl, "Estimate of 
Able-bodied men in Zoutpansberg"; Grandjean, La Mission, 60;
OT., O.I. Miyen, (Elim, 18 Feb., 1981).
91. TA. SN.l Oscar Dahl, "Estimate of able bodied armed men" and
SN. 2 "Report of (sic) the chiefs and population in the northern 
part of the District of Zoutpansberg". On whereabouts of dispersed 
settlements of Tsonga-speakers, cf. SN.la. Lydenburg, ass.N. Comm, 
to Clarke, 31 May 1879. P. Berthoud, Lettres Missionaries, 426, 
447; R. Wessman, The BaVenda of the Spelonken, 54; Transvaal 
Native Affairs Dept. Report, 1905, 60; T.S. van Rooyen, "Die 
Verhouding tussen die Boere, Engelse en Naturelle in die Oos 
Transvaal tot 1882", SAAYB, (1951), II, 190.
92. St. V. Erskine, "To the Limpopo mouth and back", 1868, ms. in 
RGS, p. 27; SS 1240.R3129/86 encl. in native commissioner 
Spelonken to Supt. natives, 24 Aug, 1886; SSa 5, RA 71/94 
Portuguese Consul to SS, 10 June, 1891; SSa 6 , Native Commissioner 
Spelonken to Supt. Natives, 22 July 1891; also declarations of 
Klopper, Mashilahushe in Schiel to Supt. Natives, 9 Aug., 1891;
SS 365, R6802/92, Cmdt. General and Supt. of Natives to dele­
gation from Gungunyana, August 1892; H.A. Junod, "Les Barcnga", 
BSNG (1897), 94; G. Liengme, "Le Suicide", BSNG, (1895), 178.
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members of the Baloyi and Nkuna clans, congregated under the
Lovedu and Kaha chiefs Modjadji and Maale, and lived on the edge 
93of the Highveld. Smaller settlements, many of whose members
claimed Hlangaan origin, developed to the south of the Olifants river
94around the Pedi and immigrant Boers in the Ohrigstand river valley. 
These communities constantly drew people from east of the Lebombos.
Thus by the 1860s the widespread social dislocation suffered 
by the peoples of the northern and central Delagoa Bay hinterland 
had resulted in large-scale in-migration and the emergence of a 
strong tradition of westerly emigration.
The Southern Delagoa Bay Hinterland: African Politics and
Imperial Rivalries
The Swazi raids which were so influential in pushing people
westwards from the Delagoa Bay hinterland only ceased in the late
1870s following dynastic disputes in Swaziland and the re-emergence
of Zulu power in the south. The resurgence of Zulu power in the
area followed the stabilization of Zulu politics once Cetewayo
had secured his hold over the Zulu royal house. Of equal
importance was the securing by the Maputo of a marriage alliance
with the Swazi, which allowed them to pursue an aggressive policy
of territorial aggrandizement. This drew the Zulu northwards as it
threatened their control of the trade route running through the
95southern Delagoa Bay hinterland.
The Portuguese presence in the area remained weak and divided.
Inhambane, which had supported Mawewe during the civil war and had
sheltered some of his chiefs after their defeat by Umzila, remained
96in a beleaguered position for almost the next thirty years.
With Umzila*s retreat north of the Limpopo, Louren^o Marques was 
deprived of its most powerful ally and its power stretched little 
further than the range of its cannon.
93. Anon. "Altes und Neues..." BMB, 1863, p. 7; SN.1A. Oscar Dahl, 
"Estimate of able bodied armed men."
94. H. Ward, The Cape and the Kaffirs, 177; H. Raddatz, "Das 
Kaffernland", p. 53 and especially map entitled "Das Untere 
Olifantbecken".
95. See Chapter 5, p.190, notes 32, 33.
96. AHU. CG. Pasta 21. GG-MSMU 8 Aug., 1863; GG to District gov.,
11 June 1863 in BO., 19 Sept., 1863; ACU, 1866, Rep. of GInh for 
1863, pp 39-40; Cabral, Ragas, Usos, 27-29. See also Noronho, 
Lourengo Marques, 63; GH 837 Br. Cons, to Sec. State for foreign 
affairs, 4 July 1886.
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The settlement thus lay at the mercy of the Swazi and its
97population was considered ungovernable; the soldiers who 
constituted the garrison were generally illiterate and poorly 
trained and armed. Most were degredados or Angolans who had been 
unwillingly pressed into the army and at best they were paid 
sporadically and then often in trade goods. The civilian popula­
tion was made up of slaves, degredados and a handful of rapacious
and impermanent traders drawn largely from Portuguese and British 
98India. Portuguese officials certainly had no power either to 
encourage or to control the flow of labour from the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland to South Africa, a flow that began as a trickle in the 
late 1850s.
The Portuguese were only able to extend their political
influence over the Delagoa Bay hinterland by involving themselves
in dynastic politics and by taking sides in local disputes, in
which their strategy was to supply their allies with arms and
99impose trade blockades on their enemies. Portugal's position 
at Louren90 Marques remained precarious and her policy of backing 
one chief against another threatened at times to backfire.
In 1867, Assane, the exiled chief of Mafumo, was brought 
back to his country where he died later that y$ar. The Portuguese 
then installed his son Amule as chief of Mafumo. But when Amule
97. Noronho, Augusto Castilho, 8-9.
98. Joao de Andrade Corvo, Estudos sobre as provinciais Ultramarinos 
(Lisbon, 1884), II 265-66, 276 . In 1857 the population of 
Lourentjo Marques stood at 844 of whom 370 were slaves, 328 free 
Africans (of whom 8 6% were women and children under 10 years old),
44 Asiatics (mainly Catholics, Banians and Moslems) and 82 
Europeans of whom 55 were soldiers. (BO. 46, 1857, 197). In 1861 
the population of 936 was composed of, inter alia, 276 slaves,
92 soldiers, 55 merchants, 5 hawkers, 3 civil servants, 6 
fishermen and 180 without fixed employment. By 1864 the popu­
lation stood at 1 094, including 260 slaves, 751 Asiatics and 
free Africans and 83 Europeans, see Noronho, Lourengo Marques, 72,.192
99. David Leslie wrote in 1871 that "It appears that the governor 
of Lourengo Marques' way of making war is to pay one tribe to 
attack another and sometimes one tribe he agrees with takes 
his goods and then refuses to come out." SNA 1/1/21 Leslie
to SNA 9 Aug., 1871; Ibid., 24 Aug., 1871.
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refused to supply the Portuguese with a contingent of men for
military service in Angola, or elsewhere in Mozambique, he was
attacked by a detachment of Portuguese troops and their African 
100allies. He then laid siege to Lourengo Marques and his forces
were only driven off after hand-to-hand fighting. Amule then 
ravaged the country surrounding the settlement before taking his 
people and settling with the Nwamba. Hostilities continued until 
November 1869 when Amule was seized and exiled to Mozambique
t n * 101 Island.
To the south of Lourengo Marques Maputo emerged as a major
power when, following the death of Mawewe's father-in-law, Mswati,
in August 1865, the focus of Swazi military operations began to
shift from the Delagoa Bay hinterland to the northern and eastern 
102
Transvaal. Having secured a marriage alliance with the Swazi 
and, having been furnished with arms by the Portuguese intent on 
chastising the Tembe for their refus ail to supply Lourengo Marques 
with labourers, the Maputo chief Nozingile (Missongue/Msongi) moved 
north of the Maputo river in August 1870.
After sustaining heavy losses the Tembe clan, of which Maputo
was a junior house, was forced north of the Tembe river and in May
1031871 sought refuge with the Portuguese. In January 1872 the
Maputo army stood before Lourengo Marques and, in order* to stave
100. Noronho, Lourengo Marques, 56; FO.84/2224 British consul 
Delacour to FO., 4 April 1892. But cf. Junod whose information 
on Mfumo history during this period seems confused. Life, I
458 and UNISA/JC. Junod, "Les Causes de la Rebellion...", letter 
to V. Rossel, 21 Oct., 1896.
101. BO., 18, 9 May 1868; BO. 49, 16 Oct., 1869; BO. 12, 25 March 
1871; Noronho, Augusto de Castilho, 9-12.
102. In 1866 the Swazi launched expeditions into the eastern 
Transvaal which embroiled them in a series of wars with, 
amongst others, the Pedi. A major expeditionary force was sent 
in alliance with Albasini to fight Magato and the campaigns 
against the Pedi continued until November 1879 when Sekhukhuni 
was overwhelmed by an Anglo-Swazi force. Bonner, "Dlamini 
power", 242 ff.; BO. 9, 1871, p 37; BO. 10, 1871, p 41.
103. FO 63/1050 Delagoa Bay statements of D. Leslie encl. in Dean 
to Hammond, 14 July 1873; Straker to Lt Gov., 21 Feb., 1872 
encl. in Lt. Gov. to Kimberley, 18 March 1873; FO 84/2224 
Delacour to FO. 4 April 1892; SMA 542/B Loze to Grandjean
3 Dec., 1897.
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off an attack on the settlement, several merchants provided
Nozingile with five headloads of goods in exchange for their cattle
which had been pastured in Tembe. But at the same time the
Portuguese armed their ally, chief Mapunga of the Mazwaya, whom
104Nozingile accused of stealing some of his ivory. After
invading Matolla, Nozingile attacked and inflicted heavy losses
on the Mazwaya army near Lake Malangotibo. These wars in the
southern and central Delagoa Bay hinterland restricted the flow
of labour emigrants as they required male labour power for military
purposes and increased the dangers of the journey to Natal.
According to Junod, writing twenty years later, they were also
responsible for the "deep hostility (that) existed from then on
amongst these different clans.
The extension of Maputo power proved extremely embarrassing
for Portugal as an imperial power. Moreover, an Anglo-Portuguese
anti-slavery treaty of 1817 which recognized Portugal's suzerainty
from Cape Delgado to Delagoa Bay, was imprecise as to which
European nation had rights to the area south of the Bay. Britain's
107claims, first made in the 1820s, were rejuvenated when,
encouraged by Mawewe's hostility towards the Portuguese in Lourengo
Marques and his desire to trade with Natal, a British naval vessel
108took possession of Inyak and Elephant Islands in November 1861.
104. SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871, Ibid., 3 Sept.,
1871; FO 63/1047 Erskine to Keate encl. in Keate to Kimberley, 
12 Sept., 1971.
105. FO 63/1050 Leslie "Delagoa Bay Statements"; UNISA/JC, "Les 
Causes..."; Junod, "Tembe", BSNG, 1895, 124; Ferrao, Circum- 
scripqoes, 150-151. But for Mazwaya victory cf. Noronho, 
Lourengo Marques, 6 6 ; Junod, Life, I, 475. The governor of 
Lourengo Marques merely stated that both sides had suffered 
heavy casualties and that the Maputo were obliged to retire, 
BO. 23, 8 June, 1872. Stuart’s informants Mahungane and 
Nkonuza stressed that Matolo was only hlasela'd (invaded) and 
not cita'd (ravaged). This was possibly because the Matolo and 
Maputo were linked by marriage, see JSA, file 25, p 259.
106. UNISA/JC, Junod,"Les Causes...."
107. M. Jackson-Haight, European Powers and south-east Africa, 
187-217, 223-4; RSEA, IX, 131-183; BPP 1875 C.-1361, 
Correspondence respecting claims of H.M. government to Delagoa 
Bay.
108. FO 97/318 Capt. Bickford to GLM, 5 Nov., 1861. The annexation 
of the two islands by Natal was gazetted in 1862, GH 1049 
Straker to GLM, 25 Feb., 1870 encl. in Straker to Lt. Gov.,
21 Feb., 1873. Vide n. 75.
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The Portuguese replied to the formal annexation of the two islands
109in the following year by seizing a Natal coastal schooner.
Similar tactics, and the politics of attrition which followed, had 
proved successful in the 1820s but byr the early 1870s the 
importance of the southern shore of Delagoa Bay had increased 
dramatically. Inyak Island was viewed as a good embarkation point 
for the maritime movement of migrant labour to Natal and by the 
mid-1870s Delagoa Bay was considered an important element in 
Carnarvon's federation scheme as its annexation would encircle
Zululand and give Britain control oveir every port used by the Boer
_ . . . 110 Republics.
Natal's claims to Inyak reemexged when in March 1870
the Maputo chief Nozingile refused to> sell the island to the
Portuguese and instead allowed a party of Englishmen to settle
there. Natal's position was further strengthened by Portugal's
inability to occupy I n y a k . T h e  onily weapon that the Portuguese
were able to employ against Maputo was that of a trade embargo,
since their African allies were weak «and vacillating in their
support of the settlement. Thus it weas from weakness that the
Governor of Lourengo Marques turned to the Zulu for support.
Although Mpande had placed Nozingile on his throne and although the
112Maputo paid tribute to the Zulu, relations between the two states 
had reached a low ebb during the late 1860s. The Zulu were opposed 
to Nozingile's marriage to the daughter of the Swazi king Mswati^^ 
and regarded any expansion of Maputo power over their tributary 
chiefdom of Tembe with suspicion as it weakened Zulu control over the 
trade route to Lourengo Marques. It was, furthermore, in the 
interest of the Zulu that the southern shore of Delagoa Bay be 
repopulated as the Tembe had traditionally provided Zulu porters
109. FO 97/31.8 Peel to Hammond, 13 Marrch, 1862.
110. FO 63/1026 Elton to FO. , 2 Oct., 1875; C.J. Uys, In the era of
Shepstone, 141-149.
111. FO 63/1047 Ablett to Col. Sec., 3) Dec., 1870; Keate to Kimberley,
22 June, 1871; BO. 12, 25 March L871; F. Da Costa Leal, Uma
Viagem na Africa Austral, 42.
112. FO 63/1050 Leslie, "Delagoa Bay Statements"; F. Elton, Natal 
Mercury, 10 Oct., 1871; KCL. Mpanide file, Lt. gov. Keate to 
High Commissioner, 17 Dec., 1871.
113. SNA 1/1/18 Kinsman to SNA, 21 Augr. , 1868;A. Preston(ed) South 
African Journal of Sir Garnet WoLseley 1879-1880, 47.
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114
with food and shelter en route to Lourengo Marques.
Another cause or symptom of hostility between Maputo and Zulu 
was the execution by Nozingile of Cetewayo's official messenger and 
his 16 companions, whom he had accused of fraud and deception. 
Zululand's antipathy towards/Maputo was paralleled by a growing 
dependence on Lourengo Marques for the arms and ammunition needed 
to modernize the Zulu army. Thus as in the 1820s,. it was the 
need to control the northern trade route that drew the Zulu into 
the Delagoa Bay hinterland and by the early 1870s both Portuguese 
and British observers agreed that the Portuguese presence at
116Lourengo Marques was contingent upon their alliance with the Zulu.
Cetewayo ordered that Nozingile prohibit any permanent British
settlement of Inyak and, with Zulu support, a Portuguese garrison
temporarily occupied the island until 1872 when the question of
suzerainty over southern Delagoa Bay, Inyak and Elephant Islands
117was submitted for arbitration to the French President.
Cetewayo also demanded that Nozingile pay him 408 headloads of
goods as reparations, for his unauthorized attack against the
Tembe and called a halt to the Maputo advance against the 
118Mazwaya. In order to influence the outcome of the MacMahon
award, Portugal felt compelled to occupy the southern shore of the
Bay and in order to achieve this appealed to Cetewayo to intercede
with Nozingile to bring about the resettlement of the area by the
Tembe. A Zulu ambassador was then sent to Lourengo Marques to
oversee the peaceful reoccupation of the area south of the Tembe
river. This took place in May 1875 and in June the Tembe chief,
119although tributory to the Zulu, swore allegiance to Portugal.
In July the MacMahon award granted to Portugal the area south of
114. AHU. Moc., CG pasta 29. GLM to MSMU, 30 May, 1874.
115. Webb and Wright (eds) James Stuart Archive, I, 6 6 , evidence of
Bikwayo.
116. SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871; idem., 14 Sept., 1871;
BO 11, 1871, 46. See also page 185 , note 4.
117. GH 1049 Straker to Lt. gov., 21 Feb., 1873.
118. SNA 1/1/21 Lieslie to SNA, 3 Sept., 1871.
119. AHU. Mog., CG pasta 29. GLM to GG, 11 May 1875 encl. no 2 in 
GG to MSMU, 24 Jan, 1875; BO. 23, 5 June, 1875; BO. 25,
19 June 1875.
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Delagoa Bay to 26°30', which included half the Maputo chiefdom.
But Portugal's position in the Delagoa Bay hinterland remained
dependent on the Zulu alliance, which in turn was secured by the 
unhindered flow of arms and ammunition through Lourengo Marques.
In May 1875 the Governor of Lourengo Marques wrote despondently 
of
"the district of Lourengo Marques, or speaking more
correctly the Fort of the same name - because we do
not really rule except up to the range of the ancient 
guns of our tumbledown ramparts... surrounded by more 
or less powerful chiefs in whose loyalty but little 
trust could be placed, peace has been preserved since 
1868 with them through a miracle of equilibrium... 
in reality they live freely at their own good 
pleasure." 120
A few years later another governor referred to the district as
"a national disgrace" while contemporary British travellers were
even less enthusiastic aboutv the results of Portuguese rule at 
121Lourengo Marques.
Tribute collected by the Portuguese from the villages in the
Crown lands consisted mainly of a basket of millet or sorghum and
rarely exceeded the taxes in kind paid by individual villages to
their chiefs. This form of "hut tax" was considered by the
Governor to be "more a sign of vassalage or feudality than a
122source of revenue for the state." Furthermore, tribute in 
kind was paid irregularly and often entailed a fair amount of 
reciprocity in the form of government stipends and, although the
120. BO. 22 May 1875, GLM to GGM, 24 April 1875. Reprinted in 
Mogambique, Dec., 1951, no 6 8 , p. 73. A translation exists 
in GH 837 encl. in Br. cons, to FO, 27 May 1875. See also 
AHU., Mog., CG. pasta 29 GLM to MSMU, 19 Jan, 1874.
121. JolTo de Andrade Corvo, Estudos sobre as provinciais Ultramarinas, 
II, 267; St Vincent Erskine, "A Journey to Umzila's south­
east Africa in 1871-1872", in JRGS, 1875, 48-9; FO 63/1026 
Elton to FO, 25 Oct., 1875; BPP. 1876 LXXIV, Cons. Rep. for 
Mozambique, 1875.
122. BO. 32. 6 Aug., 1877, Lourengo Marques District Report, June 
1877; BO 11, 17 March 1879, Lourengo Marques district report 
for the financial year 1877-78; see also FO 63/1026 Elton
to FO, 25 Oct., 1875; Junod, "Les Baronga", 140.
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Portuguese equated tribute payment with the recognition of
vassalage, it did not prevent "tributary chiefdoms" from
simultaneously recognizing the overlordship of one or more other 
123suzerains. Another form of tribute payment was made m  labour
for colonial military service, porterage and public works.
The structure of the Delagoa Bay social formation provided 
for the expatriation of sale of kinsmen who were considered deviants 
or dissident elements. Thus the labourers that vassal chiefs 
supplied to the Portuguese were drawn from their unwanted 
followers and chibalo labour and forced conscription provided the 
chiefs with a useful and profitable means of ridding themselves
124of "umtagatis (wizards), riff-raff, the overclever and agitators". 
Much of the unrest in the Delagoa Bay hinterland was caused by 
this forced labour, for if Portuguese demands for labour became 
excessive, they'cut into the labour power controlled by the 
chiefs.
The late 1870s mark a watershed in the history of the Delagoa
Bay hinterland. The MacMahon award guaranteed the Portuguese
tenure of Lourengo Marques and, with a liberal government in power
in Portugal, gave a new impetus to the development of the Delagoa 
125Bay hinterland. The regularization of migrant labour to various
parts of South Africa increased the amount of sterling entering 
the area and commerce with the newly-discovered goldfields of 
the eastern Transvaal offered new sources of revenue to the customs 
house and to those engaged in porterage. The purchasing capacity 
of wages that were repatriated in sterling, the gun trade with the 
interior and experiments with vegetable oils drew traders to 
Lourengo Marques and gradually provided the revenue for a sound 
administration.
123. Seisal to Lytton, encl. "Case for the Portuguese government", 
15 Sept., 1873 in Theal (ed) RSEA IX, 123-25; FO 63/1050 
Leslie "Delagoa Bay Statements"; GH1053 Farrell to Col. Sec., 
20 Aug., 1879; UNISA/JC. Junod, "Les Causes..."; Noronho, 
Lourenco Marques, 53.
124. SNA 1/1/27 no. 55, R. du Bois to SNA 22 March 1876. In October 
1875 all the chiefs of the Crown lands but one refused to 
supply the governor of Lourengo Marques with labour.
125. These included the draining of the swamp around Lourengo 
Marques and plans for a railway to the Transvaal. Noronho, 
Augusto Castilho, 12-3; S.E. Katzenellenbogen, South Africa 
and southern Mozambique, (Manchester, 1982), 12-20.
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But the local need for labour rose proportionately with the 
economic development of the settlement and, as the Portuguese 
increasingly forced labour away from the higher wage markets in 
South Africa, the fragile alliance between the colonial state and 
the chiefs collapsed.
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Chapter 5
THE COMMODITIZATION OF LABOUR AND THE 
BREAKDOWN OF THE LUSO-AFRICAN ALLIANCE
The favourable results of the MacMahon arbitration did not 
dispel Portuguese fears of Britain's intention to annex Delagoa 
Bay. These fears were fanned by the presence of the British anti­
slavery squadron off the Mozambican coast and by the numerous 
scientific and missionary expeditions which were mounted by the
British to explore parts of south-east Africa claimed by the 
1
Portuguese. A major means of continuing British involvement in 
the Delagoa Bay area after the MacMahon award was presented by the 
movement of labourers to Natal and by the gun traffic between 
Lourengo Marques and the Zulu.
Political Developments in the Southern Delagoa Bay Hinterland
The sale of guns to the Zulu by John Dunn had been encouraged
by Lt-governor Keate who in 1869-70 wished to bolster Cetewayo's
power in order to stabilize Zulu politics, discourage Boer land-
grabbing and secure Natal's northern frontier. But because of
the political problems involved, the direct sale of guns to the
Zulu was prohibited in June 1875 while their export to the
2Portuguese possessions north of Natal was not disallowed. Fire­
arms, which had previously been sold at Louren9o Marques almost
entirely for hunting purposes and which had provided the settlement
3
with the means to participate in the lucrative ivory trade then 
became a major article of commerce and provided the settlement with 
much needed customs revenue. The political influence of the gun 
trade in cementing Zulu support for the Portuguese in the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland was not lost on the British. Frederic Elton observed
1. AHU. Moc., CG., pasta 30. GLM to GGM 16 Sept., 1876; MNE caixa 663
Duprat to MNE 3 Aug., 1876; AHJ . Moc., CG., pasta 32 GLM to
Conselheiro Director Geral do Ultramar 25 Dec., 1878.
2. GH 1052 Dunn to Lt. Gov., 21 Oct., 1878; MNE caixa 697 Walter
Peace to MNE 17 June 1875; J.J. Guy, "A Note on Firearms in the
Zulu kingdom", JAH, XII, 4, 1976; Idem., The Destruction of the 
Zulu Kingdom, 89, 97-8.
3. GH 29. no. 8 . Howard to Clarendon, 25 Aug., 1856 in Clarendon to
Scott, 4 Oct., 1856; GH 30 no 92. Marquis de Sould to Howard, 20
April, 1857 - Howard to Clarendon, 22 April 1857; Struthers,
"Hunting Journal", 15 June, 1854. The Lourengo Marques-Zulu gun 
trade is dealt with on pp. 300-302.
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in 1875 that it was
"in the interest of the Zulus not to interfere with the 
Portuguese trading station (at Lourengo Marques), so long 
as it may serve their purpose as a secure base for the 
supply of arms and ammunition." ^
From August 1875, large parties from Zululand, numbering 
between 500 and 2 300 carriers, arrived on the beaches of Tembe 
in order to fetch guns, percussion caps, powder and ammunition.^ 
British sources estimated that in the three years following 1875, 
many thousands of guns, together with large amounts of gun powderg
were annually imported into Lourengo Marques. The British opposed
the gun trade because it both armed the Zulu and provided the
7
settlement with a viable source of income. But the fear that 
Britain would use the arms trade as a pretext to occupy Lourengo
4. GH 837 Elton to FO., 3 Dec., 1875. See also p. 180.
5. BO 40 2 Oct., 1875, Lourengo Marques District Report, 1 Aug-15 
Sept, 1875; BO 43 6 Nov., 1875, Lourengo Marques District Report, 
15 Sept. - 15 Oct., 1875; BO 15 10 April, 1876 District Report, 
Feb., 1876; BO 51, 31 July 1876, District Report, June 1876;
BO 12 Nov., 1876; BO 6 , 5 Feb., 1877 District Report Dec., 1876;
FO 84/539 O'Neill to FO, 5 Aug., 1879.
6 . The Royal Navy gave figures of 6 000 to 7 000 guns imported 
annually. GH 829 Purvis to Lt. Gov., 20 March, 1878; Vice cons. 
Thompson estimated an annual importation of 20 000 percussion 
guns, 500 rifles, 10 000 barrels of gunpowder of which 2/3 went 
to Zululand. FO 84/1539 Thompson to O'Neill encl. in O'Neill to
FO 10 Oct., 1879. These figures would seem to be exaggerated as,
following the end of the Anglo-Zulu war, only 7 700 guns were 
surrendered by November 1880, see NA. Despatch book Melmoth 
Osborne, Osborne to Colley 10 Nov., 1880, cited in C.S. Shields, 
"The Life of John Dunn" (MA, Unisa, 1939), 19. As the Portuguese 
were quick to point out, many British merchants were involved in 
the gun trade with Lourengo Marques and many thousands of guns 
were sold by the Griqualand West and Cape governments, cf. AHU. 
Mog., CG., GLM to GGM 17 March 1878; MNE caixa 664 Duprat to MNE 
29 Feb., 1879; Ibid., 30 April 1879. On the enormity of the gun 
trade at Kimberley which was only prohibited in 1877, cf. Turrell, 
"Kimberley Diamond Fields", 100.
7. PRO. CO. 179/122 Minute 17 Feb., 1876 on Elton to Derby 3 Dec., 
1875. Cited in Etherington, "Frederic Elton and the South African 
Factor". See also GH 29 no. 8 . GGM to MSMU 5 May 1856 in Clarendon 
to Scott 4 Oct., 1856.
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0
Marques led the Portuguese to prohibit the sale of guns and
9
ammunition at the settlement in February 1878. This prohibition
dealt a severe blow to the economy of Lourengo Marques- but more
importantly, it closed Cetewayo's major source of guns and threatened
the Luso-Zulu alliance, although the Zulu were still able to procure
10firearms from Umzila via Inhambane.
In July 1878 a Zulu delegation arrived at Lourengo Marques
but was unable to bring about a relaxation of the arms ban.**
In September 1878 an attempt by the Portuguese to occupy Inyak was
repulsed by the Maputo and, for the second time in as many years,
Lourengo Marques came under threat of attack. This emphasized
the destabilization process resulting from the termination of the
gun trade since without Zulu support, the Portuguese were unable
to extend their power or implement the MacMahon award. This
situation continued until the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu war when
the Maputo, ostensibly fearing a Zulu, invasion of their country,
allowed a Portuguese detachment to occupy Inyak in exchange for
13arms and ammunition. The outbreak of renewed hostilities with 
the Maputo coincided with a succession dispute following the death 
of Nozingile and gave rise to fears in Natal that the flow of
8 . CPC. CdO l878-k879, Carvalho to MSMU, 15 Oct., 1878. See also
MNE caixa 697 vice cons. Durban to MNE 21 Oct., 1974.
9. CPC. CdO 1878-9. Carvalho to Frere 20 April 1878; Carvalho to
MSMU 27 Oct., 1878. In the case of war being declared, the
clearing out of the customs house would also be prohibited.
10. AHU. Mog., CG pasta 31 GGM-MSMU 20 July 1878; GH 829 Menlove 
to Lt. Gov., 9 June 1878; GH 845 GGM to Lt. Gov., 30 July 1878;
G. Inhambane to Lt. Gov., 2 Aug., 1878; James Stuart Archive I, 
64, evidence of Bikwayo (ed. Webb and Wright).
11. AHU. Mog., CG. pasta 31. GLM-GGM 5 Aug., 1878; BO 34. 26 Aug., 
Lourengo Marques District report for July 1878. GH 1052 
Bennet to Lt. Gov., 26 Sept., 1878.
12. AHU. Mog., Ia Rep., pasta 1. GLM-GGM, 7 Oct., 1878 in GG to MSMU
1878; SNA 1/1/32. Acting NA, annot. to Bennet to SNA, 18.10.1878;
GH 829 Capt. Purvis to Lt. Gov., 20 March 1878. For hostilities 
in 1876, see FO 63/1039 Elton to FO 19 Jan., 1876; Idem., 17 
Sept., 1876.
13. The Portuguese had previously levied an arms embargo against 
Maputo, AHU. Mog., la Rep., pasta 1. GLM to GGM 7 Oct., 1878.
GLM to GGM 1 Nov., 1878 in GGM to MSMU 18 Nov., 1878; GGM to 
MSMU 22 Feb., 1879; GLM to MSMU 4 Aug., 1879; MNE caixa 664 
Thompson to Duprat 7 May 1879 in Duprat to MNE 20 June 1879.
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14Maputo labour to the British colony would be impeded.
The British invasion of Zululand in 1879 increased the
importance of Lourengo Marques as a central factor in a future
South African confederation and gave rise to the diplomatic
offensive which culminated in the abortive Lourengo Marques treaty
of 1879. This envisaged a direct British involvement in the
administration of Lourengo Marques and, although the treaty was
extremely unpopular with imperialist interests in Portugal, it was
only abandoned in 1881 when the planned confederation evaporated
following the accession to power of the Liberal Party in Britain
15and the proclamation of Transvaal independence. But the British
remained fearful that Delagoa Bay or the strategically important
coastal areas south of the Bay, would fall into the hands of
Germany or the Transvaal and because of this, the independence of
the Maputo came under threat in the 1880s.
After Nozingile's death in 1876 his Swazi wife, Zambili, was
only able to secure the chieftaincy for her young son, Ngwanasi, by
declaring herself queen regent, by forcing all opposition into
16exile and by looking to the British for support. In 1887 when
the Portuguese mounted tax raids into areas north of the Maputo
river occupied by Zambili's followers, the queen regent appealed
17to the British for help. This led to the signing of the Anglo- 
Maputo treaty of friendship in July 1887 and the division of the 
chiefdom into factions supporting either the British or Portuguese. 
Zambili initially headed the pro-British group and in June 1888 
when she realized that the treaty of the previous year would not 
secure the unity of the Maputo, she offered to accept the MacMahon 
line, although it bisected her territory, provided that she and 
her followers were given compensatory territory stretching as far
14. I.I. 1/1. R63/76 Elton to PI, 20 Jan., 1876; SNA 1/1/29 no 73 
Dunn to SNA, 3 Sept., 1877.
15. Pedro Gastao MesnierJ Considerag^es acerca do tratado de Lourengo 
Marques (Porto 1882); AxeIson, Portugal and the Scramble for 
Africa, 20-37.
16. AHU. Moc., CG. pasta 32 GGM to MSMU 30 Jan., 1880; SNA 1/1/41.526 
"Message from Zambia (Zambile)" 6 Sept., 1880; SNA 1/1/45.158. 
"Statement of Tonga delegation", 25 March 1881.
17. MNE Caixa 697 acting vice consul Snell to MNE 21 July 1887; AHU 
Mog., la Rep., pasta 2 GLM to GGM 29 July 1887 in GG to MSMU
21 Aug., 1887; AHU Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 4 GLM to MSMU 2 Sept.,
1887.
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18south of the Mkuzi as the Shibigan river. In the same month
Zambili crushed a group of conspirators who supported the claims
to the chieftaincy of Nozingile's son Shimaka. These dissidents ■
were in turn supported by a group of concessionaires who wished to
gain control over a strip of territory linking Sordwana Bay with
19the "New Republic", an area that had been presented by Dinizulu
to his Boer allies in 1884 in return for their assistance against
Zibhebhu and that had been annexed to the Transvaal in 1887.
When the British refused to extend Zambili's territory south
of the Mkuzi and the Portuguese presented her with gifts and promised
to annex all of the Maputo territory, Zambili swung her allegiance
20from Britain to Portugal. This change in policy was confirmed
when the British forestalled Transvaal claims on Sordwana Bay by
annexing to Zululand in December 1888, the lands of chiefs Sibonda
21and Ncamana which were situated on the north bank of the Mkuzi.
This was followed by the annexation in February 1890 of the lands
of chiefs Fokoti, Umjindi and Ludvico. But by extending their
power north of the Mkuzi river, the British had disregarded
Zambili's claims that Mpande, Cetewayo and the Natal government
had recognized her rights to suzerainty over the chiefs living in 
22the area.
18. FO 84/1902 vice consul Drummond, Delagoa Bay to Havelock, 13 
Dec., 1887; ZGH 712. G383 vice consul to Martin, 10 June 1888; 
Ibid., GH833 Drummond to vice consul to Natal Governor 1 Jan., 
1888; SNA 1/1/114.342 Bruheim to Natal Governor, 19 April 1889.
19. ZGH 712.317/88 vice consul to Havelock 25 June 1888; Ibid., 
400/88 Bruheim to SommerschieId 24 June 1888 in vice consul to 
Martin, 3 July 1888; Ibid., 401/88 Coope to Havelock, 5 July 
1888; FO 84/1902 Bruheim to Sommerschield n.d. in vice consul to 
FO, 6 July 1888.
20. ZGH 713.481/88 Martin to Havelock 20 July 1888; FO 84/1970 vice 
consul Knee to FO 15 May 1889.
21. BPP 1890 c6200, Knutsford to Loch, 10 Jan., 1890 and Mitchell to 
Knutsford 15 Feb., 1890. For attempts by the Transvaal to secure 
a route to the sea via Maputoland and on "concession politics" 
and international rivalries in the area, see Eric Axelson, 
Portugal and the Scramble for Africa (Johannesburg, 1967), 
96-116; N. Garson, "The Swaziland Question and a Road to the 
Sea (1884.1895)" SAAYB, II, 1957, 306-311, 373-396.
22. See map 2 , p 72. ZGH 713.480/88 Martin to Havelock 20 July
1888; ZA635/89 Bruheim to Osborne (n.d.) in Osborne to Mitchell, 
4 Sept., 1884; BPP c62001890. Zambili to SNA 1 March 1889.
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The remarkable cultural fluidity which today marks the trans-
Mkuzi area makes the reconstruction of its history particularly
difficult. The ease with which people of "amatonga" descent today
claim to be Zulu or Swazi was first noted in the nineteenth 
23century. At that time the people living to the north of the
Mkuzi were designated on maps and referred to by travellers as 
24
"amatongas". However, the followers of several chiefs and
sub-chiefs were the descendants of refugees from civil unrest in 
25Zululand and even amongst the Tsonga-speakers, many were not
members of the Maputo clan. Recently collected oral tradition is
probably correct in asserting that although the Maputo sent
expeditions south to collect tribute, they never occupied the 
27trans-Mkuzi area. Sovereignty vacillated with the ability or
desire of the Maputo or the Mandlakazi or Swazi to exert their
power over the chiefdoms in the area and it was not unusual for a
28chief to pay tribute to more than one sovereign. Nevertheless
following the defeat of Zibhebhu the Maputo were able to advance
at the expense of chiefs like Manaba and Ncamana who had supported
29the Mandlakazi during the Zulu civil war. Thus Britain's 
annexations north of the Mkuzi divorced the Maputo from a traditional
23. James Stuart Archives I (ed Webb and Wright) 150-151, evidence of 
Giba. On the modern ethnic heterogeneity of the population, cf. 
Krige and Feldgate,"An Ecological Survey of the Tembe-Tonga."
24. W. Drummond, The Large Game and Natural History of South and 
South-east Africa, 33-34. 429; W.C. Baldwin, African Hunting 
from Natal to the Zambezi, 1852-1860, 92-3. 218-221; D. Leslie, 
Among the Zulus, 257; F. Jeppe's map of the Transvaal, 1878. 
Tsonga-speakers lived as far south as the Hluhluwe/Shibigan.
See pp. 70-71.
25. Ingwavuma Magisterial District Book 3(c); ZA 26.654/89 Saunders 
to Osborne 10 Sept., 1889 encl. in Osborne to Mitchell 12 Sept., 
1889; ZA 27 Saunders to Res. Comm., Zululand 4 June 1895; JSA., 
file 25 p258 evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.
27. Krige and Feldgate Ecological Survey, 11-12. See also GLM to 
GG 4 Jan., 1892 in Commissao Organizadora (ed) Mouzinho, 
Governador de Lourenyo Marques (Lourenco Marques, 1956), 159 
(henceforth cited as Mouzinho).
28. BPP 1890 c.-6200 Martin to Lt. Gov., 21 July 1888; Ibid.,
Havelock to Knutsford 4 May 1889; ZGH702.1/87 "Message from 
Sibonda", 2 Dec., 1886; ZGH713.482 Martin to Havelock 21 July
1888.
29. ZGH 716.759 Coope to Havelock, 27 Sept., 1888; ZGH 723/544 
Saunders "Report with reference to concessions....1889";
ZGH 724.677 Saunders to Res. Comm. Zululand, 21 Sept., 1889;
BPP 1890 C.-6200 Saunders to Osborne 10 Sept., 1889. ZGH 
736.2233/91 minute, acting Res. Comm., Zululand, 13 March 1891; 
JSA file 25 p258, Mahungane and Nkonuza.
190
area of tribute extraction and by so doing pushed them into the
arms of the Portuguese. By the end of 1888 a Portuguese residency
had been established at the Maputo capital which was moved north
30of the MacMahon Line.
The western Delagoa Bay hinterland was invaded intermittently
by Swazi armies whose major aim was the extraction of "tribute"
and the enforcement of their dominance over the trade route passing
from Lourengo Marques through Mato 11a. These acts prevented a free
flow of labour from Gazaland to Natal and prompted Umzila to ask
the British to transfer his relative Sotondose, a chief of the
Nxumalo clan which had formerly adhered to the Ndwandwe confederacy,
from the Newcastle-Umsinga area to the Delagoa Bay hinterland.
Sotondose would act as a buffer against Mawewe and the Swazi and
would bolster Umzila's military strength with sufficient Nguni
32soldiers to protect Gaza workers passing south to Natal. But
despite the death of Mawewe in 1872 the Swazi continued to collect
tribute some six miles from Lourengo Marques and as late as 1881
33were presented with sagwate by the governor.
In 1884 the Nwamba, Mabila and those Gaza who after the 
civil war had settled under Mawewe in northern Swaziland, were able 
to return to their traditional lands because of the political 
turmoil in Gazaland caused by Umzila's death and Gungunyana's 
usurpation of the throne. Three years later the Mabila agreed to
30. BPP 1890 C.-6200 vice consul Knee to Salisbury 15- May 1889;
ZGH 739.444 Bruheim to acting Resident Commissioner Zululand,
22 May 1891; Paul Berthoud letter of 13 Dec., 1888 in L'Afrique 
Explor^e et Civilizde, 1889.
31. Mato Ha paid "tribute" to both the Swazi and Portuguese,
FO 63/1050 "Delagoa Bay statements of David Leslie" in Dean to 
Hammond, 14 July 1873; B012., 24 March 1879.
32. BPP 1890-91 LVII, 198 Statements from Umzungulu and Dubule, 
messengers from Umzila, 6 Aug., 1870.
33. BO 17 March 1879 Lourengo Marques District Report for 1877-78; 
FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO 20 Sept., 1879; D. Fernandes das 
Neves, "Exploracao do rio Bembe", BSGL, 3, 6 , 1882, 343.
subject themselves to the Portuguese. They were Later followed
by Mawewe's son Hanyane and his adherents who, encouraged by the
Portugese and dissident elements within Gaza and probably by the
Khosa chief as well, settled in the Ntimane area immediately south
35of the bend in the Nkomati river. Here Hanyane developed his
power base and, in a loose alliance with the Khosa, acted as a
36pro-Portuguese counter-poise to the Gaza. Although the Swazi
king claimed in the mid-1880s that the people living between the
37Lebombo's and Delagoa Bay paid tribute to him, the influence of
the settlement at Lourengo Marques began to spread into its
hinterland in the early 1880s.
Under the governorship of Major Chaves de Aguiar, alliances
between Portugal and her African allies were concretized by the
signing of so-called "treaties of vassalage" and the sporadic
gathering of taxes in kind was abandoned. In December 1880 three
chiefdoms living to the north of Lourengo Marques signed treaties
of vassalage according to which they agreed to supply the Portuguese
with labourers, porters and soldiers and an annual hut tax of ls6d
($340) paid in specie, which was largely earned on the labour
38markets of South Africa. "Vassalage" meant in reality a political 
alliance which brought with it a form of most-favoured-nation status 
that bolstered the power of the chiefs as it supplied them with 
presents and goods which they could•trade or distribute to their
34. Ferrao's informants give 1883 as the date oftUmzila's death, 
Circumscripgoes, 87. But cf. Liesegang Beitrage 99-100. It seems 
possible that the return of'Mawewe's people' to Mozambique was 
portended by a sortie on a small Portuguese customs post in late 
1883. Cf. AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 4 GLM to MSMU 2 Sept., 1887. 
SS 869 R5604 Portuguese consul, Pretoria to SS 2 Dec., 1883; Ibid 
8 Dec., 1883; B06 9 Feb., 1884.
35. Hanyane's lands were proclaimed Transvaal territory after the 
border delimitation of 1880. Attempts by Abel Erasmus to collect 
the heavy Transvaal hut tax of £2.18s6d resulted in a skirmish 
and Hanyane's flight. AHU. 2a Rep., pasta 4 GLM to MSMU 2 Sept., 
1887; SS1439 R6126/87 encl. in R5173/87 "Rapport in zake Hanyane" 
LA461 A. Erasmus to Portuguese consul 16 Aug., 1887; A.C. Myburgh 
The Tribes of the Barberton District, 78-9; Mouzinho, 84.
36. AHU. Mog., la Rep., pasta 1 GLM to GG 16 Nov., 1886; AHU 2a Rep., 
pasta 4, GGM to MSMU 24 Sept., 1887; P. Berthoud, "Oeuvre du 
Littoral", BMSAS, 71, April 1887, 212; J. Malungana, "Une Visite 
chez Magoude" Sept., 1884, BMSAS 58, 1885, 171-2; GLM to GGM
12 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 108.
37. WUL. A74. Machado, "Interview with Swazi King over boundaries" 
(n.d. ? 1886-87).
38. The chiefdoms were Xerinda, northern Manyisa and Nwamba. AHU 
la Rep., pasta 1 GG to MSMU 12 Dec., 1881; B06. 4 Feb., 1882 
"Termo de Vassalagem...", B03. 21 Jan., 1882, "Termo de
followers. The vassalage relationship also provided the chiefs
with guns and ammunition that could be used to provide dependents
with meat or exchangeable hunting produce, to quell dissent and
protect followers. The military benefits of vassalage became
apparent in 1882 when Mazwaya and Xerinda detachments armed by the
39Portuguese, raided chiefs south of the Nkomati bend. But when
the hut tax was raised to 3s6d ($800) in July 1883, armed opposition
40forced the Portuguese to rescind the increase for, as a visiting 
evangelist noted,
"the Portuguese have only the port where ships debark. 
Delagoa Bay is the only place that they occupy and 
dominate. Everywhere else they are under the power of 
the native chiefs."
In 1886 the salaries of civil servants were about three months
in arrears, officers entrusted with tax collection were provided
with no clerical assistance and the garrison was often on the verge 
42of mutiny. Thus the Portuguese, despite their treaties of 
vassalage, did not possess the level of organized violence needed 
to extort taxes comprehensively from the African populace. The
Vassalagem prestado pelo regulo da Cherinda, Mahatane (menor) 
et pelo regente Didisse"; GLM to GGM 22 July 1891 in Mouzinho,
115; SMA514 Grandjean to Leresche, 5 Jan., 1895.
39. FO 84/1616 O'Neill to governor Natal 22 July 1882, copy in GH837;
FO 84/1616 O'Neill to governor Natal 22 Aug., 1882.
40. Unrest was reported, presumably over the new taxes, in Xerinda.
In 1886 the Mazwaya and Mafumo, in an engagement referred to as 
a "skirmish", quelled a minor tax rebellion mounted by the 
Xerinda, northern Manyisa and Ntimane clans. Treaties of 
vassalage entered into in 1887-88 stipulated the old hut tax of 
$340. Cf. note 45. Eduardo de Noronho, "Lourengo Marques e as 
suas relagoSscom a Africa do sul", BSGL, 15.2.1896, 8 6 ; Unisa/
JC Junod, "Les Causes...".
41. E. Creux, "Voyage de Yosepha Ndjumo...a la baie Delagoa", BMSAS,
1882, 42. For complementary views cf. SMA1255/B Paul Berthoud,
"Report on the expedition to Magude", 6 Oct., 1885; H. Joest,
"Reise in Afrika im Jahre 1883", Zeitschr. fur Ethnologie, 17,
1885, 212. For unrest in Xerinda in 1883 cf. Noronho, Lourengo 
Marques, 8 6 , 183.
42. BO 19. 8 May 1886; Noronho. Lourengo Marques, 183, 189; SMA 497/E Paul 
Berthoud to Leresche, 30 Oct., 1888;
Joao de Andrade Corvo, Provinciais Ultramarinas, II, 273.
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hut tax returns for the economic year 1883-4 amounted to just under
£300 which represented payment by only 36% of the huts enumerated
in the census. The hut tax produced about £600 each year for the
next two years and then from 1887 to 1890, at least partly due to
the sharp reduction in labour emigration to Natal, was not collected 
43at all. Despite the ethereal content of Portuguese rule, treaties
of vassalage were concluded in 1887-88 with Mabila, two small
Ntimane chiefdoms and Maputo and calls were made for the Delagoa
44Bay hinterland to be settled by European colonists.
A new phase in the history of the Portuguese penetration of the
Delagoa Bay hinterland emerged when Lt-colonel Francisco Lopes
Serra,a former interim governor who was familiar with the African
languages and peoples of the area, was nominated to the newly-
created post of Military Commander of the Crown lands in November
1887. This effectively placed the administration of the African
population under military jurisdiction and the following year a
magistracy and administrative centre was established by Serra at
Angouane in Mabota, some 13 kilometres from Lourengo Marques.
Another indication of the growing seriousness of Portugal's
intention to occupy the Lourengo Marques hinterland was the
seconding of an adjutant and a clerk to help Serra collect taxes
and the initiation of a wage bonus for all civil servants proficient
45in a Bantu language.
43. GLM, Mouzinho de Albuquerque to GGM 18 Aug., 1891 in Commissao 
Organizadora (ed) Mouzinho, 227; BO 32. 8 Aug., 1885; BO 19.
8 May 1886; BO. 10 Aug., 1886, GLM Report for March 1886;
BO 2. 21 Jan., 1888.
44. AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 5 GLM to GGM 2 Dec., 1887 in GGM to
MSMU 22 Dec., 1887; BOll. 12 March 1887; B05. 4 Feb., 1888;
BO 9 March 1888; B018. 5 May 1888; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 5
no 28 of 1888 "Projecto de regulamento para a fundagao de 
colonias na districto de Lourengo Marques"; Anon., Colonias 
Agricolas no Districto de Lourengo Marques (SGL, 1890).
45. Noronho, Lourengo Marques, 55, 183, 198; Unisa/JC., Junod, "Les 
Causes..."
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Political Developments in the Northern Delagoa Bay Hinterland
In October 1885 the Portuguese concluded a treaty of vassalage
with Gungunyana and in May 1886 a Portuguese resident was installed
46at Mossurize, the Gaza capital. Despite this treaty Portugal's
continuing powerlessness before the Gaza was underlined when in
October 1886, after attempting to extend their control beyond
Inhambane, a Portuguese army of 5 000 men armed with modern rifles
was routed by a Gaza force. Inhambane lay at the mercy of the
Gaza and Gungunyana severely punished those of his recalcitrant
47followers who had aligned themselves with the Portuguese.
The Limpopo-Olifants rivers had since 1862 formed the southern
48frontier of the Gaza state and raids into the Khosen area,
between the Nkomati and Limpopo rivers, were rare and generally 
49unauthorized. The Khosa were considered allies rather than
subjects of the Gaza, and they were sufficiently autonomous to be
able to refuse to supply troops to the Gaza for their razzias
50against the Chopi chiefdoms. The balance of power in the northern 
Delagoa Bay hinterland shifted markedly when Gungunyana moved from 
Mossurize to Bilene with some 80 000 to 100 000 of his followers
46. FO 84/2142 encl. 2 in Marques de Soveral to FO 4 Jan., 1891; 
GH837 Br. consul to Sec. State for Foreign Affairs, 4 July 1886. 
See also Axelson, Portugal and the Scramble, 125ff.
47. ABM:ABC. 15.4 vol. 12 Richards to Bebour 2 Nov., 1886; Ibid., 
Ousley to Smith 25 Oct., 1886; idem., 15 Nov., 1886; The 
Natalian 13 Nov., 1886. But cf. Eric Axelson whose Lisbon 
sources overemphasize the strength of the Portuguese, Portugal 
and the Scramble, 126-9.
48. F. Elton, Natal Mercury 10 Oct., 1871; BPP LXXIV 1876 Consular 
report for Mogambique, 1875; Gautier, "une excursion au nord 
du Transvaal", Globe, April 1884; ABM:ABC. 15.4 vol. 12 Bates 
to Smith 30 July 1888.
49. Paul Berthoud letter of 20 Dec., 1884, L'Afrique Explor^e et 
Civilizee, VI, 1885, 99; Patrick Harries, "Slavery, social 
incorporation and surplus extraction; the nature of free and 
unfree labour in South-east Africa", JAH, 22, 1981, 320.
50. Crewe "Voyage de Yosepha Ndjumo...d la baie Delagoa", BMSAS,
45, 1982, 42; SMA 1255/B Henri Berthoud "Report on the 
expedition to Magude", 9 Oct., 1885; A. Grandjean, "Voyage a 
Antioka", BMSAS, 7 Dec., 1889.
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51in mid-1889. This move facilitated Gungunyana's war against
those Chopi chiefs who had not accepted Gaza rule and allowed him
to punish at least one Bilene chief who, following the establishment
of a Portuguese military post in Bilene in February 1890, had
52placed himself under the governor of Lourengo Marques. The move
also jeopardised the independence of the Khosa as the Gaza king
sought new areas of settlement for his excess population and
prohibited the Khosa from giving refuge to his enemies. In
extending his power southwards, Gungunyana was able to take
advantage of a Khosa succession dispute.
When the Khosa chief Magude died in 1885 the son born of his
first wife was eight years old. This son Shongeli (Chonguele;
Sangele) was the rightful heir according to the legal system
brought north by the Gaza Ngoni but according to local law the
legitimate heir was Wanyanyane, the product of a leviratical
marriage between Magude and the wife of his deceased elder 
52brother. Shongeli was supported by the prince regent Mavabaze,
who pushed the opposing party into exile and then installed the
53young Shongeli as king under his regency. Gungunyana was able
to exploit the bitterness engendered by this dynastic dispute
when he turned his attention to the area south of the Limpopo-.
In 1889 Mavabaze assisted the Gaza in raiding the Chopi for
provisions with which to feed the large numbers of Gungunyana's
people who had moved south. But the Khosa regent refused to
jeopardize his loose alliance with Hanyane's Ngoni and the
Portuguese by participating with Gungunyana in a proposed attack 
54
on Hanyane. The Gaza king then summonsed Mavabaze to appear 
at his court and when he refused to do so out of fear for his life, 
Gungunyane threatened to invade Khosen. This caused large numbers 
of people to flee from the eastern parts of Khosen which bordered
51. AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 6 GG to MSMU 3 Aug., 1889; AHU. Mog.,
la Rep., pasta 4 Gaza Res. to GGM 18 Nov., 1889; ABM:ABC. 15.4 
vol. 12 Ousley to Smith 18 Sept., 1889.
52. SMA 467 Grandjean 1890; Grandjean letter of 17 Oct., 1891 in
BMSAS no 100, Dec., 1891; Mouzinho, 107.
53. SMA 497/D Paul Berthoud to Leresche 4 Feb., 1888; 497/E P. 
Berthoud to Leresche, 11 Oct., 1888; 467 Grandjean 1890.
54. SMA 467 Grandjean 1890; SMA 483 Qrandjean to Leresche 20 Feb., 
1890; 514 Grandjean to Leresche 5 Jan., 1895; SMA 502/B 
Grandjean to Leresche 17 Oct., 1890; GLM to Freire de Andrade 
10 June 1891 in Mouzinho, 96.
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on Bilene and brought increasing pressures on Mavabaze to visit
Gungunyane. His refusal to do so rapidly lost him the support
of his councillors and in May 1890 he and Shongeli fled south
of the Nkomati where they sought the protection of the Portu- 
55guese.
The Portuguese at Lourenzo Marques were at that stage in no
position to offer refuge to Gungunyana's enemies for a dispute
had arisen with Britain over the western border of southern
Mozambique in which Portugal needed the support of the Gaza 
56king. For this reason Hanyane, despite his popularity, and
the prestige that his submission gave to the Portuguese, was
kidnapped and, in compliance with Gungunyana's requests, exiled
57to Mozambique Island where he died in 1893. The Gaza king made
similar appeals for Mavabaze to be exiled or repatriated. In this
he was supported by two newly-appointed Portuguese officials, the
so-called Superintendent-General of native affairs in Gazaland, a
metropolitan appointee accountable only to the Imperial government,
and his subordinate, the Superintendent of native affairs in
Bilene. These men believed that Mavabaze had assisted Hanyane in
"intriguing" with the British South Africa Company and that he
should be obliged to return to Khosen. Many of Mavabaze's
adherents were of the same opinion for following his flight, Khosen
had fallen increasingly into the Gaza orbit and Gaza settlers
58were rapidly colonizing the eastern areas. But when Mavabaze
did return, under pressure, to meet Gungunyana in May 1891, he
found his position untenable and, fleeing south to Louren<j:o Marques,
59he sought Portuguese vassalage in August of that year. But
55. SMA 502/B Grandjean to Leresche 19-30 May 1890; SMA 483 Grandjean 
to Leresche 6 Sept., 1891.
56. Mouzinho de Albuquerque, GLM to GGM 22 July 1891 in Mouzinho,
113; Antonio Enes Mozambique. 172. On the border disputes 
between Portugal & the BSA Co.see Axelson, Portugal and the 
Scramble and P. Warhurst, Anglo-Portuguese Relations in South- 
central Africa 1890-1900 (London, 1962).
57. SMA 514/A Grandjean to Leresche, 24 May 1895; Augusto de Castilho, 
"Acerca de Lourengo Marques", BSGL, 14 May 1895, 558; Freire de 
Andrade to GLM 8 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 98-99.
58. SMA 502/B Grandjean to Leresche 27 July 1890; Ibid., Grandjean 
to Leresche 17 Oct., 1890; SMA 467 Grandjean, 1891.
59. GLM to GGM 7 Aug., 1891 in Mouzinho, 121; BMSAS., 9 Oct., 
1891, 328-330.
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when Gungunyana heard that Mavabaze had placed himself under the
Portuguese, the Gaza king sent the governor of Lourengo Marques
"a considerable amount of money" in order to have Mavabaze exiled
and Shongeli repatriated. As an added incentive, Gungunyana also
threatened to send an expedition of 3 000 men into the Crown lands
60in order to kill Mavabaze and his followers.
The Portuguese administration was deeply divided over the
appropriate course of action. The military Commander of the
Crown lands and the governor of Lourenco Marques wished to accept
Mavabaze's offer of vassalage as it would increase Portugal's
prestige and provide the district with a new source of taxation.
They felt that, following the settlement of the western border
dispute with Britain in June 1891, they no longer had to pander to
Gungunyana and that effective occupation of Lourenzo Marques
district could only be achieved once Portugal had gained control
of the populous and fertile Khosen and Limpopo-Olifants areas
which straddled the trade and labour routes leading to the
Transvaal. Only the building of roads and the establishment of
military garrisons would effectively exclude the Transvaal from the
61
area south of the Limpopo. The Superintendent-general of native
affairs in Gazaland, who was more familiar with the strengths of
the Gaza empire and had provided their armies with military aid
against the independent Chopi, opposed the acceptance of Mavabaze's
62vassalage which he feared would lead to war with Gungunyana. A
compromise was eventually reached; Mavabaze was settled as a 
Portuguese vassal on the Nwamba-Mafumo border and in September 
1891 Shongeli was returned to Khosen under the protection of a 
detachment of Portuguese troops. Although Shongeli was recognized 
as chief of the Khosa, as a minor he was directly subordinate to 
Gungunyana. The troops which acccompanied him to Khosen constructed 
a fortified outpost on the right bank of the Nkomati river which 
ostensibly gave Shongeli an element of protection but also extended
60. GLM to GGM 15 Aug., 1891 in Mouzinho, 127.
61. GLM to GGM 28 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 118; Military commander 
of the Crown Lands to GLM 25 July 1891 in Ibid., 120.
62. Supt-general of Native Affairs to GGM 29 Sept., 1891 in 
Mouzinho, 134; GLM to GGM 5 Oct., 1891 in Ibid., 133. See also 
GLM to GG 20 July 1891 in Ibid., 110; GLM to Freire de Andrade 
10 June 1891; GLM to Supt-gen. Native Affairs 27 Oct., 1891 in 
Ibid., 135; GLM to GG 29 Oct., 1891 in Ibid., 139.
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63the Portuguese field of hut tax collection. In reality the post
at Stocolo afforded Portugal a military presence on the frontier with
Gazaland, which was then recognized to have moved south to the 
64Nkomati. Portuguese ambitions suffered a setback when Gungunyana 
agreed to allow the military commander of the Crown Lands to 
collect taxes in the trans-Nkomati area only on condition that he 
be the recipient of all revenues or alternately that the hut tax 
be doubled and divided equally between Gungunyana and the 
governor.^ In the event, the Portuguese presence in the Nkomati- 
Limpopo area was restricted to a Resident who, according to a
66
missionary, was 'bharged with keeping the country for Gungunyan ."
, Under Gaza pressure, the Khosa continued to desert the area 
east of the Nkomati bend and were replaced by followers of Gungun­
yana. Many Khosa sought refuge west of the Nkomati and joined 
Mavabaze. A missionary wrote in September 1891 of eastern Khosen 
that "all the villages are abandoned, a part of the huts entirely
destroyed, others half ruined; (there are) everywhere traces of
67panic and rapid flight." This exodus of the Khosa population
continued well into 1892 and in May the Gaza king was obliged
to station detachments on the Nkomati drifts in an effort to
68prevent people from joining Mavabaze. The following month
63. GLM to GGM 15 Aug., 1891 in Mouzinho, 129; GLM to Supt.-gen. 
Native Affairs 27 Oct., 1891 in Ibid., 137; Idem., 2 Dec., 1891 
in Ibid., 140; SMA467 Grandjean 1891; Grandjean "Notices",
BSNG., 1893, 120.
64. SMA 872/f Grandjean "Rapport sur Antioka', 1891" 7 Dec., 1891;
SMA 467 Grandjean 1891; SMA 435 Liengme to Leresche 27 July 1891;
GLM to GGM 12 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 107.
65. GLM to GG, 12 July, 1891 in Mouzinho, 107; Supt. Native
Affairs, Bilene to GLM 1 Dec., 1891.
6 6 . SMA 872/F Grandjean, "Rapport sur Antioka, 1891" 7 Dec., 1891.
67. Grandjean, Letter 6 Sept., 1891 in BMSAS., 10 Dec., 1891, 353; 
Idem., "Rapport du Conseil", BMSAS, 103, June 1892, 70; Idem., 
"Antioka" 11 Dec., 1893 in BMSAS, 14 April 1894; SMA 872/F 
Grandjean "Rapport du Antioka, 1891" 7 Dec., 1891; SMA 484/B 
P. Berthoud to Leresche 16 March 1892; SMA 513/B Grandjean to 
Leresche 5 Sept., 1895; GLM to GG 15 June 1891 in Mouzinho, 101.
6 8 . SMA 1256/A Grandjean "Rapport sur l’oeuvre missionaire, 1892"; 
SMA 872/E Grandjean to Leresche 6 May 1892; SMA 1760 Grandjean 
diary, Feb., 1893; Grandjean "Voyage de Lourengo Marques et 
Antioka",BMSAS, 104, Aug., 1892.
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Gungunyana consolidated his hold over his southern marches when
he expelled the Portuguese Resident in Khosen, whom he accused
69of building fortifications and extracting forced labour. He
then threatened to go to war with the Portuguese if they did not
remove their garrison in Bilene and return two of the king's sons
70who in effect were being held hostage at Mozambique Island. It
was generally conceded that without large numbers of imperial
71troops, bankrupt Portugal would be crushed by the Gaza and 
consequently, following British mediation, the Portuguese 
capitulated to Gungunyana's demands.
The Expansion of Portuguese Rule into the Central Delagoa 
Bay Hinterland
South of the Nkomati where, unlike Khosen or Maputoland,the
72population was "a human agglomeration without organization",
Portuguese expansion met with more success. With Francisco Serra
as military commander of the Crown Lands and a vigorous imperialist,
Mouzinho de Albuquerque, as governor of Lourenco Marques, the hut
tax was raised from ls6d ($337) to 4s ($900). The establishment
of military posts in the interior facilitated the collection of
hut tax and in 1890-91 a total of £2 850.4s (12 825$900) was
accumulated from 12 251 huts, an improvement of some 10 000$000
on the previous hut tax collection of 1886-87. In 1892 the
taxation of 22 116 huts produced a revenue of £4 423.4s 
73(19 904$400). The hut tax, of which 10% went to the collector,
was often gathered with extreme brutality for if an individual
74were unable to pay, his home would be fired. These methods of
69. SMA 467 Grandjean 1892.
.70. FO 84/2224 Br. consul, De la Cour to FO 4 June 1892; Idem.,
7 June 1892, 11 June 1892, 25 June and 25 July 1892.
71. SMA 484/A P. Berthoud to Leresche 27 Feb., 1891; GLM to GG 12 
June 1891 in Mouzinho, 108; Trindade Coelho (ed) Dezoito Annos 
em Africa, 288.
72. A. Grandjean, "La Mission Suisse a la Baie de Delagoa", Le
Chretien Evangelique, XL, 9 Sept., 1897.
73. GLM to GGM, 18 Aug., 1891 in Mouzinho, 227; Noronho, Lourengo Marques,
54. Grandjean, "Notices", BSNG, 1893, 120.
74. This was the case in Matolla in 1892 when because of an extended 
drought people were unable to pay taxes and "the majority of 
villages" were burnt down. FO 84/2224 De la Cour to FO 4 April 
1892; B02. 21 Jan., 1888.
200
collection, when combined with an increasing level of extortion,
constituted an important cause of the Luso-Gaza war which broke
out in 1894 following an official rise in the hut tax from $900
to 1$350 (6s) in June and a, perhaps unofficial, rise later that
75year of up to 12s to 14s. Many people were unable to pay the
hut tax because of the ecological and epidemiological upsets that
plagued the late 1880s-90s. But according to Junod, the ability
of the African population to pay hut taxes was primarily marred
by the demands of the Portuguese for unpaid labour, "lasting
weeks if not months", as this forced agriculturalists to neglect 
76their fields. During the 1890s the crucial issue of contention
that arose between the Portuguese and the population of the Crown
Lands, was that of labour rather than taxation.
The unification of the peoples of the Delagoa Bay hinterland
was precluded by clan endogamy, dynastic disputes, the competition
between clans for refugees and dependants and historically
entrenched trade rivalries. Consequently, as the British consul
noted in 1892, although the Portuguese were weak, the African
population was "divided into a number of petty tribes, the chiefs
of which are all antagonistic to, and ready to go to war with, the
others." If a vassal chief refused to supply labourers for the
public works, guns and ammunition were given to "other chiefs to
77make war on the one who refuses to obey orders." Labour was 
always the scarcest and most valuable factor of production in the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland. But as long as the labour needs of the 
Louren<j:o Marques settlement were limited by its lack of development, 
vassal chiefs were able to comply with requests for chibalo labour 
by sending social deviants to the Portuguese and in return for 
supplying this labour the chiefs participated in the benefits of 
the vassalage relationship which had developed in the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland. But the terms of this relationship turned against the
75. Carlos Santos Reis, A Populaggo de Lourentpo Marques em 1894, 83; 
SMA 516/B Junod to Leresche 3 Aug., 1894; FO 63/1281 Bernal
to FO 1 Sept., 1894; UNISA/JC. Junod, "Les Causes..."
76. SMA 1127/E Junod, "L'Histoire du differend entre Mahazoule et 
Mobvesha".
77. FO 84/2224 Br. consul to FO 4 April 1892. When Junod queried 
why Africans did not unite to fight the Portuguese he was told, 
"every time that a clan expressed the wish to chase out the 
whites, others would oppose them as they did not want to give up 
their access to material goods (renoncer aux etoffes)". UNISA/
JC Notebook marked "Le Probleme Indigene".
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chiefs and elders and especially against young men as the value of
labour rocketed in the 1890s with the massive emigration of the
Delagoa Bay workforce to the mines of the Witwatersrand.
As early as 1887 British officials in Maputoland estimated
that up to half the economically-active male population was
78
employed in South Africa. This view was supported by population
and hut tax returns and by travellers, one of whom reported in 1896
that "the Amatongas who remained in the country were either home
from the Rand for the holidays or belonged to that class content
79to live without work." Many labour emigrants settled permanently
in Durban, Pietermaritzburg, Port Elizabeth, Kimberley and Cape 
80Town. Statistics indicate that 30 to 40 per cent of Mozambican
migrants settled permanently on the Witwatersrand. This suggests
a permanent emigration in the mid-late 1890s of 15 to 20 per cent
of the male population with a temporary loss of a further 30 to 35
81per cent working as migrants. The loss of manpower was worsened 
by a high mortality rate in the wage labour areas. In Kimberley 
this rose from 7.3 per cent in 1877 to 9.92 per cent in 1888 while
on the Witwatersrand the death rate has been estimated at 8 to 10
82per cent. When added to a probable 2 to 3 per cent loss on the
83routes leading to and from the labour centres, this meant that in 
some areas migrant labour resulted in a permanent loss of between
78. ZGH.708. Z288/87 Saunders, "Supplementary Report on the charac­
ter of the Amatonga people, 1887"; FO 84/1846 O ’Neill to FO,
26 Feb., 1887.
79. ZA 27, "Report of the Amatongaland Boundary Commission, 24 Dec., 
1896"; Cuenod mss., Henri Berthoud, "Expedition chez Gungunyana, 
1891". Population returns for 1884-5 are in BO 4, 23 Jan., 1886; 
1886 in BO 4, 22 Jan., 1887; 1887 in BO 3., 21 Jan, 1888, 1892 
in Noronho in Lourengo Marques, 54-55; see also Circumscripgogfs 
de Lourenpo Marques, 1909. p. 142.
80. JSA file 25 p261, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza, 8 Nov., 1897.
81. TA.SSa330 "Aantal Naturellen Vertrokken..." pl83; TLC., evidence 
of Ferraz, 246 and Wirth, 112; CMAR 1895, 56; SPG., W. Smythe
to SPG., 5 Jan., 1899.
82. Turrell, "Kimberley Diamond Fields", 162; A. Jeeves, "The Control 
of Migrant Labour on the South African Goldmines in the era of 
Kruger and Milner", JSAS, II, 1975, 17.
83. Cabral, Ragas, Usos, 8 6 , 102; MNE697 Portuguese consul Durban 
to MNE, 28 Sept., 1891. See also p. 31, 87-8, 104-5.
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25 and 30 per cent of the male population.
The demand for labour on the Witwatersrand increased dramatically 
in 1895 as numerous deep level mines entered the development stage.
But the increase in labour migration was paralleled by the 
development of Lourengo Marques as a feeder port for the Rand which 
necessitated the local employment of large numbers of workers in 
transport activities and the construction of a modern economic 
infrastructure. Large numbers of men were employed on the con­
struction of the railway to the Transvaal and their daily wages of
2s to 2 s6d compared favourably with those paid to emigrant 
84
workers. Many men were also employed m  porterage,
shipping, landing and forwarding goods, in customs clearance, public
and municipal works, domestic service and various other spheres of
the local economy, whose growth was closely tied to that of the 
85Witwatersrand. Because of the competition for labour between 
these different sectors and the south African economy, African
workers in Lourengo Marques could earn as much as ls6d to 3s per
, 86 day.
These relatively high wages were the major cause of the
chibalo system which provided African labour for various public
works. Mouzinho de Albuquerque claimed that chibalo workers recieved
87
daily wages of lid ($200). However, the British consul in 
Lourengo Marques reported in 1892 that chibalo workers never 
received more than 5s for three months labour. He characterized 
chibalo as
84. SMA 503/A Grandjean to Leresche 15 Nov., 1889; BPP LXXVI, 1890. 
Br. consul,report for 1889; Ibid., 1895 XCIX; CMAR 1894,
29; A Voz Publica, 13 Oct., 1894.
i
85. In 1903 there were 7 463 wage-earners in Lourengo Marques.
These included forwarding, landing and shipping 2 230, domestic 
service 1 870, customs clearance 1 298, harbour works and 
railways 650, building and construction 555, public and 
municipal workers 450. TLC., evidence of F. de Mello Breyner, 29,
8 6 . AHU. Mop., 2a Rep., pasta 9 Freire de Andrade, "Relatorio do 
Reconhecimento do Rio Incomati, 1891"; Richardson The Crowded 
Hours, 163; Grandjean, "Voyage de Lourenco Marques a Rikatla, 
June 1892" in BMSAS, 104, 1892.
87. Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Mogambique 1896-98, 145; BPP 1895. 
XCIX Consular Report, 1893.
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"a system of forced labour as established by the 
Portuguese government of this district which seems to 
carry with it many of the component parts of slavery, 
while it ensures none of that protection which expensive 
slaves receive... Workers get no food but are promised 
'ordinary wages' of Is to 4s per day. After 2 to 3
months they are sent home with a few shillings or in
some cases nothing at all."®®
The Mafumo, Matolla and Tembe chiefdoms which lived close to Lourengo
Marques suffered most from chibalo demands, especially as they were
fully conversant with wage rates paid in the town and in south
Africa. Periods, of forced porterage could last for 9 to 10 months
without any wages materializing. The British consul related the
story of a party of 160 Mafumo men who were promised premiums of
£10 to carry goods to Manyisa. But only a few headmen received
£2 and the porters, who were expected to be away for a year, were
89threatened with imprisonment if they deserted. The chiefdoms 
around Lourengo Marques were the first actively to oppose the 
developing chibalo system. But the refusal to supply the 
Portuguese with forced labour came not from the chiefs and elders 
who benefitted in several ways from their alliance with the 
Portuguese but from the cadets whose labour power was becoming 
increasingly commoditized through wage labour.
The youths of Matolla were the first to refuse to supply labour 
to their chiefs for chibalo. The Portuguese replied by kidnapping 
the Matdla chief Sigaule, his mother and other notables whom they 
held hostage at the Angouane magistracy. Junod recounts that "the 
young people have persisted in refusing (to supply chibalo) by 
saying 'we have just returned from chibalo, how can we already 
return?' and by 'declaring that they did not have the time to repair 
their own houses'." Sigaule was eventually freed only when "the 
mature men and those of headring status" offered themselves in 
exchange for their chief.^
Early in 1894 a particulary severe chibalo was imposed on 
the people of the Crown Lands when they were forced to construct
8 8 . FO 84/2224 Br. cons, to FO 4 April 1892.
89. Ibid., UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes..."
90. UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes "
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the roads needed by the Portuguese in order to occupy effec­
tively the Delagoa Bay hinterland. The Tembe, Matolla, Nwamba, 
Mabota, Mafumo and Mazwaya all worked on these roads and in some 
areas left their villages deserted of men. This widespread 
chibalo was particularly detested because of the political 
implication of the roads. A popular song invented and sung on the 
roadworks lamented
Young chief, do not speak too loudly.
Imitate the small elephant.
Young chief] We call you Mahazoule!
You should live far away in Johannesburg <
You fear being deported over the sea and (having) to leave us!'
The exiling of dissident chiefs became commonplace during the
1890s and led the African population to believe that the Portuguese
wished to break their national life by expatriating their chiefs
who were, according to Junod, "the embodiment of the nation, the
92representation in skin and bone, of national unity." Thus,
following the deportation of Hanyane in 1889, the Tembe chief Mabai
was exiled to Mozambique Island in 1893 for the killing of a
Maputo man in Tembeland. A few months later a sub-chief of the
Mabota named Gouaba was also deported and his land was given to 
93a concessionaire.
Forced conscription constituted a further source of structural 
disequilibrium in the vassalage relationship. Junod felt that 
with the experience gained through migrant labour, people no longer 
considered deportation, in the form of forced military service on 
the Zambezi or Angola, as just punishment for a severe crime, but 
preferred jail sentences instead. The arrival of a black corvette, 
known as the Misi or hyena because of its whistle, foreshadowed
91. Ibid., SMA 519/B Loze to Leresche 17 May 1894; 516/B Junod to 
Leresche 3 Sept., 1894; Junod, "Tembe", BSNG, 1895, 115.
92. UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes..."
93. Ibid., SMA 1127/E Junod, "L'Histoire du differend..."; SMA 1127/B 
Junod "Quelques considerations aidant a comprendre le corres­
pondence entre le regule Nouamantibyana et Henri Junod". SMA 1254/A 
P. Berthoud, "Rapport sur la station de Lourengo Marques em 1893". 
Concessions were largely speculative at this time. But for the 
belief that they would entail a sub-imperial penetration of the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland, cf. SMA 528/B P. Berthoud to Leresche
13 July, 1894.
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razzias throughout the streets of Lourengo Marques. Those workers
who, unable to flee the town, were captured by the press-gangs,
were then subjected to a language test which divulged their area
of origin. Ronga-speakers, whose disappearance from the chiefdoms
surrounding Lourengo Marques was politically undesirable, were then
generally freed while members of outlying chiefdoms, who spoke
94different dialects, were conscripted into the army. The 
unexpected and forced conscription of a father, elder brother or 
son could deal a shattering blow to the productivity of a home­
stead but perhaps of equal importance' was the fear deportation 
inspired.
As in other parts of Africa, people in the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland often rationalized the disappearance of individuals in 
terms of anthropophagy. Europeans were thought to take people to 
an island at sea where they were fattened and eaten. According 
to an informant of Junod's the Misi "called men and devoured them". 
A Wesleyan evangelist who had grown up and preached in the Delagoa 
Bay area believed similarly that "when (the Portuguese) have
95arrested a man they tie stones to him and sink him in the Bay."
As the labour demands of capitalist development expanded it became 
increasingly impossible for the chiefs to supply the Portuguese 
with labour under the old system. The consequent intervention of 
the colonial state in the labour market transformed "vassalage" 
from a political alliance of some mutual benefit to one of 
exploitation. Uneasy co-existence was replaced by resistance and 
the intervention of the Portuguese in a succession dispute, which 
divided one of the vassal chiefdoms, was thus merely a catalyst 
for war.
When chief Mapunga of the Mazwaya died in 1891 his designated 
heir Mahazule had the full support of Francisco Serra. However 
Mobvesha, the head of the Hlewane junior branch of the Mazwaya,
94. Generally Djonga or the linguistic cluster that evolved into 
Thonga-shangaan. UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes...". Press ganging
was one of the major causes of the scarcity and expense of labour at 
Lourenco Marques , BPP 1895 XCIX consular report for 1894.
95. Ibid., Junod, Life, II, 353-354; Robert Mashaba, letter of 22 
Oct., 1894 in the Mission Field 1895, 38. For similar beliefs 
such as chifwambwe in Central African, see G. Shepperson and T. 
Price, Independent African (Edinburgh, 1958) 10-11. For West 
Africa, P. Curtin (ed) Africa Remembered (Madison, 1967), 92-3,
15In, 215, 313, 331.
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wished to take advantage of Mahazule1s youth by segmenting from the
rest of the clan and settling west of the Nkomati. But because of
opposition from Mahazule and Serra, Mobvesha was obliged to flee
to Nwamba in mid-1891. Although he returned to live near Angouane,
peace was maintained until the second half of 1893 when Mobvesha
again attempted to move to the west where there was no flooding
of the Nkomati and where he would be free of the Mazwaya royal
house. When this move was again prohibited by Mahazule, Mobvesha
turned to the new military Commander of the Crown Lands, Nogueira,
whom he supplied both with labour and, according to Junod, "a
96large amount of money". Consequently Mahazule distrusted the
impartiality of Nogueira's tribunal and when he did report at
Angouane in July 1894 to settle the dispute, he was accompanied
by his entire army as he feared that Nogueira might attempt to
kidnap and exile him. Mahazule refused to discuss the case,
refused to pay the new hut tax and, in symbolically ending his
vassalage, returned his government uniform, which he advised
Nogueira to present to Mobvesha. In August 1894, ten Mazwaya
councillors arrived at Angouane to put Mahazule's case but, when
they complained after Nogueira had decided in favour of Mobvesha,
they were arrested. The first act of the Luso-Gaza war took place
97
when these councillors were freed by the Mazwaya army.
The Luso-Gaza War and its Aftermath
The Portuguese initially turned to Nwamantibyana, the vassal
chief of Mafumo who, although he was willing to aid them, was
physically restrained from doing so by his councillors. But while
the elders demanded caution, the young men clamoured for war with 
98the Portuguese. Nwamantibyana's indecision increased the threat
to the Portuguese posed by the Mazwaya and forced them to retire 
from Angouane in September 1894 and look to the Maputo for assistance.
Although British annexations to Zululand of territories claimed 
by the Maputo had pushed them into the arms of the Portuguese, they
96. SMA 1127/E Junod, "L'Histoire du differend..."? Junod, "Baronga", 
166.
97. SMA 1127/E Junod, "L'Histoire du differend...", SMA 1127/B 
Junod, "... la correspondence entre. 3e regule Nouamantibyana
et H.A. Junod"; UNISA/JC Junod, "Les Causes..."; Junod, Life I, 
409-410; Reis, Populaqao de Lourengo Marques, 82-83
98. Junod, Life I, 514.
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had consistently refused to provide labour for road construction
or pay hut tax until Portugal implemented the promises made to the
99Maputo envoys in Lisbon in 1889. These included horses for the
chief, a public school and especially, that the chiefdom would
not be divided between Portugal and Britain. However, the Anglo-
Portuguese treaty of June 1891 recognized Portugal's rights to the
area only as far south as a line running from the Pongola-Maputo
confluence to the sea. Pending incorporation by the British, the
Maputo living south of this line were not expected to pay tax and
consequently Zambili and her son Ngwanasi decided that those
100living north of the line should also be exempted. Ngwanasi
was advised by his councillors to send an army to aid the Portuguese.
The Maputo army arrived before Lourengo Marques on 3 October
1894 and, having discarded with disdain the flintlocks proffered
by the Portuguese, were given over 1 000 Martini-Henrys and Sneiders.
But when the army was about to cross from the Tembe beaches to the
north side of the Bay, word spread that they were to be pressed
101into the Portuguese army and sent to Mozambique Island.
Ngwanazi's pro-Portuguese councillors were discredited by this
perfidy of the Portuguese and, perhaps as planned, the chief then
took his counsel from the young men of his own age-set who advised
102him not to form an alliance with the Portuguese.
The willingness of the Maputo to stay neutral persuaded the 
Mafumo to enter the war on the side of Mahazule's Mazwaya. On 
8 October Henri Junod took a message from chief Nwamantibyana to the 
governor-general of the province. In it he stated that
"The reason why we are tired of the whites is because 
they seize us in large numbers and send us to other
99. SMA 516/B Junod to Leresche, 3 Sept., 1894.
100. FO 84/2224 DelaCour to FO 4 April 1892; GLM to GGM., 4 Jan.,
1892 in Mouzinho, 157-160; GLM to GGM 12 Feb., 1891 in Ibid., 156.
101. SPG. Rev. Charles Johnson, Journal of his Expedition into 
Tongaland, Aug.-Sept., 1895, Pt. I; JSA file 74 p 67, evidence
of Majuba; FO 63/1281 Bernal to FO 10 Oct., 1894.
102. H. Junod, "Tembe", BSNG 1895, 119-120; KCL., Richter in von 
Wissel, p 6 ; Gustav Bruheim, a son-in-law and major adviser 
of Zambili especially lost face as he was blamed for the 
failure of the expedition, BPP, 1895- C.-7780 Res. magis.,
Ubombo to Res. Comm., Zululand, 17 Jan., 1895.
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countries. There are many of our people who have been 
deported. They call us for their town works. We go and 
then they take us. They even told me that they would 
seize and deport me... I have paid the hut tax and the 
labour tax; and also the great road. I have never seen 
what I earned for that. Now you want to kill me. I want 
my people you have arrested; give them back to me and it 
will be finished."103
Nwamantibyana and Mahazule then laid seige to Lourengo Marques.
In the north Gungunyana crossed the Nkomati and attacked two 
small pro-Portuguese Ntimane chiefdoms in order to keep communica­
tions open with the south. His defeat of these chiefdoms was swift 
because of the division between the young men and the elders.
One missionary reported that
"all the young men would prefer to be under Gungunyane... 
but at the same time their 'uncles' who were their tutors 
during their minority, parleyed with the Portuguese and 
formed armies which they put at the disposal (of Portugal) 
probably adding as a condition that the Portuguese give 
them back the power that they formerly exercised and put 
aside their nephews."1^^
Although Gungunyana had not formerly entered the war* against 
the Portuguese his actions in Ntimane anticipated a widened political 
consciousness that was to link the various independent chiefdoms 
of southern Mozambique in an anti-colonial front. As a contemporary 
observer noted.
"We must realize that (the) cohesion, utterly lacking 
in these tribes at the time of the Zulu invasion of 
1820-1830, now exists among them thanks to the authority 
of Gungunyana whom they all recognize.
The siege of Lourenzo Marques was lifted only in early December 
with the arrival of Portuguese imperial troops. Angouane was then 
re-occupied and on 28 February 1895 Nwamantibyana and his Mafumo
103. H. Junod, "Lettre du chef Nouamantibyana a M. Junod, 10 Oct., 
1894", BMSAS, 118 Dec., 1894, 215; UNISA/JC. Junod, "Les Causes.."
104. SMA 1254/C Junod, "Rapport sur la station de Lourenco Marques 
1894"; SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 4 April 1895.
105. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 5 Jan., 1895. SMA 1128/A Junod 
to Breyner n.d. ?4March 1896. For a list of the major 
combatants and their military strengths, see appendix 2 .
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forces were defeated at Marakwene on the lower Nkomati by the
Portuguese and their one constant ally, the Matolla who straddled
the railway line leading to the Transvaal. The Portuguese pursued
a scorched earth policy and "the country was devastated. Up to
fifty kilometres to the north of Lourenzo Marques, the country,
106once covered in huts and villages, is now devastated."
Nwamantibyana and Mahazule then retreated to Khosen and the Portuguese
consolidated their hold over the chiefdoms south of the Nkomati.
The Khosa were divided over whom to support in the conflict and
when the Portuguese army crossed the Nkomati in August, numbers
of young people were reported to be leaving in great haste for 
107
the mines. On 8 September 1895 Nwamantibyana and Mahazule were
defeated at Magule on the Nkomati bend and sought refuge with 
Gungunyana.
In Gaza, the anti-Portuguese attitude of the king was
supported by the "younger party" while another group, headed by
Mandjobo the governor of Bilene, wanted Gungunyana to hand over
108Nwamantibyana and Mahazule to the Portuguese. The Gaza king
was supplied with arms by at least one labour recruiter and, before
the arrival of Imperial troops, "a Johannesburg consortium" offered
to lead an attack on Lourenzo Marques in exchange for control of 
109the town. The shortage of workers on the Witwatersrand mines
brought about by the Luso-Gaza war caused the managements of 
numerous mines to attempt a peaceful settlement to the conflict.
Thus Charles Fisher of Compound Mine and Underwood Fisher of Paarl 
Central Mine, men who had good reputations with their "Shangaan" 
workers, introduced ambassadors sent to them from Gungunyana, to the
106. Paul Berthoud, Les Negres..., 200, 205; Idem., "La Guerre au 
Littoral", BMSAS Feb., 1895, 245-247; Grandjean La Mission, 
157-58.
107. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 4 Aug., 1895; Grandjean to 
Renevier, 21 Oct., 1895.
108. G. Liengme, "Un potentat Africain: Goungounyana et son regne", 
BSNG, 13, 1901, 130, 134.
109. FO 63/1281 Bernal to FO 11 June, 1895; SMA 840 Liengme, 
3 Jan., 1896.
210
110
Imperial secretary in Cape Town. The Chamber of Mines, which
had unsuccessfully attempted to construct shelters along the
Nkomati labour route in June-July 1895, sent at least one special
envoy to Gungunyana in an attempt to end the war and reopen the flow
111of labour from Gazaland to the Rand. But these and all other
attempts at a peaceful conclusion to the war failed and in November
1895 Gungunyane was decisively defeated.
The Portuguese victory resulted in the expatriation of the
112Gaza king and the chiefs of Mafumo and Nwamba. Soon after the
end of the war, chief Sigaule of Matolla shot himself, reputedly
after the Portuguese threatened to exile him because of his failure
113to supply them with chibalo labour. The Mafumo chiefdom was
dissolved and its members fled to the Transvaal or were incorporated
into the neighbouring Matolla and Mabota. The Mazwaya population
114
was also seriously depleted by the war. In the south, the Maputo
lost the chiefdoms of Sambaan and Umbegiza when in April 1895 the 
British annexed them to Zululand in order to foil Transvaal plans 
for access to the sea. For the same reason, the MacMahon line 
was implemented and "British Amatongaland" was proclaimed a 
protectorate in May. Following the Portuguese victory over 
Gungunyana, Ngwanasi fled to the Ubombo district where a British 
resident was established in June 1896. The Maputo were irrevocably 
divided when British Amatongaland was annexed to Zululand on 27 
December 1897.
By April 1897 the British consul reported that in the Louremjo 
Marques district, "the greater portion of the revenue is contributed 
by the direct hut tax on natives." But he warned that martial law
110. The British declared themselves unable to intervene in the war 
as Gazaland was recognized as Portuguese territory according 
to the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of June 1891, MNE 709 news- 
cutting encl. in Consul, Pretoria to MNE 23 Dec., 1895.
111. SMA 840 Liengme to Leresche, 3 Jan., 1896.
112. SMA 483 Grandjean "Journal du voyage, 1896",* Junod, Life I,
251, 1. ■ '
113. JSA file 74 p 139, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza, 8 Nov., 
1897.
114. SMA. 519/C Loze to Leresche, 23 Aug., 1895; Junod, Life I, 388, 
542, II, 5.
115. Natal Witness, 17 Dec., 1898.
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and the collection of the estimated £22 000 in hut taxes by the
military authorities would lead to rebellion. In Khosen and Bilene
a war tax of £1 or one head of cattle, together with a hut tax of
10s, was imposed in 1896. Each petty chief was also expected to
116supply a contingent of workers for chibalo. These extortions
caused the Khosa to join the Gaza, led by Gungunyane's old general
Maguigane, in a final war against the Portuguese in 1897. This
war led to the break-up of the Khosa kingdom, the flight of some
2 000 Gaza Nguni into the Lydenburg district of the eastern
Transvaal, and placed the Sul do Save firmly under the control of 
117the Portuguese. Many refugees from the Luso-Gaza wars settled
in Lourengo Marques where the African population soared from
1181 059 in 1894 to 4 902 in 1897. Numerous others became rootless
in-migrants who moved from one area to another in search of a means
of subsistence.**^
Over the years 1897-98 and 1898-99, an annual hut tax of
64 000$000 or £14 222 was drawn from the African population of the
120Lourengo Marques district. The ability of Africans to pay
this hut tax was contingent upon their access to the labour markets 
of South Africa. But the imposition of the hut tax, together with 
the extraction of numerous levies from migrant workers, was only 
made possible by the break-up of the chiefdoms and the political 
subjugation of the African people of southern Mozambique in the 
wars of 1894-5 and 1897. The subjugation of southern Mozambique 
allowed the Portuguese to intervene in the labour market with all 
the power at the disposal of the colonial state. The modus 
vivendi labour agreement of 1901 drastically rfeduced African wages
116. SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier, 24 Jan., 1896; Idem., 24 June,
24 Nov., 1896; FO 63/1336 Consul Casement to FO, 9 April, 1897.
117. Transvaal Native Administration Annual Report, 1904-5, B22; 
Stevenson-Hamilton, The Low-veld, 179-81. Shongele was obliged 
to pay an annual reparation of £200. He died in 1898 and Khosen 
was broken up in 1900. Ferrao, Circumscripqogs, 111.
118. Reis, Populaqgo de Lourengo Marques, 33-4; TLC., Report, 29.
119. SMA 1760. Grandjean diary, 274; Junod, Life I, 358-9, 537.
120. J. Mouzinho de Albuquerque, Providencias publicadas pelo 
Commissario Regio na provincia de Mozambique desde 23 Maio atg 
9 Julho 1898. (Lisbon, 1899), 184-5.
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in exchange for rail, labour and fiscal privileges that
largely benefitted metropolitan coffers. Thus to see the
121
Luso-Gaza wars as tax rebellions or as the result of
122
succession disputes is to take too narrow a perspective. The
wars must be set within the context of imperialism and the conflict
over manpower which arose out of the clash between two forms of
accumulation; one which valued labour as a commodity and generator
of surplus value and the other which viewed labour as the primary
factor of production and as a means of attracting followers and
123hence power and respect. The delicate balance between the two
was made uneasy and finally overturned by the increasing labour
needs of capitalist development. Thus without taking an
124instrumentalist perspective, it is possible to trace the causes 
of the Luso-Gaza wars and the invasion of southern Mozambique to 
the cheap labour needs of the Witwatersrand mines.
121. J.J. Texeira Botelho, Historia Militar e Polltica dos 
Portuguezes em Mozambique, (Lisbon, 1934), 433-68; A. Issacman, 
"Resistance and Collaboration..." AHS, 10, 1, 1977, 53-4.
122. Junod, Life I , 511; D.L. Wheeler, "Gungunyana the negotiator", 
JAH, IX, 4, 1968, 596.
123. For the importance of labour in pre-industrial societies, cf. 
pp. 308 ff.
124. With the power of hindsight Junod came to blame the war of 
1894-5 on Portugal's wish to supply the Transvaal mines with 
labour. Cinquante Ans Apres, (Lausanne, 1925), p. 13.
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CONCLUSION
An examination of the historical development of the trading 
settlement at Lourengo Marques has shown that the Portuguese had 
little control over the resources of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. 
Until 1894-1897 the exactions of the Portuguese upon the people of 
the area were merely another misfortune, along with the extortions 
of the Swazi, Gaza and Zulu and the trials of a harsh environment. 
Consequently the early causes of labour migration cannot be traced 
to colonial intervention in the labour supply. It has however been 
ascertained that although warfare was not determinant in generating 
a flow of labour it did limit the ability of people to feed 
themselves and widened the difference between actual and desired 
standards of living. Political turbulence and insecurity induced 
a high degree of geographical mobility and the direction of this 
mobility took different paths according to fluctuating local 
conditions.
The following four chapters seek to determine why such a 
large part of the male population of the Delagoa Bay hinterland 
sought to sell its labour in South Africa and why the movement 
of workers onto the labour market took a migratory form.
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SECTION TWO
The Economic and Social Origins of Labour Migration
INTRODUCTION
African historians have tended, whether under the influence 
of Romanticism or Nationalism, to idealize the pre-colonial past and 
little has been written on the precariousness of existence before 
the introduction of modem medicine and farming methods.^  For many’ 
people in the Delagoa Bay hinterland, temporary wage labour in 
south Africa furnished the means needed to secure a level of 
nutrition that was sufficiently high to provide resistance to 
endemic and epidemic diseases. This was particularly important 
during the late 19th century when the Delagoa Bay hinterland was 
hit by an extended ecological crisis, a change in the terms of trade 
which made the carrmoditization of labour power more profitable than 
the commoditization of the product of labour, and by the narrowing 
of economic alternatives to migrant labour. Migrancy was engendered 
not only "fran below" but also "from the top" as the rulers of 
the Delagoa Bay hinterland adapted existing forms of surplus 
appropriation to benefit fran migrant labour.
As outside earnings became an integral part of the rural 
economy, migrant labour became self-perpetuating as, by education, 
tradition and habit, it was accepted as a self-evident law of nature. 
Migrant labour became one of the conditions for the reproduction of 
the existing mode of production and the migrant was anchored to his 
rural base by the perpetuation of ccxrittunal land ownership, late
1. A partial exception is Joseph C. Miller, "The significance of 
drought, disease and famine in the agriculturally marginal zones 
of west-central Africa", JAH, 23, 1, 1982 and Jill R. Dias, 
"Famine and disease in the history of Angola, c. 1830-1930", JAH, 
XXI, 3, 1981. But cf. the growing body of work on the history of 
famine, disease and mortality in the industrialized world. In 
central Europe in 1880 the life expectancy for men was about 
30 years and about 35 for wcmen. In 16th and 17th century France 
only about half the population reached the age of 20. Similarly 
high mortality rates existed in Japan and other countries. Tb 
cite only the most recent literature, cf. M. Mitterauer and R. 
Sieder, The European Family (Oxford, 1982) , 34-5; Peter Laslett, 
(ed.) Household and Family in Past Time (Cambridge, 1972), 501- 
502; Paul Slack, Death and Disease in Pre-Industrial Europe, 
(London, 1982); E.A. Wrigley and R. Schofield, The Population 
History of England, 1541-1871 (Cambridge, Mass., 1982).
215
inheritance, settlement patterns based on kinship and fealty and by 
a socialization that encouraged early marriage and travel but 
disdained bachelorhood and spinsterhood. Far fran being an indivi­
dualistic, risk-taking venture entered into by "men of two worlds",
migrant labour emerged as an integral and "natural" resource 
whose exploitation increased the chances of survival in a harsh
environment.
Chapter 6
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LIFE AND DEATH:
Food and Disease
The Ecological Framework
The geology of the flat, lew-lying coastal plain stretching 
fran the Indian Ocean to the Lebambo mountains is one of largely 
unconsolidated Quatenary and Tertiary sediments marked by infertile 
and acidic soils. Drought was ubiquitous in these areas, where 
porous soils were unable to retain the light and irregular rain­
fall which fell in the interior and where high evaporation rates 
were caused by sumner temperatures which often exceeded 100 °F.
In these areas, by far the major part of the Delagoa Bay hinter­
land, an entire crop could be lost within ten days due to un-
i
seasonal rainfall.
The sandy soil areas were cut by fertile alluvial plains which,
in the case of the Limpopo, could reach a width of twelve miles.
These areas were particularly valuable because of the rich silt
2
deposited by annual flooding. A range of fold hills reaching 
300-400 feet flanked the coastal areas of Maputo, Tembe and 
Nondwane. Patches of fertile red and black soils which are humus - 
rich and water-retentive were situated on the eastern slopes and 
tops of these hills. Summer temperatures were moderated by sea 
breezes and the rainfall on the coast was higher than that in the 
interior. A number of seasonal swamps and lakes lay in the depre­
ssions found to the west of the coastal hills, as well as in the 
perennial Muze swamp zone which stretched north of the Mkuzi river. 
These swamps had a high water table and, together with the black
3
soil in the depressions, constituted good areas for agriculture.
In virtually the entire Delagoa Bay hinterland, subtropical forest 
had been turned into wood and bushland by fire, cultivation and
1. Crops in these soils probably "saw" less than 50% of the annual 
rainfall. Hornby, "Report on tsetsefly problems of Maputo",
Anais do Instituto de Medicina Tropical, 1947, vol 4, 316.
2. St. Vincent Erskine, "1871-2 journey", ms., RGS., ch. 10, pp 11-12 
A. Longle, "De Inhambane a Lourengo Marques", BSGL, 6, 1, 1886?
SMA 1760 Grandjean 15 July 1890; SMA 435/G Liengme to Leresche,
16 Oct, 1891; Grandjean, "Le Bassin du Nkemati", BSNG XII, 1900.
3. H. Berthoud, "Deux problenes hydrographiques du pays de Gaza", 
BSNG, XV, 1904.
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grazing. However, isolated forest areas still existed in Maputoland 
and a large forest, situated south of the Nkcmati bend in Ntimane
4
and xerinda, provided fresh land for Gaza immigrants in the 1890s.
Coastal rainfall was sufficient to support cereal cultivation 
in the water-retentive black and red soil areas. But it was ex­
tremely irregular and this limited the cultivation of the sandy 
soil and dry areas east of the Lebombos.^ The Dutch noticed in 
the 1720s that if rain did not fall in the correct season, the
g
sumner heat soon dried and killed all planted seeds. Junod noted
similarly that if rain did not fall in Novenber or December, "it is
a dreadful misfortune... famine will certainly follow as cereals
7can only be sewn during these two months."
By 1880 at least two types of maize were grown in the Delagoa
Bay hinterland. These were probably the hardy, quick-maturing
but lew-yielding "flint" strain and the "dent" type of maize
8which grows best in the alluvial soil areas. In fertile, well- 
watered soil it was often possible to harvest two crops in one 
year; the one an high ground next to the river was harvested in 
summer and the other, planted in the fresh alluviun, was harvested
9
in autumn. The yield per acre in the alluvial plains of the
4. See Ario Lobo Azvedo, O Clima de Mozambique e a Agricultura, 
pp. 199-207 for a preliminary account of the soils of present- 
day Maputo district.
5. Junod, Life II, 2-4. For 20th century accounts of rainfall in 
the Delagoa Bay hinterland, see also A.L. Azvedo, O Clima de 
Mocambique, 9-102; M.A. Peres, "Preliminary Investigations on 
the rainfall of Lourenco Marques'^ , SAJS, XXVII, 1930. j - . 
For irregularity of rainfall, see figure 4, p. 230. ’
6. C.G. Coetzee, "Die Stryd era Delagoabaai", (PhD, Stellenbosch, 
1954), 140, 144.
7. This probably refers to the lcwerNkeraati area where Junod 
worked as a missionary, Life, II, 315-316; see also Seidel, 
"Die Ba-Ronga an der Delagoa Bay", Globus, 74, 12, 1898, 188.
8. WUL. American Zulu Mission, Pinkerton Diary, August 1880. For 
maize types, see Hedges, "Trade and Politics", 41-42.
9. SMA 467 Grandjean 1890; BMSAS, 1890, 122; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., 
pasta 9, Freire d1 Andrade, 1891; E. Sbhlaefli-Glardon, "De 
Valdezia a Lourengo Marques, journal de voyage", BSNG., VII, 
1893, 156; Grandjean, "L'Invasion", 74.
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Nkanati and Lirnpopo-Olifants was also far superior to that of 
10other areas. In the more perennial swamp areas an early maize
11was planted close to the water and ripened before the main crop.
But as maize needed fertile soil and regular rainfall, in the drier
areas it was replaced by various strains of sorghum and especially 
12millet. The leaves and tubers of cassava and sweet potato plants 
were also important famine-breakers as they grew well in sandy soil. 
Groundnuts also grew well in the dry areas and, roasted or as a 
relish, provided people with an important source of protein and fat. 
Rice was grown under tidal irrigation on sane rivers and, together 
with inferior sugar-canes, was cultivated in the coastal depressions 
where perennial water was found. Pumpkins were grown for their 
leaves and fruit, and watermelons, bambarra nuts and cow-peas all 
proved popular. Mung beans were particularly important as they are
fairly drought-resistant and, harvested in May, they were the last
. . 13crop to ripen.
Despite the spreading of risk by cultivating a variety of 
crops, agriculture in most parts of the Delagoa Bay hinterland was 
dominated by poor soils and irregular rainfall. This meant that 
in most areas the amount of food produced from one year to the next 
was highly unreliable. Ecological problems were aggravated by 
political uncertainties which brought "tax raids" by Zulu, Swazi, 
Gaza and Boers, at different times and into different areas. This 
made the open storage of cereals difficult and caused grain to rot 
in pits or, hidden in the bush, to fall prey to animals and insects. 
Even where grain ecu Id be kept in conventional storage facilities,
10. Junod, Life II, 9.
11. BO 46, 13 Nov., 1876, 317; Junod, "Correspondence", BSNG, 1893, 
532.
12. Sorghum (maphilia; mapira); millet (mabele); pennisitum millet 
(moexeira). Junod Life II, 10-11; P. Hair, "Milho, meixoera 
and other foodstuffs of the Sofala garrison, 1505-1525", in 
Cahiers d1 Etudes Africaines, XVII, 1977.
13. Junod, Life II, 11-15; H* Junod "Lourenco Marques" in BMSAS,
117, Oct., 1894, 180; Junod, Life II, 12-13; For descriptions
of foods cultivated, see BO 45. 5 Nov., 1877, 324; BO 4. 22 Jan., 
1887; BO 20. 14 May 1887 "Relatorio do Excursao agricola ao 
Districto de Lourengo Marques"; ZGH 796 2892 Foxon, "Information 
regarding the British Protectorate of Maputoland, 1896"; P.J. 
Quinn, Foods and Feeding Habits of the Pedi, (Johannesburg, 1957) 
especially, 40, 45-46.
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14these were unsophisticated. Thus in most of the Delagoa Bay
hinterland, Novenber and December were months of hunger when little
food was left in the granaries and much energy had to be expended
on cultivation. During this time of year, and especially during
periods of drought, alternative sources of food to cultivated crops
had to be found. Foremost amongst these were fruits gathered from
the sparsely populated dry areas of the western and north-western
Delagoa Bay hinterland and frcm the clan ccmnanage separating the
various honesteads.
The mafureira almond of the Natal mahogany (nkuhlu; Trichilia
emetica) ripened in November and December. The pulp and nut of
this fruit are rich in oil and constituted an important drought-
breaker, body oil and export product. The edible pulp of the fruit
of the dull-leaved kwakwa tree (strychnos innocua) was dried or
smoked and then pounded into a storeable flour. The monkey orange
(nsala; strychnos spinosa) was also an important drought-breaker
as it matured between May and November and the fruit of the wild
plun (bukanye; Herpethyllum caffrum) was made into a popular and 
15nutritious beer. Several other fruits of lesser importance were
also gathered fran the clan commonage and various plants such as
tomatoes, anions, pineapples, water-lily bulbs and water chestnuts,
were either gathered or cultivated. Trees growing on the communal
land provided wood for construction, carving implements and utensils,
mortars, canoes and especially, provided fuel for cooking and warmth.
Fresh and sea water fishing and the gathering of several kinds of
16crustacae and molluscs were practised throughout the year.
14. St. V. Erskine, 1869 journey, ms in EGS, 96; 1871-72 journey 
ms. in EGS, ch 6, p. 4; Fernandes das Neves, A Hunting Expedi­
tion to the Transvaal (London, 1879), 68; Natal Witness, 17 Dec., 
1898. For conventional granaries, see Junod, Life I, 315.
15. Junod, Life I, 395-399; II, 15-19; Sa Nogueira, Dicionario;
Keith Coates Palgrave, Trees of Central Africa; E. Palmer and 
N. Pitman, Trees of Southern Africa, 3 vols (Cape Town, 1973).
16. This interpretation differs frcm that of Hedges, who sees 
fishing as a largely coastal activity, Hedges, "Trade and 
Politics", 53-4. But for contrary evidence, cf. SMA 513/B 
Grandjean-Leresche, 5 Sept., 1894; Delegorgue, Afrique Australe, 
465; C. Hilliard, "Notes on the Manucosi or King George river", 
ms in EGS, p. 6; Schlaefli-Glardcn, "De Valdezia", 173; Freire
d1 Andrade, "Exploragao Portugues em Lourengo Marques e Inhara- 
bane", BSGL 13, 5, 1894, 311; Junod, "Tembe"'; BSNG., 1895, 
115-116; ZGH 796.892/96 Foxon, "Further information regarding 
Maputoland, British Protectorate"; Junod, Life I, 175; II, 
338-339.
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Fish were caught in tidal basket traps, in specially constructed
weirs, and, often frcm sailing boats, on a hook and line. The
collective fish hunt or tjeba often involved several hundred people
and was of great importance as it took place during the "hungry
period" at the end of the dry season, before the rains of November
and December replenished the lakes and before the flood waters
17came down frcm the Highveld.
Another product of the clan Is caimonage and an important source 
of protein, which often served as a famine-breaker, was the meat 
derived frcm hunting small game and fran foraging for large land- 
snails (achatina), tortoises, the large kwhale lizard and locusts.
Men who hunted game in order to provide food for their families 
were distinguished as hloti, frcm the professional hunters of the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland. They generally hunted in the dry winter 
season when bush cover was lew and when the movement of wild animals 
was restricted by the seasonal shortage of ground water and pala­
table grasses. This was also the season when male labour could be 
spared fran agricultural activities and when the threat posed by 
malaria, tick-bite fever and dysentery, together with the barrier 
presented by rain-swollen rivers, was minimized. Game was hunted 
not only for meat but also for skins and the animal fat used as a 
soap and in cleansing and softening hides.
Cattle were pastured on the clan ccmmonage and were an impor­
tant bridewealth medium whose ritual slaughter on special occasions
18brought prestige to their owners. But their ultimate importance 
lay in their "convertability" to beef during times of famine.
Cattle provided milk, hide for shields, thongs, skins, cleansing fat, 
horns, dung fertilizer and a dung cement used in the construction of hut 
floors and walls. Although beef was a prized famine-breaker and 
alternative to cultivated crops, in that cattle'could be moved to 
available water resources, the ecology and political geography of 
the Delagoa Bay hinterland severely limited cattle-keeping.
A lack of ground water in the dry sandy soil areas restricted 
cattle to the neighbourhood of seasonal or perennial water points.
Tidal or fresh water swamp grasslands provided particularly good
17. Jeannert, "Les Ma-Khoca", BSNG, 1895, 127; Junod, Life II, 
85-88; see also H.P. Braatvedt, Roaming Zululand with a Native 
Ccmmissioner, (Pietermaritzburg, 1949), 106.
18. Berthoud-Junod, Lettres, 250; AHU M09., 2a Rep., pasta 9, 
Relatorio de Freire d'Andrade, 1891, p. 41; Junod, Life I, 48, 
61, 369; II, 413.
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pasture and attracted cattle frcm areas where sourveld pastures
19were burnt during the dry winter months. But the centralization 
of cattle around water points made them more susceptible to raiding 
parties, disease and tsetse fly.
Tsetse was endemic to the Delagoa Bay hinterland; trypanoso­
miasis was carried by a blood parasite, or trypanosane, which was 
injected by the tsetse fly into a living vector. Five species of 
tsetse, each adapted to a specific floral and faunal environment, 
existed in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. The most virulent and 
widespread species was that of Glossina morsitans which lived
essentially off ungulates rather than the water and bush cover
20favoured by the other species. Clearing tsetse frcm an area
required the extermination of those wild animals which served as
vectors for the trypanosane and the clearing of the floral habitat
of the tsetse fly. As each beast needed 12 acres of pasture, bush
clearance was a labour intensive operation which was traditionally
hindered by the practice of slash and bum agriculture in the drier
21areas where land was often left fallow for two year periods.
The area occupied by the tsetse fly also changed due to normal
seasonal, as well as severe environmental, adjustments brought on
by drought or flooding. Nineteenth century observers felt that
tsetse infestation had expanded as pastures reverted to bush and
woodland following the extensive loss of cattle to the Ncpni
invaders during the 1820s and 1830s. Because of the ease with which
tsetse flies moved and multiplied, trypanosomiasis at times took on
22epidemic proportions and could cause the depopulation of an area.
19. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud, "L'Etat du Littoral", Sept., 1887. Oral 
testimony of A.J. Roberts who lived in Lourenco Marques during 
1887-88 in W. Punt, Louis Trigardt se Laatste'skof, 122, 125.
20. Jaime Dias, "Qual seria o status glossinioo no territorio de 
Mogambique, ao sul do Rio Limpopo anteriormente a grande 
panzootia de peste bovine de 1896?" In Bol. Soc. Estudos Moc., 
1961, 128; H.E. Hornby, "Report on tsetsefly problems of Maputo", 
Anais do Instituto de Medicina Tropical, 1947, vol 4; D. Bruce, 
Preliminary Report on the tsetse-fly disease or nagana in 
Zululand, (Ubcmbo, 1895H
21. St. V. Erskine, 1869 ms., 106,110; Bishop D. McKenzie, diary June- 
July 1881 in anon., Missionary Life of Douglas McKenzie, 13;
BO 20. 14 May 1887 "Relattfrio do Excursao agricola ao Districto 
de Lourengo Marques"; Leslie, Among the Zulus and the Amatongas, 
259; ZA 27 Saunders to Res. Comm. Zululand 8 July 1895; T.
Baines, The Gold Regions of South-eastern Africa, 153.
22. St. V. Erskine, 1874-5 ms., ch 1, p. 3; SMA 1255/A; E. Rosset, 
"Voyage au Limpopo", July-Aug., 1894; C. Fuller, Louis Trigardt's 
trek across the Drakensberg 1837-38, ed. L. Fouche, 141-142, 367, 
333.
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But the presence of trypanosaniasis did not everywhere exclude
cattle keeping, nor did it entirely preclude a local trade in cattle
or their importation into the area, for the flies lived in belts
23or patches which could be circumvented by knowledgeable guides.
Other, generally tick-borne, diseases such as gall-sickness,
heartwater and biliary fever exhibited a dynamism similar to
trypanosaniasis because tick infestation is highest during sunnier.
Mortality was especially high during periods of drought when the
24animals' resistance to disease was weakened. These habitual
threats to cattle, and hence to beef and milk as sources of food,
were overshadcwed during the second half of the nineteenth century
by war and drought; scourges which laid the basis for the great
epizootics of the period. Because cattle were highly visible,
mobile and valuable they constituted an ideal form of booty for any
raiding party. Because of this, milk was an unreliable nutrient
and people, especially during periods of political uncertainty,
preferred to keep pigs and fowls, which were food taboos of most
Nguni speakers, as well as goats, all of which were resistant to 
25trypanosaniasis. It becanes clear that an inherent imbalance 
existed between man and his environment in the 19th century Delagoa 
Bay hinterland and the ability of people equipped with a limited 
technology to transform nature for the cwn purposes by means of 
their productive labour was severely restricted.
The Precariousness of Food Production
The precariousness of agricultural production and cattle- 
keeping was constantly alluded to by Portuguese officials, mission­
aries and travellers.
After reaping good harvests in 1860-61 which resulted in a small
23. N. Isaacs, Travels and Adventures in eastern Africa, 59; SNA 
1/1/13 Dunn to SNA, 12 Jan., 1863; AHCJ. Mog., pasta 9, 2a Rep.,
Freire de Andrade Report, 1891; FO 63/1317 Consul to FO, 4 Aug.,
1896; KCL., Arthur Richter in voi Wissel, 9. See also note 185, p. 256.
24. M.W. Henning, Animal Diseases in South Africa, 276-296. Biliary 
was confined to horses and dogs.
25. Fynn, Diary, 46; Struthers, "Hunting journal", 7 June 1854, 89;
6 July 1855, see also BMSAS 94, Feb., 1891, 197.
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26export of cereals, the Delagoa Bay hinterland was in 1862 struck
by the widespread dought affecting all of southern Africa. The
drought soon took on famine proportions in those areas where it was
accompanied by the ravages of the Gaza civil war. According to the
Governor of Lourengo Marques the drought was marked by a "great
loss of foodstuffs for, despite the previous year's good crops,
27famine was worsened by war." Oral testimony collected 38 years 
later recalled that "During the civil war certain parts of Khosen 
were in a continual state of devastation. They speak of a famine 
which lasted five years (during which) the most hardy were dis-
28couraged frcm working in fields which they would see devastated."
The rocketing cost of food at Lourengo Marques was indicative of
the general shortage of food during the drought. Frcm May 1862 to
October 1863 the price of millet at the settlement rose frcm $172
to $590 per panja. The price of maize climbed from $172 in May 1862
29to $690 in October 1864 and to 1$150 per panja in May 1865.
The devastation caused by drought and the civil war was worsen­
ed by the advance of a strain of cattle peripneumonia, which had 
arrived at the Cape in 1854 and which had spread to the Zoutpans- 
berg by the following year. ^  Probably because of problems 
encountered in crossing the tsetse belt, this disease only reached 
the Delagoa Bay hinterland in 1861. By August 1862 the Governor of 
Lourengo Marques reported that peripneumonia had killed "almost all"
26. Seme 333 panjas of "mantimento catreal", which was distinguished 
frcm "mexoeira", was exported in 1861 and 1862. A panja was a 
measure of capacity for dry goods used in Mozambique equal to 
27,71 litres, which is 1,29 litres more than 3 pedes (6 gallons) 
or 3/4 bushel. In seme areas a panja was measured as 30 litres.
BO 18. 5 May 1860, 78; BO 20. 18 May 1861; BO 22. 31 May 1862.
27. AHU. Mog., CG. pasta 21 GLourengo Marques to GGM 8 Feb., 1863;
ACU 1864 Fernandes das Neves, "Noticia de uma cagada em Inhambane" 
61; Ibid., "Noticias do anno 1862", 59; BO 32. 27 Dec., 1862,
GInh. to GGM 21 Nov., 1862; BO 22. 30 May 1863.
28. SMA 467 Grandjean, 1890.
29. BO 40. 5 Oct., 1861; BO 22. 31 May 1862; BO 42. 17 Oct., 1863;
BO 42. 15 Oct., 1864; BO 19. 13 May 1865. The price per panja 
of meixoeira (millet) and maize fell to $135 and $128 in 1866- 
67, BO 22, 22 May 1869.
30. SS 7. E827/55 Landdrost Zoutpansberg to Kmdt. Gen., 1 June 1855;
Ibid., R 851/55 26 June 1855.
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the cattle in the area. A cattle epidemic, probably that of
1862-3, was thought responsible for the destruction of the original
31cattle breed on the lower Limpopo. By February 1863 1 lungsickness"
had killed more than 3 000 cattle in the territory around Lourengo
Marques claimed by the Portuguese and a further 5 000 cattle were
32thought to have died because of the. drought and war.
The cattle losses caused by the epizootic were increased when
in February 1862 Unzila lost most of his cattle to the forces led
33by Mawewe and his Swazi allies. The uncertain food situation
caused by the drought and cattle epidemic constituted a major
reason for Umzila's move northwards and his pillage of the area
34south of the Zambezi. But with Umzila in the north, Mawewe and
the Swazi were able to replenish their lungsickness-ravaged herds
by raiding large numbers of cattle frcm Umzila's allies in the
Delagoa Bay hinterland. These raids discouraged cattle-keeping
for, as one traveller was told in 1869, "our ivory we can hide,
35but our cattle we cannot." As late as 1880, at least one chief
living in the vicinity of Lourengo Marques refused to keep cattle
36for the fear that they would attract Swazi raiders. Before the
Zulu defeat of 1879 and the civil war of 1883, similar fears were
expressed by people living to the south of Lourengo Marques who
felt that any accunulation of cattle would merely attract Zulu
37tribute gatherers. By the mid-1860s it was recognized that the
31. AHU. Mog., 0G. pasta 21. GLM to GCM, 13 Aug., 1862 encl. in 
CG to MSMD 14 Oct., 1862; St. V. Erskine, 1871-2 ms. in KGS., 
ch 8 p 7.
32. AHU. Mog., CG. pasta 21. GLourengo Marques to ^ GGM 8 Feb., 1863.
33. It was reported that the white cattle taken from Umzila alone 
filled the Swazi king's cattle kraals, H. Merensky, Erinnerungen 
aus dan Missionsleben im Transvaal, (Berlin, 1899), 83; AHU.
Mog., pasta 19, GGM to MSMU, 28 May, 1862.
34. SNA 1/1/96 encl. in no 73, "Statements of...messenger of Umzila", 
16 May 1870; AHU. MogjCGpasta 21, GInh to GG, 16 Jan., 1863, 
encl. in GGM to MSMU, 8 Aug., 1863.
35. St. V. Erskine, 1869 ms. in KGS., 244; AHU. Mog., CG. GGM to 
MSMU., 28 June 1862.
36. WUL., Am Zulu Miss., Pinkerton diary, 4 Aug., 1880.
37. BPP 1890 C.-6200 Saunders to SNA 17 Nov., 1887; Fynn, Diary, 46.
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drought and epizootic had caused men to concentrate on hunting as
a source of food and had forced many others, who had formerly
supplied the settlement with food and cattle, to seek work in Natal.
Over the next few years the African population continued to supply
food to the settlement and visiting ships, but little was left for 
38export. Our knowledge of food production in the vicinity of
lourenco Marques becomes clearer from 1875, after which an annual,
and at times monthly, report was made on agricultural conditions
affecting the territory claimed by the Portuguese.
After a good harvest in 1875, sufficient maize was produced
39to allow the export of 44 061 kilos, worth £5 377, to Natal.
But summer rains later that year were poor in most areas, except
for Maputo land and the upper Nkanati, the consequent "paralysis" of
agriculture resulted in high food prices in Lourengo Marques in 1876
and the Governor of the settlement feared a year of "disastrous 
40famine." By December 1876 the widespread drought affecting
southern Africa had gripped the Delagoa Bay area; cereal cultivation
came to a standstill and people had to exist on mafureira almonds
and venison. Because of the drought, many men sought wage labour
in Natal and the Cape. In January 1877 it was reported that people
were abandoning cultivation altogether and had turned to gathering
wild fruits; food was imported from Mozambique Island and Zanzibar,
41but only the wealthy could afford to buy it. But in February
1877 rain fell, by April the food crisis was over and the harvest
was large enough for 37 908 litres or 1 067 bushels of maize to
be exported, of which 7 840 kilos, worth £857 was sent to Natal.
This abundant harvest allowed the Governor to report that, along
with mafureira almonds, maize was the major export of Lourengo 
42Marques in 1877. But the successes of 1877 were threatened by poor
38. ACU., GEM 15 April 1865, Report for 1964, p 97; BO 41. 14 Oct., 
1866, GEM to GGVL 13 Sept., 1866. In 1866-67 exports of rice, 
maize and millet amounted to 5 258$586 (£1 168, 10s). BO 22.
22 May 1869.
39. NBB 1875, "Imports and exports". The total maize exports for 
1875 were declared as 10 000 pahjas (277 100 litres or 7 864 
bushels). BO 27, 3 July 1875.
40. BO 7. 14 Feb., 1876; BO 15., 10 April, 1876; BO 46. 13 Nov., 1876.
41. BO 6. 5 Feb., 1877.
42. NBB 1877 "Imports and exports," BO 13. 25 March 1877; BO 45.
5 Nov., 1877.
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rains in the summer of 1877/78. This caused the price of cereals 
to rise in lourengo Marques in December and the price only declined 
in March as new cereals entered the market. By April the harvest 
had been successful enough to provide a healthy volume of maize
43exports which included 10 920 kilos valued at £1 250, for Natal.
High summer temperatures and lack of seasonal rain at the end of
1878 killed all the seeds planted in anticipation of the October
rains and dried up the cattle pastures. Favourable rains in
November and succeeding months allowed seeds to be rescwn and, by
44March 1879, food prices dropped after a good harvest. Irregular
bainfall continued to be a major problem when poor rains at the end
of 1879 resulted in a food shortage in 1880 which was only alle-
45viated by late rains in January, February and March of 1881. In
that year many pigs died for the first time from trichinosis, an
46infestation of the body with the larvae of the trichina worm.
Seasonal rains in October and November 1881 produced good crops
but this was followed by food shortages brought on by poor rainfall
47during the following two summers. The sunrner of 1884-85 produced
good rains and crops but by Decenber part of the maize crop had
been lost due to unseasanal rain and the following month the Governor
described the food situation around the settlement as "precarious"
because of insufficient rain. By April 1886 lack of rain had
limited the amount of maize harvested and people fell back on more
48hardy crops such as groundnuts, millet, sorghum and beans. At the 
end of 1886 sowing was withheld because of late rains and during the 
sunnier of 1886/87 agriculture was reported to be "completely 
stagnant". Poor early rains during the following sunnier resulted
43. BO 11, 18 March 1878; BO 20, 20 May 1878; BO 22, 3 June 1878;
NBB 1878, "Imports". The official maize export was recorded as 
300 588 litres (approx. 8 500 bushels).
44. BO 8, 24 Feb., 1879; BO 11, 17 March, 1879; BO 20, 19 May 1879; 
BO 21, 26 May 1879 .
45. BO 11. 14 March 1881.
46. Antonio Ferreira, "Relatorio do Servigo de Saude de Lourengo 
Marques, 1886" in Archives Medioo-Coloniaes, 4, 1890, 74.
47. BO 51. 17 Dec., 1881; BO 25. 10 June 1882; BO 29. 8 July 1882;
BO 6. 9 Feb., 1884; BO 24. 14 June 1884; BO 45. 8 Nov., 1884.
48. BO 2. 10 Jan., 1885; BO 7. 13 Feb., 1886; BO 11. 13 March 1886; 
BO 16. 17 April 1886; BO 23. 5 June 1886.
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49in the loss of the first crop.
When the Governor of Lourengo Marques stopped his agricultural
reports in 1888, it was generally regarded that Lourenco Marques
50'was the poorest agricultural district in Mozambique. Unpredict­
able agricultural production was partially offset by an increase 
in cattle herds brought about by the shooting out of those animals 
which acted as vectors of trypanoscmiasis.
Reports sent by Swiss missionaries frcm their station on the 
coastal hills bordering the lover Nkcmati flood plains, 22 kilo­
metres north of Lourengo Marques, give a good impression of food 
production in that area after 1887. When unseasonal rain fell in 
August of that year, crops were hastily planted and maize grew to 
a height of one metre before drying an the stalk and dying for lack 
of rain. Drought conditions began to emerge in September and October
1887 and continued when maize, planted in spring 1888, dried on the 
52stalk. Insufficient rain resulted in the loss of three quarters 
of the crop of 1888/89 and the importation of maize from Natal at 
three to five times the Lourengo Marques price. At the end of 
the dry winter of 1889 the missionary at Rikatla lamented that,
"For the last 15 months we have had only 3 to 4 days of 
rain - there is no more maize, nor any other provisions 
in the country. The inhabitants are wandering far and wide 
in search of (food). In (Lourenco Marques) where maize is 
imported, it sells at 3 tiroes its usual price. The fields 
have produced nothing. "53
49. BO 42. 16 Oct., 1886; BO 40. 2 Oct., 1886; BO 49. 3 Dec., 1887; 
BO 2. 14 Jan., 1888; SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud to Leresche 7 Oct., 
1887; Berthoud to Leresche 14 Nov., 1887; 497/D Paul Berthoud to 
Leresche 4 Feb., 1888; BO 3. 21 Jan., 1888.
50. AHU. Mog., Diversos, caixa 2, "Relatorio acerca de alguns portos 
de Provingia de Mogambique", Angus to Castilho 12 March 1883;
AHU. Moc., 2a Rep., pasta 3, Machado memo, 10 Nov., 1885.
51. BO 22. 14 May 1887, "Excursao Agrioola do Districto de Lourengo 
Marques" by the provincial agronanist, March 1887. See especially 
pp. 272-274.
52. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud "L'£tat du littoral", Sept., 1887; Paul 
Berthoud, BMSAS, Feb., 1888; Grandjean, 15 Jan., 1889 in BMSAS, 
^pril 1889.
53. SMA 502/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche 28 Aug., 1889 also in BMSAS,
Oct., 1889; Paul Berthoud estimated the price of maize to have
quintupled by the 5 April 1889. L'Afrique Exploree et Civilizee,
X, 1889; BO 27. 6 July 1889.
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As the rains failed again, people were reduced to gathering
fruit and many travelled fran Rikatla to the fertile mai ze-producing
54areas on the lower and middle Nkeinati in order to buy food. But
famine conditions existed even in the Nkomati flood plain where, as
elsewhere, people were reduced to eating wild fruit and roots. The
inaccessibility of maize in Khosen was partly attributable to the
sale by local producers, imbued with a more cyclical sense of time,
of their crops to Banyan merchants. These traders, who had spread
throughout the area during the previous decade, used their knowledge
of wider markets and octnmmications to speculate in foodstuffs by
buying up all surplus maize and then selling it for three to four
times it original purchase price. Maize had also to be imported
55fran the United States.
This famine of the late 1880s, which was part of a more wide­
spread drought affecting most of southern Africa, ended suddenly
c/r
with torrential downpours in February 1890. Yet by September
Nondwane was again "as dry as is possible" and by the following
year drought had brought to the area "conditions touching on 
57famine." In Khosen, recently inundated with inmigrants brought
south by Gungunyana, matters were far worse. In 1891 a Swiss
missionary stationed on the Nkcxnati bend renarked on the "cruel
suffering" that had been brought to the area by the drought of that
/ year. In June 1892 food was rare and expensive in Khosen and the
58area was reported to be in "dire straits". By September the 
missionary reported that
54. SMA 503/A Grand jean to Leresche 15 Nov., 1889; SMA 503/B Grand jean 
to Conseil, 9 Sept., 1889.
55. Grand jean, "Voyage a Antioka", BMSAS, Dec., 1889, 337? Grand jean, 
16 Nov., 1889 in BMSAS, Feb., 1890. SMA 1256/A Paul Berthoud, 
"Marche sur 1'Oeuvre.. 1 8 8 9 .  The growth of Banyan trade is 
treated on pp • 287-293.
56. SMA 502/B Grand jean to Leresche, Feb., 1890; SMA 502/C Junod 
to Leresche, 13 Feb., 1890.
57. SMA 502/C Junod to Leresche 16 Sept., 1890; Paul Berthoud, 
L'Afrique Exploree et Civilizee, XIV, 1893.
58. SMA 467 Grandjean, 12 June 1892; SMA 1256/A Grand jean, "Rapport
sur l'oeuvre missionaire, 1892", Grandjean, "Voyage a Antioka",
4 Aug., 1892 in BMSAS 1892, 119.
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"Most people are reduced to eating only grass and wild fruit 
or to preparing the pith of certain trees. Over half the 
population is constantly travelling in order to buy provi­
sions where they are still available."
All supplies of maize had been consumed and there was no seed left 
59for planting. The British Consul reported from Lourengo Marques
that the entire maize crop had failed due to the drought of 1891/92
60and that the African population was "on the verge of starvation".
Probably because the drought reduced pasturage and thus
limited the resistance of cattle to disease, an epizootic swept
through the Delagoa Bay hinterland where it killed large numbers of 
61cattle in 1891. Although one observer thought the disease to be 
lungsickness it was generally described as a "liver disease". This 
indicates that the epizootic was redwater or Texas fever, one of 
the symptoms of which is an enlarged and swollen liver. This 
disease had spread through southern Africa in the 1870s and, like 
the epizootic of 1862/63, took several years to penetrate the tsetse
W 04- 62belt.
The drought ended when rain fell in Khosen in September and
more generally throughout the area in October 1892; seeds were
planted early in Khosen and it was hoped that a first crop would be
harvested in December, two months before the rest of the Delagoa 
63Bay hinterland. In January 1893 Khosen celebrated the end of
the famine, but within days torrential rains flooded the riverine
plains of the Delagoa Bay hinterland and in January and February
64the country experienced "the worst floods in living memory." In 
Lourenco Marques precipitation in those two months reached 495 
millimetres (19.48 inches) and 500 millimetres (19.6 inches) and 
on the lower Nkomati it was recorded as 462 millimetres (18.18 inches) 
and 508 millimetres (19.9 inches) (see fig11376 4 ) Communications
59. SMA 872/E Grandjean to Leresche 9 Sept., 1892.
60. FD 84/2224 Consul Lourengo Marques to FO, 4 April 1892.
61. AHU., Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade, 1891, p. 46.
62. SMA 484/B Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 9 March 1892; SMA 485/B 
Junod, "Rapport sur Rikatla", 1891; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 9, 
Freire de Andrade, 1891 report, p. 46; Natal Mercury, 22, 23 
April, 1873. For "redwater-fever" and its history see Henning, 
Animal Diseases, 261-277.
63. SMA 484/B Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 7 Sept., 1892; SMA 484/B 
Berthoud to Leresche, 14 Oct., 1892; SMA 872/E Grandjean to 
Leresche, 22 Oct., 1892.
64. SMA 467 Granjean to Leresche, 1 Oct., 1893.
65. Paul Berthoud, 16 March 1893 in L'Afrique Exploree et Civilizee,
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were broken and part of the harvest was lost when fields, roads 
and rivers were submerged by flood waters.
Figure No. 4 
Rainfall Deviation in Millimetres
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Recorded 1891/2 to 1894/5 in Nondwane and 1909/10 to 1942/3 in 
Lourengo Marques.
(Source: Junod,"Le Climat de la Baie de Delagoa", Bull. Soc. Sci. 
Naturelles de Neuchatel, XXV, 1897; Ario Lobo Azevedo, 0 Clima de 
Mozambique e a Agricultura, 96.)
Due to the floods famine renained a threat and food was rare
and costly during the October-November sowing season and before the 
66
harvest. In Khosen the crops that emerged after good seasonal rain
XXV, 1893; SMA 1760 Grandjean diary 4-24 Jan., 1893.
66. SMA 528/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 4 Feb., 1893; Ibid., 14 Feb., 
1893; SMA 1254/A Paul Berthoud, "Rapport de la Conference du 
littoral...en 1893"; Ibid., "Rapport sur la station de Lourenco 
Marques, 1893"; Grandjean, "Antioka", 2 March 1893 in BMSAS, 1893, 
274; SMA 485/B Junod to Leresche, 16 Dec., 1892; SMA 513 *
Grandjean to Leresche 2 March 1893; see also SMA 1254/B G. Liengme, 
"Expedition et sejour a Mandlakazi", May-Sept., 1893.
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67at the end of 1894, were destroyed by locusts in December. In
February 1895 twelve days of rain resulted in flood conditions in
Khosen where, "the fields of maize are completely covered in water,
it is inpossible to try and save the grain, it would hardly be
worthwhile. And new our people, who thought they were dying
because of the drought, are distraught because there is too much 
68water." Matters were made worse by the invasion of Khosen by
five waves of locusts which in April and May "ravaged the greater
69part of the fields that we had sewn anew following the flood."
Locusts and drought also destroyed the crops in the Lourengo Marques
70area and trebled the price of maize. But in Khosen the famine
was so bad that it was reported in May 1895 that parents were
"selling" or pawning their children for £4-5 while others sought relief in 
71wage labour. Rain failed to fall over the summer of 1895/96,
movement was made difficult during ahd after the Luso-Gaza war,
locusts continued to plague the area and, because of the drought,
wild animals were drawn to settlements where they ravaged hardy
72crops like sweet potatoes. North of the Limpopo famine was one
of the major causes for the inability of the Gaza to repulse the
\
Portuguese invasion for, as the Gaza army had no ocumisariate, its
full mobilisation was severely restricted by the inability of the
73countryside to support a heavy concentration of soldiers. In the Tembe-
67. SMA 573/B Grandjean to Leresche, 5 Dec., 1894.
68. Perrenoud, "Antioka" 10 Feb., 1895 in BMSAS, June 1895. See also
SMA 438/A Liengme to Leresche, 18 Feb., 1895; SMA 514 Grandjean
to Leresche, 4 April 1895.
69. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 27 May 1895; Grandjean, "Antioka"
25 May 1895 in BMSAS, Aug., 1895, 362.
70. SMA 517/B Junod to Leresche, 28 June 1895. Junod, Life II, 444.
71. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 27 May 1895. The people of the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland often turned to voluntary enslavement
and the pawning of children in times of famine. See p. 316, note 45.
72. SMA 514 Grandjean to Leresche, 18 Aug., 1895; Ibid., Grandjean
to Renevier, 21 Oct., 1895; SMA 515/C Jacques to sec., Mission 
Romande, 1 Oct., 1895; SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier, 26 Dec.,
1895; Ibid., 24 June, 1895; Ibid., 3 March, 9 July, 15 Aug.,
24 Nov., 1896; SMA 528/C Paul Berthoud to Conseil de la Mission,
26 Nov., 1896; ZA 27 "Report of the Amatonga Border Ccmmission",
24 Dec., 1896.
73. Junod, "Littoral"; BMSAS, 12 April 1895, 279; Liengme, "Journal 
a Mandlakazi", BMSAS, 119, 1895, 252-63; Idem., "Un Potentat 
Africain", 99-100.
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Maputo areas where the maize crop had been destroyed by drought
and locusts, people were obliged to subsist on cassava, sweet
potatoes, fcwls and eggs. In most areas people lived from hunting,
fishing and gathering and with the money earned fran wage labour,
74they bought expensive inported food.
The drought was eventually broken by late simmer rains in early 
751897. But in several areas crops not destroyed during the second
Luso-Gaza war were ravaged by locusts. In August famine returned
to Nondwane where several people died of starvation and in fertile
Khosen the population had to fall back, once again, upon sweet
76potatoes as a drought-breaker.
The food situation worsened when Rinderpest, which had first 
reached the Delagoa Bay hinterland in 1896, achieved epidemic pro­
portions in July/August 1897. The epizootic destroyed large
numbers of cattle which were valuable not only as a source of nutrition
77but as a means of transporting food to famine areas. Rinderpest
also killed numerous wild animals, especially the ungulate vectors
of the Glossina morsitans species of tsetse fly. Thus although
the disease largely destroyed the sources of beef and venison
available to the people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, it also
78almost entirely ridded the area of trypanosomiasis. Starvation 
was inevitably accompanied by a drop in the birth-rate as lack of
74. SMA 517/B Junod to Leresche, 10 Oct., 1895; SMA 519/D Loze to 
Gonseil 25 Sept., 1896; LA 459 ZAR consular Report for 1896. 
Maize cost 22s per bag in Lourenco Marques in 1896, FO 63/1316 
Cons to FO 25 Jan., 1896. '
75. SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier 11 Jan., 1897.
76. SMA 501/A Eberhardt to Grandjean, 22 March 1897; Ibid., 3 May,
3 July, 6 Aug., 1897; SMA 496/A Paul Berthoud to Grandjean, 15
July 1897.
77. SSa 547 Ra4401 encl. in Ra3260/97 ZAR Cons to SS 14 Aug., 1897;
SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier 24 June, 1896; SMA 501/A
Eberhardt to Grandjean 29 July 1897; SMA 542/B Loze to Grandjean
4 Sept., 1897; Ibid., 27 Nov., 1897.
78. Claude Fuller, "Tsetse in the Transvaal", 63-64. 341-348; Dias, 
"Status glossinico"; R. du Toit, "Problems presented by the
control of tsetse flies in the Union of South Africa", SAJS, 
XLIII, July 1947. See also J. Stevenson-Hamilton, The Low Veld, 
(London, 1929), 65. Glossina austeni suffered a similar fate to 
G. morsitans. G. brevipaldis was less affected as it fed off 
hippos and G. pallidipes which fed off warthogs and bushpigs, 
rattained in sane parts of south-western Maputo.
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food induces amennorhea, a temporary sterility which acts as a
mechanism of involuntary contraception during a period of stress
79and serious food shortage.
Famine, Disease and Mortality
Death fran starvation was rare in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.
But patterns of famine and mortality were intimately linked as 
hunger gave rise to nutritional deficiencies which weakened hunan 
resistance to disease. Thus the irregularity of food production was 
mirrored by the regularity of ecological and epidemiological 
misfortunes.
The supply of food became more uncertain during times of war 
when people were pushed into infertile or unhealthy areas and when 
food stocks were ravaged. But malnutrition was regarded as less 
of a danger than the inevitable ensuing disease. This was graphically 
expressed by an ambassador, sent to Natal by Umzila in 1870, who 
stated that,
"It is hard to be always at war or ready for war. Death 
fran the assegai is invariably followed by worse death fran 
fever, for these two kinds of death are the constant compa­
nions one of the other. "80
The relationship between war, famine and disease was circular 
as disease was not only an outcome, but also a cause of war. Thus 
it was believed that "famine, locusts, drought and war...often go 
together.
Malaria and yellow fever, which was colloquially known as 
Delagoa Bay fever, constituted the two most effective barriers to 
any permanent colonization of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. These 
mosquito-bome diseases were endemic to the area and had decimated 
invading Zulu and Swazi armies and had instilled in neighbouring 
peoples an inherent fear of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, especially
79. Cf. Leroy Ladurie, "Tmennorhea in Tines of Famine" in Ladurie 
(ed), The Territory of the Historian, (Chicago, 1979).
80. SNA 1/1/96 encl. in no. 73, "Statement of Utizila's Messengers", 
16 Aug., 1870.
81. SMA 514. Grandjean to Leresche, 11 Feb., 1895.
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82in sunnier. Umzila recognized the protection afforded by his 
environment and referred to
"General Bush and General Fever and many more powerful 
generals besides in the form of diseases with which he 
could infect invading armies."83
Voortrekkers, European explorers, traders, hunters and especially 
the Portuguese in Lourengo Marques before the draining of the swamp 
around the settlement in 1877, suffered terrible losses fran 
"fevers".84
The indigenous inhabitants suffered less from malaria and
yellow fever than foreigners. This was partly because they had
knowledge of, and avoided, malarial areas and partly because,
through long experience, people had developed methods of treating
fevers. Consequently, sane contemporary observers felt that the
local population had built up a slight natural immunity to malaria
and yellav fever and that they were only severely affected in bad 
85years. Nevertheless many people, especially children, suffered
fran impaludism which lowered their resistance to other diseases,
86induced miscarriages and could result in death.
82. CSO 736.154 John Eunn to Col. Sec., 8 Jan., 1880; Fernando da 
Costa Leal, Uma Viagem na Africa Austral (Lisbon, 1943), 43;
C. de B. Webb and J. Wright (eds) James Stuart Archive, I, evidence 
Bikwayo, 64, 68; Bishop McKenzie, journal in The Net, Dec.,
1889; A.C. My burgh, The Tribes of the Barberton District, 77.
83. SNA 1/1/96 Erskine to Shepstcne, 30 Nov., 1872.
84. W.C. Baldwin, African Hunting fran Natal to the Zambezi, 1852- 
1860, 82, 90; GH 1053 Farrell to Col. Sec., 20 Aug., 1879;
Coqui, "Journey from Ohrigstadt to Delagoa Bay", in Pro RGS III, 
1859, 374; C. Fuller, "Tsetse in the Transvaal", 320-22.
Because of the malaria and tsetse on the eastern seaboard, most 
travellers journeyed northwards along the western edge of the 
Kalahari desert.
85. St. V. Erskine, 1869, RGS typescript, 40; St. V. Erskine, 1871-72 
RGS typescript, ch. 9, p 17; ZGH 796.2233/96 Dr Stephens to Res. 
Comm., 3 March 1896. L. Bostock, Malarial Fever; its causes and 
prevention (Lourengo Marques, 1905), 13-14. But cf. C. Louis 
Leipoldt, Bushveld Doctor (London, 1937), 229-30, who believed 
Africans in the eastern Transvaal suffered more from malaria 
than whites. Unlike malaria, yellow fever is non-recurrent and 
survival brings immunity.
86. CSO 665.4069/78 Statement of Qnango.. .messenger to Nozingile, 4 
June 1875; SMA 1256/A Grandjean "Rapport sur 1'oeuvre mission- 
air e" , 1892; JSA file 74, 67 evidence of Majuba. See also 
Hamilton-Stevenson, The Low Veld, 18.
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Unlike most other diseases malaria was not a class disease
related to malnutrition and poor living conditions and it counted
amongst its victims wives of both Gungunyana and the Maputo chief 
87Ngwanazi. Anopheles mosquitoes, which acted as host carriers
for the malarial blood parasites multiplied rapidly after heavy
88rains extended their ideally marshy breeding grounds. Thus 
following the heavy rains of early 1893, pools of stagnant water 
accumulated and fever broke out throughout the Delagoa Bay hinter­
land; in Lourenco Marques alone there were 228 deaths from fever
' 89that year, compared to 153 during the previous year. Malaria
and especially yellow fever were also spread by people who, in
seeking the most effective remedy to the diseases in flight from
the infected areas, transmitted the blood parasites to areas where
they were quickly spread by formerly uncontaminated anopheles
mosquitoes. Thus because of the facility with which the disease
moved and expanded, it was not unusual to find areas deserted due
90to sudden malarial infestation.
Sane areas of the Delagoa Bay hinterland were more malarial 
than others and people living on the eastern flank of the Lebanbos
91were scared of travelling to the fever-stricken coastal districts.
The lew-lying wet areas were particularly bad; Baines referred to 
Mato 11a as a malarial marsh and both travellers and local inhabi­
tants remarked on Maputo land, where malaria was particularly virulent
87. L'Afrique Exploree et Civilizee, XIII, 1892, 189; SPG., Charles 
Johnson Journal, "Expedition into Amatcngaland", Aug-Sept., 1895, 
part 1. Gungunyana was obliged to move his Bilene capital after 
six of his wives died of fever.
/
88. SMA 435/F Dr G. Liengme to Leresche, 16 Oct., 1891; Junod, 
"Rikatla", 18 Feb., 1893 in BMSAS, 108, April, 1893; Paul 
Berthoud, 16 March 1893 in L'Afrique Exploree et Civilizee, XIV, 
1893; W.H.C. Malton, The Story of Lebombo (London, 1902) , 76;
E. & H. W(ilkinson), Soldiers of the Gross in Zululand (London, 
1906) , 110-111; Mrs Wilkinson, A Lady's Travels in Zululand 
(London, 1882), 186.
89. BPP. 1895, Trade Report for Lourengo Marques, 55; SMA 1254/B 
Henri Berthoud, "Rapport de la Conference du Littoral en 1893"; 
SMA 528/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 19 June 1893. See also 
Machado, "Chemin de fer de Lourengo Marques & Pretoria", BSGL,
5, 2, 1885, 266.
90. ZGH 796.2233/96 Dr Stephens to Res. Ceram., 3 March 1896; ZGH 
796.892/96 Foxon to Res. Gonm. "Information regarding the 
Portuguese Protectorate of Maputoland"; E. & H. W(ilkinson), 
Soldiers of the Cross, 111.
91. BO 10, 1871, p 40.
.......................... 236
between the first rains in October/November and the onset of winter 
92in May/June.
The worst epidemic, as opposed to endemic, disease to inflict
the Delagoa Bay hinterland was smallpox which swept through the area
at least four times in the thirty years following 1862. In that
year the "small pox of Mawewe" which broke out in May, was by
August reported to have "laid waste the negro population" and to
have killed "hundreds of blacks and sane whites" in the Crown
93
Lands claimed by the Portuguese. The Lourenco Marques physician
in his report for 1862 remarked on the unhygienic conditions in
the settlement where, because of smallpox, "the blacks were burying
the natives in backyards or casting them onto the beach and when
they buried them, they only covered the corpses with a light
layer of soil." The springs were dirty and the cemetery a source 
94of filth. By May 1863 the epidemic had retreated to the interior
95where it caused a further great loss of life. After re-emerging
96briefly in 1877/78, smallpox entered Lourenco Marques from
Zanzibar in 1882. In the interior it was reported that "whole
villages died" while on the coast "few Europeans were attacked,
but a large number of native were, many fatally, and this gave rise
97to the panic that spread amongst them during the plague."
Africans practised variolation and quarantined homesteads and
92. T. Baines, The gold regions, 109; BPP, 1890, LII Saunders to 
Shepstone, Nov., 1887, p 48; CSO 665.4069/78 Statement of 
Umango, 4 June 1875. In the Lowveld the November-May period was 
considered "suicidal” and only July and August were free of 
malaria, H. Raddatz, "Das Kaffemland des Untem Olifant",
Peterman's Geogr. Mitteilungen, 1886, 54.
93. AHU. Mog., CG., pasta 21 GLM to QGM 13 Aug., 1862 in GG to MSMU 
14 Oct., 1862; SNA 1/1/12 Foohey to SNA 13 Nov., 1862; H.A.
Junod, "Native custans in relation to smallpox amcngst the Ba- 
Ronga", SAJS, July 1914, 1; Junod, Life, II, 463.
94. Eduardo de Noronho, O Districto de Lourengo Marques e a Africa 
do Sul, (Lourengo Marques, 1895) , 157.
95. BO 21, 25 May 1863.
96. L'Afrique Exploree et Civilizee, XIII, 1892, 185.
97. Noronho, O Districto de Lourengo Marques, 159; Adolpho yasconcellos, 
"Dos mappas estatisticos can relagJo ao movimento conmercial no 
districto de Lourenco Marques, durante o anno de 1884", Bol. Soc. 
Geogr. Canmerical do Porto, 1886, 64; H.P.N. Muller, Een Bezoek
aan de Delagoa-baai en die Lydeburgsche goudvelden (Haarlem, 1887),
19.
237
chief dans in an attempt to stamp out the epidemic. The disease
was only partly contained by the use of a vaccine brought from
Durban, and continued to infect the area as late as August 
981884. A final small pox epidemic broke out in August 1890.
Missionary sources estimated that it caused the death of several
99hundred Africans and that "whole villages have been destroyed."
It was claimed that the effects of the epidemic had been worsened
by local variolation practices.A further disease that could
take epidemic proportions was typhoid fever, which was thought! to
101have passed through Khosen in 1888.
After "climatic and malarial diseases", respiratory problems
such as tuberculosis, pneumonia, pleurisy and bronchitis were the
most endemic forms of illness in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. All
bronchial and pulmonary infections were encouraged by nutritional
deficiencies, poor hygiene and wet sunmer weather. Their incidence
102increased markedly with migrant labour to the mines.
Venereal diseases spread rapidly throughout the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland during the last half of the 19th century. Syphilis 
had existed at Lourengo Marques for many years but it only became 
endemic in the interior through the agency of migrant labourers 
and, with the growth of a rootless workforce at Lourengo Marques,
98. BO 20. 19 May 1883? CSO 921.3210/83. Vice consul, Delagoa Bay 
to Ass. Col. Sec., 11 Aug., 1883; SS 955.R2996 Native Ccmm., 
Spelonken to Landdrost Zoutpansberg, 24 June 1882; Ibid., 6 
Aug., 1884.
99. SMA 484/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 25 May 1891; 485/B Junod,
"Rikatla", 1891; SMA 485/A Junod to Leresche, 15 Aug., 1891; 
Paul Berthoud 16 Nov., 1891, L’Afrique Exploree et Civilizee, 
XIII, 1892.
100. G. Liengme, "L’emploi de la vaccine a la Baie de Delagoa" in 
L’Afrique Exploree et Civilizee, XII, 1892; SMA 485/A Junod, 
"Remarques sur l’epidemie de variole".
101.SMA 497/E Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 18 Oct., 1888? Noronho, 
Districto de Lourenco Marques, 149.
102. SMA 82/H Dr Liengme, "La Conference du Littoral", 1892; SMA 
1256/A Grandjean, "Rapport sur 1'oeuvre", 1892; Ferreira, 
"Relatorio de Servigo de Saude de Lourengo Marques, 1886", 60, 
71; Noronho, O Districto de Loureng Marques, 149, 158, 163? 
Junod, Life, II, 474-75.
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103the ccmmoditization of sex. In 1887 it crossed the Nkcmati and
entered Khosen and by the early 1890s it had spread throughout most
104of the Delagoa Bay hinterland and was greatly feared. Gonorrhea 
was only introduced with the construction of the Delagoa Bay rail­
way but soon became known as "the disease which crushes the
105villages" because of its fertility-inhibiting nature.
Other debilitating and widespread diseases that inflicted the
area were measles, bilharzia, tick-bite fever, conjunctivitis and
trachcma. Gastro-Intestinal deficiencies called "dysentery" were
especially prevalent during the hunger period before the sunmer
rains when people were obliged to consume less digestible and more
106contaminated foods and use polluted water. The tropical or leg
ulcers kncwn as leishmaniasis were caused by parasites which bored
into feet and legs causing sores and gangrene. Endemic to the area,
these parasites were perhaps related to sand fleas (jiggers or
Pulex penetrans) which entered the area in the late 1870s or 1880s.
Sand fleas caused body swelling which could result in death and
107their infestation of an area expanded rapidly in surrmer. Pigs
infected by the protozoal filaria worm suffered from trichinosis
and, through the consumption by humans of contaminated pork, this
108resulted in elephantiasis.
Thus, life was made precarious by nutritional problems and 
related diseases. A British official passing through Maputoland in
103. SMA 1256/A Grandjean "Rapport sur L'oeuvre, 1892"; Junod, Life,
I, 206, 355j II, 610. But cf. Junod on more "traditional" means 
of transmitting venereal diseases, Life, 1, 204-5. The Ronga 
and Tsonga words for syphilis (buba and vuva) are derived from 
the Portuguese word for a small skin tumor (buba).
104. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud, "L'etat du Littoral", Sept., 1887;
SMA 484/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 26 May 1891; Junod, Life 
I, 206.
105. Junod, Life, II, 476.
106. SMA 435 Liengme to Leresche, 27 July 1891; SMA 82/H Liengme, "La 
Conference du Littoral", 1892; Ferreira, "Relatorio de Servico
de Saude, 1886", 60, 70; Noronho, 0 Districto de Lourengo Marques, 
158; Junod, Life, II, 474.
107. Ferreira, "Relatorio de Servigo de Saude, 1886", 72; BPP 1890 
c.6200 Zamhili to Shepstone, 1 March 1889. The jigger flea 
(tekenya) was introduced into Zululand from Mocambique, Doke 
and Vilikazi, Zulu-English Dictionary.
108. Ferreira, "Relatorio", 74-75.
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1887 noted,
"The men and wanen appear to die young. We only saw one 
man and one old wanan in the country; these two may have 
been from 60 to 70 years of age. With these exceptions 
we did not see a single man or woman, who, I should say, 
was over 45 years of age. The death rate must be enormous 
during the hot season."109
Another traveller passing fran Lydenburg to Lourengo Marques remarked
on the extended bellies of "amatonga" children, which he compared
110unfavourably with those of the Swazi.
The mortality rate, which was particularly high amongst young
children, threatened the reproductive capacity of the family and
hence restricted the rate of pre-capitalist accumulation. Various
attempts were made by the people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland to
improve their nutritional intake. Full sexual intercourse was
prohibited during post-natal lactation and hence prevented young
infants from being deprived of the mother's milk by the birth of
111a younger sibling. A determined effort to combat nutritional 
deficiencies was also made by the introduction and adoption of 
new crops.
New Crops: For Consumption and the Market
Junod hypothesized that because maize was included in first
112fruit ceremonies, it was of relatively recent introduction.
This is confirmed by historical evidence which indicates a late
introduction, and especially adoption as a staple, of maize.
In the 17th century it was noticed that "the bread" of the
113Delagoa Bay area was a mustard seed "Guinea com". In 1708
109. BPP 1890. c.6200 C.R. Saunders to SNA, 17 Nov., 1887.
110. Cohen, "Erlautemde Bemerkungen", 228.
111. Junod, Life, II, 188-89, 192, 521.
112. Junod stressed that his evidence was drawn fran only four 
chief dans around Lourengo Marques; Tembe, Nwamba, Mabote and 
the Mazwaye. The Maputo, who are a junior branch of the Tembe 
clan, did include maize in their first fruit festivals. This 
was perhaps due to their close historic ties to the Zulu and 
Swazi. Junod, Life, I, 395; Junod "Baronga", 143.
113. S. Bannister, Hunane Policy, (London, 1830), appendix I.
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this "maswelly" (moexeira; Pennisitum millet) was considered
114"indigenous wheat". Eleven years later it was described as "a
seed, not unlike coriander, which serves as the general food for
the inland inhabitants." Then in 1723 "mawelle" (mabele; millet)
and "maswella" (moexeira) were considered to be "what natives live
frcm". This view was supported by two separate observers in the 
115late 1750s. A traveller passing through Delagoa Bay in the
late 18th century considered that the "ordinary food is maise
pounded and boy Id". But this so-called "maise" was quite obviously
millet as it was "a sort of com as small as a mustard seed" and
was differentiated frcm Indian com, which was a more caimonly-
116used term for maize. In the 19th century maize was frequently
mentioned especially in the wetter areas, but in the drier areas
millet remained the staple and, as late as 1871, Frederic Elton
117referred to it as "the staff of life of south-east Africa."
Yet by the 1890s maize was regarded as the staple crop, not only
in the fertile and wetter areas, but also in the dry, sandy soil
zones and millet was largely relegated to the function of a yeast
in beer broking. • -
It seems likely that the sudden and rapid adoption of maize as
a staple in the second half of the 19th century was related to the
loss of male labour to the plantations and mines of the Transvaal, 
119Cape and Natal. Because the maize cob is surrounded by a husk, 
less male labour was consumed in its protection during the long 
growing season than in the case of millet and sorghum. Maize only 
demands an intensive labour input over the harvesting period and
114. C.G. Goetzee, "Die Stryd cm Delagoabaai", 74.
115. F. de Bucqoi in Theal, RSEA, vi, 433-4; Jan van de Cape lie in 
RSEA, I, 418; Jacob Francken in RSEA, vi, 492; Bannister,
Humane Policy, p. xxxv.
116. Penwell's "Account of Delagoa Bay" in RSEA, II, 463.
117. Owen, Narrative, 100, 117, 129; Fynn, Diary, 47; Hewetson, S.A. 
Ccmmercial Advertiser, 20 April 1839; Custodio Jose Antonio 
Texira, "Descripcao dos rios da Bahia de Lourengo Marques" 
(Sept., 1838) in Argivo das Coldnias, vd II, 1918; BO 14, 1871, 
61; Elton in Natal Mercury, 10 Oct., 1871.
118. AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade, report 1891; 
Jeannert, "Les Ma-Khoca", BSNG, 1895, 127; BPP 1896 Consular 
Report 1904 for 1895; Junod, Life, II, 10.
119. The effect of male absenteeism on food production is dealt with 
on pp.250-251.
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most labour required in the preparation of maizemeal was expended
in the crushing of the tenacious kernel, a task allocated by the
division of labour to women. Maize's major advantage is that it
produces far more calories per acre than other cereals, and is
therefore an important and ready source of energy. In the fertile,
well-watered regions of the Delagoa Bay hinterland, maize produced
two harvests annually and storage problems, which aggravated the
"hunger period" were partly overcame by the consumption of green
maize on the cob in December. The major drawback to maize
cultivation was its susceptibility to drought and this was partly
overcome by the widespread adoption of drought-resistant cassava.
Like maize, cassava also emerged as a major foodstuff in the
second half of the 19th century. It first entered Mozambique from
Brazil in the 1770s and by the early 19th century it was grown
120in the Delagoa Bay area. But people were initially ignorant 
of its cul inary preparation as the prussic acid was not always 
successfully removed frcm the tuber. By the 1860s cassava was 
cultivated "in small quantities" in the vicinity of Lourengo
121Marques and in 1862, 60 panjas of cassava flour were exported.
A possible sign of its gradual adoption was that cassava was only
122introduced into the Spelonken in the late 1860s. By the late
1880s the plant was grown as far south as Maputo but it has never
123penetrated the more fertile areas occupied by the Zulu. In 1895
it was reported to be grown "freely" in Khosen and Junod, who left
Mozambique in 1896, mentions that cassava was "extensively cultivated
124both in the sand of the hills and near the marshes."
Cassava, like maize, is a labour-saving crop. As a perennial 
it need not be planted or harvested with other crops and, while it 
continues to grew for several years, it needs little attention,
120. M. Simoes Alberto and F.A. Toscano, O Oriente African Portugues 
(Lisbcn, 1939) , 78-79; Owen Narrative, 114; Texeira, "Descripgao 
dos Rios", 63.
121. BO 21, 27 May 1865. Sixty pan j as is approximately 1 663 litres,
BO 34, 22 Aug., 1863.
122. Carl Mauch, Journal 1869-72, ed., E. Burke (Salisbury, 1969), 120.
123. BPP 1890 c.6200 Martin to Natal governor, 21 July 1888, 87.
124. Jeannert, "Les Ma-Khoca", 127; Junod, Life, II, 15.
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apart frcm weeding during its early growth period. If properly 
tended, cassava, will significantly outyield maize. The tuber is 
far more reliable than any local cereals as it is very resistant 
to drought and disease, can withstand locust attacks while the 
bitter strains are even immune to damage by rodents and monkeys. 
Cassava presents no storage problems as, after 2 to 3 years growth, 
it may be stored in the ground for a further 2-3 years and conse­
quently spreads labour as it may be picked at any time. Furthermore,
if the stalk is cut off the tuber is effectively hidden from human 
125predators. As distinct fran maize, the crop survives well in
sandy soil and consequently the two labour-saving crops, although
lacking in protein, canpleraent each other and spread the production
risks involved in cultivating maize as a staple.
An agricultural innovation, which emerged largely as a response
to market opportunities, was the production of vegetable oils,
rubber and orchil lichen, which was gathered frcm rocks and trees
and frcm which a red-violet dye was extracted. European vegetable
oil importers suffered a setback in the 1860s following the
importation of Russian tallow and American petroleum-based products.
Fabre et fils, one of the major Marseilles trading companies dealing
in West African vegetable oils, was dealt a further blow when in
the same decade there was a rapid inflation of the West African
cowrie currency. The company had made large profits by purchasing
west African vegetable oils with cowrie shells brought from India
as well as Mozambique Island, where they had established a trading
post in 1855. Fabre et fils' oversupply of the west African
market with "Zanzibar" cowries resulted in a spiralling inflation
which lavered the value of the currency until it was eventually 
126almost worthless. However, between 1863-70 the cowrie currency
only inflated by 37 per cent and profits were high enough for Fabre
127to establish five new stations along the Mozambican coast. It
125. H.B. Ross, "The diffusion of the manioc plant frcm South 
America to Africa: an essay in ethnobotanical cultural history" 
(PhD., Columbia, 1954); D.L. Jennings, "Cassava in Africa". 
Field Crop Abstracts, 3, 23, .1970; E.F. Moran, "Manioc deserves 
more recognition in tropical farming" in Wbrld Crops, July-Aug., 
1976.
126. Bnile Isnard, Les Fhbre (Marseilles, 1927) , 160; BPP XC, 1881 
C.2945 Consular report for Mozambique, 1880; Marion Johnson, 
"Cowrie currencies in West Africa", part II, JAH, XI, 3, 1970, 
338.
127. L. Vail & L. White, Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique, 
(London, 1980) , 64. Stations were opened by Fabre at Mozambique 
Island (1855) , Ibo (1860), Inhambane (1867) , Quelimane and
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was the need to find more profitable terms of trade, following the 
downturn in "currency speculation" in west Africa that persuaded 
the company to open a branch at Lourenco Marques in 1869. In the 
same year, the opening of Suez, under construction since 1859, 
reduced the sea journey frcm the trading settlement to Marseilles 
by one week.
In Delagoa Bay, Fabre used its West African experience of
currency manipulation to stimulate the production of vegetable oils
for the Marseilles market. Between 1869 and 1876 almost one
million iron hoes, used as currency in the Delagoa Bay hinterland,
128were imported through Lourenco Marques.
, The profitability of Fabre's Lourengo Marques station drew
Regis aine of Marseilles and Dunlop Mees of Rotterdam to establish
129similar branches in 1873. These companies acted as wholesalers
who sold or extended credit, mainly hoes but also other trade goods,
to sertanejos and Banyan traders who set up itinerant and fixed
markets in the interior. These attracted African producers who
exchanged, inter alia, groundnuts, sesame seeds and mafureira
almonds, which were then sold by the traders to the French companies.
Mafureira and sesame could be cheaply produced as they were the
product of fonale gathering activities and little new land had to be
130opened, or labour expended, in their production. Groundnuts
could be cheaply produced using family labour and traditional tools.
All three vegetable oils could be grown on marginal agricultural
lands as they survived well in dry sandy soils.
Mozambican groundnuts were particularly valued at Marseilles
because of their high oil return of 39% to 44%. The product of the
first press was used as a cooking and salad oil and the product of
131the second press was used for lighting and greasing. Mafureira
almonds were much sought after as a vegetable tallcw used in the
132manufacture of candles. Sesame became particularly valuable
Chilsiane (1868), Lourmg:oMarques and Bazaroute (1869), see 
Chambre de Gcranerce, Marseilles, file 157.
128. The effect of this hoe currency manipulation upon the social 
structure of the Delagoa Bay hinterland is dealt with on pp. 296-9
312-3
129. AHU. Mog., CG., pasta 29. GG to MSM, 17 Aug., 1875.
130. BO 52, 30 Dec., 1878; D. Leslie, Among the Zulu & Amatonga, 274.
131. LouisPierrein Industries Traditionelles du port de Marseilles; 
le cycle de Sucres et des OlSagineux, 1870-1950 (Marseilles, ^ 
1975), 197.
132. Ibid., 200-1.
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after the invention of margarine by the. French in the early 1870s;
it is a particularly rich, odourless vegetable oil which was
133especially valued at Marseilles because of its low residue.
Agricultural producers in the Delagoa Bay hinterland responded
rapidly to the market for vegetable oils. By 1875 the Governor of
Lourenco Marques was able to remark that, "A lively ccmmerce based
on vegetable oils" existed at the Bay and that, "Thanks to the
endeavours of foreign' houses and of seme merchants in the interior,
the cultivation of oil-producing beans and the trade in hides has
134begun to assume a notable development." Vessels like the "Endonne"
arrived frcm Marseilles with tens of thousands of hoes and returned
with a typical shipment of 5 344 kilos of groundnuts, 1 962 kilos
of sesame and 2 207 kilos of mafureira, as well as other gathered
135vegetable exports such as 1 331 kilos of orchil lichen. During
the financial year 1876/77, vegetable oils, hides and maize
constituted the major exports of the settlement and the decline in
ivory and skin exports towards the end of the 1870s, was paralleled
by a rise in agricultural produce as a source of export revenue.
The vegetable oil companies not only presented a market for
agricultural produce, they also bolstered the administration of
Lourengo Marques by lending money to the irregularly and poorly
paid Portuguese garrison and provided the settlement with valuable
137customs revenue, levied on both exports and imports. The market 
for vegetable oil produce also stimulated the gathering of other 
products such as wax, rubber and gum as well as orchil lichen.
Little evidence exists on the amount of produce gathered and
133. Because of its geographical position, Marseilles was unable to 
sell begetable oil residue, which was processed into animal 
fodder and fertilizer, for as high a price as its northern 
major ccmpetitor, Bordeaux. Ccmpte-rendu de la situation camier- 
ciale et industrielle de la circonscription de Marseilles, 1871 
(CCM, sit. conm.).
i
134. BO 15. 10 April, 1875; GH 837 GLM to GGM 24 April 1875 in Br. 
cons, to FO 27 May 1875.
135. A good record of ships' manifests was kept in the Boletim 
Oficial de Mogambique, especially for 1875-76.
136. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877; BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879.
137. GH 837, Br. cons, to FO 27 May 1875; SS 919.R2208/84 Gold 
commissioner, Lydenburg to SS, 6 May 1884 encl. in R1634/54.
............................................................... 245 '
cultivated for the market. The statistics compiled by the Lourengo
Marques customs house excluded all exports, considered as "smuggled",
that did not pass through the customs house and when figures were
gathered, this was done on an irregular and haphazard basis.
Furthermore groundnuts, mafureira and sesame were often gathered or
grown specifically for market purposes and then consumed locally,
especially in years of famine. Mafureira became an important export
crop in 1874 when about 1 000 pan j as (about 27 710 litres) were
successfully sold in Marseilles. In 1875 seme 8 000 pan j as
(221 680 litres) were exported and in 1876/77, a total of some
264 030 litres. But the following year the export of mafureira
almonds dropped to 37 574 litres as people consumed them during a 
138year of drought. Liberal customs reforms in 1877 modified the
3% ad valorem tax on exports, which had been established in 1869.
In its place a 1% tax was levied on all vegetable oil exports and
1394% on wax and rubber. This stimulated the export of sesame seed
which rose from 1 040 litres in 1876/77 to 4 124 kilos in 1877/78.
In 1885, even though production was then in decline, seme 7 818
kilos of sesame, groundnuts and orchil was exported, largely to France.
Wax exports rose frcm 36 kilos in 1860 to a maximum of 9 235
kilos, worth over £750, in 1885. Rubber, which came largely frcm 
140the Gaza area, reached an export peak of 7 059 kilos, worth 
almost £1 065 in 1886. Exports of orchil lichen rose frcm 2 534 
kilos in 1877 to 8 130 kilos, valued at just over £1 000 in 1883.
The Effect of Market and Demographic Changes on Agricultural 
Production
The minor boon in the production of vegetable oils in the 1870s
and early 1880s led Regis aine to establish a new branch on the lower
141Limpopo which had Bilene and Khosen as its catchment area. But, 
for a number of reasons, vegetable oil production petered out in the
138. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877; BO 52, 30 Dec., 1878. These and the 
following statistics are drawn frcm the Boletim Qficial de 
Mozambique.
139. Vail and White, Capitalism and Colonialism, 62-63.
140. BO 6, 11 Feb., 1888.
141. Henri Berthoud, "Exploration entre les Spelonken et Lourengo 
Marques", L'Afrique Exploree et Civilizee, VII, 1886, 307.
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1890s. Wholesale merchants suffered a severe setback as spiralling 
hoe inflation reduced their working capital and diminished the 
amount of credit that they were able to extend to Banyan and 
sertanejo middlemen. As hoes were replaced in the early 1880s by 
sterling as the major currency in the area, traders sought to 
exbhange their wares for cash rather than depreciating produce.
A further problem was the reliance of Mozambicans on already over­
extended fsnale labour for the production of vegetable oils. Of 
at least equal importance was the inability of Mozambican producers 
to compete on the Marseilles market with vegetable oil growers in 
India. Fabre had first exported groundnuts fran India in 1856 and 
that country had several advantages over Mozambique. It possessed 
railways and a general infrastructural development that was almost 
entirely lacking in Mozambique; it had the capital to experiment 
with new strains and, perhaps most importantly, India had regular 
steamship contacts with Europe and was thus able to transport 
vegetable oil crops regularly and rapidly and consequently cut 
down on wastage and spoilage. The regularity of production in an 
area like the Delagoa Bay hinterland was severely hindered by 
continuous droughts, which caused producers to fall back an vegetable 
oil fruits as a means of subsistence, and by epidemics that closed
Lourengo Marques to foreign trade. By 1890 India supplied three-
142quarters of the demand for vegetable oils at Marseilles.
India's growing monopoly of the Marseilles market was paralleled 
by a drop in the world price of vegetable oils. Following the 
opening of Suez, the amount of vegetable oil inported into 
Marseilles increased fran 170 000 tons in 1870 to 440 000 tons in 
1894. An adequate supply allowed buyers to depress the Marseilles 
price for vegetable oil fran 49 francs per quintal of 100 kilos in 
1877, to 23 francs in 1894. The price paid for Mozambican ground­
nuts fell from an average of 47 francs in 1873 to 26 francs in 1894.
Over the same period Mozambican sesame fell frcm an average of 48
143francs to 26 francs. Massive imports of animal fats and cotton 
seed fran the United States served further to debase the price of
142. Pierrein, Industries Traditione 1 les, 199-204; CCM (sit. carrm.), 
1882.
143. CCM (sit. ocran.), 1873-1894.
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fats and oils at Marseilles and largely ousted Indian producers
144in the later 1890s.
The declining market for vegetable oils was accompanied by the 
virtual disappearance of the market for orchil when the vegetable 
dye was largely replaced by industrially-produced ana line substi­
tutes. The collecting of wax was discouraged by a price fall 
similar to that of vegetable oils. Wax from Mozambique sold on the 
Marseilles market for 215 francs a quintal of 100 kilos in 1872,
125 francs in 1889 and between 157 and 15 9 francs in 1897. This 
price drop was passed on to the producer as the value of wax at
Lourengo Marques fell fran $554 per kilo in 1867 to $360 in 1890 
145and $430 in 1898. Rubber production suffered a similar decline.
Uncontrolled tapping was injurious to trees and the quality of
exported rubber and demanded an increased labour input 16 extract a
fixed amount of rubber. By 1898 the export figures for wax and
rubber had fallen to, respectively, 815 kilos worth £78 and 388
146kilos worth £83.12s. At least two observers blamed the decline
147in gathered produce on insufficient remuneration. Declining 
international prices for gathered and cultivated produce constituted
144. Ibid., 1888-89. Shipping movements fran countries like Mozam­
bique and India were published in Le Semaphore de Marseilles 
but no division was made between production area within Mozam­
bique. The annual Canpte-rendu de la situation carmercial et 
industrielle de la circonscription de Marseilles gives the price \ 
and volume of vegetable oil imports by country of origin.
Animal fats imported fran the United States rose frcm 6 000 tons 
in 1894 to 28 000 tons in 1897. Cotton seed imports increased 
fran 11 000 tens in 1894 to 62 000 tons in 1898/9. This prompted 
Indian groundnut exports to Marseilles to fall from 133 000 tons 
in 1894 to 8 300 tons in 1897;Pierrein, Industries Traditionelles, 
190-191, 196.
145. CCM (sit. comm.) 1872 to 1897; AHU. Mog. Alfandegas, packet 1382; 
Mappa Estatistica, (Alfandega, Lourengo Marques, 1899).
146. BPP 1887 British consular report no. 60 for Mozambique, 1885.
In the area west of Inhambane rolls of rubber weighing in excess 
of one kilogram were initially sold in England as top quality 
rubber. By the 1890s rolls of 30 to 50 grams were sold wrapped 
around a stick and were often spoiled as the rubber was mixed 
with sand to give it added weight. Freire de Andrade, "Exploragab 
Portuguese em Lourengo Marques e Inhambane", BSGL, 13, 5, 1894, 
358; Mappa Estatistica, (Lourengo Marques. Alfandega, 1899).
147. AHU. Mog., 2a Pep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade, 1891; Junod,
Life, I, 145-47.
248
a major restriction on the emergence of a peasantry able to exist
independently of wage labour. Of perhaps equal importance was the
prohibitive cost of exporting high bulk, low value products like
maize, to the Transvaal. Before the advance of the railway into
the Transvaal in the early 1890s, goods had to be carried by head
porterage or by transport-riding which was made particularly expen-
148
sive because of the tsetse belts. A further restriction on the 
production of foodstuffs for the market arose out of increasing 
demographic pressure upon resources in specific areas.
Settlement patterns were influenced by warfare, human and 
animal diseases, soils, rainfall and proximity to water, markets 
and building materials. This resulted in a highly uneven and 
changing demographic structure. The heaviest concentration of 
population existed in the river plains where intensive cultivation
149
was practised. In 1871 St Vincent Erskine visited the alluvial 
plain of the Shangane tributary of the lower Limpopo which was 
being re-occupied as the Swazi threat diminished. He described the 
area in the following terms:
"The valley seemed to be completely filled with native 
kraals, here I saw the first cattle I had seen in the 
country. I did not think any kafir country could be so 
thickly inhabited as the valley; though I have seen Natal 
of course and the Zulu and Swazi countries. It was 
densely inhabited when I Was here in 1868; but it seemed 
now to have filled up to a much greater extent." 150
Gungunyana' s move south in 1889 and his colonization of the Bilene- 
Khosen area with about 80 000 followers placed further strains 
on the demography of that region and pushed many Khosas into the
148. See pp.274-275.
149. Fernandes das Neves to GLM 8 June 1879 in Mozambique, 69, 1952 
SMA 435/H Liengme to Leresche 29 Oct., 1891; SMA 435/G.Liengme 
to Leresche, 2 Oct., 1892; SMA 1255/B Henri Berthoud "Rapport 
sur 11 expedition chez Gungunyana, 1891"; Shaefli-Glardon,
"De Valdezia",/1893, 156, 162-63; Grandjean, "Notices", BSNG 
1893, 121. P_SN£,
150. St. V. Erskine, 1871-2 RGS typescript, ch. 6, p. 4. The 
Shangane river was also known as the Shohozoli.
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151dry western areas.
In the fertile coastal areas of Nondwane the population was 
estimated in 1880 to be about 350 inhabitants to the square mile.
Most villages were built on fertile hillsides and around the lakes 
and marshes in depressions/ and beyond the coastal region, which
stretched for about 25 kilometres inland, the country was "almost
152deserted". To the south and west of the lower Nkanati it was
noted in 1885 that the sandy soils in the vicinity of Lourengo
Marques supported a population of only about four people per square
153kilometre. In Maputo people clustered around rivers and marshes
154and lived more closely together than the Swazi or Zulu.
The overpopulation of specific areas forced people to break
down subtropical forest areas and till the canmonage which separated
hanesteads. This made agricultural production far more perilous
as it reduced access to drought-breaking foods gathered fran wild
trees and by restricting the amount of land allocated to pasturage,
encouraged over-grazing. Reductions in the amount of canmonage
also caused the depletion of fuels for cooking and warmth which
forced people to transfer labour fran cultivation to searching for
fuels. In the settled areas over-population resulted in a decreasing
production of foodstuffs due to over-cropping, soil exhaustion and 
155erosion.
151. SMA 1255/B Henri Berthoud "Rapport sur 1'expedition envcy^ a 
Gungunyana, 1891"; SMA 484/A Paul Berthoud to Leresche, 2 Sept., 
1891; SMA 435/H Liengme to Leresche 29 Oct., 1891; SMA 1256/C 
Grandjean, "Rapport sur l1 oeuvre missionaire, 1892"; AHU. Mog.,
2a Rep., pasta 9, Freire de Andrade report, 1891.
152. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud, "L'€tat du Littoral, Sept., 1887"  ^
Junod, Life, II, 5; Grandjean, "La Mission Suisse", Le Chretien 
Evangelique, XL, 9, 1897, 426; Junod, "Rikatla a Maroukene", 
BSNG, VI, 1891, 323.
153. AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 3, Machado memo., 10 Nov., 1885.
154. WUL. AB 867/Aa5 Zululand Bishop McKenzie to Archbishop, Cape 
Town, 21 Aug., 1889; ZGH 796.Z233/96 Stephens to Res. Ccrtm.,
3 March, 1896.
155. St V. Erskine, 1871-2 RGS typescript, ch 6, p 8; G. Liengme, 
"Rapport sur la visite faite a Gungunyana", July 1892 in BMSAS, 
106, 1892; Caldas Xavier, "Os territorios ao sul do Save e os 
Vatuas", BSGL, 13, 2, 1894, 134; Junod, "Baronga", 188-89; 
Grandjean, La Mission, 71; Junod, Life, II, 8-9.
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A major disincentive to the production of crops for the market
was the absence of male labour power as many adolescent and adult
males withdrew their labour from local agriculture and sought wage
employment in Natal, the Cape and the Transvaal. The view that men
were involved only in hunting and warfare and played little role
156in the cultivation of crops and domestic duties seems to have
little basis in historical reality. W.C. Baldwin, a hunter
operating in Maputoland in the 1850s noted with approval that,
"Amatongas are very industrious, both men and wanen working in their
gardens." This was something unheard of amongst the Zulus, he 
157added. Numerous other observers also commented upon the
willingness of men living in the Delagoa Bay hinterland to involve
158themselves in agriculture. Although the fields worked by women
were largest^  it was common for a man in the southern and central
Delagoa Bay hinterland to till and sow his own field (mpashu) and
159if it were planted with sorghum, to weed and'harvest it. Two
of Stuart's informants remarked at the end of the 19th century
that in the Maputo area, "men hoe and cultivate gardens as well as
women. A man may have his own garden or work at one piece of land 
160with his wife." Probably the major agricultural task undertaken 
by males was the breaking of new ground, for it was ohly when fresh 
land was opened, especially in the drier slash and bum areas, that 
sufficient food could be produced to support the natural increase 
in population. Men also made and repaired agricultural tools and
156. H.F. Fynn, "Delagoa Bay" in RSEA, II, 439; RSEA, X, 106; Cape 
Monitor, 16 July 1853; BO 21, 27 May 1865; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., 
pasta 9, Freire de Andrade report, 1891, p. 6. Most of these 
observations were made during drought years when hunting
. . became a major source of food and when raiding and warfare took 
on a new importance. A modem variant of this argument has been 
forcefully expressed by A. Rita Ferreira, "Labour Qnigration 
among the Mozambique Thonga", Africa, 30, 2, 1960.
157. Baldwin, African Hunting, 84.
158. Struthers, "Hunting journal", 24 May 1854, p. 84; Armando Longle, 
"De Inhambane a Lourengo Marques", in BSGL, 6, 1, 1886, 19;
BPP, 1890, c.6200, Saunders to SNA, 17 Nov., 1887.
159. Junod, Life, II, 23.
160. JSA file 74, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.
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drying tables, built dwelling huts in winter and granaries in
summer and cut the wattles and grass used in their construction and 
161thatbhing. Only men cultivated tobacco, which they manufactured
into snuff or smoked, or which they used as an important medium of 
162local trade. Male labour and organizational skills were also
vital in various other food-producing activities. They cared for
the cattle and provided the large amounts of labour needed to create
and maintain tsetse-free pastures. Men constructed fishing traps,
163mounted fishing expeditions and contributed to the food supply 
by hunting extensively and by trading for cattle.
Thus the absence of male labour impaired the ability of many 
homesteads to produce sufficient food to meet subsistence needs 
from year to year. The impact of male absenteeism upon food 
production was aggravated by the pattern of labour migration which 
took little account of agricultural season. Thus most men travelled 
to Natal in winter when malaria and jiggers were less virulent 
and to the Transvaal in summer when the cold of the Highveld 
proved less of an obstacle.
It seems likely that the ecological and epidemiological crises 
of the late 1880s and 1890s, that arose out of an unreliable access 
to food, were made increasingly precarious by the absence of male 
labour. This is supported by the findings of many contemporary 
observers who believed that lourengo Marques's paucity of exports 
and the lack of any development of the tcwn's hinterland were due 
almost entirely to the systan of migrant labour. As early as 1865 
the Governor of Lourenco Marques complained that, because of the 
upsurge in emigration to Natal and in hunting, Maputo no longer 
supplied the settlement with sufficient food. In 1878 the
161. JSA file 12, "Customs", Evidence of Ndaba; file 74 evidence 
of Mahungane and Nkonuza; ZGH 796.Z892/96 Foxon, "Information 
regarding the British protectorate of Maputoland"; Junod, 
"Baronga", 107; Junod, Life, II, 338; WUL. Am. Zulu Mission, 
Pinkerton, July 1880.
162. Junod, Life, II, 14-15.
163. Junod, Life, II, 86-87, 338.
164. See pp31, 50 . The loss of male labour was not offset by the
introduction of the plough until the beginning of the 20th
century. Its late introduction was probably due to the acidic 
and porous nature of much of the soil as well as social resis­
tance to the breakdown of female cattle taboos.
165. BO 21, 27 May 1865.
252
Governor-General of the colony expressed his concern over the
"emigration which is going to impoverish the interior of labour and
which will necessarily be fatally translated into a greater or lesser
166diminution in the flow of products from the littoral." In
the same year, the Portuguese colonial official responsible for
African welfare stated that labour emigration had led to a decline
in agricultural production and he questioned the political and
167\ economic wisdom of its continuation. In a report drawn up the
following month he expressed the strong opinion that "emigration
is nothing but a real cancer for this province from which the Blacks 
168get very little." In a report published two years later he
complained that while migrants were away, their lands were left
uncultivated and that when they returned they squandered the wages
they earned instead of investing them in the development of the 
169land. This anti-emigration stance can be traced back to 
Portuguese humanitarianism which stressed that following the inde­
pendence of Brazil, Portugal should turn from the slave trade to 
the development of her African colonies. Central to the abolitionist 
legislation of the 1830s was the belief that, rather than export
labour, manpower should be/employed locally to produce raw 
170materials. This view was subscribed to, but for different motives,
by Africa Oriental, an occasional newspaper produced at Mozambique
171Island that was supportive of settler interests. As labour
emigration increased in scale, its various opponents became more 
vociferous.
In 1884 the Lourengo Marques director of customs made a well- 
publicized attack on the migrant labour system which, he stated,
166. AHU. Mog., CG., pasta 31, G M  to GGM, 11 March 1876 in GO1 to 
MSMU, 15 March 1878.
167. AHU. Mog., CG., pasta 31, Report of the Curadoria geral dos
individuos sujeitos a tutela publica de Mogambique, 21 Jan., 1878.
168. AHU. Mog., CG., pasta 31, Report of the Curadoria geral, 8
Feb., 1878.
169. AHU. Mog., CG., pasta 32, Report of the Curadoria Geral to 
MSMU, 30 Oct., 1880.
170. Valetim Alexandre, Origens de Colonialismo Portuegues (Lisbon, 
1979), cited in Jill Dias, "Portugal in Africa", book review 
in African Affairs, Jan., 1982, 132.
171. Africa Oriental, 11 Dec., 1879; Duffy, A Question of Slavery,
71-2, 87.
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was the cause of the inability of the Delagoa Bay hinterland to
172produce agricultural exports. This in turn was largely respon­
sible for the small revenue accruing from exports. Because of 
migrant labour, agriculturalists living in the interior were unable 
to produce sufficient food to meet the requirements of the inhabi­
tants of Lourengo Marques and this had necessitated the importation 
of food. Thus the director of customs felt that migrant labour was, 
at least in part, responsible for the high cost of living at the 
settlement. In an attempt to bring down the price of food, the
Lourengo Marques municipal council ordered seeds fran Europe which
173were distributed free of charge to local chiefs. In 1897
Pereira Rodrigues, the director of customs, was dismissed by the
Royal Commissioner, Mousinho de Albuquerque for challenging the
recent labour migration agreement with the Transvaal. Rodrigues
complained that labour emigration drained Mozambique of the workers
needed to develop the colony's agriculture and that a large part of
the wages earned on the mines was spent on goods bought in the
Transvaal. The remaining, repatriated wage was spent on imported
foodstuffs, which absolved the workers from any need to produce
174marketable articles within Mozambique. The British consul 
inadvertently sided with the opponents of migrant labour when he 
stated that,
"unless facilities are offered for opening up the rich 
agricultural districts which exist here, the only future 
this city (Lourengo Marques) can possibly expect is that 
...it may become the supply station for Barberton,
Pretoria and Johannesburg. "175
This view was supported by other contemporary observers, including 
the consul of the South African Republic, who believed that migrant
172. Molpho de Castro Neto de Vasconcellos, reports in BO 32, 8 Aug., 
1885; Estatistica das Alfandegas (Lourengo Marques, 1884);
"Mappas estatisticas ocm relagao ao movimento commercial no 
districto de lourengo Marques, 1884", Bol. Soc. Geogr. Commercial 
do Porto, 1886.
173. BO 1885, 356.
174. MinistSre des Affaires Etrangdre , Paris, CCC., Lourengo Marques 
vice consul to Ministere des Affaires Etrangere 18 Dec., 1897. 
For the Portuguese metropolitan stance on the export of labour, 
see pp. 133—134, notes 160—164.
175. BPP 1893-94, Consular report for Lourengo Marques, (no. 1153) , 
1892.
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labour had a debilitating effect upon indigenous agricultural
production as migrants used their cash earnings to purchase the food
176that they had formerly grcwn themselves. Available statistics 
indicate seme support for this impressionistic evidence for by the
late 1880s Lourenco Marques had swung fran being an exporter to being
/ 177a net importer of foodstuffs fran Natal.
Thus it seems that the limited response during the late 19th
century of peasant producers living in the Delagoa Bay hinterland
to the world market demand for cultivated and gathered products
can be ascribed to a number of factors; low market prices and
retail monopolies, the absence of cheap transport facilities linking
producers with the large consumer markets in the Transvaal, the
relative over-population of important fertile areas and, because of
the migrant labour system, the general under-population of able-
bodied adult males. The unwillingness of people to grow crops
did not anerge out of an inherent preference for mine work rather
than farming; it was rather a rational decision which saw temporary
wage employment as a supplement to agricultural production and
hence as a means of ending the old precarious dependence upon the
environment, with all of its attendant famines and wars.
As early as 1886 the governor of Lourenco Marques believed
that many people were dependent on earnings fran migrant labour
178for an assured source of food. The British consul at Lourengo 
Marques reported in 1891 that Africans
176. SSa 155 Ra1358/95 Vers lag van de consulaat in Mozambique, 1894; 
BPP 1896 LXXXVTII Cons, report no. 1760 for 1895; BPP 1897 
XCII Cons. Report no. 1904 for 1896; Alfredo Freire de Andrade, 
"As minas de oiro do Transvaal e sua influencia sobre Lourengo 
Marques", Revista de Obras Publicas e Minas, 1898, 331; P. 
Berthoud, "Lourengo Marques" , BSNG, 1895, 105, 108. See also 
notes 172-173.
177. Natal Blue books. "Exports." The production
statistics for the Delagoa Bay hinterland were at this time 
entirely absent and it is probable that maize was exported to 
the Transvaal without being declared. An illucidation of this 
point and the effect of changes in maize production upon social 
stratification must await further research. But cf. Mappas 
Estatisticas 1897-98 in which the director of the Lourengo 
Marques customs speculated that the maize production figures 
were less complete than canmonly believed (p. iv).
178. BO 19. 18 May 1886. In his report for March 1886 the governor 
feared that the suspension of emigration to Natal "could have 
a terrible effect an the natives."
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"find it more profitable to work for Europeans and 
buy fran them such food as they require. With the 
high rate of wages obtained they are both able to 
live better in this way than they could by cultivating 
the ground, and to have a surplus with which to drink 
or buy such luxuries as they may desire." 179
J.H. Bov ill wrote in the late 1890s that:
"an account of the poverty and dryness of the soil (of the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland), which in appearance is just like 
sand, the natives in the least drought are often in a 
starving condition, through failure of their crops. The 
appearance of the soil to an ordinary European would lead 
him to believe that nothing could possibly grow in it, 
yet it is surprising how the natives do produce from it 
pumpkins, melons, sweet potatoes, beans,bananas, mealies 
etc., if they get the rain in its season. The uncertainty 
of the food crops is, of course, a great incentive to the 
natives to offer themselves for work, and the rate of wages 
offered in the labour market is a great attraction ."180
In 1892 a Swiss missionary lamented over the fate of Khosen, which 
was normally a maize exporting area. Due to its fertility Khosen 
had remained dependent on agriculture for its subsistence rather 
than on migrant labour. This production strategy had caused the 
famine of the early 1890s to take on a far more serious aspect in 
Khosen than in those areas that had broadened their means of 
subsistence by supplementing agricultural production with wage
Henri Junod, writing in 1895 of the continuing famine and 
locust plague, stated that
"For the blacks, the necessity to work for the whites in 
order to procure their food is a great tragedy, a calamity 
of the first order. For centuries the families have lived 
fran the product of their fields - and if one earned 
money, the last few years, it was to buy clothes and 
luxuries. All is now changed."182
179. BPP 1892 LXXXII, Consular report no. 955 for 1891.
180. J.H. Bovill, Natives under the Transvaal Flag (London, 1900), 64.
181. SMA 1256/A Grandjean, "Rapport sur 1'oeuvre missionaire, 1892".
182. SMA 517/B Junod to Renevier, 16 Oct., 1895.
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The ecological crises of the period had more than merely
widened the gap between real and desired standards of living; in
his first monograph, published in 1898, Junod claimed that wage.
labour had saved the people of the southern and central Delagoa
Bay hinterland frcm the effects of drought, locusts, war and 
183rinderpest. This new dependence on wage labour for a means of 
subsistence is well illustrated in an anecdote recounted by Junod. 
When visiting a famine stricken canmunity the missionary's offer of 
spiritual assistance was rebuffed by a wanan who
"pulled a small coin fran its hiding place and said, 'Here
is my cock.'"184
To this wanan money had became a symbol of fertility in which she
could place her trust, rather than in the vagaries of religion or
agricultural production. In sane cases migrant workers were
immediately able to change their wages into food, in the form of
cattle, which were purchased in the area of wage employment and
185then taken through the tsetse belt.
As long , as mining wages remained high, migrant labour consti­
tuted for many people a more profitable market response than agri-
186cultural production. In the less fertile areas wage labour 
became the nutrient for survival in a rapidly changing world. It 
provided access to the cash needed to procure a regular and secure 
source of food and this in turn provided the means of acquiring and 
maintaining a large and powerful following. But a full understanding
183. Junod, "Baronga", 207.
184. SMA 516/A Junod to Leresche, 26 June 1894.
185. TA. SN 2. Barlcw to SNA, 3 Sept., 1879; JSA, file 25, p. 261, 
evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.
186. Initial evidence indicates a rise in agricultural production in 
the early 20th century that co-incided with the sharp fall in 
mining wages during the period. Junod, Life, I, 538; TLC 
evidence of Lionel Cohen, pp. 163, 166; Donaldson, p. 603;
Dyer, p. 281; TA/SNA 14. Na 172/02 WNLA circular, gen. manager 
to other directors, 1902; SNA 230 Na 2020/04 WNLA document 
entitled "East Coast Recruiting", 17 Aug., 1904; TA/GOV.1062
Ps 17/106/07 Director of Agric. to Selboume, 1907.
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of the growing dependence of the social formation of the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland upon migrant labour for its reproduction calls for 
an historical examination of the structure of both production and 
exchange. In many areas this was marked by a narrowing of economic 
options which left men with little alternative source of income 
to temporary wage labour.
Chapter 7
258
THE HUNTING ECONOMY:
Closing the Economic Options
The Importance of Hunting for Subsistence and Exchange
As a subsistence activity, hunting constituted a major source
of protein in a milk-poor area and was especially important as a
supplement to gathering activities in times of famine. But
hunting produce was also an important medium of exchange and meat,
skins, bones and the animal fats employed in cleansing and softening
hides,were used domestically and in local trade.
A large market for animal skins developed in the second
quarter of the 19th century with the adoption by males of the
Zulu-Gaza form of dress. The old plaited palm leaf covering vised
to protect the male genitalia was replaced by a kilt of up to
sixty strips of monkey, genet or civet cat skins which were cut
roughly six inches long and half an inch wide. ^ These skins or
cattle tails were also sometimes worn on the chest. Soldiers hung
genet tails fran their military and other shields, wore blue
monkey skin strips at the side of the face, leopard and other skin
headbands and topped these with crane, ostrich and other bird 
2
feathers. Lion and leopard skins and claws were worn by chiefs.
Wild and civet cat skins ware worn on special occasions, and 
distinguished notables from commoners as only the former could 
afford the expensive cats kin dress; ccmnoners wore a less expensive
3
dress of two pieces of ox of buck skin. Alongside the local 
market existed a foreign market for these skins in the Gaza, Swazi, 
Zulu and Natal Nguni areas. By the 1870s a civet skin bought in Bilene
1. Theal, RSEA, VI, "Aanmerkelyke Qntmoetingen", Jakob de Bucquoi, 
1719, 494; RSEA, II, 460, Penwell "Account", p. 468; Ibid.,
Often, "Description", p. 481; E'ynn, Diary, 49.
2. Africana Museum, Johannesburg, Junod Collection (1) 39/220-661;
H. Seidel, "Die Ba-Ronga an der Delagoa Baai", Globus, 74, 12, 
1898, pp. 186-87; F. Elton, Natal Mercury, 10 Oct, 1871; W. Bleek, 
Natal Diaries, p. 76; Junod, Life, I, 451. An excellent descrip­
tion of Khosa military dress is in SMA 1760 Grand jean Diary,
27 Jan., 1894.
3. Seidel, "Die Ba-Ronga", 86; Junod, Life, I, 451; II, 95-96;
SMA 1760 Grandjean Diary, 27 Jan., 1894.
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for Is could fetch 3 s in Natal and cat and monkey skins bought in 
the Delagoa Bay hinterland were exchanged for cattle in Zululand.
A seaborne trade in cat and monkey skins developed and in 1877,
4
24 991 of these skins entered Durban fran Lourengo Marques. The
Maputo supplied the Zulu with large numbers cf cat skins as 
sagwati.^
But the major hunting produce of the area and the reason for 
the existence of Lourengo Marques until the 1860s, was elephant 
ivory. Elephants were killed an the outskirts of the settlement 
as late as the 1830s and in the 1840s sane 600 elephants inhabited
g
an area of three square miles to the south of the Bay. Smith 
and Hedges have shown the importance of ivory areas to the south 
of Delagoa Bay but, as their work has concentrated an trade between 
Zululand and Lourengo Marques, it has given the impression that 
the ivory trade with the Lew and Highvelds was of little conse-
7
quence. However, even before Portuguese and Luso-Indian traders 
moved into the Transvaal to trade with Boer hunters in the 1840s 
and 1850s, much of the ivory procured by Delagoa Bay hunter- 
traders came fran the High and Lcwveld areas to the west of the
g
settlement.
4. Fynn, Diary, 47; NA/GH 1050 Supreme Court Case Agnew vs. Van
Grunning, 24 May 1875; NA/SNA 1/7/9 "Passes issued", 10 June 1874,
20 May 1876. See also BO 29, "Report of Lourengo Marques customs 
for 1881", 29 Aug., 1882; ZGH 736.249 Statement of Faku, 20
March 1891.
5. Webb & Wright, James Stuart, I, 64-7 evidence of Bikwayo.
6. T. le Roux (ed), Dagboek van Louis Trigardt, 185; Delagorgue,
Voyage, 490. See also Coqui, "Journey fran Origstadt", ProGS III,
1859, 373. For the Dutch period, see C.G. Coetzee, "Die Stryd cm 
Delagoa-Baai", 14, 60.
7. Smith, "The trade of Delagoa Bay as a factor in Nguni politics, 
1750-1835" in L. Thompson (ed) , African Societies in Southern 
Africa, 186-7; Ibid., "The struggle for control", 268; Hedges,
"Trade & Politics", 230. Smith's evidence on the Zulu provenance 
of most of the ivory exported through Lourengo Marques is based 
on a statement, made by the traveller Francis Farewell, designed 
to raise funds for a trading expedition to Zululand. Farewell's 
commercial hyperbole also led him to aver that Shaka's kraals were 
made of ivory and that gold could be found in Zululand. Fynn, Diary, 
52, 56; P. Kirby (ed) Andrew Smith & Natal, 161. Both Smith and 
Hedges refer to a report by Owen, in support of this thesis, yet 
Owen in his dispatch to the Admiralty clearly stated that the 
caravan that he had seen entering Lourengo Marques with 300 tusks 
had cane fran the west, not the south. ADM 1/2269 Owen to Adm,
19 June 1824. The origin of this caravan was excluded fran CWen's 
published account, Narrative, vol. II, 20. Nor is there any evi­
dence to support the view that the caravan seen by Penwell in
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As long as trading activities at Lourenco Marques were con­
trolled by poorly financed monopolies which paid lew prices for 
ivory and had few guns and as long as elephants remained in the 
vicinity of the Bay, ivory hunting remained an adjunct of other 
forms of subsistence and coitmercial hunting. The meat and fat of 
elephants were consumed or traded locally and the tusks were sold 
at Lourengo Marques. But in 1853 the newly installed Regenerado 
liberal government in Lisbon opened Lourengo Marques to foreign 
traders and lowered customs duties. This change in policy was 
brought about by the removal of the British Imperial threat 
following the recognition by Britain of the independence of the 
Boer settlers living to the west of Lourengo Marques in 1851 and 
the demise of the Fast India Company in 1858. The opening of the 
Bay resulted in European, and especially British Indian, traders 
establishing themselves in the area in order to participate in the 
ivory trade. These traders brought capital goods such as elephant 
guns which, valued at 38$000 in 1861, were four times the cost of
9
"trade guns" at Lourengo Marques. They also brought gun powder, 
lead, tin, spare parts, percussion caps and other technological 
innovations which revolutionized hunting in the Delagoa Bay hinter­
land. Official ivory exports from Lourengo Marques more than
doubled from 1846 to 1859, increasing from 11 364 kilos to 25 915
. ... 10kilos.
But ivory is a wasting asset and this new firepower caused 
the ivory frontier to retreat away from the settlement. In 1855 
the best hunting fields were reportedly in Maputoland north of the
the late 18 century came from the south.
8. Stayt, The Bavenda, 76; N.J. van Warmelo, The Copper Miners of
Musina, 68; R. Skully, "Phalaborwa Oral Tradition" (PhD.,
SLJNY, 1978), 330-332; O.T., Chief Shikumba, interview, 18 April 
1979.
9. BO 20. 18 May 1861.
10. PO 63/698 Parker to Palmerston, 18 Feb., 1848; BO 32, 11 Aug., 
1860.
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11Limpopo. But the following year Mpande complained for the
second time of the encroachment by unauthorized Lourenco Marques
hunters on his ivory fields and threatened to attack the settle- 
12ment. In 1859 the Governor of Lourengo Marques warned that the
uncontrolled exploitation of elephant herds by "hundreds of hunters"
13was pushing the animals away fran the settlement.
The dependence of ivory hunters on merchants capital and the
increased labour investment necessitated by the retreating ivory
frontier brought about the emergence of groups of professional
hunters kncwn as amapisi. According to Stuart's informants, these
men were "given guns by white people and (were) told to hunt
elephants... the amapisi at die time were not known, for instance
14about 1840, they had not been heard of." They developed a distinct 
material culture that distinguished them fran the batimba hippopo­
tamus hunter, the bahloti local hunters and the slaves used by 
merchants to hunt elephant. The wealth of the amapisi was reputedly 
second only to that of the chiefs and they had a special status in
the conmunity, exceptional hunters being remembered in song and 
16tradition. They wore coats, blankets and skins and carried 
bandoliers, powder horns and hunting knives. They developed special 
skills in order to hunt with highly charged heavy calibre guns 
suitable for elephant hunting. Like all long-distance hunters, they 
supplemented their own produce by trading for hunting goods. The 
amapisi were bound by a strong fellowship of carman protective 
charms, songs, incantations, purification rituals, rites and taboos 
and they employed their own diviners. A recognized hunting code 
determined ownership in cases where, for example, two men shot the
11. Struthers, "The Hunting Journal", 84, 124, 128, 132-3; AHU.
Mog., Diversos, 2, Texeira report, 1856.
12. SNA 1/6/2.87 Panda to Grey, 16 Jan., 1856. See also SAAR Natal
2. 359. "Statement of messengers of Panda, 27 Oct., 1&4&"".
13. Onofre de Andrade, 0 Presidio de Lourengo Marques, 10.
14. JSA file 25 p. 259, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza. But for 
an earlier origin of the amapisi, cf. Hedges, Trade and Politics, 
57.
15. AHU. Mog., 2a Repartigao, pasta 9, Freire d'Andrade report, 1891; 
Junod, Life, II, 68-69; TA/A.1266 BPC. no 1. Simoes to Paiva de 
Rapozo, 6 Dec., 1860.
16. Fernandes das Neves, A Hunting Expedition, 11.
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same animal or a wounded animal had to be killed in a thicket.
As the amapisi could spend long periods of up to more than a year
away from hone, advances were paid to than before they undertook
a journey and their families, who perhaps acted as a security for
creditors, were looked after in their absence. Each hunter was
accompanied by as many as twenty men, often family members, who
carried trade goods on the outward journey and returned with
hunting produce. Guns and amnunition, which in Lourengo Marques
could cost up to four times their European value, were generally
lent out by traders on condition that a fixed part of the hunting
produce was sold to the creditor before a specific date and the
amapisi were paid a fixed portion of the value of the huntinq
17goods produced in gunpowder or trade goods.
Lourengo Marques ivory merchants had links with colleagues
in the Transvaal and were often well capitalized. Paiva Raposo
was able to call together 300 hunters and a sum of 12,000$00
(approximately £2,670) during the Gaza civil war while other
18merchants raised 2 000 rifles and 50 000 cartridges. In'the
Transvaal, Cassimir Simoens left an estate which included £3,500
19of ivory and ostrich feathers. Delagoa Bay elephant ivory was
generally sent to India where it was used in the manufacture of
women's galang bracelets. Mozambican ivory was of a good quality,
size and colour for carving and most of the London ivory imported
20from Bombay was of Mozambican origin. Elephant hinting was
supplemented with hippopotamus hunting from the beginning of the
19th century when it was discovered that hippo ivory could be
21manufactured into dentures and rifle foresights. A bull hippo­
potamus also produced as much as 200 lbs of flavour-free fat for
casking or local trade and hide whips, cut from a single skin,
22could fetch up to £40. The special techniques needed for hippo
17. Ibid., 7-14, 47-8., 267; Drunmond, The Large Game, 16, 28, 131, 
201-2, 223, 271; Struthers, "Hunting Journal", 44, 45, 62;;De 
Vaal, "Albasini", 35, 52; Junod, Life, II, 59-63, 72-74.
18. SS 45. 9/62 Albasini to Schoeman, 8 Jan., 1862; Qnofre de Andrade, 
Presidio, 19, 26, 28.
19. ABB. Albasini to Portuguese Consul, Natal, 24 March 1868.
20. BPP 1876 Consular Report, c 1421, 1875; Anon., "Le Ccmmerce de 
l'lvoire Africain", L'Afrigue Exploree et Civilizee, VI, 1885, 242.
21. Oven, Narrative, I, 113; Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage, I, 85-6.
22. TA. W.179. H.T. Glynn, "Game & Gold", 246; TA. Private Papers, 
Greathead Diary, 1893 notebook, 17.4.
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hunting gave rise to the batimba hunters. The rhinoceros was 
hunted for its horns, which were imamufactured into aphrodisiacs 
in the Far East and, under Zulu influence, were locally fashioned 
into snuffboxes worn in incisions im the earlobe. Buckskins were 
exported and worn locally by males eand animal bones were fashioned 
into various implements.
The Closing of the Western Hunting (Grounds
The animal population to the wrest of Lourengo Marques was
increasingly depleted following the; colonization of that area by
Boers in the 1840s; a colonization ithat effectively closed off
ivory trading and hunting areas formerly exploited by people living
in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.
One of the major reasons for tlhe move by the voortrekker
Hendrik Potgieter fran Ohrigstad ito> the Zoutpansberg in 1848 was
the lure of ivory and this drew Louirengo Marques traders like Joao
23Albasini after him. Wherever posisible, the Boers extorted taxes
fran Africans in the form of ivory. The Transvaal state gave a
modicum of protection to English and other merchants trading for
ivory for which they paid a higher: jprice than Lourengo Marques
24merchants and which they sent to ithse Cape and Natal. Boer access
to capital, technology and their monopoly of the organized violence
of the state as embodied in legislatticn allowed them to push their
coastal canpetitors eastwards. The; Boer use of horses, wagon
transport and sophisticated firearms in the tsetse-free winter
months resulted in what one trader referred to as a "fearful
slaughter" of elephants. During 1thie summer months when tsetse,
malaria and tickbite fever settled <on the huntingveld and prevented
the use of horses and dogs and the sunraer grass obscured the game,
Boers with sufficient capital employed African hunters in their
"hundreds if not thousands", on a credit basis similar to that
25practiced in Lourengo Marques. By the mid 1850s the Zoutpansberg 
figure of over 90 000 kilos of ivory exported each year was about
23. J.B. de Vaal, "Albasini" 12, 19; TA. A.375 Forsmann Collection.
24. SS 36/63 Albasini to Uitvoeremdle Raad, 10 April, 1863 in SAAR. 
Transvaal no 4; ABB. Albasini to GGM, 9 Dec., 1861.
25. De Zuid Afrikaan , 28 Jan., 1864; Staats Courant 15 Nov, 1867.
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three to four tines that of Lourenco Marques and represented the
26annual slaughter of almost 2 000 eltephants.
Boer settlement in the Zoutparusberg was based on hunting and
pastoralism. But following the luntgsickness epidemic of 1855
which destroyed large numbers of catttle, many men were pushed
into hunting for a living. As pastcoralists the Boers were also
obliged to kill wild animals in ordier to protect their livestock
and open up new pastures as well as; to supply themselves with
venison, clothing, shoes, whips,rieanpies and trading canmodities.
As the Highveld became shot out andl as Boer pastoralists sought
sweet veld winter grazing for their: cattle, they fired their
winter sourveld pastures and moved :into the Lcwveld for the
27malaria-free hunting season. As <early as the late 1850s Boers
were hunting systematically as far 'east as Khosen on the Nkomati
. , 28 river bend.
Boer legislation at first restricted African competition but 
later defined Mozambican hunters as -poachers. The initial Zoutpans­
berg hunting laws of 1855 were adopted and codified by the South 
African Republic in 1858. Apart frrcm game protective aspects, this 
legislation attempted to maintain ai white monopoly of guns and to 
undercut African competition. Thus; it demanded that all hunters 
should only operate in winter and that Black hunters operating west 
of the Lowveld and outside of their: employers' farms, should carry 
passes or be accompanied by Whites., Africans were similarly 
prohibited fran owning guns and horses; transgression of these laws
was punishable by imprisonment or ax fine and the confiscation of
29weapons which were forfeited to the captor. Africans considered
30to be Portuguese subjects were also bound by this legislation.
26. TA/A.17 J. Fleetwood-Qiurchill;; TA.W179 Glynn, "Game"; De Vaal, 
"Albasini", 15, 77; Hattingh, "'Die Trekke", 400-415; F.V.
Kirby, In Haunts of Wild Game.
27. Stevenscn-Hamilton, Low-veld, 776;
SPG. MacKenzie to SPG, 3 June 1L889.
28. Fernandes das Neves, A Hunting Expedition, 46. See also BO 49, 
1870, p. 205.
29. O.J. Ferreira, "Stephanus Schoeman in Transvaal" (PhD., UNISA, 
1977), 44, 168-69. See also Law 22 of Oct., 1858, Law 10 of 1870, 
Law 6 of 1891, Law 13 of 1893; Staats Courant, 22 Oct., 1858; 
SAAR Transvaal. 13, "Locale Wetten..." , 106-109.
30. ABB. Albasini to Paiva de Rapozco, 20 Dec., 1860; Ibid., Albasini 
to GEM, 23 Dec., 1860.
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Although the Lowveld was soon incliuded in these laws, they were 
seldom enforced - much to the beneffit of the Delagoa Bay and other 
hunters and capitalists like AlbasiLni, who procured their ivory 
almost exclusively through "contracted" Black hunter-traders.
However the 1864-67 frontier war im the Zoutpansberg allowed 
Albasini's competitors to demand tlbe effective implementation of 
racial gun laws because many of the followers of the hostile chief 
Magato were armed with hunters' gums supplied by Albasini. But 
the Boers were unable to enforce amy of these laws after their 
retreat from the Zoutpansberg in 1867 and ironically it was 
Albasini and his followers as the ^representatives of the Republican 
state, who took advantage of racial, hunting legislation to eliminate 
ocmpetition.31
With the establishment of Occupation farms in the Zoutpansberg
and the Lowveld in the 1880s and 1890s new game laws were legislated
and, with a more organized and financially secure adminstration,
the Republican state was able to emforce these laws. Consequently
the large numbers of Mozambican humters who crossed the border in
the summer months became a source of bounty to Transvaalers as the
latter had the right to confiscate and keep all guns and hunting
32produce taken from "poachers".
The Decline of the Hunting Economy
To the south of lourengo Marqiues as early as the 1840s and 
more regularly from the 1850s, groups of well capitalized hunters 
operated in the Maputo and Tanbe aireas with the backing of Natal 
merchants. Much of the product of these hunts was sent back to 
Natal in coastal schooners, few of which declared their cargoes
31. SAAR. Transvaal, 6, pp. 167-169, EVR.109. Zoutpansberg Peti­
tioners to Volksraad, 9 Jan., 1866; Staats Courant, 15 Nov., 
1867.
32. SSa.176. R1406/95 in Ra869/95. Lothering to State President,
30 Jan., 1895; SS.4681. R1579/95 Bumes to Police Carmissioner, 
28 April, 1896; Kirby, In Hauntts, 331. See also E.F. Sandeman, 
Eight Months in an Ox Wagon, 3444-45 and note 29.
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33at Lourengo Marques. These Nattal-based hunters not only combined
> hunting with trading but also witth labour recruiting, both over­
land, and from the 1860s by coasttal schooner. In 1859 Mawewe, 
in an attempt to accumulate ivor^ y, and perhaps control its over­
exploitation, levied heavy taxes upon Lourenco Marques ivory
merchants.and, in order to force Umzila's repatriation, closed
34his lands to all Transvaal hunteir-traders in January 1861.
Umzila's subsequent return to the Delagoa Bay hinterland
initiated the Gaza civil war whicch, together with the drought and
the ivory blockade, severely resttricted the hunting and porterage
of ivory to Lourengo Marques. Tlhis resulted in a drop in ivory
exports frcm 33 090 kilos in 186(0 to 10 736 kilos over the 1862-3 
35economic year. Unzila's victory in 1862, and the ending of the 
drought the following year removeed these obstacles to the produc­
tion and movement of ivory. Moreover, the weakness of the chiefs 
of the Delagoa Bay hinterland ancd their uncertainty over Lourengo
Marques' new status as Umzila's ally, caused them to forgo the
36normal extraction fran hunters ojf the grounded tusk. By the
end of 1862, 1 200 hunters armed with guns were operating in the
interior and the Governor of Lomrenco Marques warned that
uncontrolled exploitation of ivoiry resources would result in an
37overkill of elephants. Sunrner hunting was especially destructive 
as. it restricted the ability of agarae to reproduce itself. In 1863 
he reported that
33. KOi. Alexander Anderson Papeirs. "Gunrunning at Port Natal";
SNA 1/1/12 Koch to SNA 23 Jam., 1862; MNE. caixa 697 Blandy to 
GLM, 20 May 1870; FO 63/1046 Lt. Gov., Natal to PO, 30 Oct.,
1863; Bishop of Zululand, Mission Field April 1873, 106; Struthers, 
"Hunting Journal", 145; Natali Mercury, 2 May 1871-
34. In a message to Thecphilus Shepstone, Mawewe explained that his 
hostility to the residents att Lourenco Marques was partly 
caused "by their manner of hunting." SNA 1/1/10 Statement of 
Mabulawa, 12 Jan., 1860; Onoifre de Andrade mentions Mawewe de­
manding a head tax in cloth If ran all Lourengo Marques residents, 
pregnant wcmen were to pay a. double tax. Presidio, 18.
See also Fernandes das Neves,, Hunting Expedition, 1, 2; ABB. 
Albasini to GLM, 1 Dec., 185S9.
35. BO 20., 18 May, 1861; BO 42, 17 Oct., 1863.
36. AHU. Mog. Corres. Gov. pasta. 21, GLM to GGM, 8 Feb., 1863; GGM . 
to MSMU, 8 May 1863; GGM to IMSMU 19 Sept., 1863; BO 22, 30 May 
1863.
37. AHU. Mog. Gorres. Gov. pasta. 21. GLM to GG, 13 Aug., 1862 in 
GGM to MSMU, 14 Oct., 1862.
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"A great commercial movement hais made itself felt in 
the country. Almost all the inhabitants have gone into 
the interior, seme to trade andl others to hunt... except 
for a few officials, all the inhabitants and even the 
negroes of the Crown Lands are merchants and hunters."
Others remarked on the "strings of kaffirs several miles in length 
39carrying ivory." With the ivory fields once again open for
bunting, exports shot up from 10 736; kilos in 1862-3 to 40 935 kilos
in 1863-4. Hippo ivory exports rosea similarly from 1 760 to 2 780
40kilos and rhino horn exports fran 3 000 kilos to 6 590 kilos.
But the overkill that resulted frcm this heightened production
pushed elephants northwards. By the. mid 1860s the best ivory fields
were in the Inhambane, Sofalla-Sennai area and, in marked contrast
41to the mid 1850s, there were few elephants left in Maputo land. ' Hie
strength which the Lourenco Marques hunters and ivory capitalists
exercised in the period after the Gaza civil war proved ephemeral
for the Mawewe-Swazi invasions of the Delagoa Bay hinterland
rendered the area unsafe for large scale movements of goods for the
next fifteen years. These invasions, which obliged Unzila to with-
42draw to Mosapa where the best ivory fields lay, also caused him
to reimpose royal taxation on ivory hunting, a move that was
43quickly followed by the chiefs living south of the Limpopo. Nor 
did Unzila's victory Improve the situation of the Zoutpansberg 
hunters as he did not forget the willingness that many Boers had
38. ACU, 1863, 72 Report of GLM; BO 17, 1863. GLM to GGM, 2 Oct., 
1862.
39. FO 63/1047. Dickson, Munro and Co. to FO., 18 Aug., 1863.
40. BO 39, 26 Sept., 1863; AQJ, 1864, p. 66, Fernandes das Neves; BO 
42, 17 Oct., 1863; ACU, 1866.2 a serie p 45.
41. AHU. Mog. Corres. Gov. Pasta 21* Albasini to GGM, 1 Sept., 1864 
in GGM to MSMU, 18 Nov., 1865; Freire de Andrade, "Exploragoes 
Portugueses", BSGL, 5, 13, 1894, 320; BO 15, 1871; W. Drurrmond, 
The Large Game & Natural History of South & South-east Africa, 
202, 215; Natal Mercury, November sumtary, 1870.
42. Drummond, Large Game, 215; ABB. Albasini to GLM, 7 April, 1862.
43. ABB. Albasini to GLM, 15 Oct., 1864; ACU, 15 April 1865, p. 97;
BO 17, 1871, p. 74. See also BO 41, 14 Oct., 1866; Natal Mercury, 
16 Dec., 1869. On game protective elements in taxation, see
BPP 1890 c.6200 Erskine to SNA, 22 July 1871.
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shewn to surrender him to Mawewe. But Albasini too was excluded
fran Umzila's ivory fields because, despite his acceptance of sane
ivory and slaves, his assistance in the civil war had not 
44materialized.
The problems arising fran the continued closure of the Gaza
ivory fields, upon which the Zoutpansberg hunting canmunity and the
Portuguese coastal settlements were dependent for their livelihood,
were aggravated by ccntanporary frontier wars in the northern
45Transvaal against Rambuda and Magato. These wars prevented
hunter-traders fran reaching Mzilikatze's country and closed the
46northern Zoutpansberg as an ivory producing area. This led to a
draining of the Schoemansdal treasury and was an important reason
for the Boer retreat fran the tewn in 1867. A number of Boer
hunter-famers remained in the Spelonken area at the south-eastern
point of the Zoutpansberg. They were largely dependent upon the
protection of anti-Magato elements for their continued existence
and, like Albasini who maintained a force of about 700 hunters and
over 100 guns, they were badly hit by the declining opportunities
47offered by elephant hunting.
The unsettled interior markedly increased the Lourengo Marques 
capitalists' overheads, as the loss, through desertion or theft, of
44. SS 55. R210/64. Verklaring van Manene, 11 April 1864; SS 65. 
R290/65 "Verslag van die Kafir Dodanhana", 13 March 1865; UR. 2. 
Art. 1. Schoeman and Duvenage with messengers from Unzila,
4 April, 1868. Exclusion fran the Gaza ivory fields seems to have 
been selective rather than general in nature. See ABB. Albasini 
to GEM 22 Dec., 1862; Albasini to GLM 22 July, 1863. See also 
SS 106. R1627/68 "Voorlopige rapport van Mozela", 26 Sept., 1868.
45. ABB. Albasini to GLM 31 March 1861; Albasini to GGM, 9 July 
1866; TA/A.595 Struben ms; De Vaal, "Die Rol", 73; Natal 
Mercury, 16 Dec., 1869; SS 109.50, van Nispen to SP, 8 March 1869.
46. SS.38 46026/61 Albasini to St. Schoeman, 25 Aug., 1861.
47. SS.57 Verceuil to M.W. Pretorius, 8 July 1864; ABB. Albasini to 
G G M , 9 July 1866; De Zuid-Afrikaan, 28 Jan, 1864; SS.100 R784/68 
"Notule der Zittung", 2 May 1868. For the politics of the period 
see De Vaal, "Rol", 112; R. Wagner, "Zoutpansberg: the dynamics 
of a hunting frontier, 1848-67" in S. Marks and A. Atmore, 
Econany and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa; O. Ferreira, 
"Stephanus Schoeman" 275-282.
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guns, ammunition and trade goods invested in hunting expeditions
48drained their profits. In late 1859 and I860 Mawewe took ivory
from hunter-traders working for Boda Cassimo, Fernandes das Neves
and Joao Albasini and another hunter-trader, Augustinho de Quadros,
49lost his life. In February 1861 Mawewe attacked and killed several
porters, returning from Mzilikatze, who were employed by Paiva de
Rapozo and left Jose Nicolau da Cunha for dead. Several Boer
hunter-traders were similarly harassed and sustained considerable
losses.^ After his defeat by Umzila, Mawewe continued to harass
hunter-traders operating in the Delagoa Bay hinterland and in 1863
killed 69 hunters, employed by a Natal merchant, who subsequently
51claimed losses of £6 000, including £3 500 of ivory.
The continuing hostilities between Rambuda-Magato and Albasini
prevented Delagoa Bay hunter-traders from operating in Mzilikatze*s 
52country. Other hostilities claimed the lives of fifty-one of 
Modjadji's followers who were killed six miles outside lourengo 
Marques in retaliation for the earlier death of a party of Matolla 
hunter-traders in Modjadji's area in the mid 1860s. As late as 
1871, following the Maputo-Tembe war, a hunter-trader-labour 
recruiter wrote of the area north of the Tembe river as
"...in a frightful state of anarchy. Even the different 
tribes which constitute Unzila's kingdom are always 
plundering one another and the smaller tribes about.
48. TA/BFC A. 1266 no. 1. Simoes to Paiva de Rapozo, 6 Dec., 1869?
T.S. van Rooyen, "Die Verhouding tussen die Boere, Engelse en 
Naturelle in die Geskiedenis van die Oos-Transvaal tot 1882", 
SAAYB, I, 1951, 192.
49. ABB. Albasini to GEM, 1 Dec., 1859; Albasini to GEM, 4 March 1860.
50. SS.37 R4298/61. Albasini to SP, 2 March 1861? ABB. Albasini to 
GEM, 18 April 1861.
51. NA/GH 1214 no 23, Scott to Newcastle, 3 March 1863; GH.1214 
no. 125, Scott to Newcastle, 30 Oct., 1863. See also Fernandes 
das Neves, "Exploragao do Rio Bembe", BSGL, 3, 6, 1882, 343.
52. ABB. Albasini to Vogichande Prichande, 30 April 1864; Albasini 
to GEM, 15 Oct., 1864; TA/A.595 Struben ms.
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Every man travelling through another tribe is constantly 
in danger of his life... one tribe is constantly on the 
watch for the people of another bearing goods."*3
While increased overheads lowered the ivory merchants' profits
the credit system of hunting and the Banyan monopoly of ivory
purchases severely depressed the hunters' profits. Thus, despite
the fall in the volume of ivory produced and the added labour
involved in its production, the value of ivory calculated by the
Lourengo Marques customs remained constant from 1863 (2$863 per
54kilo) to 1885 (2$641 per kilo). This was probably a reflection
of the value of ivory in India which remained constantly low
until 1875, i.e. during the critical years faced by Lourengo
55Marques ivory capitalists. The northward emigration of elephants 
when combined with a lew purchasing price, caused ivory production 
costs to soar in labour terms without a corresponding rise in 
remuneration as hunters travelled greater distances after scarcer 
resources. The overkill of elephants was paralleled by the over­
kill of rhinoceroses especially of the more palatable white 
rhinoceros whose horn is two to three times the size of the black 
rhinoceros. The market for hippo ivory suffered a severe setback
and then collapsed with the invention in the 1880s of xylonite,
56an industrial substitute used in the manufacture of dentures.
By 1872 it was remarked that Portuguese merchants who had
57monopolized the ivory trade at Lydenburg were fast disappearing.
In 1875 an impoverished Albasini was forced to leave the Spelonken 
in search of a now source of livelihood. In doing so he attempted
53. FO 63/1047 D. Leslie, statement in Keate to Kimberley, 15 Sept., 
1871; SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871; Leslie to SNA,
19 July 1871.
54. The value of goods estimated by the Lourengo Marques customs 
seldom bore any resemblance to their real market value. They do 
however, indicate changes in price. BO 42, 17 Sept., 1863; AHU. 
Mog., Alfandega packet 1382. On the Banyan monopoly, cf. Natal 
Mercury, 11 April 1971.
55. The value of Indian ivory was depressed during the 1860s. Between 
1870-1875 it rose from 8s 6d per kilo to 9s 6d per kilo and in 
1876 shot up to 17s 6d, levelling at 24s Id in 1890-91. Indian 
figures are drawn from BPPs, especially 1878-9, LXVIII, pp. xii 
and 44. See also anon., "Le Commerce d'Ivoire", 245.
56. TA/W.179 Glynn, "Game", 246; Kirby, In Haunts, 9.
57. WUL. A.55f R. James,"Reminiscences."
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to apply his intimate knowledge of the peoples and environment of
the north-eastern Transvaal to that last resort of ivory hunter-
58traders made redundant by overkill, labour recruiting. In 1877
otherwise liberal Portuguese tax reforms raised the export duty on
ivory from 3 to 6 per cent and the following year the Governor of
Lourenco Marques blamed the economic crisis in the town on the
decline of the hunting economy as the interior no longer produced
59sufficient commodities to pay for imports. For the ivory 
capitalists, the problem of heightened overheads incurred by taxation, 
raiding and overkill was .compounded by a vacillating Portuguese 
policy which often restricted the importation of guns and ammuni­
tion through Lourenco Marques.^ In 1882 one observer noted that, 
because of the depletion of elephants in Gazaland, Lourengo Marques 
ivory merchants found it more profitable to trade in Bilene, on 
the south-east border of Gaza, where they exchanged their goods for 
sterling specie earned by migrant workers in the Transvaal and 
Natal. The Zoutpansberg saw a brief resurgence in ivory hunting 
in 1885 when a treaty of friendship was signed with the newly- 
installed Gungunyana allowing Zoutpansberg hunters into Gazaland..
This led to more ivory being produced in the Zoutpansberg in that
year than over the previous decade and this caused Gungunyana to
62cnce again restrict entrance to the hunting fields.
Because of the declining hunting economy the twenty years 
following the mid 1860s were marked by a transfer of Lourenco 
Marques merchant capital fran ivory hunting to retail trading. 
Although virtually all ivory exported in 1885 (1 052 kilos) and 
1890 (952 kilos) went to India, by 1899 following the introduction
58. P. Berthoud, Lettres Missionaires de M. & Jf00 P. Berthoud 
1873-79, 250, 376.
59. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879. District Report for Lourengo Marques, 
1877-78.
60. BMSAS, 45, 1882, 39. See pp. 301-302.
61. Cardosa, "Expedigao", 184;
62. TA/SS 1036. R824/85, "Traktaat tuschen zyn Hbog Edele Staats 
President en Koning Omdonga", in Nat. Canm. Zoutpansberg to 
Supt. Natives, 13 Feb., 1885; P. Berthoud, in L'Afrique 
Exploree et Civilizee, VII, 1886, Hattingh, "Die Trekke", 403.
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of a 10 per cent export tax, all 155 kilos exported went to Germany.
As ivory production declined a new market, based on the purchasing 
pcwer of migrant workers' repatriated wages, developed in the 
interior.
The depressed ivory trade persuaded hunters to transfer their
labour fran ivory hunting to the production of less capital and
labour intensive horns and skins for the Natal, French, Dutch and
local markets. Skins were taken to Natal in coastal schooners
carrying migrant workers and ivory. French ships taking vegetable
oils to Marseilles carried as many as 100 000 skins on a single 
64voyage. Smaller game was hunted almost exclusively with cheap
flintlock and percussion guns and consequently it was possible for
65large numbers of men to draw a living fran hunting. By 1874
ivory had been replaced by buckskins as the major Lourengo Marques 
66export. But the increased circulation of guns heightened the
depletion of game in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Similarly, the
general displacement of flintlock by percussion guns and their
easy availability and cheapness, together with ammunition at
Lourengo Marques, was a major reason for the great slaughter of
67game in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. The more efficient breech­
loader was seldom used and at one time breechloaders could only 
be procured in Kimberley and then only at the cost of a return 
journey skirting the northern border of the Transvaal because of 
the latter's restrictions upon blacks carrying guns. When
breechloaders were later sold at Lourenco Marques their cost was
68 rconsidered exhorbitant. Over the econanic year 1877-78 dried skin
63. AHU. Mog. Alfdndega, packet 1382; AHU. Meg. 2a Rep. pasta 7 
Alfandega de Lourengo Marques, 1890; Mappa Estatistica, 
(Alfandega de Lourengo Marques, 1899). See also BO 45, 5 Nov., 
1877; BO 52, 30 Dec., 1878.
64. For one year, see BO 7, 13 Feb., 1875; BO 10, 6 March 1875; BO 
40, 2 Oct., 1875; BO 43, 6 Nov., 1875; BO 50, 11 Nov., 1875.
65. Alice Times, 10, 17, 31 March 1876.
66. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877; BO 47, 19 Nov., 1877; Alice Times, 10 March 
1876.
67. FO 84/1539 Vice-consul O'Neill to FO, 10 Oct., 1879; BPP C.-6200 
1890 Saunders to SNA, 17 Nov., 1887, p. 45. See also pp. 300-302.
68. NA/SNA 1/3/26 Res. Magistrate, Upper Tugela to SNA, 29 March, 
1896; FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO, 5 Aug., 1879.
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exports totalled 142 996 kilos. In 1883 some 42 197 kilos were
exported, in 1890 32 614 kilos and in 1899 a total of 10 263 
69kilos. Although the 1877-78 figures were inflated by Boer 
exports, the later figures confirm contemporary impressionistic 
reports of a rapid animal overkill throughout the Delagoa Bay 
hinterland.^
A similar decline is to be found in the export of monkey and 
civet skins from Lourengo Marques. As Maputoland became increasing­
ly independent of Zululand in the 1880s, the production of tribute 
in the form of monkey and civet skins declined. This gave an 
initial fillip to the seaborne trade in these skins to Natal. 
However, this sector of the skin trade declined rapidly as the 
Inhambane interior, still largely untouched by southern market 
denands, supersaded Lourenco Marques as an exporter of mcnkey and 
civet skins to Durban.
Figure No. 5 
Monkey & Civet Cat Skin Exports to Durban
71Lourengo Marques figures above; Inhambane below:
1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882
24 991 5 054 4 593 22 458 33 932 11 467
- - 2,937 n/a n/a n/a
1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888
17 713 19 839 10 517 6 549 2 006 2 505
n/a n/a 21,778 18,870 10,843 15,348
69. AHU. Mog., Alfandega, packet 1382; AHU. Mog., 2a Pep. pasta 7, 
Alfandega de Lourengo Marques; Mappa Estatistica.
70. P. Berthoud, "Lourengo Marques", BSNG, 1895, 108; ZA 27 Report 
of Anatongaland Boundary Commission, 24 Dec., 1896; ZGH.796. 
892/96 Foxon Report, 27 July 1896.
71. Natal Blue Books, annual series.
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The collapse of the cat skin trade was compounded by the dis­
integration of the Zulu army after the wars of 1879-83. In the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland the shooting out of cats and the ready availability 
of European clothing brought hone by migrant workers or purchased
locally with their wages, brought about a discarding by males of skins
72in favour of European or Europeanized dress.
The disintegration of the hunting economy had a number of 
effects on the social formation of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. It 
virtually terminated access to a major source of protein and, when 
combined with cattle losses and the rise in importance of carbo- 
hydrate-rich crops like maize and cassava, this laid the basis 
for a structural malnutrition and a heightened dependence on 
purchased foodstuffs. The closing of the ivory frontier destroyed 
the amapisi and the diminution of small game restricted the ability 
of the bahloti to sell hunting produce. But as old ways of making 
a living closed, new ones opened.
The Response of Commoners and Chiefs to the Declining Hunting
Fran the 1870s porterage fran Lourengo Marques to the eastern
Transvaal goldfields was particularly important because of the
difficulties involved in transporting goods during winter over the
73Drakensberg fran Natal. Transport-riding fran Lourenco Marques 
was restricted, especially in summer, by tsetse infestation, poor 
oxen and the bad state of the roads, constructed in the first half 
of the 1870s, between Lourengo Marques, Lydenburg and Pilgrims 
Rest. Although the mortality rate of draught oxen dropped fran 
50 per cent in 1851 to 10 per cent in 1874 and 2 per cent in 1884, 
the ease with which tsetse could suddenly infect an area remained 
a constant problem for transport riders. Thus in 1886,
72. Seidel, "Die BaRonga", 1898, 186. Nineteen photographs taken by 
a Swiss missionary of the 1895 Gaza mobilization shew that all
-soldiers had a kilt of cloth under a kilt of skins. Most wore 
shirts or a toga-like cloth over the shoulder; SMA 2001/B. For 
Delagoa Bay elders wearing waistcoats, red coats, British 
military helmets, shirts and cotton cloth, see photographs in 
SMA 2001/A. See also SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier, 24 Nov., 
1896; SMA 1760 Grand jean diary, 24 Jan., 1894.
73. MNE. caixa 663. Duprat to MNE, 9 Oct., 1874; Natal Mercury,
June survey, 1874; SS 788. R 991/83 Nationale Boerenshandels 
Vereniging to Govt., March? 1883.
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a severe drought drew the ungulate vectors of trypanosomiasis
to the newly constructed shorter road between Lourengo
Marques and Barberton and this resulted in a high oxen mortality
rate that bankrupted tranported riders like J.W. Colenbrander
74and Percy Fitzpatrick. Porters carrying up to 80 lbs took 8 to
10 days to walk frcm Lourengo Marques to Lydenburg for which they
received 15s per 100 lbs and then a further 12s for the journey
frcm Lydenburg to Pretoria. There were probably about 750 men
employed as porters on the Lourengo Marques route at any given time
during the late 1870s. ^
Road construction and porterage introduced many men to wage
labour and offered carriers the opportunity of supplementing their
incomes from porterage with several months on the Goldfields before
returning hone. The amapisi who were dependent on large numbers of
porters to carry the product of the hunt, were unable to compete
with these fees. By 1879 porters carrying hunting produce were
reported to be fast decreasing in relation to the increase in
76porterage to the eastern Transvaal. However, porterage did not 
constitute a long-term alternative to hunting. In July 1891 the 
railway from Lourengo Marques to Kanati Foort was opened and the 
extension to Pretoria was completed on 1 January 1895. The railway 
and the decline in tsetse infestation removed the raison d’etre for 
porterage.
A more important alternative to hunting was presented by labour 
migration, which in itself can be seen as both a cause and a result 
of the declining hunting economy. As early as 1878 the Governor 
of Lourengo Marques noted that
"The hunting of animals which still a few years ago 
occupied many hands ... has grievously declined because 
of the diminution of said animals and because of their 
emigration to the distant interior and because of the
74. P. Berthoud, letter, 25 June 1887 in L'Afrique Civilizee, VIII, 
1887, 307; BO 2, 8 Jan., 1887.
75. Cohen, "Erlautemde bemerkungen", 173; (21 1053 Farrell to 
Col. Sec., 20 Aug., 1879.
76. BO 17, 24 March, 1879.
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lack of manpower, which prefers to leave for foreign 
colonies where they will find more remunerative 
work."77
In similar fashion, Cetewayo complained that the movement of labour
frcm Maputoland to Natal had caused a decline in tribute, largely in
78game skins, sent frcm that area.
While the decline in the hunting economy released male labour
for migrant labour, it also threatened the existing social relations
of production and the economic base of chiefly power. Before the
advent of gun hunting the chiefs were able to mobilize 1 500-2 000
people in communal hunts and in the construction of game traps
79and fences that were up to two kilometres long. The organization
of these hunts and the control of the redistribution of their
product provided chiefs with the means needed to attract followers
and retain the loyalty of dependants. Participation in the market
economy through the sale of labour allowed a decentralization of
gun ownership. When guns were imported, they were initially
confined to the notables but when they became more generally
available, it was the notables who held the better guns, such as
percussion and later breechloaders, and flintlocks and later
80percussion guns, tended to be confined to cctimoners. While
modem guns were invested with an element of symbolic political
power, it is important to note that the chiefs were unable to
81control the circulation of guns or gunpowder. The hunting taxes 
demanded by a chief varied from the joints of a buffalo, eland, 
giraffe or antelope, to half the joints of a hippopotamus or as 
much as the grounded half of the slain animal. Skins taken from 
lions, leopards or honey badgers automatically belonged to the chief
77. BO 3, 1879, p. 17. "Relatorio do district© de Lourengo Marques, 
1877-78".
78. SNA 1/1/13 J. Dunn to SNA, 8 July 1863. See also SNA 1/6/3 
"Statement of messengers sent by the government to Ceteswayo 
and Panda".
79. CMe,n, Narrative, I, 113, 134, 268; Threlfall, Cape Monitor, 16 
July 1853; Hilliard, "Notes on the Manucosi"; Junod, Life, II, 
58-9, 339.
80. Struthers, "Hunting Journal", 94, 144; JSA file 25, p259, Mahun- 
gane & Nkonuza; Bleek, Diary, 28; 2A 27 Report of Amatongaland 
Boundary Commission, 24 Dec., 1896; ZGH 796. 892/96 Foxon 
Report, 31 Aug., 1896.
81. However there is some evidence that the Portuguese gave gunpowder 
to chiefs. SNA 1/1/13 Fookey to SNA, 13 Nbv., 1862.
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as did the grounded tusk of an elephant and the contents of a
crocodile's stanach, the latter being used in magico-religious
.. 82 rites.
In response to the thinning out of game and the consequent
decline in chiefly revenues frcm hunting, the chiefs tended to add
to the burden of taxation placed on hunters. In the case of
Umzila, this evolved into de facto hunting concessions which, in
addition to the grounded tusk, foreign hunters were obliged to
pay in exchange for the right to kill or skin a predetermined number
83and type of animals. Gungunyana protected and monopolized all 
the elephant ivory in Gaza land. The more powerful of the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland chiefs, such as Ngwanasi of the Maputo, also came 
to monopolize all elephant hunting for the royal house and hence
84removed ivory hunting altogether frcm the world of the commoner. 
Thus, when the Delagoa Bay hinterland was conquered and occupied 
by the Portuguese, hunting had largely ceased as a branch of 
production. The colonial imposition of strict regulations and 
heavy fees on hunting, together with the implementation of game 
preservation policies and governmental claims to the grounded tusk 
brought a final end to hunting.
But the people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland not only drew a 
living from their environment. They were also able to capitalize 
on their geographical position as the natural middlemen in any trade 
between the Zulu, Swazi, Gaza and other people wishing to procure 
European-made goods at Lourengo Marques. Thus the causes of labour 
emigration should be sought not only at the point of production 
but also at the level of exchange.
82. BO 17, 1871, p. 74? Junod, Life, I, 40; II, 57, 76; SMA 467 
Grandjean, 1890.
83. Drunmcod, Large Game, 215; G. Lacy, Pictures of Travel, Sport 
and Adventure, 52-3; Natal Mvertizer, "Exploits of Reuben 
Benningfield", 26 June 1925? Junod, "BaRonga", 140? Life, I, 
406.
84. ABM. ABC: 15.4 vol 12. Richards to Mean, 24 Aug., 1884; BO 6, 
11 Feb., 1888? Junod, Life, I, 338.
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PATTERNS OF TRADE AND CONSUMPTION 
AND THEIR EFFECT UPON MIGRANT LABOUR
The Structure of Merchant Capital
Commercial enterprise was fostered in several ways; children 
were instilled with a respect for the knowledge engendered by travel
i
and were taught carmercial skills. Traders were esteemed as
adventurous and wealthy men and various chiefdans were rencwned for
2their mercantile abilities.
Throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries imported beads,
3
used as ornamentation, bridewealth and currency, constituted a 
major article of conmerce with the interior. The market for beads 
was extremely localized, dynamic and specific and consequently 
demanded a well-developed canmercial acumen. Beads and cotton 
goods frcm Lourenco Marques were traded extensively throughout the 
Low and Highvelds^ and were found in such dispersed areas as the
1. AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 9. Freire de Andrade report, 1891;
H.A. Junod, Grammaire Ronga, 20; Junod, Life, I, 339; H-P. Junod,
. and A. Jacques, The Wisdom, 93-101.
2. Owen, "Description of Delagoa" in RSEA, II, 469; A. Mackenzie (ed) 
Mission Life among Zulu-Kafirs (Cambridge, 1866) , 298; BMSAS, 86, 
October 1889, 330; Junod, "BaRanga", 241. See also Krige, 
Rainqueen, 67-68.
3. Van der Cape lie (1723), RSEA, I, 417; Ledeboer (1727), RSEA, I, 
428; Francken (1757) , RSEA, VI, 499; Boteler, Voyage of Discovery, 
90; Oven, Narrative, 118; Hillier ms., 1857, p. 8 in RGS; St. V. 
Erskine to RGS President, 11 Dec., 1868.
4. Preller (ed), Dagboek van Louis Trigardt, 76; T. Arbousset, 
Narrative of an exploratory tour to the north-east of the colony 
of the Cape of Good Hope (Cape Tcwn, 1846) , 180; TA/BPC, I, C. 
Simoens to Paiva de Andrade, 28 June 1858; Simoens to Cabral,
4 Aug., 1858; UNISA. Nachtigal, Tagebuch, 1879, 283; Grandjean,
La Mission, 57, 59.
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5
trans-Limpopo, the edge of the Kalahari, Basutoland and Gaikaland.
European and Indian cotton cloth, which initially had to 
compete with locally-woven cotton and bark cloth, quickly became 
the major commodity imported through Lourengo Marques. In the 1820s 
women's attire consisted of
"a piece of dungaree, about eight inches broad, attached 
in front to a single or double row of beads or shells, 
supported by their hips and brought to a knot behind, 
frcm which was suspended a string of 10 or 12 iron 
balls."6
This cloth was woven cn a horizontal locm by women in most parts of
7
southern Mozambique as far south as Maputo land. Although imported
Q
cloth was reported in 1823 to be "of prime value", unmanufactured
cotton was of such importance as a trade caimodity that a ccmmercial
crisis developed in Lourenco Marques when imports were curtailed
by the American civil war. In 1866-67 seme 2 673 kilos of dyed
thread valued at 6 467$900 and 1 293 kilos of raw cotton worth
102 676$000 were imported through Lourengo Marques. Only women 
wore locally-woven cotton cloth and, when European and Indian cloth 
was imported it was initially confined to female attire. Thus even
5. 00 48/62, Philip to Somerset, 13 April 1824? J. Thompson, "From
Cape Town to Cape Correntes", in Walekenaer (ed), Histoire des
Voyages, vol. 21, p. 17; Livingstone's Private Journals 1851-3, 
(ed) I. Shapera (London, 1960), 41-2; Merensky, Erinnerungen,
60; L.M. Thompson, Survival in Two Worlds, 10; A. Smith, Trade 
of Delagoa Bay", 179.
6. ADM 1/2269 Osborne, "Description of the peoples of Delagoa Bay,
28 Sept., 1822". See also Boteler, Voyage of Discovery, 27;
CWen, "The Bay of Delagoa", RSEA, II, 468; Fynn, "Delagoa Bay", 
RSEA, II, 481.
7. Penwell, "Account of Delagoa Bay", RSEA, II, 460; St V. Erskine
to President RGS., 11 Nov., 1868 in RGS; Junod, Life, II, 98;
ZGH 708 2 288/87 Saunders, "Report cn the amaTonga people, 17
Nov., 1887". See also SNA 1/6/2 "Statement of Umkunhlana, messen­
ger from Langa (Mawewe)", 5 Oct., 1859. For weaving by Tsonga- 
speaking immigrants in the north-eastern Transvaal, see Berthoud, 
Lettres, 14 June 1876, 310; War Office, Native Tribes, 134.
8. ADM 1/2269 Oven, "Report on the Portuguese settlements, 15 April
1823"; Owen, Narrative, 118.
9. AHU. Mog., CG. pasta 20, GG to MSMQ 13 Nov., 1862; pasta 21, GG 
to MSMU, 19 Sept., 1863.
10. BO 22, 22 May, 1869.
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in the late 19th century Mafumo herdboys, who wore cotton clothing,
were taunted by their Matolla peers, "crowd of women that you are,
11clad in cotton material." Imported cloth was also traded in the 
interior where the Portuguese term pega, a length of two fathcms of 
cloth, was later incorporated into the Venda, north Sotho and Tsonga 
languages. ^ ^
Metals also constituted a major trade item. Despite the lack
of any ore deposits in the Delagoa Bay hinterland, when Europeans
first arrived on the coast in the 15th and 16th centuries, they
13noted the presence of iron, copper and tin. The high quality
of copper neckrings worn in the Delagoa Bay area was frequently
caimented on in the 18th century and several hundred kilograms of
14copper and tin were exported fran the bay during the 1720s.
Bronze was smelted in the area and larger quantities of high quality
15brass were taken to the northern Nguni. The copper used in the
Delagoa Bay hinterland came fran the Phalaborwa-Murchisan range
and Olifants-Selati mines and perhaps fran as far north as 
16Messina. Heavy copper and brass arm, leg and neckrings were
considered a sign of distinction in the 19th century and were used
17as a bridewealth medium and in tribute presentations. Although
11. Junod, Life, I, 69.
12. Sci Nogueira, Diciondrio Ronga-Portugu£s (Pesa); N.J. van Warmelo, 
Venda-English Dictionary (Pesa) ; D. Ziervogel and P.C. Mokgokong, 
Groot Noord-Sotho Woordeboek (Pesa).
13. E.G. Ravenstein, A Journal of the first Voyage of Vasco da Gama 
1497-1499, 18; C. Montez, Descobrimento e Fundagao de Lourengo"" 
Marques, 1500-1800, (Lourengo Marques, 1948) , 31; H. Junod,
"The Condition of the Natives", 18-19; C.G. Coetzee, "Die Stryd 
an Delagoabaai", 14.
14. Jan van der Capelle, RSEA, I; Jacob Francken, RSEA, IV, 493;
Jakob de Bucquoi, RSEA, VI, 43; Penwell, RSEA, II, 463; Coetzee, 
"Die Stryd cm Delagoabaai", 163-174, 192-93; T.M. Evers, "Three 
Iron-Age industry sites in the eastern Transvaal Lowveld", (M.A., 
University of the Witwatersrand, 1974), 91-94.
15. Coetzee, "Die Stryd", 193; KCL Fynn Papers, "Miscellaneous notes 
cn Native Industries"; JSA file 15, p. 68, "Description of Tribes."
16. Penwell, RSEA, II, 463; Junod, Grammaire Ronga, 21; Evers, "Three 
Iron-age sites", 93-4.
17. ADM 1/2269 Osborne, "Description of the peoples of Delagoa Bay,
22 Sept., 1822"; Fynn, RSEA, II, 481; Owen, RSEA, II, 468;
Junod, Graitmaire Ronga, 18.
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zinc was imported through Lourenqo Marques and was alloyed with
18copper in the Transvaal to produce brass, a large amount of
European brass was exchanged at Lourenco Marques for hunting and
agricultural produce. Much of this brass, in the form of large
unworked bars or rings, was then carried to Zululand where it was
19exchanged for livestock and skins. Imported copper manillas were
used in trade with the Zoutpansberg and brass and iron wire was
, . . . , 20used to bind weapons.
Iren was used in the manufacture of weapons and, fashioned into
rings, balls and wire, was enplcyed at various times as a bridewealth
medium together with beads, copper and brass rings, cattle, goats,
21mats and baskets. As a currency iron hoes were durable, trans­
portable, easily stored, and were divisible and convertible into 
use values such as spear heads, wire, sweat scrapers or agricultural
hoes. The lotus-shaped marriage hoe was readily exchanged over a 
22wide area. In the Delagoa Bay hinterland these hoes were given
the adjective beja which was the Tsanga name for their area of
23provenance in the northern Transvaal. Hoes of a regionally
specialized shape were also used as bridewealth and currency in the 
24Inhambane area and throughout the northern and eastern
18. WUL. Nicholson papers, A.82. Peringuez to Nicholson, 24 Oct.,
1921; T.G. Trevor, "Sane Observations on the Relics of pre- 
European Culture in Rhodesia and South Africa", Jml. Royal 
Anthrop. Institute, LX, 1930, 394, 396. For zinc imports see 
BO 1, 2 Jan., 1875; BO 43, 6 Nov., 1875; BO 2, 16 Jan., 1876;
BO 7, 14 Feb., 1876; BO 21, 22 May 1876.
19. JSA file 25, p. 261, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza; file 12,
p. 123, evidence Ndukwana; file 74, evidence Mabola; Webb and 
Wright, James Stuart Archive, I, 24, 41, 109.
20. FO 97/303 Ctoen to Admiralty, 6 Sept., 1825; Account book of Manuel 
da Gama, 1859-63, an Indo-Portuguese trader in the Zoutpansberg;
J. Mouzinho de Albuquerque collection of weapons, Pretoria 
museum; Junod, Life, I, 452-3.
21. Jakob de Bucqoi, (1719), RSEA, VI, 434; JSA file 74 p 9, evidence
Mahungane & Nkonuza, evidence Mabola, file 25, evidence Ndaba;
Junod, Life, I, 275.
22. Fynn, "Delagoa Bay", RSEA, II, 481; J. Flygare, De Zoutpansberg 
en de BaVenda Natie (Pretoria, 1899) , 8; B.H. Dicke, Appendix G 
to C. Fuller, "Tsetse in the Transvaal", 9th-10th Reports of Vet. 
Educ. S.A., 1924.
23. Junod, "BaRonga", 88; Life, I, 276; Grandjean, La Mission, 57;
O.T., Nelson Mhlongo, chief Dzumeri's village, Letaba district, 
Gazankulu.
24. BO 13, 26 March 1864, 81; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep. pasta 1. Director 
Inhambane customs to GG, 26 June 1885; ABM: ABC.15.4. vol 12, 
Gusley to Smith, 1 May 1886; Cabral, Ragas, Usos e Costumes, 98.
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25Transvaal. Although chiefs fixed the size of arbrideprice and
the bride's father stipulated the medium of payment, it was common
for the size and medium of the brideprice to fluctuate according
26to the availability of the specific bridewealth mediums. It is
traditionally believed that hoes became increasingly important as
bridewealth following the loss of cattle to the Ngoni invaders in
the 1820s and 1830s but that it was only following the cattle
epidemic of the early 1860s that hoes became the major median of
27bridewealth in the Delacpa Bay hinterland.
Sweet potato plants brought from the coast were exchanged in
28the north-eastern Transvaal for metal objects and it seems likely 
that coastal traders as well as Tsonga-speaking settlers introduced
other foodstuffs into the Transvaal such as groundnuts, various
29 30 31millet strains, maize, cassava, fowls, and possibly tobacco.
Tobacco twisted into coils and rolls was important in both long-
32distance and local trade. Salt was also vital in local trade as 
it was both a dietary necessity and an important element in tanning. 
Salt encrustation was taken fran the edge of coastal saline lakes 
during neap tides and the annual dry season. In the interior a less
25. SAAR., Transvaal no. 4, Supl. Stukke 36/63 Albas ini to Volksraad,
10 April 1863, "Verslag van Kafirs O p g a v e n . BMB, 1874, 90; 
EMSAS, 1876, 13, 72, 284-5; Stayt, The Bavenda, 75; Krige collec­
tion, South African museum. See also numerous Zoutpansberg native 
camnissicner case returns in TA. SN 3 and SN 5.
26. 00 48/62 Owen to Philip (n.d.) in Philip to Somerset, 13 April 
1824 encl. in Somerset to Bathurst, 22 April 1824; JSA file 74, 
p 38, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.
27. Grandjean, La Mission, 56; Junod, Life, I, 276; Junod, "BaRonga",
87.
28. O.T., Nelson Mhlongo, chief Dzumeri's village, Letaba district, 
Gazankulu.
29. Krige, Rainqueen, 36. The Tsonga and Venda words for "groundnut” 
are almost identical, see van Wannelo, Venda-English dictionary. 
Ibid., The tshivalo and tshivedvane strains of millet in Venda land 
were introduced by Tsonga-speakers.
30. O.T., Edward Mabyalane, Kurulen, north-eastern Transvaal. 30 
March 1979.
31. The Journals of Carl Mauch, (ed) E.E. Burke (Salisbury, 1969), 120. 
The Venda word for cassava (mutumbula) is almost identical to the 
Ronga word (ntumbula). Krige, Rainqueen, 45.
32. The Venda word for tobacco (fola) is very similar to the Portu­
guese word for "leaf", folha. Grandjean, La Mission, 59; Kirby,
In Haunts of Wild Game, 361; TA ".179. H.T. Glynn, "Game and
Gold'*, 214.
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palatable and impure salt was laboriously filtered from saline grasses 
33and soils. Earthenware produced in specific areas with good clay
resources was extensively traded as were baskets manufactured by
weaving specialists.^
Trade at Lourengo Marques was strongly influenced by Portuguese
tariff legislation. Following the dissolution of the Commercial
Company at Lourengo Marques in 1843, foreign traders were almost
entirely excluded from the Bay until the promulgation of a new
tariff structure in 1853. This included the establishment of a
customs house, the running of which was contracted out to a local
merchant, the opening of the settlement to foreign trade and the
introduction of a three tier ad valorem taxation set at 4, 8 and 
3512% The nuriber of "Portuguese" traders at the settlement rose
from about 15 in 1848 to 55 in 1861, the majority of whom were Luso- 
36Indians. Although many of the traders of Asian descent were
Moslems, they were generically known as "Banians". They were drawn
largely frcm Goa, Diu and Damao and by the late 1860s had formed a
37"Banian association" in Lourengo Marques. These men traded along 
the routes to the Highveld, married Boer women and as Portuguese
38citizens were, until 1871, entitled to a burgher farm in the Transvaal.
33. F. Elton, Natal Mercury, 10 Oct., 1871; Mauch, Journal, 1 Sept., 
1870; Anon., Missionary Life of Douglas McKenzie, entry for 
June-July 1881; BPP 1893-4. Consular report no. 1153 for 1892.
34. Junod, "BaBonga", 225, 231.
35. PO 63/698 Parker to Palmerston, 18 Feb., 1848; BO 32, 8 Aug., 
1885.
36. FO 63/698 Parker to Palmerston, 18 Feb., 1848; BO 21, 25 May, 
1861.
37. BO 20, 16 May, 1868.
38. Until the early 1870s Transvaal Boers expressed surprise at the 
presence of white Portuguese. Fernando da Costa Leal, Viagem,
16; Fernandes das Neves, Hunting Expedition, 113-14; Naude, 
"Boerdery", 65. See also Mauch, Journal, 38.
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They established trading outlets which were linked to Lourengo
Marques throughout the northern and eastern Transvaal and at least
one of their number, Cassimir Simoons, left assets of £40 000 on 
39his death.
Despite the legislation of 1853 the settlement was only
effectively opened to foreign trade in 1864 following a severe 
40economic crisis. The opening of Lourengo Marques to foreign
trade attracted large numbers of British Indians to the settlement.
These men exhibited a high degree of literacy and, as distinct
frcm the Hindu and Catholic Luso-Indians, many of whom were employed
in the civil service, British Indians were largely Moslem and
41constituted more of a trading caste. Most came from Bombay and
Cutch and they drew the Delagoa Bay hinterland indefatigably into
42an Indian Ocean trade network stretching as far south as Durban.
The establishment of European trading houses at Lourengo 
Marques, drawn to the settlement by the production of vegetable
43oils in the late 1860s, initiated a marked improvement in commerce.
The simultaneous emergence of a coastal schooner traffic between
Lourenco Marques and Durban, based an the ferrying of migrant
labourers, and the opening of steamship and cable communications
44also helped draw small merchants to the Delagoa Bay hinterland.
The European and Banyan importers at Lourengo Marques provided 
itinerant merchants or sertanejos with goods on credit which were 
then often distributed to African ccmpradores who sometimes
39. The history of these Luso-Indian traders has yet to be written 
but cf. BO 18, 2 May 1863; ABB. Albasini to vice consul Natal,
2 March 1866; 8 June 1866; 24 March 1868; Albasini to Duprat, 17 
Aug., 1869; TA Braz Pereira Collection; Manuel da Gama account 
book (privateMS); De Vaal, "Die Rol van Joao Albasini".
40. BO 30, 23 July 1964; BPP 1876, LXXIV, Consular Report for 1875.
41. Carlos Reis, A Pcpulagao de Lourengo Marques em 1894, 30, 34-5.
42. PO 63/1110 O'Neill to Secretary of State, 17 July 1881; 1.1. 
1/40.757/87 PI to Col. Sec., 28 June 1887; BPP 1890-91 LXXVII, 
British consular report for 1889; FO 63/ 1282 Bernal to PO,
27 Nov., 1894; Standard Bank 1/1/102 Liabilities report, July
1897.
43. BO 10, 6 March 1875; AHU. Mog., CG.,pasta 29, GG-MSMU, 17 Aug., 
1875; D. Leslie, Among the Zulus and Amatongas, 274.
44. Natal Mercury, November summary 1870. By 1874 Lourengo Marques 
was the fourth largest source of Natal imports, Natal Mercury,
22 Oct., 1874; BPP 1881 Consular report c2945 for 1880. See also 
the extensive cargo manifests in the Natal Mercury and the 
trade statistics in the Blue Books.
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travelled for several months in the coarse of their trading 
45operations. The ccmpradores followed narrow trading paths marked
by small enclosures surrounded by thorns of stone walls that served
as shelters. At the larger "depots" goods were traded, caravans
rested and retailers sent out in all directions. The latter would
return with merchandise and, when sufficient was accumulated, this
was sent to the coast with the requisite numbers of porters and 
46guards. Oswald Hoffman, the agent for Lipperts and Dentzelman
employed 120 African ccmpradores who traded and recruited labour
47as far west as the Spelanken.
The rivers that cut through the Lebcmbo mountains provided
well-watered and provisioned trade routes into the South African
interior. The mineral springs in Khosen and on the Nkanati acted
as an entrepdt from which large numbers of traders passed up the
Uanetzi river to the Olifants. Frcm the Olifants river three
routes led into the Transvaal. One route, which seems to have
been dominated by the Gaza, led to the Olifants-Selati confluence
and the rich copper and iron-producing Phalaborwa area. Another
passed up the Groot Letaba river to the Eiland salt-producing area
north of the copper-rich Murchison range. It then continued to
Modjadji's where rain medicines and ivory were procured. The most
important route passed up the Klein Letaba river to the salt-
producing Soutini area. It then followed the river, passing iron-
rich Tshimbupfe, before running between the mineral-rich carbanatite
plugs of Iron Mountain and Magoro Kop. Leaving the Klein Letaba
the route passed Albasini*s headquarters at Goedewensch before
continuing to the saltpans of the western Zoutpansberg and the
iron- and copper-producing areas to the north. Frcm Goedewensch
another route led up the Levubu or Pafuri river to Messina and
thence north of the Limpopo to Inhambane and, via the northern
48Uanetzi and Limpopo, south to Delagoa Bay. Traders transported
45. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879. District Report for 1877-78.
46. B. Dicke, The Bush Speaks, 21-22? Schaefli, "De Valdezia", 150.
47. II. 1/4 Edward Cohen to Col. Sec., 12 Jan., 1878; II. 1/16, 
Hoffman to PI, 28 Feb., 1877; Hoffman to Col. Sec., 3 March, 
1877; SS 263 R250/78 Veldkomet Grieve to Landdrost Zoutpans­
berg, 8 Jan., 1878.
48. P. Harries, "Production, trade and labour migration frcm the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland in the second half of the 19th century" 
in Collected Papers of the Africa Seminar, UCT, 1978, pp. 30-31.
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goods to riverside entrepots in flat-bottomed, locally constructed
sailing vessels capable of carrying several tons. In 1861 sane 37
of these gatum were registered at Lourengo Marques in the name of
49Mafumo traders while Luso-Indian merchants owned 14 launches.
Credit was essential in the Lourengo Marques trade with the 
interior as the goods entrusted to sertanejos yielded long-delayed 
returns. Overheads were high and merchants had few guarantees.
The Governor of Lourengo Marques wrote in 1875 that
"Merchants who venture to trade In the traffic in goods 
and spirits in the interior have to give at the villages 
where they wish to establish themselves a larger or 
smaller present to the king or headman of the village 
and to entrust part of their valuable property to Kafir 
buyers who travel on their account and trade for than - 
they sometimes settle their accounts and sometimes do 
not settle them - and it is necessary that this business 
must be most profitable to give a return."50
The high cost of porterage, in wages and slaves, the proclivity
of ccmpradores to disappear and the "wild revelries of degredado
and ex-soldier sertanejos in the interior further depressed the
merchants' profit margin; if a merchant wished to undertake a large
trade speculation he had personally to accompany his goods into 
51the interior. Merchants' wealthy caravans, sometimes consisting
52of several hundred porters, provided a constant target for raiding 
parties. These attacks resulted in a continual drain, particularly 
in times of war or famine, on Lourengo Marques merchants' human and
49. BO 20, 18 May 1861; AHU, Mog., CG. pasta 21, GG to MSMU, 21 May 
1863. See also Fynn, Diary, 41, 49; Threlfall, Cape Monitor,
16 July 1853; PO 63/1316 Consul to PO, 24 Feb., 1896.
50. GH 837 GLM to GGM, 24 April 1875 in British consul to C.O., 27 
May 1875. Also in Mbgambique, December 1951, 68, p. 77 and in 
BO 22 May 1875.
51. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879, GLM, District Report for 1877-78; BO 1882, 
p. 142, GEM, Report for 1881; Joao de Andrade Corvo, Estudos 
sobre as provinciais Ultramarinas, vol. II, 265-266.
52. SS 919, R1634/84 Louis Kaufman report in Lydenburg landdrost 
to SS., 16 Sept., 1883; Henri Berthoud, letter entitled "Mss 
cheres freres et soeurs", 25 Jan., 1886 , in Cuenod collection.
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53material resources. But as the production of ivory, skins and 
vegetable oils declined merchant capital swung from risky itinerant 
trading to a retail trade supported by migrant workers1 sterling 
wages.
The Monetization of the Econany and the Boom in Retail Trading
The flew of sterling wages into the Delagoa Bay hinterland
became increasingly important to the commerce of the area. As
early as 1866 the circulation of currency at Lourengo Marques was
dependent on migrants1 sterling wages and in the early 1870s it
was estimated that £4 000 to £5 000 in cash was spent in Maputo- 
54land each year. Even before the large-scale movement of Delagoa 
Bay labour to the Diamond Fields in the late 1870s sterling 
constituted almost all the money in circulation and was the inter­
national currency most used and understood by the African popula- 
55tion. By the mid-1870s Banyans were no longer exchanging their
goods solely for produce and instead were demanding part-payment
in cash. The contemporary trade imbalance at Lourengo Marques
was thought to be due to the purchase of imported goods with
56sterling, the export of which did not have to be declared.
Frcm the early 1880s observers noted that trade in the Delagoa Bay
hinterland was no longer dependent on the export of agricultural
and hunting produce but instead rested on the purchasing power of
57migrants' sterling wages. The British consul in Mozambique
53. NA SNA 1/1/10 Johnson to Portuguese consul Natal, 14 June 1860; 
SS 45 10/62 Albasini to Lddrst Scboemansdal, 8 Jan., 1862; BO 4, 
25 Jan., 1862; SNA 1/1/13 Dunn to SNA, 12 Jan., 1863; Delgado 
to SNA, 14 Aug., 1863; BO 22, 30 May 1863; AHU. Meg., CG. pasta 
21, GG to MSMU, 24 Aug., 1863; BO 36, 9 Sept., 1865; Albasini 
to J. NicoISo da Cunha, 18 May 1869. See also pp.268-70for 
raids on ivory trading expeditions.
54. GEM to GG, 11 April, 1866 in BO 41, 22 Sept., 1866; SNA 1/1/21 
Leslie to SNA, 28 July 1871; Leslie, Among the Zulus and 
Amatongas, 392.
55. BPP 1876 Consular report c.1421 for 1875; FO 84/1539 O'Neill to 
PO, 7 June 1879; Junod, Life, I, 276.
56. BO 47, 19 Nov., 1877; BPP 1876 LXXIV, Consular report 1875.
57. Bishop McKenzie, The Net, Dec., 1881; Alfredo Freire de Andrade 
to GLM, 8 July 1891 in Mouzinho, 99. See also Antonio Cardosa, 
"Expediqab as Terras do Muzilla em 1882", BSGL, 3, 7, 1887, p. 
184.
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was in 1887
"struck by the uncultivated appearance of the country 
and the comparatively large trade done in it (and) 
said once to a trader, 'Where are the exports of pro­
duce by which all those imports are to be paid?' 'The 
produce of this district', he replied, 'is English 
gold.' The native pays for everything here in hard 
cash.' And this is strictly true: the natural produce 
of the district is almost nil: its wealth consists in 
the savings of the natives fran their earnings in one 
of our South African Colonies. Sterling is the local 
currency - when the Public Works Department tried to 
pay workers on the railway in Portuguese silver, the 
workers stopped working until paid in sterling."
58This view was endorsed in 1894 by the SAR consul . The monetiza­
tion of the economy "fran below" pushed workers onto the labour 
market and encouraged the shift in merchant capital fran itinerant 
to retail trading, a process that was further assisted by the 
increasing incorporation of the Delagoa Bay hinterland into the 
world market ecancmy.
Traders were drawn to Lourentpo Marques because of the tariff 
reforms of 1877 which drastically lowered duties on imported
articles, abolished a 3% public works tax and which favoured
59inporters as no duty was levied an sterling exports. But in the 
late 1870s, Lourengo Marques entered an economic depression 
following the prohibition of the gun trade, the collapse of railway 
speculations and a decline in export trade. Merchant companies 
faced with bankruptcy were obliged to demand more securities and 
guarantees from sertanejos. This led to a withdrawal of credit 
and trade goods were increasingly only extended in exchange for 
cash, produce or letters of credit.^ In an area without wagon 
transport it was also more profitable for merchants to trade in 
specie than in high bulk agricultural and hunting produce whose
61transport to the coast by head porterage was particularly costly.
58. FO 84/1846 O'Neill to FO, 26 Feb., 1887; SS 155 R1358/95 SAR 
consular report for 1894.
59. Import duties fell fran 15-30% to about 10% and export duties 
fran 3-8% to an average of about 3%. BPP 1883 C.3533 "Corres­
pondence with respect to tariffs in the Portuguese possessions 
in Africa, 1877-83"; BPP 1881 XC C.2945 Consular report for 
Mozambique 1880.
60. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879, District report for 1877-78; Joao de Andrade 
Corvo, Estudos, II, 265-66.
61. Capt. Chaddock, "Exporation du Limpopo", L'Afrique Exploree et 
Civilizee, VI, 1885, 186.
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But probably the most important impetus for the transfer of merchant
capital from itinerant trading to retailing came frcm speculation
in the Indian rupee which, linked to the Indian silver standard,
underwent a steady devaluation between 1870-1893.
Indian rupees, together with Austrian Maria Theresa and Mexican
Spanish dollars, were in the 1870s legal tender in most countries
bordering on the Indian Ocean. But frcm 1873 to 1876 the rupee's
value in London declined frcm 2s to ls6$d and for the next ten
62years fluctuated at this price before sinking even lower. Specu­
lation in imported rupees valued at lslOd in Mauritius and at 2s in
Natal caused Natal banks to refuse acceptance of rupees in August 
631876. In Lourenpo Marques, merchant companies offloaded silver
rupees and dollars from branches elsewhere in Mozambique. This
money was then used to pay government taxes and duties and gold
was then employed in the remittance of profits to India. Consequently
depreciating silver was accumulated by Portuguese officials while
gold sovereigns earned by migrants in the British colonies and the
64Transvaal circulated in the caimercial sector. Indian exporters
benefitted from the falling rate of exchange between silver and
gold, for as the rupee depreciated the margin between cost and
selling price widened. Profits were particularly high in areas
like the Delagoa Bay hinterland where gold sovereigns were procurable
through retailing goods bought in silver rupees frcm old stock and
65bank consignments in India. Thus migrant workers supplied Indian 
traders with a constantly appreciating source of gold specie and 
with a means of facilitating international econcmic transactions.
By 1884 it was reported that Banyan retailers had cut out 
all intermediary traders and that they were oversupplying the market
62. M. de Cecco, Money and Bnpire, 62-68; D.H. Leavens, Silver Money, 
72-74, 76. The rupee declined by 33% frcm 1873 to 1893 and by a 
further 17% in 1893-94.
63. CSO 558.1987/76 Collector Customs, Natal to Col. Sec., 3 Aug., 
1876; CSO 559.2048/76 EM Durban to Col. Treasury, 3 Aug., 1876; 
2061/76 Sec. Natal Chamber of Canmerce to Col. Sec., 2 Aug.,
1876; Ibid., 26 Aug., 1876 and Col. Sec. annot., 30 Aug., 1876 
in CSO 561.229.
64. PO 63/1127 O'Neill to PO, 13 June 1882; GH 837 O'Neill to PO, 
"Report of a Journey", 28 Feb., 1887; GH 838 Br. Consul to GH,
22 Sept., 1888.
65. BPP 1893-4 Consular report no. 1153 for 1892.
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66with cheap goods. In contrast to Inhambane, where sertanejos 
continued to operate, retailers working through Lourengo Marques
had by 1886 "established permanent trading stations in all possible
67places" and within the next few years they had "spread every-
68where". Frcm 1885-6 to 1889 the number of Banyans in the Lourengo
Marques area increased frcm 400 to 250 established in the town and
69500 in the interior. Banyan traders soon established a monopoly 
of the Nkonati. Goods were shipped up the river and then carried 
to stores constructed in strategic areas like drifts and chiefs' 
homesteads.^
Besides Lourengo Marques, the two most important entrepots
were Kouchalou in Bilene and Magule in Khosen. Frcm the latter
point goods were sent up the Dzembe tributary of the Nkcmati to the
Olifants-Limpopo and into the Lowveld. Magule was a Banyan village
consisting of a dozen reed walls surrounding rectangular, zinc-
roofed shops. Round huts for wives and servants flanked courtyards
71planted with trees and flcwers. Banyans, whose average age was
gauged at 28 in 1894, generally took temporary wives in the areas
where they settled and returned to India after a limited period or
72took long leave every few years. The retail trade also drew
66. Vasconcellos, "Mappas estatisticas", 53. For a description of the 
stock held by one Banyan retailer in 1892, cf. Junod, Life, I,
146, note 1.
67. A. Langle, "De Inhambane a Lourenco Marques", BSGL, 6, 1, 1886, 36.
68. Paul Berthoud letter of 13 Dec., 1888 in L'Afrique Explorge et 
Civilizee, 1889, p. 92; SMA 435 Liengme to Leresche, 27 July 
1891; AHU, Mog., 2^ Rep., Freire de Andrade report, 1891. See 
also H.P.N. Muller, Zuid-Afrika: Reisherinneringe (Leiden, 1899), 
6-9.
69. BO 4, 22 Jan., 1887; BPP 1890-91 Consular report no. 855 for 1889.
70. Liengme, "Voyage de lourengo Marques A Antioka", 25 Aug., 1891 
in BMSAS, no. 99, Oct., 1891; Berthoud-Junod, Lettres, 155; 
Grandjean, La Mission, 191.
71. Henri Berthoud, "Voyage chez Magoude", BMSAS, 64, 1886, 6; Grand­
jean, "Antioka, 11 Dec., 1893", BMSAS, 114, April 1894; Schlaefli- 
Glardon, "De Valdezia a Lourengo Marques", 167, 175.
72. SMA 50 2/A. P. Berthoud to Leresche, 20 Aug., 1889; Ibid., 23 
Nov., 1893; SMA 516/B, Junod to Leresche, 3 Dec., 1894; Junod, 
Life, I, 279.
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European wholesalers to Lourengo Marques from whan Banyan merchants
73obtained a large part of their trade goods.
As silver rupees continued to depreciate, the Portuguese in
August 1888 prohibited their importation into Lourengo Marques,
74although not elsewhere in Mozambique. This did little to unify 
the town's currency for the Portuguese real was undergoing a similar 
depreciation. Although officially valued at 4$500:£1, the real 
was exchanged on the open market for 4$800 in 1882. By 1892 the 
open market rate had slid to 5$200, by December 1896 it had
75depreciated a further 25% to 6$000 and continued to fall unchecked.
The Governor of Lourengo Marques successfully called for the
withdrawal of Portuguese banknotes in 1889 as railway workers,
merchants and the African population in general would only accept
gold, silver and draft orders. Officials were paid in notes whose
circulation threatened Lourengo Marques' trade in specie with the
76more northerly Portuguese settlements. Despite the withdrawal 
of Portuguese banknotes traders continued to profit fran the depre­
ciation in Portuguese currency by paying their customs duties and
taxes in Portuguese specie while retaining sterling for their
77commercial transactions.
Banyan traders were regarded by the Standard Bank as a much- 
respected clientele. They were punctual in meeting payments, had
73. SMA 1255/B H. Berthoud, "Rapport sur 1'expedition chez Magude,
6 Oct., 1885"; BO 32, 8 Aug., 1885, 323.
74. AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 6. GEM to Conselheiro Director general 
do Ultramar, 27 Sept., 1889. The rupee depreciated by 34% at 
Lourengo Marques between 1882 and 1890.
75. FO 63/1127 O'Neill to Granville, 13 June 1882; BPP 1893-4 Con­
sular report no. 1153 for 1892; SMA 528/C P. Berthoud to Mission 
Council 20 Dec., 1896; SMA 496/A P. Berthoud to Grandjean, 24 
May 1897; FO 63/1336 Consul to FO, 20 Oct., 1897. By 1898,
£1 : 7$400 to. 8$200, AN - CCC. Lourengo Marques 1895-1901 
vice consul to MNE, 23 April 1898.
76. AHU. Meg., 2a Rep., pasta 6. GEM to MSMU, 27 Sept., 1889. See 
also enclosed petition form Lourengo Marques municipal council, 
13 Aug., 1889.
77. BPP 1890-91 Consular report no. 855 for 1890; BPP 1893-4 
Consular report no. 1153 for 1892. See also Std. Bank 1/1/102 
Lourengo Marques 1895-1900, Inspector's report, 26 July 1897.
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not suffered one bankruptcy in 20 years and were "large purchasers"
78of drafts on London for remittance to Bombay. Although traders 
were not obliged to declare the amounts of specie exported, at 
least £16 577 was sent fran Lourenco Marques in 1885. Some 58%
went to Bombay, 37% to London and 3% to Zanzibar. In 1890 a total 
of £12 704 in specie exports was declared at the customs house of 
which 81% went to "British possessions", 15% to Britain and 4% to
79"Portuguese possessions". In 1892 £170 000 was declared exported.
The monopoly which Banyans came to exercise over local trade
80led to the exclusion of African and European itinerant traders
and gave rise to a strong body of racial feeling. The Governor of
Lourengo Marques referred to the Banyans in 1881 as "a plague" of
"bloodsuckers". To Freire de Andrade they were "one of the greatest
81plagues... of the East Coast." Banyans were accused of exporting 
the capital needed for the development of Lourengo Marques for
"The native returning to his honeland is immediately 
besieged by a horde of Moors and Banyans who seduce 
him by every means until he lets his money go."®2
Following the defeat of Gungunyana, sane 900 Banyan merchants were
78. Std. Bank 1/1/102. Lourengo Marques 1895-1900. Position and 
prospects of the branch and the Post, 12 Oct. , 1895; Inspector*s 
report, 26 July 1897. See also liabilities reports.
79. These figures are in no way complete and merely indicate the 
direction and flew of sterling exported frcm Lourengo Marques.
AHU. Mog., Alf andega, packet 1382, 1885 exports; AHU. Mog., 2a 
Pep., pasta 7, Alf andega de Lourengo Marques; BPP 1893-4 
Consular report no. 1153 for 1892. See also BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879;
BO 3, 28 July 1888; Estatistica das Alfandegas de Mogambique, 1884.
80. BO 32, 8 Aug., 1885; Std. Bank 1/1/102 Lourengo Marques 1895-1900 
Inspector's report, 26 July 1887; H.A. Junod, Granmaire Ronga,
21.
81. BO 1882, p. 142, Report of GEM for 1882; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., 
pasta 9, Freire de Andrade report, 1891.
82. J.A.M. Serrano, "Exploragoes Portugueses em Lourengo Marques e 
Inhambane", BSGL, 6, 1894, 436; Alfredo Freire de Andrade,
"As minas de oiro do Transvaal e sua influencia sobre Lourengo 
Marques"; Revista de Obras Publicas e Minas, 1898, 330-31.
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described to have entered the interior
"to suck the country dry, taking fran it the geld 
the native brings fran the Transvaal."^
New Consumer Patterns and the Bnergence of Sterling as a 
Bridewealth Medium
Cloth and liquor were the two major consumer items increasingly
sought after by the people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. As large
amounts of cheap, industrially-produced cloth were imported into the
area women discarded locally-made cotton and bark textiles, which
were time-consuming to produce, and adopted a form of dress
84resembling the Indian sari. A British official was informed 
in Maputoland in 1887
"That formerly they weaved garments out of the wild 
cotton found in the thorn country... now, however, 
they can obtain all the clothing they require by 
purchasing it wherever they go to work and at 
Delagoa Bay, they seldom or never go to the trouble 
of making their own which is, of course, inferior 
to that made by Europeans."85
In reply to a general circular sent frcm the Foreign Office 
in 1887 asking consular representatives to collect sample of hand- 
woven cloth in order to secure their duplication in Manchester, the 
British consul in Lourengo Marques stated that, although cloth had 
formerly been produced, "there are no clothes of native make in 
general use within my district which it would be of any value to 
send hone with a view to their being matched by British manufac­
turers." Although cloth was still being produced in areas like 
the Lanwe Highlands it was "of a curious shape and texture (and was)
difficult to obtain ... an industry that is now rapidly dying away
86before the advance of European trade."
83. Gones da Costa, Gaza 1897-98, 128.
84. Mauch, Journals, Aug., 1870, p. 67. See also Patricia Daviscn 
and Patrick Harries, "Cotton weaving in South-east Africa: its 
History and Technology" in Textiles of Africa (ed) Dale Idiens 
and K.G. Ponting (Bath, 1981).
85. BPP 1890, C.-6200 Saunders to Shepstcne, 17 Nov., 1887.
86. PO 63/1188 O*Neill to PO, 25 Sept., 1886.
294
In contrast to males, who adopted the skin clothing of the 
northern Nguni-Gaza, women evolved their own distinctive style of 
dress. The following description of female attire in Khosen in 
1894 was similar to that of most parts of the Delagoa Bay hinterland:
"The women are dressed in cloths of bright colours 
and are much more covered than (in Switzerland). Several 
have full robes of many colours, formed by a piece of 
cloth attached to the belt and falling to the ankles. 
Another piece, attached around the neck, falls below 
the hips ... Many also have a piece of cloth across
the shoulder."87
Specific cloth types seem to have been restricted to localized
markets although dark blue calico was worn in most areas at times 
88of mourning. By the 1890s males frequently wore cotton cloth as
an addition to their skin clothing.
The increased purchasing power of migrants returning frcm the
Diamond Fields, the eastern Transvaal goldfields and Natal when
combined with the favourable duties imposed in 1877 all resulted
89in a sharp rise in the importation of cloth and liquor. This
was encouraged by the Portuguese as increased consumer demands
drove men onto the labour market and increased the amount of sterling
circulating in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Much of this money then
found its way into the hands of the Portuguese in the form of hut
90taxes, liquor licences and customs duties. Fran 1880 to 1898 the 
Lourenco Marques customs revenue from liquor rose frcm 25 000$000
87. SMA 1760. Grandjean diary, 27 Jan., 1894. See also R. Robertson 
in The Net, May 1893, p. 70; Junod, "BaRcnga", 115; ZGH. 796. 
892/56 "Further Information regarding Maputoland, 31 August, 1896" 
SMA 515/D Jacques to Renevier, 24 Nov., 1896.
88. St V. Erskine to President RGS, 11 Dec., 1868, ms. in RGS; Cohen, 
"Erlautende Bemerkungen", 203; Junod, "Rikatla", 1 July 1891 in 
BMSAS, 98, 1891; Idem., "Lourengo Marques", 25 July 1894 in 
BMSAS, 7 Oct., 1894.
89. Import statistics were published in the Boletim Oficial. Cloth 
and liquor statistics are transcribed in Appendix 3 . See also 
Junod, "BaRonga", 363; FO 63/1026 Elton to PO, 25 Oct., 1875;
GH 1053 Farrell to Col. Sec., 20 Aug., 1879.
90. BPP 1893-4 Consular report no. 1153 for 1892; Bovill, Natives 
Under the Transvaal Flag, 67; SMA 502/C Junod to Leresche, 16 
Sept., 1890; SMA 536/A Borel to Grandjean, 23 April 1897; Junod, 
Life, I, 537-38.
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to 167 000$000. The protectionist tariff of 1892 placed a heavy
duty of $450 per litre on distilled liquor and thus protected the
market for Portugal*s lowest quality ’colonial wines' or "vinhos
para pretos" which were taxed only $010 per litre. This resulted
in a rise in the importation of colonial wines frcm a rough
annual average of 50 000 litres in 1882-1890, to over 3 million
91litres annually in 1897-98. This tariff structure also protected 
the numerous distilleries constructed in the 1890s to manufacture 
Zambezi and Natal sugar into liquor for the Transvaal market.
Contemporary observers constantly remarked on the large 
number of canteens, and extensive trade in liquor, in the Delagoa 
Bay hinterland. In 1892 there were 147 canteens serving a population 
of 40 000 in the Crown Lands; by 1896 there were 82 licensed can­
teens, within a one-and-a-half kilometre radius of Lourengo Marques, 
serving a population of 5 000 to 6 000. This figure excluded
unlicensed canteens and wine shops, which did not require liquor 
93licences. Canteens became important labour recruiting centres
to which men were attracted by liquor and credit and from where they
94were taken to the mines in batches by recruiters.
It has frequently been noted that people became locked into 
the world economy when fomer luxury imports became necessities 
and that this was an important factor in generating migrant labour. 
However it was not merely human nature that created a market for 
imported goods like cloth and liquor. The chiefs and numzane often 
stimulated a demand for these goods by dressing their wives in 
imported cloth and by using liquor as a libation and reward and
91. Mappas Estatisticas (1899) pp. vii ff; BPP 1892, Consular report 
no. 955 for 1891.
92. Liquor distilled in Mozambique avoided Transvaal duties. BPP 
1893-4 Consular report no. 1153, 1892; BPP 1896 Consular report 
no. 1904 for 1895; Std. Bank 1/1/102 Liabilities report, Oct., 
1895; AN - MNE. COC. A-25-7. Int^rets Frangaisssdansle Mozambique; 
LA 464 Consul to SS, 16 Nov., 1895.
93. SMA 350 P. Berthoud, "Rapport sur la baie de Delagoa, 1887"; P. 
Berthoud-Junod, Lettres, 119-20, 236; SMA 497/B P. Berthoud,
"Etat du Littoral", Sept., 1887; D. Doyle, "A Journey through 
Gazaland", Pro. RGS XIII, 1891, 114; FO 63/1317 Casement to FO,
4 Aug., 1896; Noronho, Lourengo Marques, 54; Junod, "BaRonga", 
206, 363.
94. Bovill, Natives under the Transvaal Flag, 67; Richardson, Crowded 
Hours: Lionel Cohen, 1371
95incorporating it as an integral part of many social rituals.
Powerful chiefs were able to discourage or prohibit the sale of
liquor to their followers but in most cases it was in their interests
to encourage trade because of the numerous taxes they extracted frcm
traders. Chief Magude of Khosen levied taxes in kind on traders and
then resold the goods on his own account. He is also known to have
demanded death duties of 40 pieces of cloth and a caraf e of liquor
96frcm a deceased Banyan's estate. It was common for traders to
provide chiefs with licence fees, transit, ferry and shipping taxes
97and to extend to them considerable amounts of credit.
The importance of new consumer demands as agents of "proleta­
rianization" has been stressed in the preceding section. It has 
also been noted that the transformation of merchant activities fran 
itinerant to retail trading led to the exclusion of campradore and 
sertanejo traders. But retail trading also had a considerable effect 
upon African commercial and production patterns.
Following the cattle epizootic of the early 1860s, the
Portuguese encouraged the importation of beja marriage hoes by
98reducing their import tariff by an effective 25%. But it was not
until the French vegetable oil trading company of Fabre established
a branch at Lourengo Marques that hoes, mainly of French origin,
became a major import. From several thousand hoes imported annually
frcm Portugal in the 1860s, the number of hoes brought into Lourengo
99Marques in 1874 reached 254 700 valued at 60 000$000. By November 
1874 the Governor of Lourenco Marques remarked that
95. Junod, Life, I, 148, 216; II, 382, 385, 390.
96. E. Creux, "Voyage de Yosepha Ndjumo", BMSAS, 45, 1882, p. 40;
SMA 1760, Grandjean Diary, 23 Feb., 1893; Junod, "Rikatla",
BMSAS, 98, August 1891.
97. BPP 1887 Consular report no. 60 for 1885; SMA 497/B P. Berthoud 
to Leresche, 14 Nov., 1887; SSa 155 Ral358/95, Consular report 
1894; ZGH 795 2131, Consul to Salisbury, 25 Jan., 1896; KCL 
Richter in von Wissel, p. 4. See also note 50.
98. Canpare prices in BO 40, 5 Oct., 1861 ($460) with BO 42, 17 
Oct., 1863 ($345).
99. BPP 1883 XLVIII C3533 Report of the Mozambique Tariff Gcnmission, 
April 1877. See p 299 , figure 6.
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"the most considerable articles of kafir consumption 
in this area are hoes, but of a special kind; if 
they do not conform to this pattern they will not 
sell."100
But the following month the Governor reported that "a notable sur­
plus" of hoes had accummilated in the customs house with the result
101that hoes had halved in value. In October 1875 hb wrote 
that
"the merchants have suffered a great fall in the value 
of Land in (beja) hoes which used to constitute a large 
part of the import caimerce ."102
Nevertheless merchants continued to flood the market with industrially-
produced hoes and about 220 000 were imported in 1876. These hoes
were valued at 58 268$300 which was more than the combined value
of the two other major imports, cloth and liquor.
The African population attempted to restrict beja hoes to the
sphere of bridewealth circulation for a hoe brideprice "was considered
a sacred deposit in the hands of the father, brother or tutor of
the bride, that under no circumstances could they be used for
103agricultural purposes." But Indian and European merchants were
under no similar social compunction and increasingly used hoes to
purchase agricultural and hunting produce and to pay guide and 
104porterage fees. Hoes rapidly lost their special-purpose value
and, despite the opposition of the chiefs, brideprioes spiralled from
1055-10 hoes in the 1840s to well over 50 in the late 1870s. This 
brideprice inflation was fanned by migrants who returned from the
100. BO 1, 2 Jan., 1875, Lourenco Marques district report for Nov., 
1874.
101. BO 7, 13 Feb., 1875.
102. BO 50, 11 Dec., 1875, District report for Oct-Nov., 1875.
103. AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., GG to MSMU, 8 Oct., 1886.
104. Fernandes das Neves, Hunting Expedition, 280; UNISA/JC 
"Litteratures - Coutumes", p. 27.
105. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877 District Report for 1876-77; Junod, 
BaRonga", 79; Life, I, 276-77; JSA file 74, evidence of Ndaba; 
Granjean, La Mission, 57.
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plantations and mines of South Africa with wages which they used to 
procure hoes at Lourengo Marques.
As early as 1875 the Governor of the settlement noted that
"This fall (in the value of hoes) is because the kaffirs 
have adopted the system of exchanging wives for gold 
instead of hoes."1*6
However hoes and gold were initially both acceptable for marriage
purposes and the exclusion of hoes fran the circuit of bridewealth
107was only oanpleted in the early 1880s. In 1881 the Director 
of the Lourengo Marques customs reported that
"Hoes are not imported to-day as they no longer serve 
in the marriage of blacks. Marriages are to-day made 
with goods and money. In this district only money is 
used and hoes are only used for agriculture ."108
The transformation of the major bridewealth medium frcm hoes to gold 
was hastened by the Portuguese who, despite the otherwise liberal 
nature of the tariff reforms of 1877, placed a tax of $072, which 
amounted to about 33% ad valorem, on each imported marriage hoe 
while exempting agricultural hoes fran all duties. In 1884 the 
Governor-General of Mozambique wrote that, due to the emigration of 
labour to Natal, "the kaffirs of these (Lourengo Marques and Inham­
bane) regions prefer dowries in pounds as do any citizens of a
109civilized country.”
There were several reasons for the adoption of gold as a basic 
medium of bridewealth exchange. Sovereigns were more transportable 
than scores of hoes and they had a constant scarcity value. It was 
cannon for daughters to be married off as a hedge against starvation 
during a time of scarcity and money was, like cattle, easily
106. BO 50, 11 Dec., 1875 District report for Oct-Nov., 1875.
107. Castilho, O Districto de Lourengo Marques , 13; AHU. Mog., 2a 
Rep., pasta 3, GG to MSMU, 8 Oct., 1886; JSA file 74, evidence 
of Mahungane and Nkonuza; evidence of Ndaba.
108. BO, 29 Aug., 1882, Lourengo Marques custans report for 1881.
109. AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 1, GG to MSMU, 28 April, 1884; BPP 
1883 C3533 Report of the Mozambique tariff carmissicn, 1877;
BO 33, 16 Aug., 1884, portaria 199.
299
110convertible into food. Perhaps most importantly epizootics and 
tsetse inflated the value of cattle as a unit of consumption and 
consequently discouraged their employment as a means of exchange. 
The rise and fall of hoes as a bridewealth medium is well illus- 
t rad fed in figure 6 which traces the number of hoes imported into 
Lourengo Marques:
Year 1862
Figure 6
111Hoe Imports into Lourengo Marques
1863 1866-67 1874 1876 1882 :
No. 1,109 15,263 7,500 254,700 219,624 0
Value 141$410 7 743$500 3 338$000 60 000$000 58 268$000 0
Year 1884 1885 1886 1890 1897 1898
No. 833 23 7,524 24,974 5,446 17,930
Value 20$000 !5$50Q 1 274$050 4 053$000 755$900 2 223$800
The figures for hoe imports by sea frcm Natal are more canplete 
and although only a small and more caimercially sensitive part of 
the whole, give a good impression of the process taking place:
Figure 7
112Hoe Exports from Durban to Lourengo Marques
1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878-83 1884
500 3 824 2 156 13 028 51268 51710 686 2 800 nil 36
By the late 1870s hoes were being exported from Lourenco
113 'Marques to Durban and were taken overland to Swaziland and
Zululand as well as to the former production areas of the
110. JSA file 74, p. 38, evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza.
111. These figures are drawn frcm the Boletim oficial de Mogambique; 
AHU, Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 7, Alfandega de Lourengo Marques, 
1890; Mappas Estatisticas (Lourengo Marques, 1899). These 
statistics are of an impressionistic rather than a real value.
112. Natal Blue Books, 1870-84, "Exports".
113. Ibid., "Imports". 1 073 in 1877, 1 250 in 1878, and 7 575 in 
1880.
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114Zoutpansberg and Lydenburg districts. The depends nee of the
people of the Delagoa Bay hinterland on Indian and European
merchants for their metal requirements was tightened as African
mining and smelting in the Transvaal was prohibited by legislation
115and swamped by industrial imports. Labour-intensive locally-
116produced salt was also largely replaced by purer imported salts.
Although an important trade in flint or "trade” guns existed
at Lourengo Marques, modem guns were rare and too expensive for
the African market and those who sought than were obliged to find
117work in Kimberley. Most of the guns imported through Delagoa
Bay were obsolete military firearms which, although they cost 55s.
to make, were remaindered for 2s in Europe. These guns were landed
at Lourengo Marques for about 8s and then sold in the interior for
as little as 10-lls during "bad times" but averaged at about 
11825-30s. Lipperts and Dentzelman, a Dutch firm selling guns on
the Diamondfields, established a branch at Lourengo Marques in the
mid-187Os, where their agent "Hofumana" (Hoffman) was known to the
Zulus as "the Portuguese leader®. Hoffman boasted of selling 800
guns in one day and when the gun trade was prohibited in March 1878,
119he was left with 30 tons of gunpowder. As with cloth and beads,
114. SS 919 R1634/84 Lddrst Lydenburg to SS., 10 Sept., 1883; H.
Raddatz, "Das Kaffemland", 54; Natal Government Gazette, 58;
ZGH 736.249, "Statement of Faku, a Tongaland induna", 20 March 1891.
115. African informants believe that metal production in the Transvaal 
was halted in order to prevent their ancestors from making arms 
and force them to purchase European imports. O.T., Nelson Mhlongo, 
chief Dzumeri's vilage, Letaba district; Thomas Mampeole, Modja- 
dji's village, Lebowa; John Mabalal, Chief Thcmo's area, Gazan- 
kulu; Joao Mahuleke, chief Xikunda's area, Mhinga district. Euro­
pean sources tend to support the "swamping" theory, cf. Krige, 
Rainqueen, 47; R. Wessman, The Bavenda of Spelonken (London, 1908) 
28-29. However M o  If Schiel, the Zoutpansberg native ccmmissianer 
prohibited mining, J.B. de Vaal, "Tin en Goudsoekers in die Noord- 
Transvaal", Brandwag, 28 June 1946; O.T., N.J. van Warmelo 
referring to an interview with chief Ngevekulu in 1940. See also 
Law 17, 24 Sept., 1895.
116. Junod, "BaRonga", 203; Natal Blue Books, "Exports".
117. Struthers, "Hunting journal", 96, 103; Webb & Wright, James Stuart, 
I, 63, evidence of Bikwayo. See also p. 88.
118. MNE 664 Duprat to MNE, 30 April 1879; GH 829 Purvis to Lt. Gov.,
20 March 1878; FO 84/1539 O'Neill to PO, 5 Aug., 1879.
119. Webb & Wright, James Stuart, I, 63, evidence of Bikwayo;
FO 84/1539 O'Neill to FO, 5 Aug., 1879.
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guns required an aesthetic appearance that appealed to a very
localized market. In 1875 Lipperts and Dentzelman declared that
old Prussian flintlocks were no longer marketable and that the most
popular guns were percussion types with large-bored, long black
barrels and heavy wooden butts attached by a pin rather than a 
120ring. Guns were taken to Zululand and Natal by individuals,
sane of whan probably financed their journey to the plantations and
121Diamondfields in this manner. Guns were also sold to the Zulu
on credit for cattle which were then driven into Natal where they
122were sold for cash by "amatonga" traders.
The prohibition on arms sales at Lourenco Marques lasted from
March 1878 to July 1882 and was reimposed in January 1883 foliating
complaints from the Transvaal government that the "rebel" chief
123Mapoch was obtaining guns and anmunition from the settlement.
Because virtually every hostile chiefdcm in the northern and eastern
124Transvaal and Swaziland was able to obtain arms through lourengo
Marques, the gun trade was temporarily prohibited on several other 
125occasions. Most of these guns were muzzle-loaders and flintlocks 
which were traded in the interior for produce and money. Until 1895 
the importation of these "trade guns" was encouraged by lew customs 
duties, amounting to half that levied on modem rifles, and by the
120. CSO 525.2461/75 Lipperts and Dentzelman to Firearms Board, 
Durban, 30 June 1875.
121. GH 1050 Case of Agnew vs van Gruning in Registrar of the Supreme 
Court to GH., 14 May 1875? NA. Unsinga Magistracy files, 1876- 
78, migistrate to Attorney gen., 26 Nov., 1877.
122. NA. Urns in ga Magistracy files 1876-78, Annual report for 1877;
FO 84/1539 vice consul, Louren90 Marques to O'Neill in O’Neill 
to FO, 10 Oct., 1879.
123. SS 816 R5166/82 ZAR diplomatic agent in Lourengo Marques to SS,
22 Sept., 1883; SS 1333 R571/87 Portuguese consul to SS, 24
Jan., 1887; BO 2, 2 Jan., 1887.
124. SN 1A Nelmapius to Lddrst. Lydenburg, 4 May 1879; SS 564
Ra4034/81 Vrede regter to Cmdt gen., 15 Sept., 1881; SS 1333
45/87 Albasini to Schoeman, 24 Dec., 1886; SS 1900 R3931/89 
Haenert to SS, 29 April 1889; LA 463, consul to SS, 25 July 
1894; Idem., 12 June 1894, 4 Aug., 1894; BMSAS 1890, 107; BMB, 
1890, 21-22; Grimsehl, "Qnluste in Madjadjiland", 222, 225.
125. BO 2, 2 Jan., 1887; BO 22, Dec., 1888, p. 137; BPP 1893-94 
Consular report no. 1153 for 1892.
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126exclusion of their owners from normal gun-licence requirements.
The trade in guns and ammunition constituted an important, but
highly inconsistent, source of revenue for Lourengo Marques traders
127and the customs house. Figure 8 provides some indication of 
the importance of the gun trade but must be treated with sane 
caution as many guns were "snuggled1’ into the Delagoa Bay hinter­
land, especially via the Limpopo river mouth.
Figure 8
128Gun and Anmunition Imports into Lourengo Marques
1882 1883 1886 1887 1890 1891 1892
6,223$840 5,765$000 5,460$000 13,400$445 25,151$750 49,572$000 22,549$000
The trade in guns with the Transvaal chiefdoms eventually pushed 
the Boers into settling the border between the two countries in 
1869. Before this date the Boers had continuously encroached upon 
the markets of the Lourengo Marques traders who complained bitterly:
"What is the purpose of a port on the coast without a 
hinterland and without natives from whcm came the ^9
produce of the land, who form the backbone of commerce."
Following the ratification of the border settlement in 1875, the
Governor of Lourenco Marques complained that Lourengo Marques
' 130traders were being arrested as "smugglers" in the Transvaal. One
126. FO 63/1026 Elton to FO, 25 Oct., 1875; SS 207.893 McKenzie to 
and Ryan report 22 April 1876; A. Aylward, The Transvaal To-Day,
366; SS 4681 R1579/95 Vrederechter, Geluk to Qndt. Gen., 16 
April 1894; FO Annual series, 1894, 45; BPP 1893-4 XCV Consular 
report no. 1153 for 1892.
127. On the detrimental effects of gun prohibitions on production, 
trade and customs revenues, ef. BO 4, 27 Jan., 1879; Vasconcellos, 
"Mappas Estatisticas", 51; FO 84/1539 Thompson to O'Neill, in 
O'Neill to FO., 10 Oct., 1879; FO 63/1110 O’Neill to Sec. State,
17 July 1881.
128. AHU. Mbg., Alfandega 1836-90, packet 1382; Estatisticas dos 
Alfandegas da Provincia de Mogambique; AHU. Mog., 2a Rep., pasta 
7, Alfandega de Lourengo Marques; BPP 1892 consular report no. 955 
955; BPP 1893-4, consular report no 1153.
129. AHU. Mog., CG. pasta 19, Albasini to CG, 8 March 1860 in GG to 
MSMU, 4 May 1860; ABB, Albasini to sec. gen. province of Moz.,
4 March 1860.
130. SS 203 R153/76 Gen. Manager Lourengo Marques and ZAR transport 
service to acting SP, 16 Jan., 1876. For the extent of the territory 
"lost" to Portugal by this treaty, compare the border on Petermann's 
map of 1870 with that on Jeppe's map of 1877. BPP 1879 c2220
map facing p. 358.
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observer noted that,
"on my way to Delagoa Bay via Phalaborwa ... almost 
every day I saw kaffirs and Banyans, the former as 
porters engaged by the latter, carrying guns or boxes 
filled with drink or gunpowder, and kaffir hoes, such 
that I iryself saw ... a party of 100 of which each ^  
kaffir carried rum or 8 to 10 guns or 25 to 30 hoes."
This trade caused a Zoutpansberg veldkomet to complain that the 
Spelonken was being
"overrun with native tracers from the Portuguese 
territory ... the lcwveld is full of them. Of course 
none of these traders have any licences and consequent­
ly undersell the white traders here and defraud the 
government of import taxes and licence money ... the 
white traders here are complaining bitterly and in ^  
fact the trade is taken entirely out of their hands."
Mozambican traders operating in the Transvaal were obliged, according 
to the 1875 Peace and Commerce treaty, to pay import duties and 
government licences and this was enforced by the British administra­
tion of 1877-81 which feared that "our traders are much disadvantaged
133by this (free trade) practice."
In 1882 the newly-independent Transvaal government made provision
for the establishment of border officials and, following the
increase in transport riding and the smallpox epidemic of the
following year, officials were entrusted in 1884 with patrolling
134the border and collecting import duties. These measures aimed 
at restricting competition from Mozambican traders were paralleled 
by the passage of legislation in the Transvaal which discriminated 
against the wave of Asian traders who had entered the country after 
the first Anglo-Boer war. The "coolie" law number 3 of 1885 
prohibited Asians from obtaining Transvaal citizenship or owning 
land and required that they purchase an expensive trading license.
The Gold law (21 of 1896) prevented Asians an the goldfields fran 
working outside of European service and demanded that they carry a
131. SS 919 R1634/84 "Verklaring van Louis Kaufinan".
132. SS 263 R250/78 Grieve to Zoutpansberg Lddrst, 8 Jan., 1878.
133. SS 459 R4073/80 Lagdon annot. on Albasini to SNA, 8 Sept., 1880.
134. SS 919 R1634 Lddrst Lydenburg to SS., 16 Sept., 1883; Sanitary
inspector, Lydenburg to Lddrst Lydenburg, 10 Oct., 1883; Volksraad 
besluit 146, 23 June 1884, 86; R2208/84 Gold ccrcmissioner to SS,
6 May 1884; Law 4, 1882.
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monthly pass. The liquor law prohibited Asians frcm trading in that
basic commodity. All these measures restricted the ability of
Mozambican traders to operate competitive ly in the Transvaal and were
135forcefully, although unsuccessfully, resisted by the Portuguese.
Several Mozambican traders were arrested and at least one informant
to-day remembers the trading licence system as the reason for the
collapse of the trade, undertaken by Indians and Africans, between
136Mozambique and the Transvaal.
The ending of trading and hunting, when combined with growing 
consumer needs and the Insecurity of food production, help explain 
why men sought wage labour in south Africa. But these factors do 
not explain why the movement of labour onto the market was charac­
terized by migrancy and temporary wage employment. In the final 
chapter it is argued that the origins of a migratory form of labour 
movement should not be sought in the emergence of a super-exploitative 
system devised by capital in alliance with the state, but rather 
in terms of the changing social condition of the people living in 
the rural areas.
135. SSA 384 Ra 2892/96 M.J. Farrelly, "Opinion of the Treaty with 
Portugal and the Coolie Laws", 29 May 1897. See also various 
enclosures in Ra 2892/96; MNE 709 consul to MNE, 17 Nov., 1896.
136. MNE 707, Consul to MNE, 19 Nov., 1883; Schlaefli, "Valdezia a 
Lourengo Marques", 150; A. Schiel, 23 Jahre Sturm und Sonnen- 
schein in Sudafrika (Leipzig, 1902), 263; O.T., Thcmas Masuluke,
7 April 1979.
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Chapter 9
THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF MIGRANT LABOUR
Kinship and the Structure of Production and Accumulation
In the nineteenth century kinship structured the social 
relations of production in the hinterland of Delagoa Bay. Real or 
putative kinship links expressed a social relationship linking 
lumbers of the same productive unit. Exclusion from, or membership 
of, the kinship group determined a man's rights to labour, land, 
the resources of the clan commonage and established his position 
in the redistributive economy. At the political and judicial 
level, kinship structured the nature of material and political 
inheritance and gave a political definition to the clan as the 
dominant corporate group within the chief dan. Kinship defined crime
i
as an offence committed against the kin group, it legitimated the 
positions of chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen and importantly, allowed 
than to extract taxes and fines. At the ideological level, kinship 
determined social avoidances and deference, and defined prospective 
marriage partners.
Both the politico-judicial and ideological levels influenced
kinship at the economic level. Thus inheritance increased a man's
access to land, cattle and women, and this gave him the means to
attract ' foreigners * as dependants who would be incorporated into
the kin group. Similarly, respect for the elders was founded on
their control of women, and women's productive and reproductive
capacities,and of seeds, tools, knowledge and access to land and
the ancestors. Respect as ideology reinforced the position of the
elders in the production process. Thus kinship and ideology played
a major role in structuring the form of production and accumulation
in the nineteenth Delagoa Bay hinterland and for this reason
people were able to invoke their ancestors as far back as the
2
sixteenth generation.
1. Junod, Life, II, 582.
2. SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 6 Feb., 1890.
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Differing marriage patterns for chiefs and ccranoners 
encouraged the accumulation of wealth in the hands of the chiefs 
in the Delagoa Bay hinterland and this facilitated their dominance 
of the chief dan. As all marriages contracted by the heir to the 
chieftaincy before the death of his father were morganatic, a new 
chief was generally young on his accession and therefore had time 
to consolidate his power. While chiefs tended to form repetitive 
marriage alliances which centralized the circulation of goods and 
women between the royal families of different clans, commoners 
were prohibited from marrying the offspring of a cannon grand­
parent and, apart from preferential clan endogamy, their marriages
3
lacked any recognized patterns. The extensive or horizontal
nature of caimaner marriage alliances encouraged an egalitarian
spread of women and goods between cautioner families and restricted
the clan from becoming stratified hierarchically into self-
perpetuating tributary lineages. Corporate groups were formed by
the chief*s "placing" of his brothers, sens or father's brothers
as sub-chiefs in the various districts under his control. But
these "lineages" were generally dependent upon the patronage of
the chief for the reproduction of their wealth and following, as it
was common practice for the chief to displace existing sub-chiefs
with supporters or "clients", generally drawn from his agnatic kin,
on his accession to power. If a sub-chief accumulated sufficient
followers to present a threat to the chief, the legal precedent
existed for the latter to seize the property of the sub-chief and
4
replace him with a more tractable "client".
The power base of the chiefs was not confined to the royal
family and appointed sub-chiefs, but extended to, and his authority
5
depended upon, the support of the numzane, or homestead heads.
These men controlled the homestead as a productive unit consisting
of the "houses" of married sens and married dependants. Junod
referred to them as "gentlenen", "owners of cattle" who ranked
"almost as petty chiefs" and as "headmen of the villages, the
6important men of the country." The accession to power of a 
deceased chief's eldest sen was far from automatic or ascribed and
3. Junod, Life, I, 234, 253, 369-70, 376-77. Marriage to women 
living in distant districts was discouraged due to the problem 
of retrieving their bride-prices. Ibid., II, 183.
4. Ibid., I 357-8, 413; Junod, "BaRonga", 387.
5. The degree of centralized authority exercised by the chief differed 
frcm one chiefdcm to another. CF SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to SNA 28 July 1871
6. Junod, Life, I, 328-9? II, 6, 46.
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in many cases the numzane found legal precedent for the seizure
of the chieftaincy by the heir's father's brother (the regent) and
his house or by a brother of the heir who, as a district sub-chief,
had accumulated a large and powerful following. The council of
elders drawn from the numzane confirmed the legality of the chief's
position and could overrule and, in extreme cases, depose and even
execute a chief for misrule. The control exerted by the numzane
over the chief was symbolized by their provision of the chief with 
7
his "great" wife.
The numzane's support for the chief was ensured in several 
ways. The large number of marriage alliances entered into by the 
chief gave them access to the more powerful numzane as affines.
It was also only the wealthy numzane who were able to marry a
3
chief's sister or daughter, due to their high brideprices. It
was possible for a numzane, who had married a royal woman, to be
9placed by the chief as a district sub-chief. Because of their
relationship with the chiefs, the numzane benefitted fran. the
chief's patronage - from the distribution of land and farming-out
of cattle to the blessing of their first-fruits potions to the
redistribution of taxes and the placing of numzane as sub-chiefs.
The chief also decreed when a man, who had reached a sufficiently
10advanced age, was eligible to wear a wax headring. But it was 
the carmen role of the chiefs and numzane, within the production 
process, that linked them as a group. They organised production 
through their control of labour, mediated with other elders over 
production strategies, decided when to plant and harvest and which 
new areas to cultivate, and interceded with the ancestors. It was 
their cannon relationship to the means of production, through their 
control of access to wives, land and tools, however, that determined 
their dominance.
The quality or amount of land that a young man received was 
dependent upon the generosity of the numzane, as was his access 
to the iron tools with which to work, and the cattle with which
7. Ibid., I, 376, 410-413.
8. Owen, "Description of Delagoa", May 1823 in FSEA, II, 479; Mission 
Rcmande, Chez Les Noirs (Neuchatel, 1894) , 6; JSA file 74, p. 66, 
evidence of Majuba; Junod, Life, I, 283, 287.
9. Junod, Life, I, 416-17.
10. Ibid., I, 130-31, 295-403, 407,,409; II, 6-7; Junod, "Baltanga",
46.
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11to fertilize his lands. By attracting dependants a wealthy man aspired
to build a circular homestead consisting of up to thirty huts housing
12more than a hundred dependants. However, the powers of patronage needed
to attract such a following depended on a man’s ability to marry. This
was because labour was at a premium due to the labour intensive nature
of production and because of the controls and restrictions of the kinship
system which precluded the existence of an open wage-labour market.
A bride provided a man with children who increased the size of his
house and homestead in terms of access to labour and in terms
13of rights to cultivable land and pasture. Thus marriage 
played a central role in the expansion of the homestead where, 
because of the patrilocality of marriage, the families of male 
children enlarged and enhanced the numzane1s powers of patronage 
and consequently his political power and status. Female children 
secured the dependence of males an the homestead numzane as it was 
their brideprice that provided the means for a male dependant to 
marry. But marriages also provided young men with the means to 
segment their houses from the homestead. This was because the 
product of a wife's labour power and of her fertility increased 
her husband's ability, as a household head, to produce the surplus
needed to attract his cwn following. Thus marriage constituted a
14major means of accumulation and wives were a synonym for wealth.
A numzane generally had two or three wives while powerful chiefs
like Magoude of the Khosa and Ngwanasi of the Maputo had "several
15dozen" and fifty-eight wives respectively. As one missionary 
expressed it,
11. Junod, Life, II, 7.
12. H.F. Fynn, "Delagoa Bay", in RSEA, II, 480; Cape Monitor, 16 July 
1853; Struthers, "Hunting Journal", 26 June 1855; BPP 1890
C. 6200 Saunders to SNA, 17 Nov., 1887, 45; M. Morris, "Rjonga 
settlement patterns", Anthropology Quarterly, 45, 1972, 233.
13. Junod, Life, I, 126-29, 283, 288-89. For early twentieth century 
descriptions of lobola, see papers by Posset, Guye, Benoit,
Dieterlen and others in "L'eglise Chretienne et la ccutume de 
lobola", August 1910. WUL Swiss Mission Records 21/1 Lobola.
14. ADM 1/2269 Osborne, "Description of the people of Delagoa Bay",
28 Sept., 1822; T. Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery 
to Africa, etc., I, 44-45; Junod, Life, I, 129, 210-214, 284, 
288-89; II, 7; H.P. Junod, The Wisdom of the Thonga-Shangaan 
people (Pretoria, 1936), 121, 137, 145.
15. JSA file 74, p. 66, evidence of Majuba; Mission Rcmande, Chez 
les Noirs, 7; Junod, Life, I, 283.
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"Lobola is (the elders' bank). If they want to 
set aside some money, they invest it in a woman 
who will furnish them with children. These 
children once grown up, if they are girls will 
bring new dowries into the family and these 
dowries will buy more women and thus the family 
will become powerful. The possession of cattle 
is even subordinate to marriage."1
With the capitalist penetration of the nineteenth century 
it was the labour of children and dependants, and especially of 
wives, which determined the reproduction of the social formation. 
It was their labour that released males from domestic production 
and allowed them to take part in long-distance trade and hunting. 
As only males took part in these activities, they monopolised the 
luxury goods brought through Lourengo Marques, and the access of 
women to these goods was largely dependent upon their performing 
services for men. Thus, it was the ability of males to exploit 
female labour that allowed them to realise a profit from hunting 
and trading. That chiefs and numzane could tax trade and distri­
bute the proceeds also proved an important element adding to their 
attraction of followers.
Fran the early eighteenth century, cattle as lobola (bride­
wealth) were supplemented, and in hard times, even replaced by
other goods such as lotus-shaped beja hoes, bronze and brass neck
17and armrings, goats and especially imported beads. Before the 
epizootic of the early 1860s, cattle were the major medium of 
lobola, and for a marriage to be sanctioned they had to be trans­
ferred by the family of the bridegroom to that of the bride. 
However, because the area was largely cut off frcm other sources 
of cattle by a virulent tsetse-belt, access to cattle was 
restricted; they could only be acquired as lobola for a sister, on 
loan, by raiding or as inheritance. Both material and political 
inheritance were adelphic and consequently cattle and power passed 
from a father to his younger brothers to his eldest sons. The son
16. SMA 1760 Grand jean diary, p. 272; Grandjean, La Mission, 79; 
H.P. Junod, The Wisdom, 121, 137, 145, 149.
17. Jakob de Bucquoi (1719) in RSEA, VI, 434; Jacob Francken (1757) 
in RSEA, VI, 495; Penwell (late eighteenth century) in RSEA,
II, 460; Cape Monitor, 16 July 1853; JS 14, file 25, p. 26, 
evidence of Ndaba; Junod, Life, I, 275; African Museum, Joha­
nnesburg, Junod collection, (1) 5 sindane brass rings. See
p. 281, note 21.
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of a deceased headman could not inherit his father's goods or position
18until all his paternal uncles had died. This form of inheritance
meant that when men were of marriageable age, they had little chance
of possessing cattle through inheritance and generally remained
dependent on their father or father's brother for bridewealth until 
19late in life. Heirs were obliged to distribute part of their
cattle inheritance only insofar as it consolidated the dependence of
younger siblings, sons and male dependants upon them for wives. It
was this dependence, and the access to the means of production that
it determined, that maintained the cohesion of the homestead, the
economic basis of the numzane' s political pcwer. The numzane were
able to contract several marriages not only because of their
monopoly of cattle bridewealth but also because of the levirate
according to which men inherited the wives of their deceased elder
brothers. Rights to the fertility of these widows were the most
20important inheritance left by a man to his heirs.
The cattle monopoly held by the numzane was entrenched by the
kinship system which regarded as incest unions between descendants
of the same grandparents and favoured marriages contracted between
clan members. Thus bridewealth circulated largely amongst numzane
sharing a carman patronymic and the social unions contracted in
this way entrenched the power and political unity of the dominant
21clan within the chief dan. The cadets or nandja, because of 
their restricted access to cattle bridewealth, were dependent on 
the cattle monopolized by the numzane for their brideprices. But 
marriage did not mean automatic accession to the rank of numzane; 
a bridegroom remained dependent on his creditors until either he 
inherited a brideprice or a daughter reached a marriageable age and
18. Junod, Life, I, 211, 333.
19. Ibid., I, 278-79, 332-33.
20. Ibid., I, 202-11, 247, 262, 288-89, 509; Junod, "The fate of the 
widows amongst the BaRanga", SAJS, 1908. Widows would go to each 
of the younger brothers of the deceased husband and only there­
after to the deceased's eldest son and sister's sen.
21. The term "cadet" is used as it implies a member of the family 
who is junior in status, generally, but not always the younger 
brothers. All children of the "great" house were senior to their 
siblings by other wives of their father. A nandja is a follower, 
subject or servant, Junod, Life, I, 6.
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her lobola could be used to cancel her father's debt. It was the
transfer of the lobola in its entirety which legalised the man's
right to the children of his wife. Thus, right of filiation lay
with the lobola, and if the wife's kin were to demand the entire
brideprice and the husband were unable to pay, they had a legal
right to reclaim their daughter and all the children of the marriage.'
Even where, in the ideal instance, the full lobola was paid by the
23bridegroom's agnates, the young man remained in a state of 
indebtedness to these konwana. Bridewealth debts were contracted 
with the konwana of different homesteads and with those of different 
houses within a single homestead. As shown in figure 9 , if a 
homestead head C furnished his son I by wife D with a brideprice 
acquired through the marriage of his daughter J by wife E, a debt 
was entered into between the two houses. Consequently when E's 
son K reached marriageable age, I could be forced to dissolve his 
marriage to H in order to repay his bridewealth debt. Similarly, 
if H was separated from I and C demanded the repayment of I's lobola, 
G was dependent on A and his other konwana to produce the brideprice. 
Failure to do so would lead to the retrieval of F's lobola by the 
dissolution of her marriage to G. F would then return to her 
father's homestead with her children L and M. Thus good relations
Figure 9
The Pattern of Bridewealth Indebtedness
O  =  A  
F G
A
L
A
A
B
O
■™i
O
M
C D E 
A  =  O  =  O
O
J
A
K
22. SMA 1760 Grandjean diary, 12, 68; SMA 528/A Paul Berthoud to 
Leresche, 13 Jan., 1893; Junod, Life, I, 214-16, 241-2, 332, 493.
23. Junod, Life, I, 107, 118 but for the numerous exceptions to the 
rule, cf. Ibid., 134, 439.
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between a man and his konwana were essential as a man was dependent
on these numzane not only for the brideprice needed to procure a
24wife but also for the securing of his rights to his children.
Bridewealth debts could be inherited fran one generation to 
25another. As long as part of a man's brideprice remained out­
standing or he remained indebted to his konwana, he was a legal 
minor, a de facto "cadet", dependent on the goodwill of the numzane. 
This explains the extreme respect for elders and the hierarchical 
relationship between elder and younger brothers, for
patrimony passed through the elder brother, upon whan the younger
26was thus dependent for his lobola. The numzane were prepared to 
supply a cadet's lobola, as brides increased the power and produc­
tive capacity of the homestead and family and widened social 
alliances. In turn, the expectation of receiving a brideprice, 
and the nature of its partial payment, secured the adherence of 
the cadet to the homestead. The homestead head was under an
obligation to assist the cadet and if he failed to do so he could
27be deposed by his younger brothers and paternal uncles. Thus 
marriage was a social rather than an individual act as it introduced 
and maintained the reciprocal obligations that constituted the 
economic basis of the clan.
The massive importation of industrially-produced hoes threatened 
the numzane's monopoly of bridewealth, because migrants returning 
fran Natal were able to purchase hoes around Delagoa Bay at 2s 
each. The subsequent inflation of hoe brideprices absorbed most 
hoes into the prestige sphere of circulation and allowed the 
numzane to retain their monopoly. But in the long term this proved 
an impossible situation as, apart fran the difficulties involved 
in transporting a brideprice weighing several hundred pounds, the 
ability of young men to purchase hoes rose in proportion to their 
increasing ability to find wage labour in South Africa. As sterling 
specie replaced hoes as the medium of lobola the ability of the 
numzane to monopolise bridewealth became increasingly contingent
24. Ibid., I, 243, 282.
25. Ibid., I, 439; Grandjean, La Mission, 80-81.
26. Junod, Life, I, 211, 226, 299, 236; Junod, "BaRonga", 79.
27. Junod, Life, I, 278-79, 332.
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upon their ability to accumulate and control the circulation of
28
sterling in the Delagoa Bay hinterland.
The introduction of a sterling brideprice was constantly
29opposed by the chiefs and numzane. They vented a return to a cattle
bridewealth which they could control and which produced offspring and
was not "eaten up" in the buying of consumer goods. There was, however,
little alternative to sterling as cattle diseases and tsetse continued
to plague the area; as late as 1890 the Ronga chief dans were reported to
30be practically without cattle. In order to control the circulation 
of specie bridewealth the numzane had to control the major part 
of the "liquid capital" flcwing into the Delagoa Bay hinterland 
in the form of migrants* wages. This they were largely able to 
achieve by taxing the increasingly monetized ecanany and by 
continually raising brideprices above the level of the returning 
migrants* wages. This prevented the "devaluation" of brides and 
the breakdown of the special-purpose nature of bridewealth exchange 
which effectively meant that the dependence of the cadets upon 
the numzane for their brideprices was maintained. Thus during the 
reign of chief Zihlala (1867-83), the Mafumo brideprice was fixed 
at £8 but even during his reign was pushed up to £10.10s by the 
numzane. The Mazwaya chief, Maphunga(Ca. 1860-90) tried to limit 
to £15.10s the claims of numzane to brideprices of £20-30. Bride­
prices continued to rise and by the 1890s they stood at £15-20 and
in the Lourengo Marques area, where there was a larger circulation
31of sterling, they could reach as high as £30. The cost of a 
concubine in Khosen in the late 1880s was about £10 or about two- 
thirds that of a normal brideprice and remained relatively constant,
28. BO 50, 11 Dec., 1875; Junod, "BaRcnga", 89; SMA 513/B Grand jean 
to Leresche, 8 March 1894; JSA file 25, p. 235; ZGH 796.892/92 
Foxon report 31 Aug., 1896.
29. SMA 502/A P. Berthoud to Leresche 26 Feb., 1889; 1760 Grand jean 
diary, p. 232; 513/B Grandjean to Leresche, 8 March 1894; ZGH 
796.892/96 Foxon report 31 Aug., 1896. See also Webb & Wright, 
James Stuart, II, 146, evidence of Mahungane.
30. Junod, "BaRanga", 199; Cohen "Erlautemde Bemerkungen", 286;
ZGH 796.892/96 Foxon report; JSA file 74, p. 9; Mackenzie,
The Net, 1881.
31. SMA 528/A Berthoud to Leresche, 23 Nov., 1893; SMA 1642/A 
"Confessions des Negres", 1896; WUL.A.170 Am. Zulu Mission, 
Pinkerton diary, Julu 1880; ZGH 708.2288 Saunders report;
ZGH 796.892 Foxon report; BMSAS, 116, 1894, 143; Ibid., 122, 
1895, 361; Castilho, Districto de Lourengo Marques, 13.
314
perhaps because of the large numbers of Chopi women enslaved by
1. 32
the Gaza and Khosa in the 1890s.
The cadet's dependence upon the chiefs and numzane was also
structured by the cosmology of a society which engendered the
belief that the chiefs and numzane had access to the supernatural
forces controlling the daily existence and prosperity of the people.
As the chiefs and numzane were the direct descendants of the most
powerful ancestors and could intercede with them, they were thought
able to control rainfall, health, the fertility of wanen and of
33the soil and the outcome of wars.
The real and believed ability of the elders to control daily
existence by controlling access to the means of production acted
as a mechanism of social control and determined the form of
surplus extraction. Thus even where the cadets were tied to a
means of production they were dependent upon the chiefs and numzane,
who, through extra-economic means, could extort various prestations
from the cadets. Official taxes were known as nhlengo and could
consist of a basket of maize from each village and gathered wild
plums (bukanye) for the great national feast. An irregular and
voluntary form of taxation considered as "an act of civility" (or
mashobo) was to send beer to the chief's homestead. To luba or
hlenga was to pay a tax of fealty. Other official taxes consisted
of the payment to the chief of the skins and joints of certain
hunted animals, the grounded tusk of an elephant and the contents
34of a crocodile's stcmach. A tax was levied on communal fishing
35expeditions and on the use of fishing traps. Chiefs used the
cadets' labour to build and repair their huts and to clean their
cattle kraals, public places and roads. Unremunerated labour was
also used in porterage and hunting expeditions organized by the 
36chiefs. In Maputo land men who served in military regiments left
their homesteads in order to cultivate the fields of wives whcm
the chief placed as his representatives in the various districts 
37of the chief dan. It was expected that the chief's followers would
32. Cape Mercantile Mvertizer, 16 July 1886; Harries, "Free and 
unfree labour", 322, notes 55 and 56.
33. SMA 1760 Grand jean diary, 68; Junod, Life, I, 395-404.
34. Junod, Life, I, 401-2, 405-7.
35. Ibid, II, 88.
36. Ibid., I, 331, 406-7.
37. Natal Witness, 17 Dec., 1898; Junod, Life, I, 406; ZGH 708 
Saunders to SNA, 12 Nov., 1887.
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provide his soldiers with food and shelter and pay the lobola of
his great wife which by the 1890s could amount to £30 and 20 cattle;
38sub-chiefs paying £1 or a cow, headmen 10s and villages 2s.
Outsiders who were attached to the clan but were not recognised as
members, paid a special tax when they kcndza1 ed to the chief. A
saqwati was a present given especially on festive occasions and
39as a sign of hanage.
Chiefs and numzane were able to accumulate wealth and
followers in various ways apart form taxation. The saqwati paid
by the Maputo chief to his counterpart in Zululand had a strong
element of reciprocity which strengthened the position of the royal
families. Thus Chief Nozingile of the Maputo might collect 100-200
headloads of goods each year from his followers, which he then
sent to Mpande. In return Nozingile would receive over 100 head
40of cattle which were then added to the royal herds. It was cannon 
for cattle, pigs, hens and other livestock to be loaned out to a
neighbour who, as recompense for looking after the animals, was ‘ r .
41given, for example, one of the litter. Because of his extensive
marriages a chief normally fathered numerous daughters for whom he
42procured inflated "royal" brideprices. The goods confiscated
fran a man accused of witchcraft accrued to the chief while chiefs
and numzane, who acted as magistrates, were allowed part of any
43fine extracted fran a defendant. The sale of slaves constituted 
a further form of accumulation for chiefs and numzane that peaked 
during periods of political uncertainty and continued, in a minor 
way, into the late 1880s. An indigenous form of slavery, that 
contributed to a hierarchical social stratification, was also 
practised in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Female prisoners of war 
called tinhloko (heads) were a source of profit to their captors
38. Ibid., I, 376. See also Webb & Wright, James Stuart, II, 150-51, 
evidence of Giba.
39. Sa Nogueira, O Dicionario. , \
40. Wefcb & Wright, James Stuart, I, 67-68; Ibid., III, 157.
41. Junod, Life, I, 440; II, 46.
42. Ibid., 416.
43. Up to 50% of these fines was kept by the chief. Junod, Life, I 
97, 330-31, 407, 439, 441-45; II, 534.
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44
who either married or sold them. The pawning of followers and
voluntary enslavement were also practised during periods of great 
45insecurity. Young men on inheriting the chieftaincy were able to
enrich themselves, and entrench their power by confiscating the
46property of their political opponents.
The material goods and labour power accumulated by a chief or 
numzane were eventually distributed to his followers as presents, 
food and drink in festivals and parties, military protection, 
and access to brides. The cadets also benefitted fran the 
exercise by the chiefs and numzane of social knowledge; of genea­
logies, legal precedents, religious observances and the structuring 
of cyclical time by rites of passage and festivals. As co-ordinators 
of most phases of the production process the chiefs and numzane 
gave cadets access to wives, sufficient labour, land, tools, 
fertilizer and the divine intercession needed to ensure a success­
ful harvest. The prestige and power of the chiefs and numzane
47was measured in terms of the generosity of these "benefices".
The relations between the dominant chiefs and numzane and 
the subordinate cadets were thus a complex interaction of 
patriarchal and filial bends and mutual obligations and were very 
different from the simple wage relationship linking capitalist 
and worker. It was nonetheless a relationship of exploitation 
in the technical sense that wives, although they were passed down 
to the cadets, did not constitute part of the numzane's benefices. 
Until their husbands had fully honoured their brideprice debts, 
wives remained under the control of the numzane and the circulation 
of their brideprice cemented the social ties linking the numzane as
44. Cape Mercantile Advertizer, 16 July 1886; ZGH 699.252 Qnbandeni 
to SNA, 19 Aug., 1886; Harries, "Free and unfree labour", 312-18, 
322; FO 84/2224 Br. Cons, to FO, 4 April 1892; Junod, Life, I 
450, 471. See also Skully, "Phalaborwa Oral Tradition", 330
and note 32, p. 314.
45. ADM 1/2269 Oven to Admiralty, 8 March 1824 and 19 June 1824,
CWen to Admiralty 9 Oct., 1823; FO 97/303, Owen to GGM, 10 
May 1825; W. Owen, Narrative, I, 270; Boteler, Narrative, II, 
300-301; Webb & Wright, James Stuart, II, 143, evidence of 
Mahungane.
46. SMA 497/D P. Berthoud to Leresche, 4 Feb., 1888; SMA 497/E 
Berthoud to Leresche, 11 Oct., 1888; SPG. Mission Reports 1892. 
Bishop Carter's "Journey into Tongaland".
47. Junod, Life, I, 408-9; Grand jean, La Mission, 73.
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a collectivity. Furthermore whereas the benefices passed down by 
the numzane were the product of their social and political 
dominance, the prestations given by the cadets were the product of 
their labour. This dominance was entrenched by the numzane1 s ability 
to structure labour time and to determine the size of the cadets' 
pres tat ions. This ensured that the cadets, as direct producers, 
were dependent upon the numzane not only for access to the means 
of production but even for the redistribution of the product of 
their labour. The transfer of prestations and benefices, struc­
tured by the kinship system, ensured the reproduction of the 
relations of dominance and subordination that structured the 
chiefdan.
The dominance of chiefs and numzane was symbolised in various
ways, such as the wearing of headrings and expensive skins, the
hierarchical distribution of the joints of a slaughtered beast
48and the arrangement of households within the homestead. The
hierarhical structure of the social formation was particularly 
noticeable during first-fruits festivals when
"The gods must be the first to enjoy the produce of 
a new year, then the chiefs, the sub-chiefs, the 
counsellors, the headmen, then the younger brothers 
in order of a ge."49
Outsiders who were attached to, but had not been incorporated into,
the clan were prohibited fran partaking in the first-fruit festivals,
50or from drinking milk, with members of the host clan. Junod
described a hierarchy in which the chief was
"all powerful ... an autocrat with power over life and 
death. In every village the headman possesses similar 
power over his subjects and the elder brother reigns as 
a despot over the younger ... From the top to the bottom 
of the social ladder the strong dominate the weak and
rful way, to assure the submission of
48. Junod, Life, I, 312, 329-30, 321.
49. Ibid., II, 404.
50. Ibid., I, 251, 396, 433.
51. Ibid., II, 224-5. The power of the chief was not always and 
everywhere the same, cf. note 5, p. 306.
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A cadet excluded fran his father's patrimony and dissatisfied
52with his position could always leave the homestead. He would 
then generally move to his mother's brother (malume), as his closest 
consanguinial relative with property outside of his father's family, 
or kondza to a new chief and, in return for the customary presta­
tions, be assured of the chief's benefices. But a sister's son 
had no claim to the patrimony of the malume and the nature of the 
kondza relationship was determined by the size and importance of 
the migrant's following; a single cadet would probably be given
marginal land and, in terms of inheritance, would be beneath the
53youngest son of the most junior wife. Thus in the Delagoa Bay
hinterland segmentation was a measure of desperation rather than
a mechanism for the resolution of conflict.
This indicates that although kinship laws can be traced to,
and were rooted in, the production process, they also structured
the social relations that emerged out of the existing' form of
production. But underlying the moral inducements to conform
that were embodied in kinship ideology lay the threat of force.
Deviants were threatened with accusations of witchcraft that could
result in their execution or expulsion from the kin group and in
54the enslavement of their children. But this was a drastic course
of action as the numzane lost a dependant and the wrongdoer lost
his rights to a secure means of subsistence. In the nineteenth
century this often meant that he would be sold into slavery or be
55forcibly conscripted into the Portuguese army.
Consciousness of exploitation is discernible in political 
segmentation and social avoidances; in folk stories, proverbs and 
songs which recognised the servile position of the poor and cele-
56brated the triumph of the young and oppressed over the oppressor. 
But this consciousness was never transformed into class conflict, 
for adelphic inheritance ensured that many cadets, as brothers of 
the deceased, eventually became numzane, even though at an advanced
52. Ibid., I, 331.
53. Ibid., I, 433; II, 6-8. If a man had no heirs his goods were 
inherited by his sister's son.
54. Ibid., II, 525, note 2; Cape MercantileMvertizer, 16 July 1886.
55. Ibid; Junod, Life, I, 330-31, 387; II, 7. See also p. 182, note 124.
56. Ibid., II, 213, 221-4; H.P. Junod, The Wisdom, 75-77, 81.
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age. This dissuaded then fran segmenting and accounts for the large
size of the homesteads found in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. As
males, all cadets were separated from women by the sexual division
of labour and, even within the homestead, married women were
separated fran unmarried women, childless women from mothers and
junior wives from senior wives and widows; moreover, married women
were of different status and, due to the patrilocality of marriage,
57of diverse origin. The "oppressed" were further divided by 
inadequate communications, kinship divisions and disputes, struggles 
over brideprice debts, and by the local problems whose resolution 
was vital to daily existence. Thus in contrast to the chiefs and 
numzane, the exploited cadets and women exercized little solidarity. 
Nevertheless a structured opposition existed between the two 
groups. As will be shown in the following sections, labour 
emigration from the Delagoa Bay hinterland was strongly encouraged 
by, and in turn magnified, this opposition between dominant and 
subordinate groups.
Wage Labour and New Forms of Accumulation; the Social Pressures 
Encouraging a Migratory Form of Labour Movement
With the growth of migrant labour a major source of sterling 
for the chiefs and numzane emerged from the direct extortion of a 
part of the workers* wages an their return from South Africa.
These "labour taxes" were levied by the chiefs and then distributed 
to the numzane or were levied individually by the numzane. This 
form of taxation was recognized in the area as a cannon practice
58and generally amounted to £1 to the chief and 2s to the numzane.
The taxes differed according to the chiefdcm and the chief. Thus 
the Maputo chief Nozingile demanded an unspecified amount of 1 specie', 
while his wife the queen regent who succeeded him, levied a tax of 
£1 on all returning migrants. Her son Ngwanasi who used the labour 
of his regiments to plant and weed his fields, levied a tax of
57. Ibid., I, 126, 229, 284; II, 441. A son inherited the fields of 
his mother and the property of a mother's brother (malume) 
without a male heir was held by his sister for her son. Thus sons 
were to sane extent dependent on their mothers for their access 
to land. Ibid., I, 211.
58. BO 45, 5 Nov., 1877; BPP., SA corres., C2220, no 66, 1878-9;
FO 63/1316 Consul to FO, 14 Feb., 1896; UNISA/JC, "Litterature - 
coutumes"; ZGH 708.Z288 Saunders report; CMAR 1894, 34, 36.
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£5-10 on all males who avoided military service by migrating to 
59South Africa. Added to this source of sterling incane, by the
late 1880s the chiefs and numzane levied various fines, prestations
and taxes, previously paid in kind, in sterling specie. Seme chiefs
reportedly extorted half the Portuguese hut tax fran villagers in
60return for hiding them fran colonial tax collectors. They were 
also able to accumulate sterling by demanding presents and capita­
tion fees fran labour recruiters wishing to operate in their areas 
and it was universally recognized that recruiters were unable to 
function without the co-operation of the chiefs.^
A further source of cash income came fran the host of taxes 
levied on Banyan merchants who themselves were drawn by the 
migrants' sterling wages. With the money thus accumulated the chiefs 
and numzane perpetuated their control of the bridewealth system 
and maintained their dominance. But chiefs and numzane were not 
interested in the accumulation of sterling simply as a source of 
material wealth but rather as a means of social control. Cadets 
could be wealthier than numzane in material terms, but as long as
the elders monopolized access to wives, they were able to dominate
62
and exploit the cadets. This meant that, despite the cadets' 
participation in migrant labour and their consequent access to an 
independent source of bridewealth, they remained dependent on, and 
open to continued exploitation by, the chiefs and numzane.
59. GH 1050 Supreme court case, Agnew v. Van Gruning, 14 May 1875;
BO 5 May 1877; BO 45, 11 Nov., 1877; ZGH 708.Z288/87 Saunders 
report 17 Nov., 1887; FO 63/1316, Consul to PO, 14 Feb., 1896; 
Junod, "BaBonga", 141. See also Junod, Life, I, 407.
60. The old village tax of a basket of maize or millet was symbo­
lically transformed into a Is tax. Junod, "BaBonga", 65, 140,
157; ZGH 736.Z249/91 Statement made by Faku, 20 March 1891;
ZGH 739.441 Bruheim to Ees. comm., 22 May 1891.
61. SNA 1/1/21 Clarence to SNA, 24 Arpil 1871; Leslie to SNA, 28 
July 1871; SNA 1/1/25, J. Colenbrander to SNA, 27 March 1880;
H.W.D. Longden, Bed Buffalo (Cape Town, 1950), 46; OlAR, 1894,
36; SNA 1/1/24 Dunn to SNA 21 March 1874; GH 829 Elton to PI,
25 Oct., 1875; CSO 664. 4069/78 Circular to Magistrates; CSO 
677. 2548/78 Bennett to PI, 9 July 1878; CSO 726.4993/79 Dunn 
to PI, 1 Nov., 1879; GH 1050 Shires to SNA, 7 April 1875; SMA 
542/B Loze-Grandjean, 27 Nov., 1897; TLC., p. 47, ev. of F.
Perry; FO 63/1449, Crewe to FO, 15 April 1901.
62. SMA 513/B Grand jean to Leresche, 8 March 1894; SMA 1760 Grand jean 
diary, p. 232; Junod, Les Chants, 48; Idem., Life, I, 385.
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The deleterious effect of migrant labour upon agricultural 
production has been treated in a formalistic way in Chapter 6 . 
Although available statistics indicate otherwise, it seems likely 
that the ecological upsets of the 1880s-90s magnified the pressures 
on young men to emigrate temporarily as this ridded the homestead of 
a consumer of food during the hungry season. At a more substantive 
level it may be noted that migrant labour was unable to bring 
about a development of the productive forces or change the structure 
of the social formation for, while the export of labour depleted 
the productive forces, migrants' wages were invested in wives and 
in unproductive consumer goods like cloth and liquor. A major 
part of the migrants' sterling wages was transformed through 
marriage into productive and reproductive labour but much to the 
chagrin of local traders, was then encapsulated within the sphere 
of circulating bridewealth controlled by the numzane. As bride­
wealth was kept in trust in order to provide future generations 
with the means of acquiring wives, it could not be invested or 
"eaten" in the development of the productive forces. Hence when 
wages were "converted" into bridewealth they took on a social
rather than a market value and much of the developmental potential
63embodied in wage earnings was neutralized.
The shift in the medium of bridewealth fran cattle to hoes 
and later to sterling, deepened the involvement of males in the 
market economy and increased their dependence cn external trade 
and later an migrant labour. This increased the exploitation of 
cadets as it was the product of their labour power which was 
exchanged for the hoes and sterling needed to maintain the elders' 
monopoly of bridewealth. By the late 1880s Mozambican migrant, 
workers suffered a double exploitation through the extortion of 
surplus value by their employers and through the extraction, by 
the chiefs and numzane, of bridewealth and prestatians that amounted 
to the major part of the migrants' repatriated wages.
The increased exploitation of the cadets was however matched 
by their increasing ability to earn wages in South Africa. This 
presented those males, excluded temporarily or permanently from an 
inheritance or without access to a sister's brideprice, with a
63. Alfredo Andrade, "As minas de Ouro", 330-31; Ferrao, Circum- 
scripgoes, 45.
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source of incane independent of the chiefs and numzane. The
resultant social contradiction was manifested in several ways. A
64general decline in cadet respect for their elders was paralleled
by a refusal to wear headrings as they made porterage more 
65difficult. Other signs of the general social upheaval of the
period were the rise in alcoholism, "witfchcraft" and especially,
66in spirit possession. By the end of the 19th century the division
67between junior and elder had becane more marked, fission fran
68homesteads was more frequent and wanen had reportedly becane more
69independent of men. In areas like Lourengo Marques preferential
endogamous marriage patterns dissolved and widows were able to
contract marriages with "foreign" men who, because they were unable
to supply a brideprice, surrendered their rights of filiation
70to their wives' deceased husband's kin. Women also sought an
escape by joining mission stations which they soon came to dominate 
71numerically. The small numbers of men who joined the mission
stations were inculcated with a belief in "the dignity of labour"
72as a means to salvation. Numerous migrants returned hone with 
Christian wives married in South Africa and others, converted in
64. Richardson, Lionel Cohen, 159-160; Junod, Life, I, 157; SMA 
1760 Grandjean diary, 1889.
65. Junod, Life, I, 130-32.
66. JSA file 74, p. 67, evidence of Majuba; Webb & Wright, Stuart 
Archive, III, 287; Junod, Life, II, 206, 479-504, 613; Idem.,
"Les Barcnga", 404-7; A.T. Bryant, Zulu Medicine and Medicine­
men (Cape Town, 1970), 71-2.
67. See pp. 203, 206-209.
68. Junod, Life, I, 318. See also M. Morris, "Rjonga settlement 
patterns", Anthropology Quarterly, 45, 1972.
69. JSA., file 25, pp. 240, 260-61, evidence of Ndaba; file 74, p. 38, 
evidence of Mahungane.
70. Junod, Life, I, 213, 253, 509-10. See also Life, II, 187, 197.
71. At the Swiss mission stations in Nondwane and Lourengo Marques 
the ratio of males to females was respectively 85 : 556 and
19 : 53. SMA 1256/C Statistiques do 1890, Rikatla; R. Berthoud- 
Junod, Lettres, 140-41.
72. SMA 467 Grandjean, 1890; SMA 517/B Junod to Renevier, 10 Oct., 
1895; SMA 1128/F Grandjean to Portuguese ambassador, Berne,
7 Nov., 1896.
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South Africa and educated in centres like Lovedale, King Williams
Town and Port Elizabeth, established their own schools and missions
73in the Delagoa Bay hinterland. Thus as men found security against 
a hostile environment in wage labour which was outside of the control 
of the elders, the system of reciprocity was threatened and with it, 
the position of the chiefs and numzane. To forestall the dissolution 
of their power the chiefs encouraged migrant labour and adapted 
existing forms of surplus extraction. Many cadets responded to 
their increased exploitation and the decline in local economic 
opportunities by emigrating permanently to the labour markets of 
south Africa.
While this emigration of Mozambicans contributed to the 
growth of South Africa*s black proletariat, it depleted the 
following of the chiefs and numzane in Mozambique. In Maputoland 
permanent emigration to Natal reached such large proportions in 
the 1880s that the queen regent sent a message to the Natal 
government requesting that although she was
"very much indebted to the Natal government for the 
licence granted to her subjects to enter, pass through 
or work in Natal without interference or being bound 
for three years ... however ... at the same time she 
would be very pleased to know that the said government 
made it cctnpulsory for her subjects to return home 
after two or three years' service in Natal as many 
of them forsake their hemes, wives and children and 
never return."74
The absence of a large number of males employed in South Africa,
the rapid spread of venereal diseases causing female infertility
and the probable increase of amenorrhea due to the ecological
upsets of the late 1880s-90s, resulted in a fall in the overall 
75birthrate. This drop in the population of the area was 
bitterly decried by the chiefs and numzane in much the same way as
73. WUL. AB. 867 Aa5 Mackenzie to Archbishop, Cape Town, 21 Aug.,
1889; SPG., Mission reports. Bishop Carter, "A Missionary 
Journey into Tongaland", 1892; BMSAS, 14 April 1894, 57; SPG., 
Charles Johnson, "Amatongaland", 1895, parts I and II; ZGH 
796.234 Res. Ccnrnissioner to High Ccnrnissioner, 6 March 1896;
FO 63/1316 Consul to FO 8 May 1896; Grandjean, La Mission, 177, 
192-3.
74. ZGH 702.33/87, "Statement of Grantham and deputation from Zambile", 
27 Jan., 1887. See also JSA, file 25, p. 260.
75. SMA 497/B Paul Berthoud, "State of the coastal areas, 1887"; SMA 
82/H Liengme, "Report for 1892"; Junod, Life, I, 203.
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the "depopulation" thesis was later decried by the Portuguese 
in their negotiations with the Transvaal and South African 
governments.76
The loss of dependants was a serious blow to the chiefs and 
numzane because they were dependent on the labour power of the 
cadets for their social and political dominance. Their ability 
to attract followers through the accumulation and redistribution 
of goods was adversely affected which in turn diminished the 
productive potential of the homestead, lowered its defensive and 
offensive capabilities and threatened the security of the numzane 
in old age. The effect of this loss of male labour on existing 
social relations should be seen in conjunction with the general 
loss of revenue caused by shrinking hunting and trading frontiers 
and by the threat to the numzane1 s control over access to the 
means of production that was posed by alternative sources of 
bridewealth. By securing a part of the migrant's wage on his 
return hone, the chiefs and numzane were largely able to maintain 
both control of bridewealth circulation and their dominant position 
in the redistributive economy. In short, the reproduction of the 
relations of dominance and subordination was dependent on a form 
of labour movement that ensured the repatriation of the worker and 
of his wage. But the control by chiefs and numzane of egress and 
ingress of Delagoa Bay labour was severely restricted by the nature 
of its movement.
Nineteenth century migrant labour was far more complex than 
the push-and-pull migration suggested by same writers for 
twentieth-century South Africa. In-migration preceded, accompanied 
and facilitated out-migration, which often took the shape of a 
stage-by-stage movement onto the labour market. Even in the well- 
paid areas, the men moved from one farm or mine to another so as to 
benefit from better pay and working conditions. During these moves 
it was easy for the worker to loosen his ties with his area of origin 
and join the Mozbieker, Shangaan and Amatonga communities, or place 
himself under a farmer or chief, in South Africa. To move onto 
the non-contracted labour market was tantamount to "disappearing" in 
the eyes of plantation or mine owners.
76. SMA 513/B Grandjean to Leresche, 8 March 1894; SMA 1225 H. Berthoud, 
"Expedition chez Gungunyana, 1891"; E. Noronho, Lourentpo Marques, 
54-5; TA. GOV. 210 Confid. 33/06 Br. cons, gen., Lourengo 
Marques to Selbome, 27 July 1906; Cabral, Ragas e Usos, p. 102.
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There is evidence to suggest that the chiefs exercized seme
control over their followers in South Africa and that they were
able to condition, to sane extent, the willingness of their
dependants to return hone. Thus if war threatened a chief dan, the
chief refused to permit the emigration of any male followers of
77military age and recalled his people working in South Africa.
Just as the nature of the cadets' prestations changed with migrant
labour, so too did the nature of the benefices passed down by the
chiefs. The latter encouraged the cadets to maintain contact with
their hone areas by protecting their interests in various ways.
In a society where the term "recruiter" is synonymous with
78"swindler" and "perjurer" the chiefs and numzane played an
important role in controlling the operations of recruiters and
colonial government agents. By encouraging or discouraging labour
emigration, the chiefs and numzane ensured that the recruiters
operating in their areas fulfilled the obligations they contracted
with migrants. They encouraged competition between freelance and
contracted labour recruiters, negotiated and advised on the terms of
new labour-importation schemes and, by using the royal homestead as
an information-gathering centre, they directed workers to the best-
79paid labour centres. If a young wife did not return to her
parents during her husband's emigration, generally because her
lobola had already been paid, it was the duty of the chiefs and
numzane to protect her and her children. This function came to be
known as basopa, from the Afrikaans pasop (watch out) and ensured
that the cadet's property was protected during his migration and
that his family had enough land and labour to provide itself with
80food; it also prohibited any infidelity on the part of the wife.
77. Natal Mercury, 24 June 1870; Ibid., 5 Sept., 1871. See also pp.
65, 87, 112-113.
78. Sa Nogueira, Diccionario (Ba-galantzana).
79. SNA 1/1/24 Dunn to SNA 21 March 1874; GH 1050, Shires to SNA,
7 May 1875; CSO 665. 4069/78, "Statement by Umango, messenger sent 
by Nozingili", 7 June 1875; 1.1. 1/1 R496 Shires to SNA, 29 Aug., 
1875; GH 829 Elton to PI., 25 Oct., 1875; ZGH 702.33/87 "Statement 
of Grantham and deputation from Zambile", 27 Jan., 1887; SS 
3360.6608/92 Livingstone to SS., 14 June 1892; TLC., p. 47, 
evidence of Perry; CMAR 1898, p. 4.
80. Grandjean, La Mission, 199; Junod, Life, I, 330. See also Ibid., 
440; ZGH 708. Z288 Saunders report to SNA 17 Nov., 1887.
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The benefits of the redistributive economy encouraged workers to 
return hone, as it provided them with land, labour and the social 
security needed to subsist outside the wage economy. The mainte­
nance of a subsistence base in the rurdl areas provided the migrant 
with both a weapon to canbat lew wages cn the labour market and 
with an insurance in old age. Thus Mozambicans were able to use 
desertion to force an improvement in wage rates and working 
conditions in Natal. Similarly when the Chamber of Mines tried 
to reduce African wages in 1890-91, thousands of Mozambicans 
withdrew their labour by returning heme and in this way were 
successfully able to force a return to the old wage level. This 
rural supplement to an industrial wage markedly differentiated 
migrant workers frcm workers drawn from Europe who, being the 
product of a more developed process of primitive accumulation and 
proletarianization, had no other income save their wages. 
Consequently migrant labour emerged, at least partially, as a 
purposefully-developed mechanism employed by the worker to protect 
himself from the impoverishment, insecurity and alienation that 
stemmed from the excesses of proletarianization.
Several years before the imposition of Portuguese rule, the
cosmology of the peoples of the Delagoa Bay hinterland had
changed sufficiently to accommodate migrant labour as a normal
part of attaining adulthood. Prohibitions on sexual intercourse
during lactation had been a traditional form of birth control
that could last up to three years, but with the growth of migrant
labour men were encouraged to go to South Africa during this period
of abstinence. Death on the mines and various aspects of the
migrants* life were .institutionalized and incorporated into the
local cosmology through songs, stories and rituals. For many,
migrant labour became a rite of passage that replaced entry into
the age-regiments or the prestige associated with hunting and 
8*1trading journeys. Thus labour recruiters in the 1890s referred
82to migrant labour as "a form of initiation" and as early as 1891 
a missionary wrote of migrant labour as a tour de ccmpagncnnage 
or itinerant apprenticeship performed at least once if not several
81. Junod, Life, I, 136; IX, 188-9, 192, 355, 521.
82. Best and Williams in CMAR, 1894, p. 34; Junod, Life, I, 136, 
340; II, 255, 393.
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83times by all young men in southern Mozambique. After a period
of service on the mines young men were treated with new respect
as gay is a, those who have returned from the mines and are a source
of wealth. Red-coats, smoking jackets, hats and trousers bought
an the mines were the symbols of their new status. Men who remained
at hone and refused to work on the mines were denigrated as mparras,
84narrow-minded and ignorant provincials. Because of the pressures
emerging from within the society, migrant labourers in the nineteenth
85century were almost exclusively men in their teens and twenties.
But that it was not merely economic factors that drove these men 
onto the labour market; is evidenced by the presence amongst them 
of numerous chiefs' sans.®*’
A migratory form of labour was encouraged in various other 
ways. As the amount of bridewealth in circulation increased, men 
were able to marry at a younger age as they were no longer
87dependent an the receipt of a brideprice for a female relative. 
Furthermore, young marriages were encouraged and, as the birthrate 
fell in the late 19th century, the marriage age dropped from the 
mid-twenties to 11-12 years old for girls and 12-13 for boys and 
there was a withholding of the premarital sexual favours known
83. SMA 1255/B Henri Berthoud, "Rapport sur 1' expedition". Elsewhere 
he referred to migrant labour as a "tour de France". See also 
Junod, Life, I, 147.
84. R. de Sa Nogueira, Dicion^rio; Cabral, Ragas e Usos, 99, 182. 
During World War I followers of the Murimi millenarian movement 
used the word "gayisa" to mean rain, Junod, Life, II, 601.
85. II 1/5 1116/78 Col. Eng. to PI, 4 Dec., 1878; II 1/54 PI to 
Col. Sec., 28 April 1890; II 1/55 551/90 Depot surgeon to PI.,
5 July 1890; CA IAC 8 to 12, 21.
86. WUL. AB 867 Aa5 Bishop Mackenzie to Archbishop Cape Town, 21 
Aug., 1889; SMA 502/B Grand jean to Leresche, 7/9 Jan., 1890;
SMA 485/B Junod to Leresche, 2 Sept., 1892; UNISA/JC., Junod, 
"Les Causes...".
87. JSA, file 74. Evidence of Mahungane and Nkonuza. A wife married 
with a sister's lobola came to be considered higher in status 
than a wife procured with a brideprice earned on the labour 
market, A. Clerq, "The Marriage Laws of the Ronga Tribe", Bantu 
Studies, 12, 2, 1938, 96.
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88as gangisa. Early marriage meant that young men were pushed 
into marriage before leaving for the mines, and the sexual gratifi­
cation and security of family life acted as an important attraction 
for a worker who might be obliged to return hone due to accident, 
disease or an unwillingness to accept a cut in wages. Younger 
marriages ensured the continued dependence of the cadets on the 
numzane for a brideprice and probably helped offset the falling 
birthrate.
A consequence of the reduction in marriage age was that women 
played a fuller part in homestead production and became mothers 
at a much earlier age. Men's dependence on women to supply the 
subsistence needs of the family increased proportionately with their 
involvement in migrant labour and, in this way, much of the 
exploitation involved in homestead production was passed on to women. 
By increasing the burden placed on women in the production process, 
the numzane increased the cadet's dependence on women to supplement 
their wage labour with the agricultural production needed to 
reproduce the family. This increaad exploitation of women was an 
important factor conditioning the cadet's decision to return home 
with the brideprice necessary to complete his debt to the elders.
For with an increasing rate of migrancy, the establishment and 
maintenance of the homestead came to rest almost entirely an its 
fanale members and it was the product of their labour and fertility 
that gave to the cadets the possibility of entry into the dominant 
numzane grouping.
88. SMA 497/B P. Berthoud, "L'£tat du Littoral", Sept., 1887; JSA 
file 25, p. 260, evidence of Ndaba; p. 236 evidence of Mahungane; 
SMA 1642/A "Prani^res Confessions des Negres"; Robertson, July 
1890 in Wheeler, Soldiers of the Cross, 113; Natal Witness, 17 
Dec., 1898; Junod, Life, I, 99; TLC., p. 163, evidence of Cohen; 
ZGH 708. Z288/87 Saunders report, 17 Nov., 1887; ZGH 796.157 
Foxon report, 31 Aug., 1876.
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EPILOGUE
Nineteenth century migrant labour from Mozambique to south 
Africa was part of a global phenomenon; the product of the specific 
form of development that emerged in areas, on the periphery of the 
industrialized world, where capital was unable to break down exis­
ting non-capitalist forms of production or effect a transformation 
in their social relations. The historical development of an 
Industrial labour force in these areas was consequently very 
different frcm Marx's classical model of a proletariat created by
private ownership of land, single-heir inheritance, enclosures
1
and overpopulation. In 19th century southern Africa, industria­
lization was not synonymous with impoverishment. The inequitable 
spread of the benefits of industrialization must be traced not to 
an inherent link between migrant labour and underdevelopment but 
to the process of struggle - both between capital and labour and 
within the working class itself. The subjugation of the African 
working class was only secured by the emergence in the 20th 
century of an aggressive and interventionist state that was 
responsible for the implementation of a battery of racially 
discriminatory social and constitutional measures.
During the pre-colonial period the chiefs and numzane in the 
Delagoa Bay hinterland, through what was in effect an alliance 
with capital, played an important role in directing labour to and 
frcm the markets of southern Africa. But because their political 
position was dependent on the kinship system, with all its rights 
and obligations, they were constrained frcm supplying the market 
with the enormous supplies of cheap labour needed by the development 
of the Witwatersrand and the opening-up of the deep level mines. 
Colonialism was fettered by no such encumbrances and it was only 
the colonial state, increasingly powerful after the Portuguese 
victories of 1895-97, that was progressively able to free labour 
frcm its material possessions - and frcm the rights and obligations 
embodied in the social relations of the old order. Only the
1. Other early Marxists were fully aware of this distinction. Cf. 
Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (New York, 1968 
edition), 361 ff.; V.I. Lenin, "The Development of Capitalism 
in Russia", Collected Works, vol. 3.
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colonial state was able to use organized violence to propel workers 
onto the market for, unlike the chiefs and numzane, its only 
responsibility towards the workforce was to ensure the conditions 
of its physical reproduction. The colonial state was able to use 
the apparatus of government, army, police, prisons and chiefs 
working as government agents, together with the threat of forced 
labour and porterage, military conscription, compulsory cultivation, 
corporal punishment and imprisonment to coerce workers onto the 
market, while at the same time restricting Africans to reserves 
where their access to a means of production outside of wage labour 
was strictly limited. It was through the partial preservation - of 
the old non-capitalist mode of production in these regedorias that 
the colonial state was able to compel the African homestead to 
bear much of the cost involved in the reproduction of the labour 
force.
The qualitative nature of migrant labour from the Delagoa
Bay hinterland changed markedly after the Luso-Gaza wars of
1894-97. The colonial period was marked not so much by the increase
in numbers of workers forced onto the market, but rather by their
increased exploitation. In 1901 the Portuguese and the Milner
government in the Transvaal transformed the labour decrees of 1897
into a temporary working agreement. According to this modus
vivendi Portugal exchanged the labour power of its colonial
subjects, at an extremely low rate of remuneration, for recruiting
emoluments and especially, for rail, harbour and customs privileges
that gave to Lourengo Marques a competitive edge in its rivalry
2
with Durban and Cape Town.
In February 1906 the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association 
(WNLA) of the Chamber of Mines, which had replaced the FNLA while 
in "exile" in Cape Town during the Anglo-Boer war, was given 
monopoly recruiting rights by the Portuguese in Mozambique. In 
that year 53 000 workers, amounting to just over 65 per cent of
2. The number of trucks passing from the Witwatersrand to Lourengo 
Marques was strictly tied to the number of Mozambicans employed 
on the Rand, a measure that effectively gave the Transvaal a 
monopoly of Mozambican labour. NA. SNA 1/4/10. C51/01. High 
Commissioner to gov., Natal, 23 Dec., 1901 and various enclosures. 
In 1902 emolumentsanounted to £30 000 and it was estimated that 
workers would return to Mozambique with a minimum of £360 000.
TA. GOV. 18. 441/02 MacDonald to Lansdowne, 2 June 1902; GOV.
41. 307/03 Gosselin to Lansdowne, 6 Feb., 1903.
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the African labour force employed an mines affiliated to the 
Chamber of Mines , 'were of Mozambican origin. This monopsony pushed 
those mining companies that were independent of the Chamber into
3
an alliance with anti-emigration settler interests in Mozambique. 
This caused the British and Transvaal governments to intervene 
directly in the dispute and through their efforts the Robinson 
group agreed to join WNLA in January 1908. The following year the 
modus vivendi was made permanent by the signing of the Mozambique - 
South Africa convention. This was followed by the tightening of 
the pass laws and the introduction of a maximum average wage on . 
the Witwatersrand mines. These measures were largely responsible 
for the sharp drop in real wages on the Rand after 1897 and it
was only after World War II that African wages, in cash terms, rose
4
for the first time above the £3.10s wage level of 1896.
Pressure frcm the colonial state not only pushed down the wage
level, it also increased the number of migrations undertaken by a 
worker. Pre-colonial labour migration was performed almost 
exclusively by men in their teens and twenties, but during the 
colonial period labour migration was commonly undertaken by men 
who had completed up to fifteen contracts and continued migrating 
in their thirties and forties.^
"Traditional" wage supplements through theft, trade and 
informal activities were also restricted by the marked increase 
in the control of labour during the 20th century. In Mozambique, 
poorly capitalized Portuguese colonialism needed its own source of 
cheap labour. U lus under colonialism the basic contradiction in
3. GOV. 210. 33/06 Cons-gen., Lourengo Marques to Selboume, 27 
June 1906; PO 367/19 minutes of Barrington and Grey, 14 Nov.,
1906; PO 800/71 Grey to Soveral, 24 Nov., 1906.
4. Francis Wilson shows that in 1969, the final year of his survey, 
African real wages were lower than in 1889. Labour in the South 
African Gold Mines, 45-46, 53, 55, 141.
5. M. Binford, "Stalemate: a study of cultural dynamics", 86; P. 
Wilson, "International migration in southern Africa", Inter­
national Migration Review, X, 4 (1976), 459; David Webster, 
"Migrant labour, social formations and the proletarianization of 
the Chopi of southern Mozambique", African Perspectives, 1 (1978), 
171; O Mineiro Mogambicano, mimeo, Centre for African Studies, 
Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, 1976, 60 ff.; C.E. Fuller, 
"An ethnohistoric study of continuity and change in Gwambe 
culture", PhD. thesis, Northwestern University, 1955, pp. 148-9, 
224.
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the emigration of labour shifted frcm satisfying the needs of 
chiefs and numzane to satisfying the divergent needs of both 
Portuguese settler and metropolitan interest groups. To overcome 
this contradiction, the Portuguese colonial state enforced a 
migrant form of labour; a policy that was willingly supported by 
the South African state, whose mining capitalists were anxious 
for homestead production to subsidize their belcw-subsistence 
industrial wages, and whose administration was increasingly able, 
after the Anglo-Boer war, to enforce short-term labour contracts.
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Appendix I
ETHNOGRAPHERS AND THE ETHNIC CHARACTERIZATION 
OF THE PEOPLES OF THE DELAGOA BAY HINTERLAND
Early European travellers and later anthropologists and 
historians employed a variegated and confusing terminology when 
referring to the inhabitants of the Delagoa Bay hinterland. The 
British usually called them "amatongas", a word that entered the 
English lagnuage as a borrowing frcm the Zulu who used it to refer 
to all the conquered peoples of the coastal areas north of Zululand.
It was used in a similar way by the Gaza Nguni in the Zambezi river 
valley and by the Maputo who, due to their close links with the 
Zulu, perjoratively referred to the senior branch of their clan, 
which constituted a separate chiefdcm situated north of the Terabe
9
river, as "amatongas". The term was thus imbued with derogatory 
overtones and was consequently never used by the people to whom it 
was applied. Nevertheless, the Natal colonists, and later the 
Swiss mission, adopted the word as a genericism applied to all 
people living between the Zulu border and the Zambezi, regardless 
of their linguistic or cultural affiliations.
There are two hypotheses as to how the Nguni arrived at the 
term Tonga. The first is that a linguistic soundshift caused the 
Tsonga word Ronga, which denotes "easterners" to be pronounced "Tonga"
3
in Zulu. The second is that the original inhabitants of the east 
coast were called Tbnga before the imnigration into the area of 
various Nguni and Shona-speaking groups some time before the 16th
1. A.T. Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand and Natal, 286-7; St. V. 
Erskine, 1869 ms in RGS, 45; ZGH 713.480 Martin to Havelock, 20 
July 1880; C.M. Doke and B.W. Vilakazi, Zulu-English Dictionary 
(Johannesburg, 1972) .
2. C. de B. Webb and J. Wright, The James Stuart Archive, vol II,
143; A. Isaacman, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique, 
(London, 1976), p. XXIV, note 2.
3. H.A. Junod, Life of a South African Tribe, I, 15; Transvaal Native 
Affairs department. A Short History of the Native Tribes of the 
Transvaal (Pretoria, 1905), 59.
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4
century. The use of the word Tonga to define a linguistic group 
is thus the invention of European scholars and its refinement into 
terms like Thonga and Tsonga merely represent attempts by anthropo­
logists and the Tsonga Language Canmittee in South Africa to 
expurgate the derogatory connotations frcm the term. However, the 
use of the word Tsonga or Tzonga, even as a linguistic classifica­
tion, was criticized as early as 1891. According to Henri Berthoud,
Tsonga was a geographically derived term meaning southerner which,
5in the Nkonati river bend area, was pronounced Djonga or Tsonga.
This explains why many Tsonga-speakers have today rejected the term
c
as an ethnic classification. To complicate matters further, the 
gi-Tonga language was called isi-Tsonga by people living to the 
west of Inhambane and Junod initially referred to speakers of this 
language as "the Tsongas of Inhambane".
Various other generic terms have been applied to the Tsonga - 
speakers. The word rau-landi was used by the people of the Delagoa 
Bay area to designate all blacks irrespective of their origins.
This term was then adopted by the Portuguese as "Landim" and was 
used variously to describe the black peoples in the neighbourhood 
of Lourengo Marques, blacks living south of the Save River, 
displaced Nguni groups, Shona speakers, Mozambican soldiers of Africang
extraction serving in the Portuguese army and blacks in general.
The Portuguese did,, however, distinguish between immigrant Nguni
4. Bryant, Olden Times, 83; JSA file 25, p. 260, evidence of Mahungane; 
J. Nunes, "Apontamentos sobre a tribu dos ba-Thonga", B. Soc. 
Estudos da Col, de Mog., 3, 1, 1932.
5. SMA 1255 H. Berthoud, "Rapport sur 1'expedition a Magude"; Ibid., 
"Quelque remarques sur la f ami lie des langues Bantou et sur la 
langue Tsonga en particulier", Xe Congress International des 
Orientalists, 1894.
6. Krige and Felgate, "An ecological study", 8.
7. Junod, "The Ba-Thonga of the Transvaal", Addresses and Papers of 
the British South African Association for the Advancement of 
Science, 3, 1905, 224. See also ABM. ABC 15.4 vol. 12, Wilcox to 
Strong, 18 Aug., 1884.
8. C. Montez, "As Ragas Indigenas de Mozambique", Mozambique, no. 23, 
1940, 53-66; Nunes to GGM, 4 Oct., 1830 in F. Santana, Documentagao 
II, 222; F.L. Barnard, A Three Year Cruise in the Mozambique 
Channel (London, 1848) , 165, 261; Richard Thornton, The Zambezi 
Papers, 53-55, 57, 69; H.A. Junod, Graitmaire Ronga (Lisbon, 1896), 
4-5.
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groups and indigenous peoples, whom they often generically entitled
Vatua and Landim respectively.
In the Transvaal, early coastal traders were initially called
9
Tcheke because they had discarded skins for cotton clothing. But 
the 19th century waves of coastal immigrants were called either 
Gouamba (Gwamba) after a coastal chief, Koapa which was the north 
Sotho mutation of Gouamba, or Toka after his grandfather. People 
in the Phalaborwa area referred to eastern hunters and iirmigrants 
and hunters as Mabono. Although these were the ancestral names 
of chiefs belonging to merely one group of coastal people, and in 
the case of the Gouamba was a synonym for easterners, and despite 
and rejection of these terms as a form of address by most Tsonga 
speakers and later by the Swiss mission, the terms were adopted by 
many blacks and whites in the Transvaal to identify eastern 
iionigrants.10
Because of the distinctive nasal cicatrization of some irrmigrant
coastal peoples, early Boer settlers referred to many Tsonga
refugees as Knchnoses. This has caused English and Afrikaans South
African historians to use the work Knobnose and (ma)Qvarriba inter-
11changeably when referring to 19th century Tsonga-speakers. Yet
12southern Tsonga-speaking iirmigrants did not taboo themselves at all;
others had small knobs cn the face or body while the "true knobnoses",
Tsonga-speakers frcm north of the Limpopo, shared their prominent
nasal cicatrization with other immigrant and coastal groups
speaking dialects of languages as varied as Chopi, Shona and gi- 
13Tonga. Furthermore, as a means of cultural definition, this form
9. B.H. Dicke, "The first Trekkers to the northern Transvaal", S.A.
Journal Sci., 23, 1926, 1012.
10. Grand jean, La Mission, 50, 58; Nachtigal, "Tagebuch", 2, I, 279; 
Skully, "Phalaborwa oral tradition", 329.
11. G.M. Theal, History of South Africa since 1795, vol. 4, 476; Eric 
Walker, A history of South Africa, 286; B.H. Dicke, "The first 
Voortrekkers"; Grimsehl, "Qnluste in Modjadjiland, 1890-1894", 
SAAYB, II, 1955, 204, 211-215, 229; J. Mouton, "General Piet 
Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis", SAAYB, 1957, 152, 156.
12. Junod, Life, I, 178-80; Nachtigal, "Tagebuch", 281; Henri Berthoud, 
notebook 6 (private ms). Stayt viewed Knobnoses as a branch of the 
Thonga (The Bavenda, 19). This is also implied in J.D. Krige, 
"Traditional origins and tribal relations of the Sothe of the 
Northern Transvaal", Bantu Studies, 11, 1937, 324.
13. A. Caldas Zavier, "O Inharrime e as Guerras Zavallos", Bol. Soc. 
Geogr. Lisboa, 1881, 482; A.M. Cardoas, "Expedigao as Terras do 
Muzilla em 1882" in Bol. Soc. Geogr. Lisboa, 3, 7, 1887, 179;
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14of scarification was rapidly disappearing by the 1880s.
A further term used to identify the peoples of the Delagoa Bay
hinterland was "Shangaan". This expression arose because the Gaza
King Manukosi was kncwn to his Tsonga-speaking followers as Sboshangane.
Tsonga-speakers were consequently often designated "Shangaans", a
term that was then applied to refugees entering the Transvaal from
the Gaza empire. But in its correct usage, the term was only
applicable to those people conquered by Manukosi and his descendants,
who adopted, as distinct frcm the "amatonga", the material culture
15of the Gaza Nguni. In present day South Africa, only the (Gaza)
Nguni immigrants who entered the Transvaal after the Luso-Gaza war
of 1897, are officially classified as Shangaan or Tshangana and are
16thus distinguished frcm those people classified as Tsonga.
Nevertheless the word Shangaan gained widespread currency on the
diamond and later gold mines of South Africa as a synonym for East 
17Coaster and has been accepted coloquially as an all-embracing 
term used to refer to the Tsonga-speaking people of south-east 
Africa and, in a more general way, to all Mozambicans employed on the 
South African mines. The point is that during the 19th century, 
these terms were used in a generic and imprecise way to embrace 
diverse peoples and tribes with no cannon name and, as ethnographic 
terms, they are of very little value.
The term Thonga was given the seal of scientific approval by the 
Swiss mission which needed to codify a ccmmon language linking its 
linguistically related followers on the East Coast with those living
St. V. Erskine, "Journey to Linzila's South East Africa in 1871- 
1872", J. Royal Geogr. Soc., 45, 1875, 82, 85; Chapman, Travels 
in the Interior of South Africa (London, 1868) vol. II, 256-7.
14. SMA 503/C Junod to Leresche, 13 July 1889; Henri Berthoud notebook
6 (private ms); War Office, The Native Tribes of the Transvaal, 131; 
Junod, Grartmaire Rcnga, 17.
15. The term is thus somewhat synonymous with terms like Vatualizado 
and Mabuyandlela. A.A. Caldas Xavier, Reconhecimento do Limpopo 
(Lisbon, 1894), 138; Harries, "Slavery, social incorporation", 318, 
footnote 38.
16. Van Warmelo, Ethnographic Survey, 91.
17. CA/GLW 100 no. 442, Report of Native labour Department for 1876; 
Cape Blue Book on Native Affairs, G.8.-83 Appendix; ABM. ABC 15.4 
vol. 12, Richards to Smith, 25 May 1885.
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as refugees in the Spelonken area of the Transvaal. The most 
influential of the Swiss mission work was that of H.A. Junod, who in 
the 1890s wrote three books on a linguistically related group of
18people living south of the Nkomati whom he identified as the Ronga.
In his propensity to classify people, Junod was trapped within the 
limitations of his age.
Nineteenth century rationalism and positivism had bequeathed 
a categorization of the myriad of new details emerging frcm the 
discoveries of the expanding industrialised world. Without the 
orderly structuring of detail, there could be no clarity and no 
understanding. This early rationale for classification was no doubt 
further entrenched by his entomological studies and especially by 
the influence of 19th century concepts of nationalism and the 
central role of language in the classification of national groups 
and characteristics. This is evident in Junod's strong criticisms 
of Dudley Kidd's The Essential Kaffir, a work published in London 
in 1904, which grouped all Africans together and failed to distinguish 
between them on linguistic or any other grounds. Tb Junod, Kidd's 
extreme generalisations, made on the basis of race alone, were 
confusing and unscientific. However, Junod, following the publication 
in 1898 of his first monograph on the Ronga, was heavily criticized 
by his mission for artificially dividing the "Ronga" peoples living 
around Delagoa Bay from the "Gouamba" living in the north-eastern 
Transvaal. As these people spoke related dialects and fell within 
the constituency of the Swiss mission, it was felt that a single 
language with a common grammar and orthography would reduce mission 
costs.
Henri Berthoud, a leading linguist and colleague of Junod's,
was particularly critical of the latter's linguistic formulations.
Berthoud had written an evangelical handbook and a reading primer in
1884 in the central Tsonga dialect, spoken in the area between the
Nkomati and Limpopo rivers, which was the dialect used by most of the
19"Gwamba" refugees forming the mission's Spelonken congregration.
He was opposed to the adoption of a further grammar and orthography
18. For references to H.A. Junod's work and to the following para­
graph, see P. Harries, "The anthropologist as historian and 
liberal: H.A Junod and the Thonga", Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 8, 1, 48-49'.
19. Grandjean, La Mission, 101.
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as, prophetically, he felt that as different literatures emerged, 
the rift between the southern and central Tsonga speakers would
20become concretized and would divide the followers of the mission.
During the 19th century there were considerable differences
between the various dialects spoken in southern Mozambique. According
to Junod the dialects spoken by the clans around Lourengo Marques
which claimed Nguni origin, constituted the "real Ronga" while
according to Berthoud, they were a transition between the central
dialects and the very different dialects spoken by the people
living south of the Tembe river who for many years had been Zulu
subjects. This linguistic division between the people living north
and south of the Tembe river was a major reason why the Swiss
mission restricted its activities to the area north of the river.
The mission also encountered language problems when in the 1880s,
using the central Tsonga dialect codified in the Spelonken, they
started work amongst the southern Tsonga (Ronga) speakers. Because
of the linguistic division they were initially rejected as "Karangas",
21i.e. as foreigners frcm the north.
Berthoud was opposed to the contemporary European orthodoxy 
whereby political groups were delineated according to their 
languages. Consequently, he was particularly critical of the basis 
of Junod's linguistic groupings which were defined according to 
geographical rather than linguistic criteria; terms like Djonga 
meaning southerners, Ronga - easterners and Nwalungu - northerners. 
The terms applied to the Bila linguistic sub-group cwed its origin 
to the word 'Bilene', the name give to a humus-rich soil type 
lacking flood-plain. Junod's Hlanganou linguistic sub-group 
corresponds with the people the traveller St. Vincent Erskine called 
Abahlengane, a term which means "those who pay taxes, are tributary". 
This designation probably arose because, when Erskine travelled 
through the Delagoa Bay hinterland, the Nwamba and Mabila chief dans 
of the area were tributary to the Swazi. Junod's final linguistic
20. Use Hone, "The History of the Development of Tsonga Orthography", 
(private ms., 1981), 20-22.
21. For the debate between Berthoud and Junod, see SMA 1255/B 
Berthoud, "Rapport sur 1'expedition A Magude, 1885"; Ibid., 
"Rapport sur 1'expedition chez Gungunyana, 1891"; Ibid., "Des 
langues Bantou"; SMA 1254/B Junod, "Etude comparative du 
shiGouamba et du shiRonga", March 1893; Junod, "Thonga,
Gouamba, Djonga, Ronga", BMSAS, 114, 1894.
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sub-group, the Hlengwe, was also delineated in a geographically
subjective manner as the term was used by Delagoa Bay traders to
refer to the people living to the north of the Limpopo, people who
22themselves rejected the term. These terms were sometimes used as
points of reference by outsiders wanting to identify the people of
a specific geographical area or by rootless refugees wishing to
establish a claim to an area of origin? they did not refer to
groups with a common social organization or material culture. As
Berthoud stated, "the Ronga do not form a specific tribe and their
name is a geographical designation rather than an ethnographic or 
23linguistic one." Thus although a member of the Nkuna tribe
living in the Transvaal might recognize himself as a Djonga, this
did not imply any common identity with members of the Khosa tribe
or any of the other independent chiefdans living in the Djanga area
between the Nkcmati and Limpopo rivers. The debate between Junod
and Berthoud ended with the latter's early death in 1904 and, within
a few years, regional dialects and patois had been standardized into
distinct Ronga and "Gwamha" grammars and orthographies.
Junod was aware of many of the problems involved in his tribal
classification and he attempted to solve these in his later work
in which he formulated and developed his concept of a Thonga tribe.
As early as 1905 he ascribed the recognition of the Thonga as a
24tribe, largely to the work of the Swiss mission. Seven years 
later in his two volume Life of a South African Tribe, he divided 
the tribe into the "northern clans" who spoke the "gwamba" or Thonga/ 
Shangaan dialect and the Ronga who occupied the area south of the 
Nkcmati. As the word Gwamba could not be applied to the coastal 
"northern clans", it was eventually replaced by the term Thonga- 
Shangaan. What is important here is that in Life of a South African 
Tribe, Junod reified these linguistic divisions by imbuing them with 
cultural traits that distinguished the Ronga, as a cultural group, 
frcm the Thonga-Shangaan "northern clans". Similarly, although Junod 
recognized that there was no feeling of national unity in the Thonga 
tribe as a whole, it was distinguishable from other tribes because
22. Harries, "The Anthropologist", 46-47.
23. SMA 1255/B Berthoud, "Rapport sur 1'expedition".
24. Junod, "The Ba-Thonga of the Transvaal".
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25of a coirmon language and certain shared cus tons.
Junod's classification of people into tribes was further 
reinforced by his interest in folklore, proverbs and folk songs. 
Contemporary folklorists were intricately involved in European 
nationalist movements, the roots of whose consciousness they sought, 
in opposition to the nationalism imposed from above by the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment, in the cultural expressions of those elements 
of the nation least influenced by cosmopolitan worldliness; the 
peasantry. Thus it was inevitable that, just as the stories collected 
by the brothers Grimm constituted an expression of German national,.ism 
drawn frcm "the people", so too were the songs, tales and proverbs 
collected by Junod seen as an expression of a Ronga or a Thonga 
consciousness which, at the level of the tribe, was distinguishable 
from, for instance, that of the Zulu as manifested by Callaway's
2g
collection of Zulu folklore.
25. Junod, Life, II, 356.
26. Junod, Les Chants et les Contes BaRonga; Life, II, 176-300.
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THE MAJOR CHIEFDQMS IN THE DELAGOA BAY HINTERLAND 
AT THE TIME OF THE LUSO-GAZA WAR OF 1894-95
Chiefdom Settlement Chief Military Popu- 
__________Strength lation
Khosa
Mabota
Mafumo
(Chixaxa)
Maputo 
Mato11a
Mazwaya
Nwamba
Nkcmati river bend
15 miles north of 
Lburengo Marques
Lourengo Marques 
area. Just west 
of Mabota
South of the 
Maputo-Pongo la 
river
Songele
Nbvatjonga
c.8 000 
c.l 000
Nwamantibyana over 
2 000:
Ngwanasi
Both banks of Sigaule
Umbeluzi river.
Large surface area, 
thinly populated.
North of Mabota, on Mahazulu 
both sides of lower 
Nkcmati to its mouth.
Heavy population
Large surface area, 
scattered population
(22 regi­
ments) ^ 
20- 22,000
2,000 
(9 regi­
ments)
2 400 10 500
Nwangoundwana 850' 4 000
(Source: Reis, A Fopulagao de Lourengo Marques, 81-82)
1. UNISA. Junod collection, "Les Causes de la Rebellion..."
2. Junod, Les Chants et les Contes Ronga, 60
3. BPP 1890 Saunders to Shepstane, Nov., 1887; SNA 1/1/21 Leslie to
SNA, 9 Aug., 1871.
4. Junod estimated 4,000 to 6,000. Les Chants, 58.
5. Junod estimated 1,500 to 2,000. "Les Causes..."
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GOTH AND LIQUOR IMPORTS INTO LOURENQO MARQUES
Cloth Liquor
1882 119 800$000 99 108$000
1883 155 219$000 92 185$000
1884 114 873$000 37 947$000
1885 57 952$000 35 843$000
1886 52 667$000 25 818$000
1887 164 584$000 95 319$000
1890 371 600$000 185 045$000
1897 374 260$000 521 480$000
1898 158 000$000 468 900$000
Sources:
Boletim de Oficial de Mozambique
AHU Mop., Alfandegas 1836-90, packets 1376 and 1382.
AHU M09., 2a Rep. pasta 7 Alfandega de Lourenpo Marques, 1890. 
Mappa Estatistica (Lourengo Marques, Alfandega, 1899).
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1. Documents (received frcm) Mozambique 1879 a 1906
2. Mago marked "Free State" (actually "Diversos" frcm various 
vice-consulates in South Africa). Scattered periods. Mainly 
1913-1915.
3. VcLrios documentos referentes ao ano 1890.
4. Private Papers - Consulado de Portugal
d. Consulado de Portugal, Pretoria (CGP), Housed in the Portuguese 
Consulate-General, Johannesburg
1. Registers of correspondence with Diregao dos Negocios Politicos 
e Diplcmaticos (DNPD) to 2 Jan., 1892.
2. Registers of correspondence with various Portuguese authori­
ties, 20 Oct., 1892.
3. Registers of correspondence with DNPD, 1894-1896.
4. Registers of correspondence with Direcao dos Consulados e 
dos Negocias Ccmmerciais, Dec., 1892-May 1896.
5. Copy-book of despatches sent, Nov., 1895-July 1896.
6. Copy-book of despatches sent, Oct., 1895-June 1896.
e. Public Records Office (PRO) , London 
Admiralty. ADM1.: 69; 70; 2269.
Foreign Office. F0 63.: 698; 1026; 1047; 1049; 1050; 1127; 1148; 
1281; 1316; 1317; 1336.
Foreign Office. F0 84.: 1026; 1039; 1539; 1616; 1640; 1709; 1901; 
1969; 2224.
Foreign Office. FO 97.: 303; 318.
f. East Sussex Record Office, Lewes 
Shiffner MS. no. 3216.
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g. Natal Archives (NA) , Pietermaritzburg
Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) . Official Correspondence. 1s 
7-10; 12-29; 36-38; 40-42; 45-49; 51-59; 64-71; 75-80; 86-88; 
96; 106; 111; 291-2.
1/3. Magistrates Letters: 8-9; 12-13; 17; 21; 23; 26-29.
1/4. Confidential Papers: 3; 8.
1/6 Miscellaneous Correspondence: 2.
1/7 Reports, Messages and Passes: 7-9.
Indian Immigration (I.I.) Protector of Immigrants. 1: 1-6;
9-10; 13; 15-22; 24; 26; 34; 40; 44; 46-48; 50-65; 68; 71; 
74-77; 80.
Colonial Secretary's Office (CSO). 507-510; 513-515; 517; 519; 
521-522; 525; 527; 530; 532-33; 536; 643; 558-561; 566; 571; 
584; 587; 598; 603; 606; 608; 614; 620; 632; 636; 643; 656; 665
668; 677; 680; 682; 726; 729; 732; 736; 750; 784; 787; 801; 820
823; 837; 840; 841; 855; 862; 872; 876; 883; 897; 915; 918;
920-922; 927; 930; 933; 935-937; 940; 943; 948-949; 954-955; 
957-958; 963-967; 974; 977-978; 982; 989; 1019; 1029; 1082; 
1171; 1194; 1198; 1202-1203; 1209; 1268; 1273; 1295; 1330;
1334; 1345; 1352; 1357; 1360; 2298; 2552; 2554-2557.
Government House (GH). 27-30; 33; 54-56; 59-60; 66-69; 601; 
1049-1054; 1214; 1325.
Letters frcm British Consul, Lourengo Marques. 829-830; 833.
Letters frcm British Consul, Mozambique. 837; 838.
Letters from Governor-General, Mozambique. 845-846.
Letters from Foreign Governments, Zululand. 857.
Letters frcm Foreign Consuls, Portugal. 870.
Zululand Government House (ZGH). 699; 702; 705; 708; 712; 713; 
716; 736; 786; 795; 796.
Zululand, Ccumissianer's Archives (ZA). 26; 27.
Resident Magistrate. Letterbook Umsinga, 1876-1878. 
Surveyor-General1 s Office (SGO). Ill 1/2.
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h. Ingwavuma Magistracy Records, Ingwavuma 
District Record Book. Section 7-19, including 
"History of the Crcwn Land - Ingwavuma District"
"Historical Record - Ingwavuma District Tribes".
District Record Book 38(c)
i. Transvaal Archives (TA), Pretoria
State Secretary (SS) . Official Correspondence. 20; 21; 30; 37; 
38-40; 42; 43; 45; 49; 51; 55-58; 60; 61; 65-67; 89; 96; 99;
100; 105; 106; 108-112; 116-118; 124; 133; 173; 174; 185; 186; 
188; 193; 198; 203; 207; 263; 342; 459; 490; 564; 636; 657; 691;
698; 719; 732; 760; 788; 816; 869; 869; 872; 873; 919; 955; 991;
1036; 1147; 1200; 1240; 1254; 1318; 1333; 1439; 1603; 1900; 2273 
2440; 2467; 2651; 2623; 2722; 3045; 3365; 3409; 3924; 3925; 4133 
4261; 4681.
State Secretary, Foreign Affairs (SSa). 1; 5; 6; 36; 132; 144; 
155; 166; 167; 168; 169; 176; 177; 215; 241; 258; 263; 264; 329;
330; 349; 384; 388; 450; 547; 568; 594; 595.
Secretary for Native Affairs (SN). 1; 1A; 2-4; 4A; 5; 173-4.
Leyds Archive (LA). 455-6; 459; 461-465; 656.
Governor's Office (Gov.). 18; 41; 210.
Deceased Estates. No 4294 (old) Joao Albas ini; No 2256 (old)
Bras Piedade Perreira.
j. Cape Archives (CA), Cape Town 
Immigration Agent (IAC). 1-11; 21.
House of Assembly (HA), Unpublished annexures to Votes and 
Proceedings. 53; 108; 110; 154; 167.
k. Archives Nationales de France, Ministere des Affaires 
Etrang&res (AN-MNE), Paris
CCC. Lourengo Marques Vice-Consul's Reports. 1895-1901.
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2. Missionary and Business Records and Diaries
a. Swiss Mission Archives (SMA) , Lausanne
82. Rapports et documents.
435. Lettres de G. Liengme 1891-92.
436. Lettres de G. Liengme 1893.
437. Lettres et Rapports de G. Liengme 1894.
438. Correspondence du Dr. G. Liengme 1895-96.
467. Journal d'Antioka, 1890. Grandjean.
483. Lettres de A. Grandjean 1890-1892, 1896.
484. Lettres de Paul Berthoud 1891-1892.
485. Lettres de H.A. Junod 1891-1892.
496/A. Lettres de M. Paul Berthoud 1897.
497. Lettres de Paul Berthoud 1888.
501/A. Lettres de M w Eberhardt 1897.
502. Lettres de MM. P. Berthoud, A. Grand jean and H. Junod
1889-90.
503. Lettres et Rapports de MM. Grandjean, Junod and 
Nhalamhlala 1889.
513. Lettres de Grandjean 1893-94.
514. Lettres de M. Grandjean 1895-96 (also incl. 1912).
515. Lettres de M. Numa.Jacques 1895-1896.
516. Lettres de H.A. Junod, 1893-1894.
517. Lettres de H.A. Junod, 1895-1896.
519. Lettres de P. Loze 1893-1896.
528. Lettres de Paul Berthoud 1893-1894 et 1896.
536. Lettres de M. A. Borel 1897.
542. Lettres, recit et rapport de M. Paul Loze 1897-1893. 
549/A. Lettres de Numa Jaques 1896-1897.
797. P.V. de la Conference du Littoral. Statistiques 1889-1892.
798. Conference du Littoral 1893-1894. Liengme lettres 1894 
and 1899.
815. P.V. de la Conference du Littoral 1895-1899.
840. Memoire justicatif du Dr. G. Liengme 3 Jan., 1896.
850. Rapports 1888.
872. Lettres de Mile. Jacot, M. Grandjean 1896-1911.
1254. Rapports 1893-1895.
1255. Rapports 1890-1895.
1256. Rapports 1885-1892.
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1127. Affaires de 1890-1896. Guerre.
1128. Lettres autour des affaires Liengme-Junod 1896-1897. 
1180. Dossier Wesleyan.
1190. Divers et lettres Privees de M. & Mnme. Berthoud.
1642/A. Premieres Confessions des NSgres qui se Convertissent
a Lourengo Marques 1896.
1760. A. Granjean. Journal 1889-1890 et 1895.
2001. Ethnographic photos by G. Liengme.
2013. Ethnographic photos by G. Liengme.
b. United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (USPG) , 
London
Mission Reports:
Bishop Carter, "A Missionary Journey into Tonaaland", 1892.
Rev. Charles Johnson, "Journal of an Expedition into Tonga land", 
Aug.-Sept., 1895. Parts I and II.
Report of the Bishop of Lebcmbo an the State of East Coast 
Labourers at the Johannesburg Goldfields, January 1899.
c. Witwatersrand University Library, Johannesburg
A. 170. American Zulu Mission. "Our Lamented Pinkerton*s Story". 
Diary of an expedition (July-Nov., 1880) from Durban up the 
East Coast.
A. 950. Archives of Tscnga Presbyterian Church: Swiss Mission 
in South Africa 1872-1950. 21/1 Lobolo; 24/1 Shilvane; 23/1
Valdezia 1888-1896; 23/2 Elim 1890-1896; 56/1 Native Affairs;
3 unsorted envelopes (1874-1879; 1882-1889; 1890-1899).
d. University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria
Diary (tagebuch) of A. Nachtigal, Band 2, vol I, 1879, pp. 274- 
284. "Beitrag zur Geschichte der Knopneuse".
Junod Collection, Original MSS and letters.
e. American Board of Canmissioners for Foreign Missions, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Mass.
Letters fran Missions. ABC 15.4. Volume 12.
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f. Archives of H. Eckstein and Co. (HE) of the Wemher-Beit 
Group. Held by Barlow-Rand, Johannesburg
H. Eckstein, Correspondence. 57; 62-63.
P. Fitzpatrick, Correspondence. 140; 141.
L. Phillips. 146; 149; 151.
G. Rouliot. 171; 172.
Taylor. 190; 192; 197.
Marquard. 205.
General and Technical Report, Oct., 1889 - Feb., 1894.
g. Standard Bank Archives (SBA) , Johannesburg
1/1/102 Lourengo Marques 1895-1900.
1/1/103 Lydenburg 1878-1879.
h. Chanibre de Cctnmerce, Marseilles (CCM)
File 157, Canpagnie de Navigation, Cyprien Fabre.
3. Unpublished Private Papers
a. Transvaal Archives (TA)
Albas ini Letterbooks. Correspandencia Official do Consulado 
Portuguez em a Republica Africana do Sul Transvaalsch. Volume
I, 14 April 1858-7 April 1862; Volume 2, 12 June 1862-8 June 
1866; Volume 3, 8 June 1866-15 October 1872. (Portuguese 
original, Afrikaans translation available.)
A. 18. Dicke, B.H. "The Development of the Northern Transvaal: 
Historical Stepping Stones and Reminiscences". June 1925.
W. 179. Henry T. Glynn. "Game and Gold".
A. 180. Cape. Public Works Department. Typescript of letters 
despatched. General, (i) 2.8.1875 to 31.5.1879
(ii) 3.6.1879 to 3.12.1880
(iii) 3.12.1880 to 12.1.1882
A. 195. MSS regarding concessions (1891-1893) in Lourengo 
Marques of A. Erasmus, J. Winterbach and L.H. Rau.
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A. 334. Copies of material in A.H.U. relating to Louis 
Trichardt. 1838-39? 1843-49.
A. 375. 0. Forssman Collection.
A. 599. Van Wielligh Aanwins op ZAR - Mozambique grens en die 
Swaziland-Mozambique grens. Dagboek 1890.
A. 881. Mariano Luiz de Souza, "Herineringe van Lydenburg 1872".
A. 1092. W.H.J. Punt Versameling, "Herinnerings van C.J.
Trichardt".
A. 1266. Braz Pereira Collection (Portuguese original):
(i) Correspondencia 1846-1883.
(ii) Financial Records 1869-1873.
(iii) Financial Records 1873-1878; 1873-1880.
(iv) Financial Records 1873-1880.
(v) Publications and Newspaper Cuttings (in English and 
Afrikaans.
A. 1140. Beelaerts van Blokland Collection. Includes Anon., 
"Verhaal van een Reis in Oost-Transvaal uit ter jaar 1858"; 
"Handelsexpedities naar Port Natal en Delagoabaai in 1852".
A. 1255. Newspaper cuttings (1889-1890) found in the South African 
Chancellory in Lourengo Marques.
b. Witwatersrand University Library (WUL)
A. 55 f. James, R.T.N., "Reminiscences.
A. 74. Machado Papers.
c. Royal Geographical Society, London (RGS)
Rogier, Lt. E., "Notes on CV/en's Expedition (1823)". (1833 MS )
Hilliard, C., "Notes on the Manucousi or river King George,
S.-E. Africa". (1859 ms.)
St. V. Erskine, "To the Limpopo mouth and back on foot", 1868.
St. V. Erskine, "Journal of Mr. St. V. Erskine, Special 
Canmissioner fran the Natal Government to Umzila - King of 
Gaza, 1871 and 1872".
St. V. Erskine, Letters to Secretary, R.G.S. 27 Aug., 1868?
11 Dec., 1868.
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d. Africana Museum, Johannesburg
Junod Collection 39/220-661. MSS. related to Individual 
Items.
Notes on Junod Collection.
e. Killie Campbell Africana Library, Durban (KCL)
James Stuart Archive. Files 12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 25, 60, 70,
74.
St. Vincent Erskine Papers, including diaries, letters, 
miscellaneous notes.
Alexander Andersen Papers. Includes "A Sea Voyage to Delagoa 
Bay in 1868 for big game hunting", and "Gun running at Port 
Natal".
Davidson Papers, "Diary of a sugar/coffee planter near Umzinto, 
1867-1870".
Letters of J. Ecrqyd.
Fynn Papers.
L.C. von Wissel. "Reminiscences of trading days in Northern 
Zululand, 1895-1919".
f. Papers Held by Private Individuals
Robert Briggs Struthers. "The hunting journal of Robert Briggs 
Struthers in Zululand and Tonga land 1852-1856" (In possession 
of Mr. R. Butcher, Durban).
St. V. Erskine Papers (Mr. E. Erskine, Natal).
Account book of Manuel da Gama 1859-1863 (In possession of Mr V. 
da Gama, Kurulen).
Letters and Papers of Henri Berthoud (In possession of Mr. P. 
Cuenod, P.O. Elim Hospital).
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II. PUBLISHED SOURCES
a. British Parliamentary Papers (BPP)
Accounts and Papers, Commercial Reports.
BPP LXXI, 1877, C.1662 Consular Report for Mozambique 1876.
BPP LXXIV, 1876, C.1421 Consular Report for Mozambique 1875.
BPP XC, 1881, C.2945 Consular Report for Mozambique 1880.
BPP LXXI, 1882, No. 45 Consular Report for Mozambique 1882.
BPP LXXXV, 1887, No. 60 Consular Report for Mozambique 1885.
BPP LXXVI, 1890, No. 742 Consular Report for Mozambique 1889.
BPP LXXXVII, 1890-1, No. 855 Consular Report for Mozambique 1890.
BPP LXXXIII, 1892, No. 955 Consular Report for Mozambique 1891.
BPP XCV, 1893-4, No. 1153 Consular Report for Lourengo Marques 
District 1892.
BPP XCV, 1893-4, No. 1312 Consular Report for Mozambique 1892.
BPP XCIX, 1895, No. 1463 Consular Report for Mozambique 1893.
BPP XCIX, 1895, No. 1537 Consular Report for Mozambique 1894.
BPP LXXXVIII, 1896, No. 1760 Consular Report for Mozambique 1895.
BPP XCII, 1897, No. 1904 Report for Consular District of 
Lourengo Marques 1896.
BPP 1878-9, C.2220 South Africa. Correspondence no. 66.
BPP XLVIII, 1883, C.3533 Correspondence with respect to tariffs 
in the Portuguese Possessions in Africa, 1877-1883.
BPP LXXV, 1883, C.3587 Report by Consul O’Neill on Agriculture 
and Labour in the Province of Mozambique.
BPP 1875, C.1361 Correspondence respecting claims of Her Majesty’s 
Government to Delagoa Bay.
BPP 1875, C.1137 Report of the expedition sent to install Cetewayo 
as king of the Zulus.
BPP 1890, C-6200 Further correspondence respecting the affairs 
of Swaziland and Tongaland.
BPP 1892, C.6684 Correspondence respecting boundary questions in 
Zululand.
BPP 1895, C.7505 Correspondence relating to certain Native 
territories situated to the north-east of Zululand.
BPP 1895, C.7780 Further correspondence relating to certain Native 
territories situated to the norht-east of Zululand.
BPP 1895, C.7878 Further correspondence relating to certain Native 
territories situated to the north-east of Zululand.
BPP 1896 C.7920-19 Report an the Port and Railway of Lourengo 
Marques.
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Laws of the Transvaal up to 1899. (H.M.S.O., London, 1903).
b. South African Republic
Notule van die Volksraad van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek.
Vol. II (1851-1853) to VI (1866-1867) (ed.) J.H. Breytenbach.
South African Archival Records, Transvaal. Vols. 2-6.
Voortrekker Argiefstukke, (eds.) D.W. Kruger and H.S. Pretorius
(Pretoria, 1937).
De Locale Wetten der Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek, 1849-1885.
(Pretoria, 1887).
c. Cape Parliamentary Papers
Annexures to Votes and Proceedings of the House of Assembly:
1875 - A. 3. (Special Session) on the MacMahon Award.
1876 - G.8. Report on Imnigratian and Labour Supply for 1875.
1877 - G.47. Report on Inmigration and Labour Supply for 1876.
1880 - G.71. Report on Native immigraticn to the colony from 
extra-colonial territories, for the year 1879.
1881 - G.56. Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants at Cape 
Town, East London and the Knysna area, for the year 1880.
1882 - G.64. Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants at Cape 
Town, East London and the Knysna area, for the year 1881.
1883 - G.79. Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants at Cape 
Town, East London and the Knysna area, for the year 1882.
1884 - G.58. Report of the Superintendent of Immigrants at Cape 
Tcwn, East London and the Knysna area, for the year 1883.
1885 - G.2. (Report of the) Immigration Agent, Cape Town, to the 
Cctimissicner of Crown Tands and Public Works for 1884.
1879 - A. 26. Report of the Select Caimittee on the Supply of the 
labour Market.
1890 - A. 12. Report of the Select Carmittee on the Labour Question.
1892 - C.2. Report of the Select Committee on the Labour Question.
1893 - G.3993 Cape of Good Hope labour Conmission.
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d. Natal Legislature
Sessional Papers 1872, no. 12, "Report of the Select Cannittee 
into the introduction of native labourers from beyond the borders 
of the colony".
Sessional Papers 1874, no. 4, "Report of the Select Cannittee 
on the best means of introducing labourers from beyond the 
colony".
e. Mozambique, Customs Department
Estatistica das Alfandegas, 1884.
Estatistica das Alfandegas, 1899.
f. Periodicals and Newspapers
Bulletin de la Mission Suisse en Afrique du Sud. To 1900;
1910.
Bulletin de la Societe Neuchateloise de Geographie.
Boletim da Sociedade de Geografia de Lisboa.
L1 Afrique Explor§e et Civiliz§e. Monthly, Geneva. Numbers 
1 (1879-1880) to 14 (1893).
Chamber of Mines, Annual Reports, 1889-1897.
Missionary Herald. Proceedings of the American Board of 
Cannissioners for Foreign Missions. 1880 to 1883.
Canpte-rendu de la situation caimerciale et industrielle de la 
circanscription de Marseilles. Annual. 1873-1897.
Boletim Oficial de Mozambique.
g. Documentary Material Subsequently Published
M. and Mme. Paul Berthoud, Lettres Missionalres, 1873-1879. 
(Lausanne, 1900).
Berthoud, Ruth, Du Transvaal a Lourengo Marques: lettres de Mme 
R. Berthoud - Junod. (Lausanne, 1904).
Bleek, W.H.I. The Natal Diaries 1855-1856. (ed.) O.H. Spohr. 
(Cape Town, 1965).
Theal, G.M. Records of South-east Africa. Vols. 1-9.
Webb, C. de B. and Wright, J. (eds.) James Stuart Archive.
Vols. I-III.
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Ccmissao Organizadora. Mouzinho: Govemador de Lourengo Marques. 
(Lourengo Marques, 1956).
Santana, F. Documentagao avulsa Mogambicana do Arquivo Histdrico 
Ultramarino, Vol. I (Lisbon, 1964); Vol. II (Lisbon, 1967).
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